State Of Louisiana VS Ian Jones

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF OUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT IJ 2012 KA 0825 l STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS IAN ONES On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court Parish of Washington Louisiana Docket No 10 Division B 111242 CR5 Honorable August 7 Hand 7udge Presiding Walter P Reed Attorneys for Appellee District State of Louisiana Attorney Covington LA and Kathryn Landry Special Appeals Counsel Baton Rouge LA Gwendolyn K Brown Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge LA Attorney for Appellant Defendant Ian ones BEFORE PARRO WELCH AND KLINE J Judgment rendered FEB 1 9 2013 I udge 1William F Kline r retired is serving as judge ro temoore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court PARRO J The defendant Ian Jones was charged by bill of information with production and manufacture methamphetamine of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance a violation of LSA 40 count 1 S A R 967 1 CDS creation or operation of a clandestine laboratory a violation of LSA 40 count 2 and S R 983 possession of a Schedule II CDS methamphetamine a violation of LSA 40 SC R967 count 3 He initially entered a plea of not guilty and filed motions to suppress evidence and his statement which the district court denied The defendant then moved to quash count 3 Following the district court grant of his motion to quash he s pled guilty to counts 1 and 2 pursuant to a plea agreement with the state reserving his right to appeal See State v Crosby 338 So 584 588 La 1976 According to 2d the plea agreement the state would bill the defendant as a habitual offender on count 1 only and the district court would sentence the defendant initially to eighteen years at hard labor on count 1 with the first ten years to be served without benefit of parole probation or suspension of sentence and to fifteen years on count 2 both sentences to run concurrently Pursuant to the plea agreement the district court sentenced the I defendant to eighteen years at hard labor on count 1 with the first ten years to be served without the benefit of parole probation or suspension of sentence He was also sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor on count 2 and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently At this stage of the proceeding the state filed a multiple offender bill of information The defendant was then adjudicated a second habitual offender on felony count 1 and the district court vacated its previously sentence on that count imposed and resentenced the defendant to eighteen years at hard labor to be served concurrently with his previously imposed sentence on count 2 The defendant now 2 The defendant brother Robin Jones was charged by the same bill of information His charges were s severed and he was tried separately He has filed a separate appeal with this court See State v ones 12 La App lst Cir 2 unpublished opinion 0824 13 19 3 See LSA 40 SB R967 a 3 See LSA 15 and LSA 40 S 1 R 529 A S B R 967 a 3 2 appeals arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence For the following reasons we affirm the defendant convictions habitual s offender adjudication and sentences FACTS On October 15 2010 the defendant was riding in a car with his girlfriend Peggy Temple and his brother and co Robin Jones defendant vehicle and was involved in a motor vehicle accident Temple was driving the After the accident Temple left the scene and drove to a lighted area of a nearby parking lot Sergeant Chad Dorset with the Franklinton Police Department responded to a call reporting a hit and arrived at the parking lot where the defendant was located run and shortly thereafter He conducted a plain view search of the vehicle and saw items consistent with a methamphetamine lab including coffee filters drain cleaner funneis and empty bottles Sergeant Dorset then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and found a Ziploc bag containing a clear liquid and white powder which he suspected to be methamphetamine and methamphetamine products The defendant his brother and Temple were placed under arrest and transported to the Franklinton Police Department MOTION TO SUPPRESS In his sole assignment of error the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence Specifically he contends that he did not consent to the search of his vehicle On the trial of a motion to suppress the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion except that the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without a warrant LSA art 703 A P Cr C D search conducted without a warrant issued upon unreasonable subject only to a few specifically probable cause is per se established and well delineated exceptions State v Aucoin 613 So 206 208 La App lst Cir 1992 The officer 2d who searched the defendant vehicle did not have a search warrant However one of s 5 The defendant dces not contest the denial of the motion to suppress his statement 3 the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent Consent is valid when it is freely and voluntarily given by a person who possesses common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected State v Brumfield 05 La App ist Cir 9 944 So 588 593 writ denied 07 2500 06 20 2d 0213 La 9 964 So 353 07 28 2d When the state seeks to rely upon consent to justify a warrantless search it has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given Whether consent was voluntarily given is an issue of fact to be determined by the fact finder in light of the totality of the circumstances The trier of fact may consider the credibility of witnesses as well as the surrounding circumstances in determining the issue of the voluntariness Aucoin 613 So at 208 When a 2d 09 distrid court denies a motion to suppress factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the district court discretion i s e unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence See State v Green 94 La 0887 95 22 5 655 So 272 280 2d 81 rulings under a deferential As a general rule this court reviews district court standard with regard to factual and other trial determinations while legat findings are subject to a de novo standard of review State v Hunt 09 La 12 25 So 746 751 1589 09 1 3d At the hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence the three occupants of the vehicle testified and gave similar accounts of the factual circumstances surrounding the search of the vehicle According to their testimony a police officer asked Tempie whether she was the driver of the vehicle and when she responded ahe rmatively asked for her consent to search Temple responded that the vehicle did not belong to her The officer then asked Robin for consent to search and he told the officer that the vehicle did not belong to him After Temple and Robin denied ownership of the vehicle I Sergeant Craig James stated I don tcare whose car it is Search it anyway The officers never asked the defendant for his consent The officer who searched the vehicle Sergeant Dorset also testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress He stated that after observing items in plain view 4 consistent with a methamphetamine lab he asked Temple for consent to search stated that the vehicle belonged to the defendant She Sergeant Dorset then asked the defendant for consent to search and the defendant responded Go ahead Sergeant Dorset testified that he did not threaten coerce or in any way promise the defendant anything in exchange for his consent He testified that the three occupants were cooperative and did not try to stop him from searching the vehicle Sergeant Dorset never heard Sergeant James say I don care whose vehicle it is search it anyway t Sergeant James testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress He was present when Sergeant Dorset obtained the defendanYs consent to search the vehicle According to Sergeant James the three occupants were e cooperative and the remely defendant did not recant his verbal consent to search the vehicie He corroborated Sergeant Dorset testimony that the defendant was not coerced threatened or s promised anything in exchange for his consent He denied saying I don care whose t vehicle it is search it anyway After observing the witnesses and weighing their credibility the district court credited the testimony of Sergeants Dorset and James and rejected that of the defendant and the other two occupants of the vehicle to overturn that credibility determination There is no basis in the record According to both officers the defendant gave consent to search and did not attempt to stop them from searching his vehicle As pointed out by the district court it was telling that the occupants gave accounts of the facts similar to that of the officers relative to the questioning of Temple and Robin yet testified that the officers knowing of the defendant identity as owner of the s vehicle dismissed the requirement of asking him for consent Considering all of the above we find no error or abuse of discretion in the district sdenial of the motion to suppress the evidence court Accordingly this assignment of error is without merit CONVICTIONS HABITUAL OFFENDER SENTENCES AFFIRMED 5 AD7UDICATION AND

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