Deidra Jones and Steve Jones VS Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Steve St. Romain
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2013 CA 0345 DEIDRA JONES AND STEVE JONES VERSUS BERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSiJRANCE COMPANY AND STEVEN ST ROMAIN DATEOFJUDGMENT NOV 01 201 ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SECOND NUMBER 2009 DNISION F PARISH OF ST TAMMANY 14408 STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE MARTIN E COADY JUDGE Mark W Smith New Counsel for Plaintiffs Appellants Deidra Jones and Steve Jones Orleans Louisiana Steven B Witman Valerie Counsel for Defendant Appellee ANPAC Louisiana Insurance Theng Matherne Metairie Louisiana Company BEFORE KUfIN HIGGINBOTI3AM t ND THERIOT JJ Disposition REVERSED AND RENDERED REMANDED KLJHN J Plaintiffs Deidra and Steve Jones appeal a suminary judgment dismissing their suit against defendant ANPAC Louisiana Insurance Company ANPAC Finding that an unresolved issue of material fact e we reverse the trial court sts judgment and render judgment denying ANPAC smotion for summary judgment FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this personal injury suit as a result of a vehicular accident that occurred on December 20 2008 when their vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by Steven St Romain Mr St Romain and his automobile insurer Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company were named as defendants Plaintiffs later amended the suit to add their insurer ANPAC as an additional defendant alleging that Mr St Romain was underinsured and the policy issued by ANPAC included underinsured uninsured motorist IJM coverage In answer to the suit ANPAC alleged that plaintiffs had rejected LJM coverage by virtue of a rejection form executed by Ms Jones on June 1 2001 which was effective as to all subsequent policy renewals After settling with Mr St Romain and Liberty Mutual plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of IJM coverage ANPAC responded with a cross motion for summary judgment on the same issue Relying on the June 1 2001 rejection form ANPAC asserted the policy did not include iJM coverage In fiirther support of its motion ANPAC filed a copy of the policy in effect on the date of the accident the declarations page of the policy indicated that LJM coverage was rejected In opposition to ANPAC motion and in support of their own motion for s partial summary judgment plaintiffs filed a memorandum in which they denied that The policy was issued in the name of Steve Jones with Deidra Jones listed as an additional driver 2 Ms Jones signed the LTM rejection form relied upon by ANPAC contending her signature on that form was a forgery In support of this contention Ms Jones executed an affidavit attesting that she had examined the document dated June 1 2001 that allegedly bears my signature and that tsignature contained thereon he is in fact not mine and that signature is a forgery The trial court ultimately denied plaintiff s motion for partial summary judgment and granted ANPAC motion far summary judgment dismissing s plaintiffs claims against ANPAC with prejudice On appeal plaintiffs argue that 1 the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of ANPAC when Ms Jones affidavit raised an issue of material fact as to the genuineness of the signature on the rejection form and 2 the rejection form was defective because the name Steve Jones printed above the form signature line was different from the s purported signature Deidra Jones on the form SUMMARY JUDGMENT A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact All Crane Rental of Georgia Inc v Vincent 10 La App lst Cir 9 47 So 024 0116 10 10 3d 1027 writ denied 10 La 11 49 So 387 Summary judgment is 2227 10 19 3d properly granted if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with affidavits if any show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law La P C art 966 The mover bears the burden of proof on a motion for summary B judgment La C art 966 All Crane Rental of Georgia Inc v P 2 C ncent 47 So at 1027 3d The trial court role in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not to s evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact Because a trial 3 court cannot make credibility decisions on a motion for summary judgment the trial court must assume that all affiants are credible See Independent Fire Insurance Company v Sunbeam Corporation 99 La 2 755 So 2181 00 29 2d 226 236 Pumphrey v Harris 12 La App lst Cir ll ll 1 So3d 86 0405 12 2 91 In determining whether summary judgment was proper appeilate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate i whether there is e any genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to appellant judgment as a matter of law All Crane Rental of Georgia Inc v Vincent 47 3d So at 1027 DISCUSSION The insurer bears the burden of proving a valid rejection of LTM coverage See Gray u American National 08 26 2 977 So 839 845 2d 46 Property Casualty Company 07 La 1670 The trial court concluded ANPAC met this burden and rejected plaintiffs argument that the rejection form was invalid finding that Ms Jones was authorized as her husband legal representative to s execute the form and that the discrepancy between the printed name and the signature did not invalidate the form However the trial court did not address the issue raised by Ms Jones affidavit concerning whether the signature was a forgery ANPAC contends the affidavit was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding this issue because the affidavit was inconsistent with Ms Jones prior deposition testimony In support of this contention it cites Wheelock v Winn Di Louisiana Inc 01 La App lst Cir 6 822 zie 1584 02 21 2d So 94 97 in which this Court held that where there is an unexplained 2 See Harper u Direct Genera Insurance Company 08 La 22 So3d 418 419 2874 09 13 20 per curiam the fact that the named insured name was printed on a rejection form while it s was signed by a legal representative ofthe named insured did not invalidate the form 4 inconsistency between a witness deposition testimony and his subsequent affidavit the affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment However our affidavit and her review reveals no inconsistencies between Ms deposition Jones In her deposition Ms Jones admitted that LJM coverage was not included in the original policy which was issued with liability limits of 10 but testified that she did not know whether it was included 20 000 later after the liability limits were increased to 300 000 100 Ms Jones further admitted that she signed papers when plaintiffs firsY obtained their ANPAC policy and decided they did not want IJM coverage Yet the deposition excerpts provided by ANPAC contain no testimony regarding whether Ms Jones signed the June 1 2001 rejection form when the liability limits were increased or at any time thereafter Furthermore in her affidavit Ms Jones stated that she did not sign a rejection form after liability coverage was increased Additionally she specifically stated that the signature on the June 1 2001 rejection form was a forgery Based on our examination we find no inconsistency between Ms Jones affidavit and her deposition testimony with respect to the signature on the June 1 2001 rejection form ANPAC presented no evidence that Ms Jones was ever questioned about the June 1 2001 rejection form during her deposition Moreover the fact that she admitted in her deposition that she signed papers when plaintiffs first obtained a policy from ANPAC is neither relevant to nor inconsistent with her assertion that she did not sign the June 1 2001 rejection form 3 Changes to the liability limits of an automobile liability policy create a new policy and require the completion of a new UM selection form in the absence of which La R 22 S 1295 i a 1 mandates UM coverage in an amount equal to the liability coverage See La R S iiTaylor x II Agencies Casua a 1 1295 22 S tyInsurance Company 09 La App 1 st 1599 Cir 4 38 So3d 433 436 10 7 5 Since no inconsistencies existed between the deposition testimony provided by ANPAC and Ms Jones affidavit the trial court was required to accept the affidavit as credible for purposes of the motion for summary judgment It appears the trial court did not do so but instead improperly weighed the credibility of the affidavit Based on our de novo review accepting Ms Jones affidavit as credible we find it was sufficient to raise an issue of material fact regarding the validity of the June 1 2001 rejection form based on her contention that the signature on the form was a forgery This issue of material fact precluded summary judgment Accordingly the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of ANPAC CONCLUSION For the reasons outlined the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of ANPAC dismissing plaintiffs claims with prejudice is reversed and judgment is hereby entered denying ANPAC motion for summary judgment s This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion All costs of this appeal are to be paid by ANPAC REVERSED AND RENDERED REMANDED 6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
