Ian Douglas Lindsey VS Charles C. Foti, Jr., Individually and As Attorney General, State of Louisiana
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2011 CA 0426 IAN DOUGLAS LINDSEY VERSUS CHARLES C FOTI JR INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF LOUISIANA Judgment Rendered NOV 9 ZOIt EMMMMM3 On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No C545231 Honorable Timothy E Kelley Judge Presiding Counsel for PlaintiffAppellant Ian Douglas Lindsey J Arthur Smith III Seth M Dornier Baton Rouge Louisiana Counsel for DefendantAppellee Charles C Foti Jr individually and in his capacity as Attorney Jack K Whitehead Jr JohnEd L Bishop Baton Rouge Louisiana General for the State of Louisiana Department of Justice EMMME3EM BEFORE PETTIGREW McCLENDON AND WELCH JJ McCLENDON J In this disability discrimination action the plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing his claims with prejudice For the reasons that follow we affirm FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The plaintiff Ian Douglas Lindsey was an Assistant Attorney General with the Department of Justice for the State of Louisiana from January 1980 until his termination on July 18 2005 s Lindsey work was primarily in the Mr environmental law area and at the time of his termination he was assigned to the Public Protection Division Environmental Section The facts surrounding Mr s Lindsey termination are essentially In the summer of 2005 the office spaces of existing employees undisputed s were being reassigned because of the hiring of new employees Mr Lindsey office was one of those being relocated On June 15 2005 during the move Mr Lindsey became hostile and belligerent and used profanities directed toward certain coworkers When questioned later by Isabella Wingerter Director of the Public Protection Division and his supervisor Mr Lindsey confirmed that he had used profanities during the incident He also stated to Ms Wingerter that he would Choke the Bitch referring to Sonja Anderson the coworker who made the complaint and that Ms Anderson did not know who she was playing with Ms Wingerter referred the matter to Tris Lear Deputy Director of the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Affairs and on June 16 2005 Mr Lindsey was interviewed by Special Agent James Betbeze and Rodley Henry Deputy Director of the Public Protection Division During the interview Mr Lindsey was advised that he could make an oral statement but he chose not to do so However when questioned he admitted using profanities towards his co workers Mr Lindsey was also asked at that time to submit a typed or handwritten statement regarding the events of June 15 2005 That same day Mr Lindsey was placed on administrative leave with pay pending investigation and a determination of the appropriate course of action tj the As of July 15 2005 Mr Lindsey had not provided a written statement of the events in question and on that date Nicholas Gachassin Jr First Assistant Attorney General contacted Mr Lear requesting that Mr Lindsey be terminated effective July 18 2005 On July 18 2005 Mr Lindsey met with Mr Lear Mr Henry and Judy Stout Deputy Director of Human Resources At the meeting Mr Lindsey admitted using profanities on June 15 2005 When asked if he had prepared a written statement Mr Lindsey stated that he had not At that time Mr Lindsey was advised that he was being terminated from employment for misconduct Mr Lindsey filed this lawsuit on July 14 2006 against Charles C Foti Jr individually and in his official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana alleging that at all relevant times he was an otherwise qualified disabled individual within the meaning of Louisiana Employment Discrimination s Law LEDL LSA R 23 et seq Mr Lindsey asserted that his impairment S 301 resulted from the post traumatic stress disorder PTSD he sustained while fighting in combat in Vietnam He also asserted that his supervisors were well aware of the nature and extent of his disability but nevertheless he was discharged for using profanity which was merely a manifestation of his PTSD Mr Lindsey alleged that his disability was unrelated to his ability to perform the essential duties of his position and that he had successfully performed the duties of his position for more than twentyfive years He further contended that profanity was prevalent in the workplace and to his knowledge no nondisabled employees were terminated for a single instance of the use of profanity Mr Lindsey alleged that his discharge was in violation of the LEDL and he asked for compensatory as well as punitive damages reasonable attorney fees and costs Defendant answered the petition denying the allegations Thereafter on January 21 2010 defendant filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining that defendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Mr Lindsey s termination namely his misconduct including the failure to cooperate in the 3 investigation of the events of June 15 2005 Defendant further claimed that Mr Lindsey failed to present any evidence that his termination for misconduct was a pretext for discrimination due to Mr Lindsey disability s Following a hearing on October 25 2010 the trial court granted s defendant motion for summary judgment and judgment was signed on November 8 2010 dismissing Mr Lindsey claims with prejudice Mr Lindsey s appealed asserting that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment and in failing to utilize the mixed motive framework in analyzing the Iin APPLICABLE LAW A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits if any show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law La C art 9666 P Summary judgment is favored and shall be construed to secure the just speedy and inexpensive determination of every action La C art 966A P 2 The initial burden of proof remains with the movant If the moving parry will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that parry burden on a s motion for summary judgment is to point out an absence of factual support for one or more essential elements of the adverse party claim action or defense s Once the movant has met his initial burden of proof the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial LSAC art 966C P C 2 The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts that show that a genuine issue of material fact remains If the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law Davis v Peoples Benefit Life Ins Co 100194 p 5 La 1 Cir 9 47 App 10 10 3d So 1033 1035 writ denied 10 2440 La 12 51 So 11 see LSA 10 17 3d P C art 966C 2 GI An appellate court reviews a district court decision to grant a motion for s summary judgment de novo using the same criteria that govern the district s court consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate Davis 10 0194 at p 6 47 So at 1036 Because it is the applicable substantive law that 3d determines materiality whether a particular fact in dispute is material for summary judgment purposes can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case Anderson v State Farm Fire Cas Ins Co 10 0036 p 4 La 1 Cir 7 42 So 1140 1143 App 10 16 3d With regard to the present matter LSA R 23 provides in pertinent S 323 part A No otherwise qualified disabled person shall on the basis of a disability be subjected to discrimination in employment B An employer labor organization or employment agency shall not engage in any of the following practices 2 Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an otherwise qualified disabled person with respect to compensation or the terms conditions or privileges of employment on the basis of a disability when it is unrelated to the individual ability to perform s the duties of a particular job or position As set forth in LSA R 23 disabled person is any person who has a S 322 3a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the major life activities or has a record of such an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment Further an otherwise qualified disabled person means a disabled person who with reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such person holds or desires LSAR 23 S 322 8 To defeat a motion for summary judgment against an employment disability claim the claimant must establish a prima facie case that 1 he has a disability as defined by the statute 2 he is qualified for the job and 3 an adverse employment decision was made solely because of the disability Thomas v Louisiana Casino Cruises Inc 03 1937 p 3 La 1 Cir App 04 25 6 886 So 468 470 writ denied 041904 La 10 885 So 2d 04 29 2d 61 598 Hook v Georgia Gulf Corp 992791 p 8 La 1 Cir 1 788 App 01 12 2d So 47 53 writ denied 01 1098 La 6 793 So 200 01 1 2d The Louisiana statutes are similar to the Americans with Disabilities Act ADA 42 U C S 12101 et seq Thus in interpreting Louisiana semployment discrimination laws our courts have relied upon similar federal statutes and the interpreting federal jurisprudence Smith v Thurman Oils Inc 06 0743 p 4 La 1 Cir 12 951 So 359 361 writ denied 070207 La App 06 28 2d 07 23 3 951 So 1106 Thomas 03 1937 at p 3 886 So at 470 2d 2d DISCUSSION In filing the motion for summary judgment defendant argued that Mr stermination was due to his misconduct Defendant further claimed that Lindsey Mr Lindsey failed to establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under LSAR 23 and failed to present evidence that his termination was S 323 pretextual for discrimination because of his PTSD In support of the motion defendant offered several affidavits including that of Mr Lear with his accompanying memorandum concerning the investigation with attached employee statements Defendant also submitted the affidavits of Mr Gachassin Ms Anderson Ms Wingerter Mr Henry Mr Betbeze and Mandy LeGrange a secretary who witnessed the incident on June 15 2005 S U Equal Defendant also offered a copy of an informal discussion letter by the Employment Opportunity Commission regarding the ADA the definition of disability reasonable accommodation and employee misconduct Mr Lindsey argued however that PTSD is a mental disability afforded the protections of the ADA and therefore he only needed to prove that his disability played a part in defendant sdecision He asserted that his use of inappropriate language under circumstances he perceived to be stressful was caused by his PTSD Mr Lindsey also contended that he was the only assistant attorney general ever terminated for inappropriate language He also maintained that the failure to cooperate in the investigation was a non legitimate contrived reason 1 for his discharge because there was no work rule requiring him to submit a written statement In opposition to the summary judgment motion Mr Lindsey submitted a copy of extracts of his records with the U Department of Veteran Affairs the S affidavit of Eric A Whitfield Mr Lindsey treating PTSD psychiatrist in 2004 and s 2005 at the VA hospital in New Orleans the affidavit of John B Sheppard Jr Mr Lindsey ssupervisor as the Director of the Public Protection Division for more than fifteen years prior to his retirement and excerpts from the depositions of Neomie Savoy Human Resource Manager for the Department of Justice Mr Gachassin Ms Wingerter and Mr Foti as well as excerpts from his own deposition Mr Lindsey also submitted a copy of the diagnostic definition of PTSD In granting the motion for summary judgment the trial court in oral reasons initially concluded that PTSD is in fact a disability contemplated by the ADA It then undertook the threeprong analysis required of a plaintiff in a discrimination case The court found that Mr Lindsey suffered from a disability and that his employer was aware of the disability However the court concluded that the third prong of the analysis was not met stating that Mr Lindsey s discharge was based upon safety issues and threats that were made coupled with a refusal to cooperate The trial court found that there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason given by the defendant for the termination in this case Once that was given the burden shifted to Mr Lindsey to prove that it was pretextual and the court found no proof that the discharge was pretextual in any way Accordingly the trial court granted defendant motion for summary s judgment Upon our de novo review of the record we agree that summary judgment was appropriate Once defendant pointed out the absence of an essential element of plaintiff case the burden shifted to Mr Lindsey to make a prima s facie case of disability discrimination under the LEDL Because we find that Mr Lindsey failed to show that the decision to terminate his employment was made iA solely because of his disability we need not address whether he was limited in any of his major life activities and was disabled within the definition under the LEDL Although Mr Lindsey argues that his misconduct was caused by his disability and therefore the adverse employment action was taken because of his disability the LEDL does not provide protection for Mr Lindsey unacceptable s and threatening conduct The first circuit has adopted the position that our antidiscrimination law does not insulate an employee emotional outbursts at s work blamed on an impairment Hook 992791 at p 12 788 So at 55 See 2d also Hamilton v Southwestern Bell Telephone Co 136 F 1047 1052 3d 5 Cir 1998 After a thorough de novo review of the record we conclude that the basis of Mr Lindsey discharge was not discrimination based on his PTSD s but was rather his inappropriate and hostile behavior in a workplace environment as well as his failure to cooperate in the investigation court recognized in Hook As this s Louisiana antidiscrimination law is not a job insurance policy but rather a legislative scheme for correcting illegitimate inequities faced by the disabled An employer must be permitted to terminate its employee on account of egregious misconduct irrespective of whether the employee is disabled The act cannot be interpreted to require an employer to accept egregious behavior by a disabled employee when that same behavior exhibited by a nondisabled employee would require termination Thus firing an employee for conduct caused by his disability is not the equivalent of firing the employee for the disability Hook 992791 at pp 1314 788 So at 56 2d In the Hamilton case a case factually similar to the present matter the employee Hamilton verbally abused and struck a coworker on the job He was terminated for violating the policy on workplace violence Hamilton filed suit under the ADA and asserted that his conduct was caused by PTSD The Fifth 1 The Hook court considered a claim filed under the Louisiana Human Rights Act of 1988 LHRA LSAR 51 etseq which made unlawful discriminatory practices in employment S 2231 Sections 51 through 2245 of the LHRA were repealed by Acts 1997 No 1409 2242 4 effective August 1 1997 and were replaced by Sections 23 et seq of the LEDL See Pierce v 301 State Office of Legislative Auditor 070230 p 12 n La 1 Cir 2984 So 61 3 App 08 8 2d 70 n writ denied 08 0542 La 4 978 So 369 3 08 25 2d Circuit disagreed finding that Hamilton was not terminated because of his disability but rather because he violated his employer policy on workplace s violence The court stated Although Hamilton argues that the incident was caused by his PTSD we are persuaded that the ADA does not insulate An emotional or violent outbursts blamed on an impairment employee who is fired because of outbursts at work directed at fellow employees has no ADA claim The cause of Hamilton discharge was not discrimination s on PTSD but was rather his failure to recognize the acceptable limits of behavior in a workplace environment The nature of the incident shown by the record presents a clear case in which Hamilton was fired for his misconduct in the workplace based We adopt for an ADA claim the wellexpressed reasoning applied in the context of a protected activity retaliatory discharge claim the rights afforded to the employee are a shield against employer retaliation not a sword with which one may threaten or curse supervisors Hamilton can not hide behind the ADA and avoid accountability for his actions Hamilton 136 F at 1052 3d In the case sub judice Mr Lindsey has admitted that he used profanity and made a threatening statement regarding a co worker in the workplace Additionally an investigation was commenced the basis of the inquiry being To Determine if Mr Ian Lindsey was an instrument in contributing to a Hostile Working Environment by using profanities and acting belligerent sic at the Workplace In his affidavit Mr Lear stated that Mr Lindsey failed to cooperate in the initial interview on June 16 2005 and that Mr Lindsey was asked to make a written or typed statement containing his version of the June 15 2005 incident Mr Lear further attested that as of July 18 2005 Mr Lindsey had not provided a statement Mr Henry also stated in his affidavit that on June 16 2005 Mr Lindsey was told that he could make an oral statement at the interview but Mr Lindsey chose not to do so Whether Mr Lindsey was discharged for the use of profanities and making a threatening statement or for his failure to fully cooperate in the investigation we do not find that he was discharged based on disability Accordingly we find no error in the grant of the s defendant motion for summary judgment Z 91 Is ItULIJ 0 For the above and foregoing reasons the November 8 2010 judgment of the trial court dismissing Mr Lindsey sclaims with prejudice is affirmed Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff Ian Douglas Lindsey AFFIRMED lut
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
