Louisiana Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana VS KCS Holdings I, Inc. (2013CA1479 Consolidated With 2013CA1480 2013CA1481)

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT N[.11v1BER 2013 CA 1479 LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF LOUISIANA G C VERSUS j' ' KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. CONSOLIDATED WITH-- l c, 2013 CA 1480 SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. CONSOLIDATED WITH-- 2013 CA 1481 SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. Judgment Rendered: A 1 2D14 Appealed from the 19r'' Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Trial Court Numbers 618629, 618992 and 619011 The Honarable Todd Hernandez, 7udge Presiding i CZ'!/ r I i IG 11. P Aialu A Antonio C. Ferachi Attorneys for Appellant Brandea P. Averett Plaintiff Secretary of the Louisiana Frederick Mulhearn Department of Revenue, State of Johnette L. Martin Louisiana Jason M. DeCuir Donald M. Bowman Adrienne D. Quillen Kimberly Doley Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee Jolui W. Colbert Barry Defendant KCS Holdings I, Inc. W. Ashe Daniel7. Walter New Orleans, Louisiana BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., WELCH, AND CRAIN, JJ. 2 CRAIN, J. The Louisiana Department of Revenue ( Department) appeals a judgment of the district court dismissing its petition for judicial review and application for supervisory writs that challenged an interlocutory order entered by the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals ( BTA) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Department also appeals the district court' s dismissal of its petition for a declaratory judgment seeking a ecree that the taxpayer is statutarily precluded from seeking a refund under either of two statutes relied upon by the taxpayer. We affirm. BACKGROUND The facts forming the basis far this appeal are not disputed by the parties. KCS Holdings Delaware. I, Inc., is a fareign corporation arganized under the laws of In 2008, KCS remitted an estimated tax payment of $85, 000. 00 with its application for an automatic extension of time to file a Louisiana Corporation Income and Franchise Tax Return far the taac period 7anuary 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008. On November 14, 2008, KCS filed its return in which it calculated its franchise tax to be $ 79, 755. 00 and requested that the overpayment of 5, 245. 00 be credited to the following year. By letter dated December 21, 2011, KCS filed an amended 2008 Franchise tax return with the Department and requested that the Department refund the 2008 franchise taxes it paid pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1621, which authorizes the Department to refund tax overpayments ( sometimes referred to as " the refund claim"). hereafter KCS asserted that it had no franchise tax nexus with Louisiana in 2008 and therefore was not subject to the franchise tax under I7TELCOM, Inc. v. Bridges, 10- 0654 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 12/ 11), 77 So. 3d 39, writ denied, 11- 2632 ( La. 3/ 2/ 12), 83 So. 3d 1046. 3 Pursuant to Louisiana Revased Statut " 7: 14£31, KCS also filed a petition with the BTA on December 27, 2011 against Cynthia Bridges in her capacity as the Department' s Secretary and the State of Louisiana, seeking to recover the same 2008 franchise taYes ( sometimes hereafter referred to as the " claim against the In the petition, KCS asserted that under the UTELCOMdecision, it did not State"). owe the 2008 franchise tax because it had no Franchise tax nexus with Louisiana. The Department denied KCS' s refund claim, asserting that the amounts paid by KCS were not refundable under any provision of Louisiana law. The Department advised KCS that it may have an alternative cause of action to recover taxes, interest, or penalties it may have overpaid by following the procedure for a claim against the State. KCS then filed a petition in the BTA appealing the denial of its refund claim. The BTA consolidated that appeal with KCS' s pending claim against the State. l The Department filed exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action relative to the refund claim. The exceptions were based on the Department' s contention that KCS' s sole remedy to recover taxes it had voluntarily paid was a claim against the State. The Department asserted that KCS has no right or cause of action for a refund claim because subpart F of Section 1621 precIuded the issuance of a refund. Section 1621F states that "[ t his Section shall not be construed to authorize any refund of a tax overpaid through a mistake of law arising from the misinterpretation by the secretary of the provisions of any law or of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." The provision further provides that if a taxpayer believes that the secretary has misinterpreted the law, his remedy is to either pay the tax under protest and sue to recover, or appeal to the BTA when such Although KCS' s refund claim and the State claim were consolidated before the BTA, the State claim is not at issue in this appeal. 4 an appeal T'he Department argued that because there had been a lies. determination in UTELCOM that the secretary misinterpreted the law, the overpayment was based upon that misinterpretation, and KCS' s refund claim was entirely based issuance of on a the ' TELCOM d cision, then subpart F applies and prohibits the refund. Regarding the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rihe Department argued that because Section 1621F prohibits the Department from issuing a refund, the BTA iacked jurisdiction to hear the refund claim and to order the Department to issue a refund. The BTA denied the Department' s exceptions, finding that while Section 1621F inay prohibit the Department from making a refund in this case, it does not prohibit the BTA from making a refund. The BTA also overruled one of its earlier decisions where it held that Section 1621 could not be used to refund taxes paid, but not under protest, where a mistake of law arose due to a misinterpretation by the Department of either the law or the regulations promulgated thereunder. The BTA concluded that Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1625 provided the right to appeal the Department' s denial of KCS' s refund request and that Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1407 confirms the BTA' s jurisdiction to hear KCS' s appeal of the Department' s denial of its claim for a refund.2 Following the denial of the Deparhnent' s exceptions, the Department filed a petition for judicial review in the Nineteenth 7udicial District Court. The Departrnent alleged that the BTA committed sixteen errors, most of which were based upon its claim that the BTA erred in determining that Section 1621F does not prohibit KCS from obtaining a refund from the Department, and in refusing to 2 Section 1407 gives the BTA jurisdiction over all matters relating to appeals for the redetexmination of assessments, or for the determination of overpaymenYs, as provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes 47: 1431 tl rough 1438, and all mat[ers relating to claims against the state as provided for in Louisiana Revised Statutes 47: 1481 47: 1407( 1) and ( 4). 5 through 47: 1486. La. R. S. find that the claim against the State is xFze s le remedy for recovering the tax overpayment. The Department also filed an applicat on for supervisory- writs in the district court asserting that all c f the factors required for the exerc ise of supervisory jurisdiction as set forth in Herlitz ConstPUC2ior Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inca, 396 Sa 2d $ 78 ( Lae 1981), are mat in t1 is case. In the writ application the Department again challenged the BTA' s interpretation of Section 1621F, arguing that it prohibited the secretary from issuing a refund, and the BTA from ordering the secretary to issue a refund. In addition to its petirion for judicial review and writ application, the Department filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the district court. The petition described in detail KCS' s attempts to recover the alleged tax overpayment, including the refund claim, based upon UTELCOM, and requested that the district court declare that Section 1621F prohibits the Department from issuing a refund when a court has ruled that a regulation promulgated by the secretary impermissibly expanded the imposition of the tax (i. e., the secretary misinterpreted the scope of voluntarily the paid statute); in and thereafter, a taxpayer requests a refund of the tax accordance with that misinterpretation. The petition further requested a declaration that this prohibition is absolute and may not be circumvented by an order of an administrative board, court or other authority. The Department alleged that it is currently evaluating dozens of refund claims, and there are over one hundred cases pending before the BTA involving appeals of the Secretary' s denial of a claim for refund or a claim against the State that are based on facts similar to those presented in this case. The Department contends that a determination of these questions by the cotu-ts will provided needed guidance relative to the authority of the Department to issue refunds or the BTA to order such refunds. 6 By the consent of the parYies, the Depaafinent' s appeal, writ application and petition for a declaratory judgment wer eonsolidated in the district court. KCS then filed exceptions of lack of subjeci matter jurisdiction and lis pendens arguing that the district court lacked appellate jurisdictien to rzview an interlocutory ruling of BTr, the an administrative body- KCS coniended that the principles of separation of pawers prechzded tihe district eourt from xerci ing jurisdiction and supervising the ongoing aciivitizs of a body of the executive branch of government. KCS further characterized the Department' s petition for declaratory relief as being an attempt to oircumvent Louisiana' s prohibition on judicial review of interlocutory decisions of an administrative body, and argued that the statutoiy procedure for appealing decisions of the BTA is the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review. KCS also stated that all of the requirements for sustaining its exception of lis pendens were met. KCS' s exception of subject matter jurisdiction was granted as to all of the consolidated actions, with the district court finding that it lacked appellate, supervisory, dismissing or all declaratory judgment jurisdiction. three actions with prejudice. that it did not reach the merits of the A judgment was signed The district court specifically noted xception of lis pendens. The Department appealed and asserts that the dist[ ict co zrt erred in declining to find that it had jurisdiction. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authoriry of a tribunal to adjudicate a particular matter involving the legal relations of the parties and to grant the relief to which the parties are entitled. La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1 and 2; City of Denham Springs v. Perkins, 08- 1973 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 27/ 09), 10 So. 3d 311, 318, writ 0871 ( La. 5113I09), denied, 09- 8 So. 3d 568. The Louisiana Consritution prov7des that district courts have " original jurisdiction" of all civil 7 aYF oriiec b} tl e c,: ist:iution or except as provided by matters except as other uis law for administrative La. Const. art. e a ay d t sni: afiox s i vori er' s corrapensation matters. d strict cour Ys con iderEd ro have V, § 16. , eneral jurisdiction unless it has b eax s cifieally denied, City cf d) enharr S rings, 1 J Sm. 3d at 318. Further, a district, court shall ha e appelYate juri ciiction as provi ed y iaw. La. V § 16jB). Const. art. district court' s The r_ atazxe. f tri reli f demanded is det rnninative of a jurisdiction. City of Denham Springs, 10 So. 3d at subject matter 318. The Louisiana constitution vests the power of taYation in the legislature and mandates that it provide a complete and adequate remedy for the recovery of an illegal tax paid obligation, the State by a taYpayer. the legislature under La. Const. provides Section 1481, ( three art. VII, §§ 1 remedies and 3( A). To fulfill this to taapayers: ( 1) a claim against 2) payment under protest pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1576, and ( 3) a request for a refund under Section 1621. Further, the legislature created the BTA to act as an appeal board to hear and decide questions of law and fact arising from dzsputes or controversies between taxpayers and the collector of revenue. La. R.S. 47: 1401. In performing its factfinding function and applying the la, the BTA acts as a trial court. St. Martin v. State, 09- 0935 ( La. 12/ 1/ 09), 25 So. 3d 736, 740. Thus, jurisdiction to resolve taX- related disputes is constitutionally and statutorily granted to the BTA, which is authorized to hear and decide disputes and render judgments. St. Martin, 25 So. 3d at 741. Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1625 provides far appeals from the Department' s denial of a refund claim, and vests the BTA with jurisdiction to determine the orrect amount of the tax for the period in controversy and to render judgment ordering the refunding or crediting or any overpayrt ent or the payment of any additional tax, interest, and penalty found to be due." 8 Appellate Jurisdicti n The procedure for obtainir.g judici l review of a judgment of the BTA is set forth in Louisiana Revised Statute 47: 1434, which states that "[ a] fter a decision or judgment district of the boar, court... f the coilector ar the taa ayer may...file a petition with the r review c f th s id deciaion or judgment of [he board." The district court has e clusive juri d'zctio n ta z evi_ decisions ar judgments of the ew board. La. R.S. 14: 1435. l, e district court' s jurisdiction rn reviewing decisions hi by the BTA is appellate in nature. Clark v. State ofLouisiana, 02- 1936 ( La. App. 1 Cir. ll28/ 04), 873 So. 2d 32, 36, writ denied, 04- 452 ( La. 4/ 23/ 04), 870 So. 2d 300. Louisiana Cade of Civil Procedure article 2083 provides that appealable judgments are: ( 1) " final" judgments in all causes in which appeals are given by law; and ( 2) interlocutory judgments only when expressly provided by law. The Department contends that the BTA' s judgment denying its exceptions is an appealable judgment because there is no requirement or condition in Section 47: 1434 that the decision of the BTA be a final decision or a judgment on the merits. It points out that the legislature exempted the Board of Tax Appeals from many of the provisions of the Ad ninistrative Procedure Act ( APA), including Louisiana Revised Statute 49: 951( 3); which defines a " decision or order" as " the whole or part of any final disposition." See I a, R.S. 49: 951 and 49: 967A. It also points out that the A A gives a person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order a right to judicial review. The Departnient submits that since the legislature did not apply the limitations af the' APA' s judicial review provision to the BTA, it must have intended that judicial review of BTA decisions not be limited as provided in the APA. KCS contends that a district court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review an interlocutory decision that is part of the executive branch of government. It urges 9 that this conclusion is compelled by the decisions in Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 01- 0185 ( La. 10/ 16/ 01), 797 So. 2d 656, and Franklin Press, Inc. v. MclVamaNa, 479 So. 2d 657 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1985). We agree. In Franklin Press, a taxpayer filed a petition with the BTA contesting a portion of a tax assessment by the Department. The Department filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction which was overruled by the BTA. The Department appealect that ruling to the district court. The district court dismissed the appeal after finding that the BTA' s ruling was interlocutory and not appealable absent a showing of irreparable injury. The Department appealed to this court. This court held that because BTA' s decision denying the exception of subject matter jurisdiction was not final, but was interlocutory in nature, the judgment was not appealable absent a showing of irreparable harm, and the Department did not prove it would suffer irreparable harm. This court concluded that the Department had no right to appeal the interlocutory judgment to the district court and did not have a right to have this court address the merits of its appeaL It was noted that Section 1435 mandates that appeals of rulings of the BTA shall be " in accordance with law" and that the legislation establishing the BTA gave no indication that the rules regarding appeals of interlocutory judgments should not apply to those proceedings. Franklin Press, 479 So. 2d at 657- 658 3 In Metro Riverboat, the Louisiana Gaming Control Board conditionally approved the transfer of an ownership interest in a gaming license from one corparation to a yet-to- be- formed corporation. Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc., 3 Although Franklin Press recognized that interlocutory judgments causing ineparable harm are appealable, the case was decided before the legislature amended Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2083 in 2005 to provide that interlocutory judgments are appealable only when expressly provided by legislation such as Artiole 3612 ( injunctions) or Article 592 ( class actions). La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 2083, comment ( a). Thus, the interlocutory ruling denying the Department' s exceptions is not an appealable judgment under Article 2083. See Land v. Vidrine, 10- 1342 ( La. 3/ 15/ 11), 62 So. 3d 36, 41 ( stating that with respect to venue rulings, which are threshold inquiries, litigants are required to seek review via supervisory writs). IO which held an o n rship interest za the lic rR ee, txi d a etition 1ii h di trict court Gamin. challenging the aard' s resolutic n canciir or aily apF rovin the transfer and its failure to riQld a public heari ig at NI Yro I verb at' s request. The gaming law vested a pellate jurisdiction in the district court over " any decision" of the gaming board. La. IL. S. 27: 26 Thz supreme cc u rt noted thaf a cursory reading of the gaming statates' judicial r: view pr visaorf, ; ould lead to the conclusion that the district court obtains appellat , nrisdi tion over any decision f the board at any in any proceeding. point However, the court concluded that such a literal interpretation would produce absurd results and raise constitutional separation of powers issues. It pointed out that alIowing an appeal of any decision of the board could result in piecemeal appeals and an overwhelming burden on the courts, could constitute an infringement on the administrative process, and would undoubtedly disrupt the functioning of both the courts and the administrative agency. To avoid the absurd results caused by a literal interpretation of the judicial review provision and to eliminate the potential constitutional problems resulting therefrom, the court read those provisions in conjunction with the judicial review provisions of the APA, particular judicial review adjudication y Louisiana Revised Statut is available proceeding;" when the APA. is a " whiih provides that final deci ion or oxder in an and the pravisions of the gaming Iaw provzdirzg that hearings and appeals from decisions with there 49 9E4A( 1), f the board s lould he har died in aci;ordance See La. R.S. 27:25B; La. R.S. 27: 89 ( prior to its repeal by 2001 La. Acts No: 1222, § 2). The caurt held that appeals could oixly be taken from a final decision or order of the board in an adjudication proceeding. Because it was undisputed that there had been no " final" adjudication by the Gaming Board, the court held that the district court could not obtain appellate jurisdiction over the case. Metro RiverboatAssociates, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 661- 662. 11 In acc rdan a with Fr arakdira . Pr ¬ss me ! ztro Riverb ut, we hold that a district court' s app Il te ju risdict or aznder , oa i3ian Revised Statute 47: 1434 over a " decision ox or r" of the BTA, extend only to ``fzrAa" decisiqns or orders by the BTA. t3 exceptiUn ed'ias iE is as a a.t rlc>;utory dismissed Yhe 1 iaY anciis in d t rp.at ar, iitian epartrsiexit' s : aY eh w; u metit c: nyin: rh I e; arrrnent' s Ra xa that the disi, bc cc.urt cc? ectly fuz iu i3c:aat retiie; usader °: tson 143 4 fbr lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Supervisory Jurisdiction Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2201 provides that "[ s] upervisory writs may be applied for and granted in accordance with ihe constitution and rules of the supreme court and other courts exercising appellate jurisdiction." Additionally, A ticle V § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[ a] judge may issue writs`of habeas corpus and all needful writs, other orders, and process in aid of the jurisdiction of his court . . , ." The Departmient challenges the ruling that the district conrt lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Departm nt' s appIication £or a supervicQry writ. It relies on Realty Mart; Inc. v, Louisiara Board of Tax Ap ead:s, 336 So. 2d 52 La. App. 1 Cir. 1976), wher2in this court upheld a ruling by zhe district court setting aside an order of the BTA that dir. cted the plaintiff to answer e interrogatories propounded by the tax collectur. The Department notes that there is no question that a discovery order is interiocutory in nature and thai Realty Mart has never been overruled. Louisiana Inc:, 03- 09 47 ( La. The I epartment also cites Green v. l inn- Dixie ap. l Cir. 81 15! 03), 859 So. 2d 1 53, i whick this court held thaY a district court has urisdicYion to issue supervisory writs as " needful writs" in the aicl of its jurisd3cti r. KCS argues that the issue of whether a district court has supervisory jurisdiction U er the rulings of an administrative body is controlied by I Ietro 12 Riverboat. In ' l fetro Riv rboczt`, + Yiile reco ra.izir xhat the district court lacked appellate juri daetion to coa sid r tl.e s-u z i ox the adnainistrative b dy, this court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and co siderzd the merits of the decision of the administrativ ody. urisdiction _} supervisory unacceptable The suprene co rt found that this court' s exercise of was encrc achment in up4n ppropriat, c ar noting executzve it that branch of would be " government." an Metro Riverboat Associ ztes, Inc., 797 So. 2d af 663. The supreme court held that once this court determined that the district court' s judgment vaeating the administrative body' s ruling was void for lack of appellate jurisdiction, there was nothing left to review, and the appeal to this court should have been dismissed. Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 663. While Metro Riverboat is factually distinguishable frorn the present case, which involves a request that a district court exer ise supervisory jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the risk of a violation of the separation of powers by an encroachment upon the authority of the executive branah is equally present. Consequently, we find that the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over admixiistrative proceedings is properly governed by the standards set forth by this court in In re Shintech, 98- 2024 ( La. App. 1 Cir: 3/ 31/ 99), 734 So. 2d 772, 774, writ denied, 99- 12f2 ( La. 6/ 25/ 99), 746 So. 2d 601, providing: Not everyrthing an agency does must be subject to the immediate availability of judicial review in order to insure the agency' s actron is va id: The right' to judicial scrutiny exists when tliere is a claim of deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or tfie assertion that agency a tion exceeds constitutional authority. The right to judicial scrutiny also exists to determine if actions of administrative agencies are in e cess oftheir legislative grant of authoriry. Citations omitted.) These limits on the judiciary' s supervisory jurisdiction over executive branch administrative proceedings mitiimize the risk of an unacceptable encroachment upon the executive branch. The Department' s application for supervisory writs neither asserts a claim of deprivation of a constitutionally 13 protected right, nor contends that an a nGy exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority; therefore, . the triai c urk corrEetly ciismissed the application for supervisory ivrits ased upon a lacl uf subje t xmat[ rjuris licti n. Declar zt- r-t° Jur mer t A; tio Louisiana C' de of : iv; I '? cs edute rticle 1 71 aaathorizc;s tta.e judicial declaration of" i, htis, status; nd c ther l gai r fl tpons u h k ter cza not fur her relief is or could be claimed." The actiUn for a declaratory judgment simply functions to establish the rights of the parties or express the opinion of the court on a question of law Safety without and ordering that anything be done. Corrections, 11- 1282 ( La. App. Code ro. Department of Public 1 Cir. 10124/ 12), 103 So. 3d 1ll8, 1126- 27, writ denied, 12- 251 6 ( La. 1/ 23/ 13), 105 Sa 3d 59. In its petition far a declaratory judgment, the Department is seeking a declaration that Section 1621F prohibits the Department from issuing a refund when a court has ruled that a regulation promulgated by the secretary impermissibly ex anded the imposition of the tax (i.e., the secretary misinterpreted the scope of the voluntarily paid statute); and thereafter, a taxpayer requests a refund of the tax in accordance with that misinterpretation. The petition further reqnested a declaration that this prohibition is absolute and may not be circumvented by an order of an administrative board; court ar other authority. These are the same arguments advanced by the Department befQre the BTA in support of its exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to KCS' s refund claim. The Department maintains that the petition for a declaratory judgment is an independent and separate cause of action falling under the original jurisdiction of the district court. It asserts that the allegatiQns of its petition relate to th existence of an actu l, bona fide, present dispute over the construction and/ or interpretation of the tax laws, namely Section 1621F. 14 The Department also claims that it is h termination ora t: seeking a d: artrr I ep; ent:' tt: l:t. r s arding the enfor ement and administratian of tihe tax 1a vs, speci L l]_ ttA De artmen.Y' s legal authority to y, issue refunds pursuan. t to Section 1 21 hen sub jart F' is triggered. The Department ins sts that such deci rations are e sential to the collei;tor' s statutory duty to " adrnznisY the legisflat v mandates" vvi hin Tiile 47, It posits tltgat the fact that there is a matter before the BTA does not deprive the district aourt of its original jurisdiction to deterrtiine what the law is through a declaraXory judgment. KCS argues that the Department is precluded from using a reqaest for declaratory relief to circumvent Louisiana' s prohibition against appealing non- final decisions of an administrative board. It points out that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1871 recites that declaratory relief is not precluded " in cases where it is appropriate." According to KCS, thzs language evinces the legislature' s intention that declaratory relief not be available in every type of action. It cites Gulotta v. Cutshaw, 258 So. 2d 555, 558 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1972), rev' d on other grounds, 283 Sa 2d 482 ( La. 1973), where this court stated that it is settled jurisprudence that a litigant is not entitled to institute an action far declaratory judgment as a matter of right. KCS also cites a ease from another state in support of the general proposition that " jurisdicti n of a declaratory judgment actzon will not be entertained if there is pending at the tim.e of th commencem nt of the declaratory action another action or proceeding to which the same persons are parties; iri which are involved and may be adjudicated the identical issues that are involved in the declaratory actio." and v. Feltch, 669 P.2d 404, McRae &. 1)eL` 405 ( Utah 1 9$ 3) ( quoiing 1 W. Anderson, Actions for'Declaratory Jutlgmenrs § 209, at 447 ( 2d ed. 1951 and Supp. 1959)). KC su mits that the district cot rt correctly applied this general rule in dismissing the Department' s declaratory judgment petition. 15 fihis court has previous z 7e i that a cii, 4 ict court lacks ori inal jurisdiction to consider the merits of :.ai s pendirig hefor l 873 So. 2d at he Bc? of Tax . ppeals. Clark, ard n the pr sent c se tt e De arnmemt' s petition seeks a ruling on 36. the merits ai"iYs delFer=_ tkiat Sec c>r 162I1'r p vhik its th Sec retary from issuing a se refun w Secretary aere the of a } a'< 7 civer isic f ayrnetzt n a f ar}' axes eaut aris t a. misizzcerpr tatic n by the c x + f the tv les and re ula< r!. ii s la rornulgated thereunder. The Departmerit asszrted t+ same defense an opposrtion to the claim iis filed by KCS with the Board of Tax Appeal. As this court recognized in Clark, the substance of Sections 1434- 36 clearly establishes that distriet courts' jurisdiction in judicial review of decisions of the Board is appellate in Clark, 873 So. 2d at 36. nature." The existence of a specific statutory procedure generally implies a legislative intent that the special statutory procedure be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in the situations to which it applies. Met o Riverboat 4ssociates, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 660. Thus, " the trial court Iacks original jurisdictaon to consider the merits of plaintiffs' claims, as disti guished from the t'egality or constitutionaiity of the procedurai mechanisms for assertion of those l ims." Clark, 873 So. 2ci at 36 (; mphasis in original). The Department' s request far a declaratory _ judgment concerning the merits of its defense to the refund claimrequires an interpretation o Sec,tion 1621, but it does not involve a challenge to the statute' s legality or constitutionality. The Department is simply attempting to lttigate the merits of KCS' s claim in district court, as a court of original jurisdictYOn; rather than before the Board of Tax Appeals, which is the proper body vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over the elaim. Se,e C`lark, 873 So. 2d at 36. liuhough til e Departm:exit st} les its petitiion as a requesY fur deelaratory relief that invokes tha original jurisdiction of the district court9 our courts have 16 consi5tently rej cted "; ernanr ic er a- ties ivho att mpt to circumvent deavors" b an administrativ ager cy' original r xisdict on_L y faling a petition in district court. See Daily Adver tiser So. 2d 7, L7 ( Louisira ca . a. v. T y93); ans- La; er avisicrt of Atmos Energy Cotporation, 612 Bass v. D art nenfi f'Pu hli Sufen t?n' C`urrections, Stezte f'enatentiaa; 94- 974 ( I.. e p. 1 ir. 5,' S! 9S), 6 S_ 2d 55, 457; Raborn v. Io, iisiana Hec lth and f umc Ya Re.sou,NCes Aclrrain strEataon, 349 So. 2d 903, 904 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1977), writ g anted, 351 So. 2d 175 ( La. 1977). Because the Board is vested with original jurisdiction over the merits of KCS' s claims, the trial court correctily sustained the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for declaratory judgment. CONCLL'SION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jucigment sustaining the objection raising the exception of lack of sub ect maiter jurisdiction and dismissing the Department' s petition for judicial review, appiication for supervisory writs, and petition for declaratory judgment. Costs of this appeal in the arnount of$ 2, 888. 00 are assessed to the Louisiana Department of Revenue. AFFIRMEA 17 NO. 2013 CA 1479 LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENLJE, STATE OF LOUISIANA FIRST CIRCUIT VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSOLIDATED JITH-- NO. 2013 CA 1480 SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENiJE, STATE OF LOUISIANA FIRST CIRCUIT ` VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSOLIDATED WITH-- NO. 2013 CA 1481 SECRETARY, LOLTISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENLJE, STATE OF LOUISIANA FIRST CIRCLTIT VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL KCS HOLDINGS I, INC. STATE OF LOUISIANA WELCH, J., agreeing in part, concurring in Part, and dissenting in part. I agree that the trial court correctly dismissed the Department' s petition for judicial review under La. R. 5. 47: 1434 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I disagree that the district court properly granted the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the application for supervisory writs; however, because I conclude that the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not warranted under the circumstances of this case, I would affirm the dismissal of the Department' s application for supervisory writs. Lastly, I find that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked " declaratory judgment jurisdiction," and I would remand that action to the district court and order it to stay the matter pending the conclusion of the administrative adjudication in the Board f Tax Appeals ( BTA). First, I do not believe that In re Shintech, 98- 2024 ( La. App. 151 Cir. 3/ 31/ 99), 734 So. 2d 772, 7749 writ denied, 99- 1262 ( La. 6/25199), 746 So. 2d 601, ar the jurisprudence of this state commands a finding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider an application for supervisory review of an interlocutory ruling of an administrative bod, unless a claim of the deprivation of a y constitutionally protected right or a claim that an administrative agency exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority is present. In fact, In re Shintech squarely supports the position that a district court does have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an application for supervisory writs challenging an administrative agency' s ruling. In In re Shintech, during the course of a permitting action, a citizens group filed a motion to recuse various Department of Environmental Quality officials from the permitting process. Following the denial of their motion, the group filed an application for supervisory writs in the 19t" Judicial District Court. The district court concluded that it had supervisory jurisdiction under La. C. C. P. art 2201 and issued an order to DEQ to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the recusal was appropriate. DEQ sought supezvisory relief with this court. In analyzing the propriety of the district court' s action, this court began from the premise that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the application for supervisory writs incident to the court' s appellate jurisdiction. In so ruling, this court cited La. C.C.P. art. 2201, which provides that "[ s] upervisory writs may be applied for and granted in accordance with the constitution and rules of the supreme court and other courts cited La. Const. Art. V, § writs, orders and process exercising appellate jurisdiction." This court also 2, which provides that " a judge may issue... all needful in aid of the jurisdiction of his court ... ." However, this court found that it was imprudent for the district court to exercise its supervisory 2 jurisdiction at that juncture of the permit approval process because there was no basis far the exercise of a district court' s supervisory jurisdiction. In re 5hintech, 734 So. 2d at 774. While I am mindful that the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by a district court over proceedings conducted by an administrative tribunal may raise separation of powers concerns,' such issues should be decided on a case-by-case basis rather than by a bright-line rule adopted by the majority. And although there may be some cases in which the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by a district court over an administrative tribunal may be appropriate, this case simply is not one of them. Granting the Department' s application that challenges KCS' s 1621 refund claim will not terminate the administrative adjudication because there is a pending 1481 refund claim to be adjudicated by the BTA. Additionally, while the Department is essentially challenging the BTA' s construction of a statute, it has a remedy to challenge that ruling by filing a petition for judicial review at the conclusion of the tax adjudication proceeding. Moreover, the BTA may determine that KSC is not entitled to a refund on its 1621 claim, which would moot the issues raised in the application far supervisory review. Thus, I conclude that the factars identified by the supreme court in Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, 396 So. 2d 878 ( La. 1981), which warrant the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, are not present in this case. Because I find that the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction would be imprudent under the facts of this case, I would affirm the dismissal of the Department' s application for supervisory writs on that basis. Further, I find that the allegations of the Department' s petition challenging the BTA' s interpretation of a statute in its petition for a declaratory judgment See Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiaoa Gaming Board, 2001- 4185 ( La. 10/ 16/ 01), 797 So.2d 656, 663. 3 invoked the original jurisdiction of the d" rstrict ourt. The district court' s original jurisdiction is conferred by the Louisiana Constitution and not by statute. Piazza' s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 20G7- 2191 ( La. App. 15` Cir. 12/ 23/ 08), 6 So. 3d 820, 826. District courts have original _ jurisdiction over all civil matters except as otherwise authorized by the constitution or except as provided by law for agency determinations administrative Const. in workers' compensation matters. La. V, § 16. art. I do not believe that this court' s decision in Clark v. State, 2002- 1936 ( La. App. 15` Cir. 1/ 28/ 04), 873 So. 2d 32, writ denied, 2004- 0452 ( La. 4/ 23/ 04), 870 So. 2d 300, mandates a finding that the district court lacked original subject matter jurisdiction over the DepartmenYs declaratory judgment action challenging the BTA' s interpretation of a statute. That case stands for the proposition that a district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a taxpayer' s request for a refund based on theories set forth in the Civil Code because the legislature has established exclusive statutory procedures for seeking a refund and because the district court' s jurisdiction to review the merits of a BTA ruling is appellate" in nature. However, in matters of statutory interpretation, it is clear that no deference to an administrative body' s interpretation of statutes and judicial decisions is owed by a court. Instead, on legal issues, a district court gives no weight to the findings of the administrative body; it is free to make its own determination of the legal meaning of appropriate statutes and conducts a de novo review of questions of law and renders judgment on the record. Bowers v. Firefighters' Retirement System, 2008- 126$ ( La. 3/ 17/ 09), 6 So. 3d 173, 176; Twin B. Casinos, Inc. v. State ex rel. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 20001681 ( La. App. ls` Cir. 9/ 28/ O1), 809 So. 2d 995, 999. Thus, when reviewing an issue involving an administrative entity' s statutory interpretation, the district court 4 is not exercising appellate jurisdiction, but is exercising its constitutionallyendowed original subject matter jurisdiction. I find, therefore, that while the BTA may have original jurisdiction over the merits of KSC' s refund claim, it does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of statutory interpretation. At best, on issues of statutory interpretation arising during the course of a refund proceeding, the BTA and the district court have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, I find that the district court erred in granting the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the declaratory judgment action. However, I believe that it is inappropriate for the district court to exercise its original subject matter jurisdiction while there is an ongoing tax adjudication in the BTA. It is my opinion that the proper procedural disposition of this issue is to stay the declaratory judgment proceeding in the district court pending the conclusion of the administrative adjudication in the BTA between KCS and the Department under this court' s inherent authority to render " any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal." La. C. C.P. art. 2164. For these reasons, I would affirm the dismissal of the petition for judicial review and the application for supervisory writs. I would reverse the judgment dismissing the petition for a declaratory jud nent far lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but would stay resolution of the issues raised therein until the administrative proceedings have been concluded. 5

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