State Of Louisiana VS Cory Cordell Bridges
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NO. 2013 KA 0658 STATE OF LOUISIANA r 1 ,: VERSUS COREY CORDELL BRIDGES Judgment Rendered: December 27, 2013 X '% ' X ' iC ' X % ' JC JC Appealed from the 21st Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana Case No. 25440 The Honorable Robert H. Morrison, III, Judge Presiding ic k x a4 t k ie : Scott M. Perilloux Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee D State of Louisiana strict Attorney Patricia Amos Assistant District Attorney Amite, Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Thibodaux, Louisiana Corey Cordell Bridges x * x * x * t * BEFORE: KUHN, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND THERIOT, JJ. THERIOT, J. The defendant, Corey Cordell Bridges, was charged by bill of information with aggravated battery, in violation La. R. S. 14: 34. of The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The defendant waived his right to a trial by jury and was found guilty as charged after a bench trial.' The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment at hard labor and denied the defendant' s subsequent motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant appeals, assigning enor to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence. STATEMENT OF FACTS On December 29, 2009, prior to the offense, Mary Bridges ( the mother of the defendant and the codefendant) visited her cousin Linda Lee the victim) because she wanted to resolve the turmoil between her granddaughter, Taniesha Bridges, and the victim' s granddaughter, Kia Lee. The ladies agreed that since the two girls were cousins they should not be fighting and the victim told Bridges that she would bring her granddaughter to Bridges' s home later and help persuade the to girls reconcile. That afternoon another altercation involving the girls took place at a sporting event. The instant offense occurred when several members of the Lee family went to Mary Bridges' s home located at 25535 Pardue Road in Springfield, around 9: 00 p. m. on the night of December 19, 2009. When the victim arrived at the home to resolve the dispute, several people were there, including the two girls involved in the fight, Mary Bridges, the codefendant, The trial court ordered that the defendanYs case be consolidated with the codefendant Tony D. Bridges ( the defendanYs codefendant was found not guilty. brother) for 2 purposes of the bench tria1. The and the defendant. As soon as more of the victim' s family arrived, a physical altercation ensued in the road vay in front of the residence between several members of instructed Mary the two families. Bridges to ca11 Wtaen the fighting started, the victim the police. As the vi tim attempted to restrain her grandson, K nan Lee, the deferadant hit her in the back of her head with a board. The victim tivas still trying to restrain her grandson when she received another blow to the head. After the police and an ambulance arrived, the victim was transported to North Oaks Hospital where she received staples and stitches in her head. The victim testified that she went to Mary Bridges' s home in an attempt to have the grandchildren talk things out. She further stated that her grandchildren and her daughter, Latonya Lee Lloyd, knew she was going to Bridges' Mary s home and followed her there in separate vehicles. The physical altercation started after her grandson Kenan exited the vehicle and asked members sister?" of the Bridges family, "[ W] hy did ya' ll double team my The victim was trying to hold back her grandson when she was hit in the head. She turned around and looked back and saw the defendant with the board in his hand. She didn' t look back to see who hit her when she received the second blow to the head. have a gun. To her knowledge, Kenan did not In confirtnation and explanation of her claim in her police statement that the defendant hit her when he was attempting to hit Kenan, during cross- examination the victim testified, "[ S] omeone said if I wouldn' t have been in the way, I wouldn' t have got a Iick; Kenan would have got it." She testified that her grandson did not pose a threat to anyone and that she held him back the whole time. Latonya Lee Lloyd, who was the victim' s daughter, testified that while sisters Raneisha and Taneisha Bridges were fighting with Kia, the 3 defendant hit her mother in the head with a two-by- four-inch board and that the codefendant hit her mother in the head with a small iron pipe. She was standing near her mother at the time and the board hit her arm as it was going toward her mother' s head. She stated that her mother was trying to hold back Kenan to keep him from getting involved in the fight when she was hit in the heacl. Latonya confirmed that she kept a gun in her vehicle, that unbeknownst to her someone removed it, and that the police returned it to her after the incident was over. She further testified that Kenan did not have a gun, and that her mother was the only member of the Lee family who actually entered the yard of the Bridges residence to talk to Mary Bridges and that the others stayed in the roadway. During cross- examination, Latonya confirmed that she did not know who the defendant and the codefendant were swinging at and only knew that it was her mother who got hit in the head. Officers of the Livingston Parish Sheriff' s Office responded to the scene and also obtained written statements from the victim, Latonya Lee Lloyd, Kia Lee, and one unnamed statement presumably written by the victim' s grandson, Sedrick Lee. The statements were wholly consistent with the trial testimony. codefendant left the According to trial testimony, the defendant and the scene before the police arrived. After the crowd disbursed, Deputy Shawn Lang brought a gun to Deputy Todd Sutton. Regarding the gun, Detective Chuck Watts further testified that Mary Bridges was the only witness who mentioned it but only stated that it fell from the person of one of Linda Lee' s grandchildren and did not indicate that anyone waved it or used it in a threatening manner or in any other manner. Since none of the witnesses who were interviewed indicated that 4 the gun was somehow invoived in the ineident, the police returned it to the owner, Latonya Lee Lloyd, instead of collecting it as evidence. The defendant and codefendant testified at the trial along with two other defe se witnesses, the cadefendant' s ; vA_ Sharon Bridges, and their fe, mother, 1Vlary 3xidges. The codefendant nd the defendant testified that when they arrived at their mothtir' s lhouse, there was a large crowd arguing. The codefendant stated that Latonya got in her car when she saw them, and that no one was fighting at that point. The codefendant further stated that Kenan was waving a gun and added, " he never pointed it at me, but he was waiving [ sic] it like he wanted to use it." The codefendant hit Kenan when he saw him with the gun and at that point the gun fell, Kenan ran from him, and the girls started fighting. The codefendant further testified that he was unsure of who picked the gun up, but added that his mother ended up with it and gave it to the police when they arrived. He alsa stated that he did not know how the victim got hit in the head and that she was walking back toward the street from the Bridges yard when Kenan was wavang the gun. The defendant testified that after he and the codefendant arrived, the codefendant started fighting Kenan first, and then the defendant had a fight with Kenan. The defendant furtber explained that the girls were fighting and that he wanted to protect them from Kenan so he rushed him, adding that though he personally weighed 250 pounds, Kenan was much taller and wider. The defandant further stated that he was not focused on the others, specifically stating, " Well, as far as I was under the impression that a fight my focus was on Kenan. Cause he had unched my niece in the mouth at a basketball game and lrnocked her tooth loose. So Kenan was my target." When questioned as to what his fight with Kenan consisted of, the defendant stated that Kenan had a gun. Consistent with the codefendant' s 5 testimony, the defendant fuzther testified thaP I enan dropped the gun when he and the codefendant were fighting. After Kenar dropped the gun, the defendant picked up the gun and gave it to his sister-in-law, Sharon Bridges, and he and Kenan began to fistfght. The defendant then retrieved a " big long board" frorrz his yard { lc cated vitlu a close } roximit_ to his mother' s y yard} an hit Kenan once ; ath the board. When asked for clarification as to whether he actually hit Kenan with the board, the defendant stated, " I don' t lrnow. I just was swinging. It was dark." When specifically asked wh t he was trying to hit, the defendant stated that he was trying to hit Kenar. but confirmed that the victim was standing there at the time. The defendant specifically stated, " He' s you know his grandmother was standing there. He' s holding his grandmother in his way." The aefendant added that Kenan was swinging back at him at the time. The defendant testified that he was not trying to hit the victim and that he could not confirm ivlhether or nat he hit her and reiterated that his target was Kenan. The defendant further testified that he was at home when the police came and that his house was about twenty steps from his mother' s house. When fiuther questioned during cross- examination, the defendant stated that they were actually in his yard lhen he and Kenan were fighting and that he only had to go two feet or less to get the board. He again stated that they were fighting because he was told fhai Kenan punclied his niece in the mouth at the basketball game. The defendant was not present at the game and when questioned as to why he was fighting based on hearsay, he stated that Kenan was the biggest guy at his mother' s house and was a threat to his nieces. The defendant stated he lrnew the victim was trying to hold Kenan back but he just snapped and started swinging the board at him. The 6 defendant cor firmed that he was tz ing to hurt Kenan and also stated that he was, "[ t] rying to wear his body down." Sharon Bridges conizrmed that the defendant gave her the gun. She testified that she did not see the gr,n before the defzndant brought it to her. She then gave the gun to Mary Bridges. She ; Further stated that she was outside during a portion of the fight but onlv saw the gun in the defendant' s hand. Mary Bridges similarly testified that when the victim came over to talk about the fight that the kids had, her granddaughters came outside and the fighting ensued as she stood an her porch, and she did not see the gun until it was given to her by Sharon Bridges. Mary Bridges did not see the victim get hit and did not get a good view of the fighting. However, she specifically testified that she saw Kenan when he was " on the road fighting with them" and added that "[ t]hey was right otat in front of my house." ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In the sole assignment of error, the defendant contends that the evidence did not support beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed aggravated battery, The defendant specifically ar. ues that the evidence g established that his actions in defending bimself and his family were reasonable under the circumsta- ces. Contendir.g that the codefendant' s actions were justifiable due to Kenan`s possess: ori of a gun, the defendant argues that his actions were equally justifiable. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Code Crim. 7 P. 821; Jackson art. v. Virginia, ¬ 43 li.S: 3U7, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v. ,Iohnson, 461 So.2d 673, 674 ( La. App. lst Cir. 1984). In conducting this rev:Uw, we adsc must be expressly mindful of Louisiana°s circutnstantial ev: dence i, e., test, " assurning every fact to be proved that the evidexice tends to prova, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis Wright, 98- 0601 ( La. denied, 99- 0802 ( La. App. of innocence." 15: 438; State v. lst Cir. 2/ 19/ 99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs 10/ 29/ 99), 1 U17/ 00), 773 So. 2d 732. La. R.S. 748 So. 2d ll57 & 2000- 0895 ( La. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasdnably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 ( La, 1984). DI5CtiSSION The offense of aggravated batrtery- consists of the intentional use of force or violence, with a dange, ous weapc n, upon the person of another. State v. Howard, 94- 0(323 ( La. 6! 3! 94), 638 So. 2d 216, 217 ( per curiam); see also La. R. S. 1433 & La. R. S. 14: 34( A). A dangerous weapon is any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or 14: 2( A)(3). bodily harm likely to produce death or great bodily harm. La. R. S. Aggravated battery requires neither the infliction of serious nor the intent to inflict serious injury. Instead, the requisite intent element is general criminal zntent. See Howard, 638 So. 2d at 217. General criminal int0nt is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal 8 consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act." La. R. S. 14: 10( 2). In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts that have been declared criminal. State v. Payne, S40 So.2d 520, 523- 24 (La. App. lst Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 169 ( La. 1989). The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense ar trespass against property in a person' s lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense." La. R. S. 14: 19( A). " It is justifiable to use farce or violence ar to kill in the defense of another person when it is reasonably apparent that the person attacked could have justifiably used such means himself, and when it is reasonably believed that such intervention is necessary to protect the other person." La. R.S. 14: 22. In a non- homicide situation, a claim of self-defense requires a dual inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances, and second, a subjective inquiry into whether the force used was apparently necessary. State v. Willis, 591 So.2d 365, 370 ( La. App. lst Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 1316 ( La. 1992). A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from fhe conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows ar should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the Lonflict," La. R. S. 14: 2L In this case, the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of others, ee State v. Pizzalato, 93- 1415 ( La. App. lst Cir. 10/ 7/ 94), 644 So. 2d 712, 714, writ denied, 94- 2755 ( La. 3/ 10/ 95), 650 So. 2d 1174. 9 The trier af fact xs fre testimony of 6/ 29/ 98), 716 any to acc;ept or reject, in whole or in part, the State v. Drualher 97- 1i17 (La. App. 1 Cir. witness. So. 2d 422, 424. Moreovex, when there is conflicting testimony abeuY factual matters, Lhe xes dutis ri of which depends upon a determinatiorz of he weight of the redibilit;% tl e witnesses, the matter is one of the af evidene, not its sufficiency. Id. The trier of fact' s determination of the weight to be given is not subject to appellate review. State v. Clouature, 2012- 0407 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 14/ 12), ll0 So3d 1094, 1100. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a " thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give Mitchell, 99- 3342 ( La. 10/ 1?/ evidence in criminal cases. See State v. 0), 7?2 So.2d 78, 83. The fact that the record contains evidence which conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So. 2d 592, 596 ( La. App. lst C r: 19& 5). The defendant and the codefendar t were the only witnesses to testify that Kenan Lee had and brandished a gun. The other witnesses either specifically denied having seen Kenan with a gun or did not mention a gun at all. The vicYim indicated that sh was nearest to Kenan and she did not see him with a gun; She further stated tha she was restraining her grandson and that he did not hit anyr ne. Moreover, the defendant and the codefendant both agreed that Kenan did not have a gun in his possession when the defendant obtained the board and started swinging it. They both testified that the gun fell when Kenan and the codefendant were fighting, priar to the defendant' s involvement. While the codefendant was unsure who picked up the gun, the defendant specifically resolved that question when he testified that he picked up the gun at that point and gave it to Sharon Bridges who consistently testified that 10 the defendant gave her the gun. Based on the defendant' s own testimony, if Kenan ever had a gun, the d fendant knew he was disarmed and removed the gun from within his reach before committing the offense. Further, according to the codefendant, Kan n re treated after he was disarmed. The efendant' s own testimonv also s:hc w-ed that he intentionally used force or vYol nce with a dangerr us weap r. in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm in striking tne cictim in the head with a board. The defendant contends that the victim received the blow that was intended for Kenan. The law of transferred intent was explained by this court in another case similar to the instant case. See Druilet, 716 So. 2d at 424. In Druilhet, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery and, after a trial by jury, was found guilty of the responsive offense of second degree battery. In his claim that the evidence was insuffcient to support his conviction, the defendant in Druilhet argued that he lacked the intent necessary for a conviction of second degree battery because he meant to hit his brother and did not mean to lxit or cause serious injury Yo the victim. This court noted that under the theory of transfened intent, if the defendant possessed the necessary intent to inflict erious bodily injury when trying to hit his brother, but missed and accidentally hit sorneone else, such intent is transferred to the actual victim. Id. Similarly, in this cas, even if the defendant anly had the necessary intent in r gard to Kenan Lee, under the doctrine of transferred intent the evidence supports tHe aggravated battery conviction. Moreover, as stated above, aggravated battery is a general intent offense. The defendant testified that he knew that the victim was standing in the area where he started swinging the board that he described 11 as big and long. Thus, under the he circumstances, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act. CONCLUSION We cannot say that tha trial. court' s deiermination was i.rrational under the facts and Furthermor, cixcumstances p; esented.. Sa Ordodi, 946 So,2d at 662. an appellate ccurt ens by s b tituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 20072306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So3d 417, 418 ( per curiam). We are convinced that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to. the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements af aggravated battery. Due to the foregoing concluszons, the sale assignrr ent of errar lacks merit. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED. 12
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