Leslie Jones, wife of/and Joel Jones o/b/o their minor child, L.J. VS Christopher Michael Johnson, John and Jan Doe, Parents of Christopher Michael Johnson and Def Insurance Company, Arian Batiste, Jack and Jill Doe, Parents of Arian Batiste and GHI Insurance Company, Verlieann Arrizola Crandle, Mark and Mark Doe, Parents o

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF L JUISIANA URT C OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT N0 Z011 CA 1970 LESLIE ONES WIFE OF JOEL JONES 0 AND 6 THEIR MINOR CHILD L J VERSUS n l CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON JOHN AND JANE DOE PARENTS OF CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON AND DEF INSURANCE C4MPANY ARIAN BATISTE JACK AND JILL DOE PARENTS OF ARIAN BAT AND GHI INSURANCE STE COMPANY VERLIEANN ARRIZOLA CRANDLE MARK AND MARY DOE PARENTS OF VERLIEANN ARR CRANDLE AND JKL ZOLA INSURANCE COMPANY DARLENE KIRST RISHTON O 0 B HER M CHILD M AND MNO INSURANCE COMPANY NOR K ALBERT ANDRY AND PQR TNSURANCE COMPANY ST TAMMANY SH S PAR SHERIFF FFICE AND FONTA STATE NEBLEAU PARK AND STU INSURANCE C MPANY Judgment rendered A 5 2 Z Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court in and for the Parish af St Tammany Lauisiana Trial Court No 200 93 1 Honarable August J Hand 7udge RUSTY SAVOIE ATTORNEYS FOR AND APPELLANTS PLAINTIFFS FRANK EUGENE I AMOTHE III COVINGTON SLIE L JONES JOEL JONES AND L LA CHARLES M HUGHES JR ATTORNEYS FOR RYAN G DAVIS APPELLEES DEFENDANTS MANDEVILLE LA DEPUTY ST CHTASSON AND VE ST TAMMANY SHERIFF S OFFICE MICHAEL F NOLAN METAIRIE ATTORNEY FOR LA APPELLEE DEFENDANT FONTAINEBLEAU STATE PARK BEFo E P TTIG W McCLENDON AND WEL c H aa PETTIGREW In this case the plaintifFs Lesli Jon wife of Joel Jones o appellants s and b their minor child L hereinafter referred to as Janes challenge the trial courk grant s of summary in judg me nt favor of defendants St Tamman y Parish Sheriffs Office hereinafter referred to as St Tammany and Fontainebleau State Park hereinafter referred to as s Jones claims Said judgment rendered December 2 2010 dismissed all of Park against St Tammany and the Park with prejudice For the reasons that fallaw we affirm the judgment of the trial court Albert Andry hereinafter referred to as Andry an adult male and a couple of his friends wanted to throw a Christmas party on the evening of December 23 2007 To accomplish this Andry rented a secluded party camp at the Park for that night For security purposes Andry also hired St Tammany Parish Sheriffs D Steve Chiassan puty hereinafter referred to as Chiassan to work a private detail for the party from 9 0 m p December 23 2p07 to 1 a December 00 m Z4 Z007 Chiasson was hired to make sure na ane lefit the party falling drunk and to break up any troubl down between akkendees if it arose A D was also hired to play music for the party until 1 7 00 m mber a Dec 24 2007 Andry the other host and attendees of the parry provided alcoholic beverages o the sts gu attendees at the were a party Between 20Q mixed age group and 30Q individuals attended the party The som older than 21 some b 18 to 1 and tween even same under 18 Chiasson did not check I to determine anyone s D sage The party was uneventful and everything went smoothly At two minutes to 1 a December 00 m 24 2007 Chiasson presented hims to one af the hasts to be paid and then left the lf detail to go hom At 00 m 1 a th D shut dawn the J music At approximately 1 a 30 m December 24 2007 a brawl brake aut amangst the remaining attendees which was estimated ta be about two of the total attendees who had thirds came to the parry In the process of said brawl L the 16 old minar son of ones rpersonal year ived c injuries and damages ones filed suit for these damages against multiple individuals 2 including but not limited to the parents of the individuals who battered L their and insurers the Park and St Tammany St Tammany and the Park each filed a matian for summary judgm bath of nt which were granted by the trial court in its judgment of December 2 2010 Said judgment is the subject of this appeal SUMMARY UDGMENT A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avaid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact ohnson v van Hall Sugar Co op 2956 La Inc 2001 p 3 App 1 Cir 2d 02 30 12 836 So 484 486 Summary judgment is praperly granted if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with affidavits if any show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that mover is entitled ta judgment as a matter of law La Code Civ P art B 966 Summary judgment is favored and is designed to secure the just speedy and inexpensive determination af every action La Code Civ P art 966 Thomas 2 A v Fina Oil and Chemical Co 2002 pp 4 La App 1 Cir 2 845 So 0338 5 03 14 zd 498 501 5p2 On a motion far summary judgment th burden of proaf is on the mover If however the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the caurt an the motion for summary judgment the mover burden on the motion does s not require that all essential elements of the adverse party claim action or defense be s negated Instead the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for on or more elements essential to the adverse party claim action or s defense Thereafter the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufFicient to establish that he will be able ta satisfy his evidentiary burden of praaf at trial If the adverse party fails to m this burden there is no genuine issue of material fact and the t mover is entitled to summary judgment La Code Civ P art 966 Robles v 2 C Exxonmobile 2Q02 p 4 App 1 Cir 3 844 So 339 341 S4 0 La 03 28 2d Summary judgments are reviewed on appeal de novo An appellate caurt thus asks the same questions as does the trial cour in determining whether summary 3 judgment apprapriate is whether the mover whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Ernest v Petroleum Service Corp 2002 p 3 App 1 Cir 11 868 Sa 95 97 writ 2482 La 03 19 2d denied 2003 La 2866 So 830 3439 04 20 2d The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether under the facts of this case a duty was owed by the Park and St Tammany to ones daughter L and whether s J or th injuries sustained fall within the scape of the duty In Roberts v Benoit 6p5 So 1032 La 1991 the Louisiana Supreme Court 2d considered a case in which an ofF police deputy shot the plaintiff accidentally when duty he was playing with his gun while intoxicated The court addressed the ease of association between the risk posed by the deputy conduct and the Sheriffs duty to s exercise reason when hiring and training deputies The court determined that the ease of association in that case was attenuated at best Roberts 505 So at 1045 The caurt 2d extensively discussed the scope of pratection element of the duty analysis as follows risk The most critical issue in the instant case is wheth rthe injury plaintifF sustained was within the contemplation of the duty discussed There is no rule for determining the scope of the duty above Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause I cause or duty the gal scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scape of the duty In shart the scope of protection inquiry asks whether the enunciated rule or principle of law extends to or is intended to protect this pthis from ainti type ofharm arising in this manner Generally the scope af pratection inquiry becames significant in sensitive fact cases in which a limitation of the but for consequences of the def substandard conduct is warranted s ndant These cases require lagic reasaning and policy decisians be employed to determine whether liability should be imposed under the particular factual circumstances presented This is such a cas Particularly the court of appeal sbut for conclusion is that had Benoit not been commissioned as a deputy he would not have be carrying the gun that caused plaintiffs injuries n the liability for a a risk duty we relationship have found the proper inquir to be how easily the risk of r injury to plaintifF can be assaciated with the duty sought to be enforced Restated the ease of association inquiry is simply How easily does ane In determining s defendant substandard tian limit ta be placed i conduct e whether on there is associate the plaintifFs complained harm with the defendant conduct of s Although ease of association encompasses the idea of foreseeability it is not based on foreseeability alone Absent an ease of association between 4 I the duty breached and the darr sustained we have found legal fault ages cking I Roberts 605 Sa at 1044 citations omitted 2d 1045 After a thoraugh review of the memorandum and exhibits introduced by the parties we agree with the trial court Under the duty risk analysis we come ta the conclusian that the unique facts of this cas do not fall within the scope of the duty that may have been owed to ones and their daughter by the Park and St Tammany Thus summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of the Park and St Tammany For the above and foregaing reasons we affirm the trial caurt December 2 2p10 s nt judgm in accordance with Uniform Rules of Appeal Rule 2 and assess Courts 16 16 all appeal costs against the plaintiffs appellants AFFIRMED 5 LESLIE NUMBER 2011 CA 1970 FE AND JONES W OF JOEL JONES OB THEIR O MINOR CHILD L J FIRST CIRCUIT VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON ET AL STATE OF LOUISIANA WELCH J dissenting respectfully I J dissent I believe that genuine issues of material fact exist as I to whether the St Tammany s Parish Sherriff Office STPSO and Fontainebleau State Park Park acted reasonably under all of the circumstances of this case Evidence was presented on the motians for summary judgment from which it could be found that the party in question was attended by nearly 300 young persans thirds approximately two of whom undisputed that alcohol was being were under the consumed by 1ega1 drinking the party goers age It is There is also evidence showing that at the time Deputy Chiasson departed the party the party was still going on Witnesses stated that at the time Deputy Chiasson left the party it was still packed only a few persons had left and one witness estimated twa thirds of the party remained goers Shortly after Deputy Chiasson departure a s huge fight erupted during which Ms Jones was injured Additionally in opposition to the motions for summary judgment plaintiffs offered a report prepared by Dr Wade Schindler who has served as a security consultant a police officer commander and chief and as an adjunct professor of criminal justice at Tulane University Therein Mr Schindler concluded that the STPSO Deputy Chiasson the Park and its employees all had the opportunity to deter the events that should have been foreseeable to them In support of their motions for summary judgment both the STPSO and the Park argued that they had no duty to eable protect Ms Jones from unfores criminal attacks by third The trial court apparently agreed with these arguments in parties granting the motions for summary judgment Forseeability of the events leading to Ms Jones injury is a crucial issue in this case as it determines the scope of the s s STPSO and the Park s duty to Ms Jones I find from the evidence on the motions for summary judgment that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the fight was foreseeable from the perspective of the STPSO and the Park particularly in light of the large number of youthful attendees at a party where alcohol was being consumed Because there are genuine issues of fact regarding forseeability I conclude that the fact Ms Jones was the victim of a criminal attack does not preclude a finding of liability on the part of either the STPSO or the Park as a matter of law In its motion for summary judgment the STPSO further insisted that Deputy Chiasson had no duty to check the IDs of persons attending the private function because he r believed he was providing security for a 10 asonably year high school reunion and thus had no reason to believe the attendees wer under the I legal drirtking age Deputy Chiasson testified that he believed all of the party goers had graduated from high school ten years before the party and that the attendees were in their mid The STPSO also contended that Deputy Chiassan 20s had no duty to stay at the party beyond the time designated in the wark detail because there were no outward signs of trouble until the first punch was thrown which led to the brawl after Deputy Chiasson had completed his work detail and left the event Deputy Chiasson acknowledged that if he felt there had been any problems at the end of his shift he cauld have done one of three things 1 stay at the party 2 shut down the party prior to leaving or 3 call for additional police units and depart the premises following their arrival The STPSO work details procedures make it clear that a deputy performing a private work detail is an employee of the STPSO not the entity paying for the work detail and a deputy is required to enforce all state and parish laws while working the paid detail As a general rule a police officer has a duty to perform his function with due regard for the safety of all citizens who will be affected by His authority must be exercised at all times in a reasonable fashion his actions and he must act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances Officers are held choosing to circumstances a course of action which is reasonable under the Hardy v Bowie 9 La 7 744 So 606 614 21 2 99 S 2d Whether Deputy Chiasson acted reasonably in assuming all of the party were goers of the legal drinking age whether he should have taken any action prior to leaving the party or whether he should have stayed past the time designated in the work detail and whether Deputy Chiasson actions or lack th played a causative s reof role in Ms Jones injuries are questions of fact which should be determined by the trier of fact In short I find there are genuine issues of act as to whether Deputy Chiasson acted reasonably under all of the circumstances of this cas and I conclude that summary judgment on the issue of the STPS liability was s improvidently granted Similarly I find that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether the Park acted reasonably The Park ranger was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Park rules and regulations and 1ik Deputy Chiasson the Park s ranger was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the law Whether the s Park actions ar inactions were reasanable and whether the Park actians or s inactions played a causative role in Ms Jones sinjuries are questions of fact which may not be summarily resolv d 1 The STPSO contends that even rFthe conduct of Deputy Chiasson could ba found to be negligent it is entitled to immunity under La R 9 urging that the deputy S 2798 B 1 sdecision not to investigate attendees for underage drinking or to stay after the designated tima for the work detail are discretionary acts for which liability may not be imposed on the STPSO The STPSO sargument on immunity focuses on the reasonableness of Deputy Chiasson s actions and the alleged lack of forseeability that the fight would break out Because there are genuine issues af material fact on the issues of forseeability and the reasonableness of Deputy Chiasson sactions and inactions the STPSO has not demonstrated it is entitled to irnrnunity as a tnatter of law For these reasons I would reverse the summary judgments entered in favor of the STPSO and the Park and remand for further proceedings I

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.