Terry Washington VS East Baton Rouge School Board
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NUMBER 2011 CA 1703 TERRY WASHINGTON VERSUS EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD Judgment Rendered MAY 14 2012 Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Fast Baton Rouge Louisiana Docket Number C539971 Honorable Wilson E Fields Judge Presiding J Arthur Smith III Counsel for PlaintiffAppellant Seth M Dornier Terry Washington Baton Rouge LA Kenneth F Sills Counsel for DefendantAppellee Baton Rouge LA East Baton Rouge Parish School Board 7SC r 7tt 7F BEFORE WHIPPLE KUHN AND GUIDRY JJ WHIPPLE J In this appeal plaintiff challenges the trial court judgment granting s s defendant motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissing his claims with prejudice For the following reasons we affirm FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 23 2006 Terry Washington a coach and tenured teacher certified in special education and physical education who was formerly employed by the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board Board the School filed suit against the School Board alleging that he was wrongfully removed as athletic director and head football coach for the 2005 2006 school year and seeking reinstatement to those positions back pay and all other distinctions of the positions In his petition Washington contended that his appointment to those positions was terminated in retaliation for questions he raised as to possible improprieties relating to funds generated through athletic events and various fundraising sources and constituted a termination of his professional employment without proper notification Specifically Washington who had been employed as a certified teacher at Scotlandville Magnet High School Scotlandvil High le since August 2001 and was also serving as athletic director and head football coach for the 20042005 school year contended that during the fall of 2004 he became concerned about what he believed to be mismanagement of school funds by the principal office Washington further averred that s when he reported the alleged mismanagement of school funds to Principal Mary McManus on March 28 2005 she threatened to fire him and that the next day Principal McManus wrote to him informing him that he would no longer be athletic director for the upcoming 2005 2006 school year PA According to Washington although Principal McManus later informed Washington that she had changed her mind and that he could continue as athletic director Principal McManus ultimately removed Washington from all coaching positions and the position of athletic director at Scotlandville High after Washington made a report to a school board member regarding school funds that were allegedly missing and after swife sent an anonymous letter to the School Board requesting Washington an audit of the school funds at Scotlandville High Washington averred that his removal from the positions of head football coach and athletic director without notice and a hearing 1 violated state law for which the School Board is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior 2 violated procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U Constitution made actionable S by 42 U C S 1983 because he was not provided with a hearing and because his removal was arbitrary capricious and not reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests and 3 was in retaliation for his reports of alleged mismanagement of money at the school in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution A bench trial was conducted in this matter on July 7 8 and 9 2010 After Washington presentation of evidence at trial the School Board s moved for involuntary dismissal of Washington sclaims The trial court took the matter under advisement and on October 15 2010 the court orally ruled that Principal McManus acted within her authority in relieving Washington of his duties as football coach and athletic director and in doing so had not violated any policy of the School Board Accordingly by judgment dated November 5 2010 the trial court granted the School 3 s Board motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissed Washington s claims with prejudice From this judgment Washington appeals contending that the trial court erred in granting the motion for involuntary dismissal and in dismissing his claims DISCUSSION Involuntan Dismissal In an action tried by the court without a jury after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence any party may move for a dismissal of the action on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief LSA C art P B 672 1 The appropriate standard for the trial court determination of a motion for s involuntary dismissal is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence in his caseinchief to establish a claim by a preponderance of the s evidence Foster v Tinnea 96 2718 La App 1 Cir 12 705 So 2d 97 29 782 784 Proof by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that when taking the evidence as a whole the fact or cause sought to be proved is more probable than not In reviewing a trial court ruling on a motion for s involuntary dismissal the appellate court should not reverse the trial court s ruling in the absence of manifest error Politz v Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rou e 619 So 2d 1089 1093 La App l Cir writ denied 627 So 2d 653 La 1993 Alleged Violation of State Law On appeal Washington avers that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims where he was removed from his coaching and athletic director positions in violation of LSA R 17 S 81 5and LSAR 17 S 444 11 The removal of a tenured teacher is governed by the Teacher Tenure Law LSA R 17 et seg which is designed to protect the job security S 441 of teachers in the best interest of the public school system Clark v Wilcox 20042254 La App 1 Cir 12 928 So 2d 104 109 writ denied 05 22 2006 0185 La 6 929 So 2d 1252 It sets forth detailed procedures 06 2 that must be adhered to in order to perfect the proper removal of a teacher who has attained permanent status Clark 928 So 2d at 109 As part of the Teacher Tenure Law LSA R 17 relied upon by S 444 Washington herein provides in pertinent part as follows B 1 Whenever a teacher who has acquired permanent status as set forth in R 17 in a parish or city school S 442 system is promoted by the employing school board by moving such teacher from a position of lower salary to one of higher salary such teacher shall not gain permanent status in the position to which he is promoted but shall retain permanent status acquired as a teacher pursuant to R 1 S7 442 i a 4 Except as provided otherwise by R 1 S 7 B 54 relative to the maximum term of a superintendent of schools elected by a city or parish school board the employment provided for in this Section shall be for a term of not less than two years except when such employment is for a temporary position nor more than four years and said term shall be specified in a written contract which shall contain performance objectives i c The board and the employee may enter into subsequent contracts of employment Not less than one hundred and twenty days prior to the termination of such a contract the superintendent shall notify the employee of termination of employment under such contract iii The employee shall be retained during the term of a contract unless the employee is found incompetent or inefficient or is found to have failed to fulfill the terms and performance objectives of his contract However before an employee can be removed during the contract period he shall have the right to written charges and a fair hearing before the board after reasonable written notice Emphasis added 6 According to Washington LSAR S 444 17 applies to his promoted contractual positions of head coach and athletic director and the provisions of this statute require that a contract employee such as himself hold a contract for not more than four nor less than two years and be terminated mid contract only for those reasons exclusively enumerated in subsection iiiand c 4 only after written notice of the charges and a fair hearing 13 before the School Board However we note that LSAR 17 defines teacher as S 441 ny a employee of any parish or city school board who holds a teacher s certificate and whose legal employment such requires s teacher certificate Emphasis added In considering this definition this court has held that it is clear that the Teacher Tenure Law is designed to protect classroom profession teachers and no administrators specific and inclusion supervisors of coaches extracurricular sports is made in the protective statute Parish School Board 444 So 2d 219 221 La App 1 in of the teaching interscholastic Tate v Livingston t Cir 1983 writ denied 446 So 2d 314 La 1984 Indeed while athletic coaches must be certified teachers in order to teach substantive school courses as noted by this court in Tate and as acknowledged to by Washington in the trial below there is no procedure in law requiring that one be certified as a coach As such coaching duties are separate and distinct from regular teaching or instructional duties Tate 444 So 2d at 221 Thus as this court held in Tate a teacher who is also employed as a coach by a school board has two sets of rights 1 his position as a teacher is protected by tenure if he has acquired tenure status and 2 his position as coach is protected by the contract he has if one exists to perform coaching duties but not by tenure Tate 444 So 2d at 221 R In the instant case Washington acknowledged that his tenured teaching position with the School Board was not terminated Rather Washington remained a certified tenured teacher at Scotlandville High and Principal McManus merely removed Washington from or did not renew the supplemental assignments of coach and athletic director for the next school Because these supplemental assignments are not protected by the year Teacher Tenure Law the removal of Washington from the position as coach and also in this case athletic director did not require compliance with the provisions of the Teacher Tenure Law including LSAR 17 S 444 See Tate 444 So 2d at 221 We also reject Washington contention that he was removed from s these supplemental positions in violation of LSAR This statute 5 81 17 S provides that each city and parish school board shall develop and adopt rules and policies which it shall use in dismissing school employees who have not attained tenure in accordance with applicable provisions of law and whose dismissal is not a result of a reduction in force Emphasis added At the outset we note that as stated above Washington was not dismissed as an employee of the School Board nor was his teaching position at Scotlandville High terminated Rather he was denied the opportunity to continue to hold the supplemental positions of coach and athletic director The testimony of record reveals that in the East Baton Rouge Parish School System coaching positions and other extracurricular assignments for which a stipend or supplement is paid are assigned by the principal of each respective school The decision not to reappoint a teacher to such Washington ultimately resigned from his position as a tenured teacher with the East Baton Rouge Parish School System effective January 22 2007 2 I addition to the testimony at trial the evidence introduced establishes that the School Board has a written policy governing extra duty assignments which includes activity sponsorship providing that the principal shall have authority to make such supplemental assignments does not in any way terminate the teacher s position with the School Board As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court nothing in the body of LSAR 17 concerns anything other than S 81 5 dismissal policies for non tenured employees Doherty v Calcasieu Parish School Board 93 3017 La 4634 So 2d 1172 1175 94 11 Additionally LSAR 17 applies to non tenured employees of S 81 5 city and parish school boards Because the legislature has provided for the termination of tenured and non tenured teachers elsewhere in the Revised Statutes it is clear that LSAR 17 S 81 5pertains to school employees who are not teachers Wilhelm v Vermilion Parish School Board 598 So 2d 699 701 La App 3d Cir 1992 see also Easterling v Monroe Cjjv School d Board 612 So 2d 975 978 La App 2 Cir 1993 wherein the Second Circuit determined that 5 81 LSAR 1 S 7 was the applicable statute governing the situation involving the dismissal of the plaintiff who although employed as a contract teacher and coach was not a teacher within the meaning of the Teacher Tenure Law because she did not hold a teacher s certificate As a tenured teacher with the School Board who was not dismissed Washington reliance on LSAR 17 is misplaced s S 81 5 Accordingly we find no manifest error in the finding that Washington failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a violation of these statutes Due Process In addition to asserting that his removal from the supplemental positions of football coach and athletic director violated state law assignments Moreover the written policy of the School Board concerning high school coaching duties provides that i will be the responsibility of each principal to designate t coaching duties with written notification to the Division of Human Resources no later than the end of the first week of school The policy includes a supplemental compensation schedule setting forth the supplement paid in the form of a salary percentage for various positions in interscholastic athletics including athletic director and head football coach Washington also asserted a claim for violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U S Constitution on the bases that he was not provided with a hearing and that his removal was arbitrary capricious and not reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that no state shall deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law Emphasis added Similarly Article I 2 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life liberty or property except by due process of law Washington contended in the trial court below that his due process claim is made actionable by 42 U C S 1983 which provides in pertinent part Every person who under color of any statute ordinance regulation custom or usage of any State subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law To claim the protections of due process a claimant must show the existence of some property or liberty interest which has been adversely affected b y state action App 1 s Johnson v Southern University 20002615 La Cir 12 803 So 2d 1140 1144 1 Louisiana law creates 01 28 145 3 W note that while Washington filed suit against the School Board Principal McManus is the party who made the decision not to reassign him to the supplemental positions at issue It is well settled that a local governmental body liability under 42 s C S U 1983 cannot be imposed under the theory of re superior Nonetheless ondea sl the School Board can be held liable under section 1983 if the constitutional violation is due to official action policy or custom Monell V Department of Social Services 436 S U 658 690691 98 S Ct 2018 20352036 56 L Ed 2d 611 1978 Thus to the extent that Washington asserts that his due process rights were violated by the School Board practice of allowing principals to make decisions on s coaching assignments or by the School Board failure to provide him with a hearing s prior to his removal from the coaching assignments at issue we will review his section 1983 due process claim 9 a property interest in continued employment for tenured teachers requiring that certain employment procedural steps be followed before the termination of See Johnson 803 So 2d at 1145 Rubin v Lafayette Parish School Board 93 473 La App P Cir 12 649 So 2d 1 1009 94 14 003 1010 writ denied 95 0845 La 5 654 So 2d 351 95 12 However as stated above Washington position as a tenured teacher with the School s Board was not terminated Rather he was not allowed to continue to hold the supplemental positions of football coach and athletic director for the upcoming 2005 2006 school year Thus the question before us is whether Washington had a property interest in continuing to hold these supplemental positions There are no Louisiana statutes or School Board policies supporting s Washington claim that he possesses a property interest in the continuation or renewal of supplementary assignments The record establishes that Washington was employed by the School Board as a health and physical education teacher not as a coach or athletic director Moreover while Principal McManus assigned Washington the supplemental positions of head football coach and athletic director for the 20042005 school year these assignments were effective from August 5 2004 until May 20 2005 and Washington has not contended that he was not paid the appropriate compensation for those supplemental positions he held during that time period Additionally Principal McManus sultimate decision not to extend these supplemental positions to Washington for the upcoming 2005 2006 school year was made on June 22 2005 after the expiration of those assignments for the 20042005 school year Accordingly we find no manifest error in the trial court implicit s finding that Washington failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 10 that he had a protected property interest in the continuation or renewal of the supplementary assignments of head football coach and athletic director See Johnson 803 So 2d at 11 professor failed to establish a property interest 45 in his particular class assignments also see generally Jett v Dallas Independent School District 798 F 2d 748 752754 5 Cir 1986 affirmed in pArt remanded in art 491 U 701 109 S Ct 2702 105 L Ed S 2d 598 1989 hereinafter referred to as Jett I athletic directorhead football coach failed to establish a property interest in the continuation of his coaching responsibilities and Brewer v Purvis 81 F Supp 1560 1572 6 1573 M Ga 1993 teacher assigned as head football coach did not have D a property interest in the supplemental duty position of coach Because Washington was not deprived of a protected property interest when the supplemental duties of coach and athletic director were not reassigned to him due process protections do not apply Johnson 803 So 2d at 1145 Retaliation Finally Washington asserted a claim for retaliation in the trial court below contending that his removal from the positions of head football coach and athletic director was in retaliation for his reports of alleged mismanagement of money at the school in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution To prevail in a retaliation claim a public employee must establish that 1 his speech involved a matter of public concern 2 he suffered an adverse employment action for exercising his right to free Fhe 4 First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press Additionally Article 1 section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution provides in pertinent part No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press 11 speech and 3 the exercise of free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action Johnson 803 So 2d at 1146 As with due process claims and other claims of constitutional violations plaintiffs claim of retaliation on the basis of the exercise of free speech is also made actionable through 42 U C S 983 1 See Harrin ton v Harris 118 F 359 365 5 Cir cert denied 522 U 1016 118 S 3d S Ct 603 139 L Ed 2d 491 1 see also Devers v Southern University 997 st 970259 97 0260 La App 1 Cir 4 712 So 2d 199 207 Graham v 97 8 St LandEy Parish School Board 96904 La App 3rd Cir 2 689 So 97 5 2d 595 589 590 Ta or v City Shreveport 26 La App 2nd Cir of 820 95 7 4 653 So 2d 232 235 236 writ denied 95 1131 La 6 655 95 16 So 2d 333 and GuidKy v Broussard 897 F 2d 181 5 Cir 1990 However we again note that the record before us establishes that Principal McManus is the party who declined to extend Washington sassignment as head coach and athletic director beyond the 2004 2005 school year allegedly in retaliation for Washington exercise of free speech in reporting s his concerns about money management by the high school administration to the school board member for the district encompassing the school Nonetheless Washington has named the School Board as defendant herein and not McManus As noted above in footnote 3 a local governmental body liability s under 42 U C S 1983 cannot be imposed under the theory of respondeat superior Monell v Department of Social Services 436 U 658 98 S Ct S With 5 regard to an adverse employment action the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an athletic directorhead coach may recover for resulting injuries if he was reassigned in retaliation for protected speech even though he does not have a protected property interest in his former position Jett 1 798 F 2d at 757758 citing Mt Healthy City School Di Board of Education v Doyle 429 U 274 97 S strict S Ct 568 574 50 L Ed 2d 471 1977 6 See LSA R 17 granting qualified immunity to school employees S 439 12 2018 2035 2036 56 L Ed 2d 611 1978 see also Devers 712 So 2d at 207 Nonetheless the School Board can be held liable under Section 1983 if the constitutional violation is due to official action policy or custom Monell 98 S Ct at 2035 2036 Jett 1 798 F at 759 2d Official policy includes a decision that is officially adopted or promulgated by the governmental body lawmaking officers or by an s official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy making authority Jett 1 798 F at 759 Thus a local governmental body can be liable for the 2d acts ofits official where that official possesses final policymaking authority to establish governmental policy with respect to the action taken However municipal liability attaches only where the decision maker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered Jett 1 798 F at 759 citing Pembaur v City of Cincinnati 475 U 469 2d S 106 S Ct 1292 1299 89 L Ed 2d 452 1986 Gra 689 So 2d at 599 In Jett 1 the plaintiff was employed by the Dallas Independent School District as a teacher athletic director and head football coach at one of the School District high schools s After clashes with the high school s principal about among other things certain statements made by the plaintiff the principal recommended that the plaintiff be removed as athletic director and coach The School District superintendent affirmed the principal s s recommendation and reassigned the plaintiff to a teaching position in another school where he had no coaching duties Jett I 798 F at 751 752 2d The plaintiff then brought suit against the School District and the principal alleging in part that his exercise of protected speech was a substantial and motivating factor in the decision to remove him from the positions of coach and athletic director Jett 1 798 F 2d at 752 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability against the 13 principal on the basis that the plaintiffs protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in his decision to recommend the removal of plaintiff from the positions of coach and athletic director Jett 1 798 F at 757758 763 2d However with regard to the imposition of liability on the School District for the actions of the superintendent in transferring the plaintiff to a non coaching position the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient evidence to impose liability pursuant to 42 U C S 1983 Specifically the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the s superintendent decision was improperly motivated or that he knew or believed that or was consciously indifferent to whether the principal s recommendation was so motivated Jett 1 798 F at 760761 On review 2d however the United States Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Fifth Circuit for a determination of whether the superintendent had the requisite final policy making authority as to employee transfers for purposes of Section 1983 as clarified by the Supreme Court in St Louis v Pra rotnik 485 U 112 108 S Ct 915 99 L Ed 2d 107 1988 so as to render the S School District liable for his actions Jett v Dallas Independent School District 491 U 701 109 S Ct 2702 2723 2724 105 L Ed 2d 598 S 1989 Jett II On remand the Fifth Circuit determined that while the superintendent had final decision making authority as to employee transfers he did not possess the requisite final policy making authority Accordingly the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the School District under 42 U 0 S 1983 Jett v Independent School District 7 F 1241 12461251 5t Cir 1993 3d III 14 Dallas Jett As with the liability of the School District in Je III the only possible basis for liability of the School Board herein is if Principal McManus possessed final policymaking authority as to coaching assignments reassignments and removals See Jett III 7 F at 1245 However as noted 3d by the Fifth Circuit therein the United States Supreme Court has carefully distinguished between those having mere decision making authority and those having policy making authority in Pembaur and Pra rotnik As explained by the Supreme Court in Pembaur the fact that a particular officialeven a policy making official has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not without more give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion Rather the official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality 300 1 can be held liable Pembaur 106 S Ct at 1299 Moreover in Pra rotnik the Court further instructed that when an s official discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that s official making those policies gather than the subordinate departures s from them are the act of the municipality and simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one subordinates is not a delegation to s them of the authority to make policy Pra rotnik 108 S Ct at 926 927 Whether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law Jett II 109 S Ct at 2723 Although the evidence in the instant case supports the finding that Principal McManus had decision making authority to assign supplemental positions such as the coaching and athletic director positions there is nothing to suggest that the School Board delegated final policymaking authority regarding coaching assignments reassignments and removals to McManus Under Louisiana law as set forth in Title 17 of the Revised 15 Statutes such policy making authority rests exclusively with the School Board Pursuant to LSA R 1 there shall be a parish school board for S 7 51 each of the parishes The parish school board is the governing body of all school districts created by it LSAR 1 Each parish school board S 7 1373 shall determine the number of schools to be opened the number of teachers to be employed and shall select teachers and all other certified personnel from recommendations made by the parish superintendent regarding the hiring and placement of all personnel for which state certification is required LSA R 17 S 81 1 A 2 Additionally the parish school board is further authorized to make such rules and regulations for its own government not inconsistent with law or with the regulations of the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education as it may deem proper LSAR 17 S 81 C A principal appointed by a parish school board on the other hand shall have administrative responsibility for the direction and supervision of the personnel and activities and the administration of the affairs of that school consistent with the requirements of law the rules and regulations of the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and the parish school board by which he is employed LSAR 17 S 414 1 Nothing in Title 17 of the Revised Statutes purports to give any policy making authority or the power to make rules and regulations to school principals Rather the parish school boards are given not only what might be described as a form of legislative power over the school districts they serve i the power to make such rules and regulations for its own e government LSA R 17 S 81 Cbut also a form of executive power as the governing body of all school districts they each create See Jett III 7 F 3d at 1245 and LSAR 17 S 1373 16 Moreover the assignment of supplemental coaching duties does not involve the selection hiring or placement responsibility of 1 A 81 172 the School Board as of certified set forth teachers in a LSAR S Rather the assignment of these duties for which no certification is required involves an administrative function that the School Board has delegated to its principals In having its principals perform these administrative functions the School Board has clearly delegated decision making authority to its principals for their individual schools However this authority does not equate to principals having the status of policy makers for the School Board with regard to such assignments See Jett 111 7 3d F at 1246 Rather in deciding to whom such supplemental duties should be assigned Principal McManus was merely applying the policy directing her to assign extra curricular and supplemental duties within Scotlandville High rather than establishing any rules regulations or policy for the School Board See Jett III 7 F at 1250 Although McManus application of this 3d s School Board policy may have been improperly motivated in violation of s Washngton right to free speech we are constrained by the precepts noted above to conclude that Washington has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Principal McManus possessed final policy making authority in the area of extra curricular or coaching assignments such that the School Board could be held liable for her actions under 42 U C S 1983 See Jett Ill 7 F at 1251 Thus we likewise are 3d constrained to find no error in the involuntary dismissal of Washington s retaliation claim See 7 footnote 2 supra 17 Accordingly considering the foregoing and the record as a whole we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Washington failed to establish cognizable claims against the School Board by a preponderance of the evidence Thus the trial court properly granted the School Board s motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of Washington scase CONCLUSION For the above and foregoing reasons the November S 2010 judgment dismissing Washington sclaims with prejudice is hereby affirmed Costs of this appeal are assessed against Terry Washington AFFIRMED rV NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NUMBER 2011 CA 1703 TERRY WASHINGTON VERSUS EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD GUIDRY J dissents in part and assigns reasons 5 GUIDRY J dissenting in part I disagree with the majority opinion in this matter that basically holds that the plaintiff has no grounds by which he can contest his unilateral removal from his supplemental non tenured employment as a coach and athletic director As the first portion of the opinion discusses in detail why the supplemental coaching assignments are not a part of the plaintiffs teaching duties then it would seem proper and reasonable to classify the plaintiffs supplemental duties as separate employment Thus if the plaintiff is considered to be employed separately and independently of his teaching duties when performing the supplemental assignments the observation that plaintiff is separately employed as a tenured teacher should not bar the application of La R 17 to the plaintiffs cause of S 81 5 action contesting his removal from his separate employment in the supplemental assignments of coach and athletic director Hence I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by the majority on this issue and therefore respectfully dissent
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