State Of Louisiana VS Ranall D. Mauldin
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA FIRST CIRCUIT NO 20 0 KA 1240 STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS RAN D MAULDIN Judgment Rendered June 10 2011 On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Washington State of Louisiana Trial Court No 08 CR5 98044 The Honorable August Hand Judge Presiding Holli Herrle Castillo Attorney for DefendantAppellant Marrero LA Ranall D Mauldin Walter Reed Attorney for the State of Louisiana District Attorney Lewis V Murray III Assistant District Attorney Franklinton LA and Kathryn Landry Baton Rouge LA BEFORE CARTER C GAIDRY AND WELCH JJ J CARTER C I The defendant Ranall D Mauldin was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder a violation of La Rev Stat Ann pleaded not guilty 30 14 The defendant The defendant filed a motion to suppress inculpatory statements and following a hearing on the matter the motion was denied Subsequently a jury trial was held and the defendant was found guilty as charged The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole probation or suspension of sentence The defendant now appeals designating two assignments of error We affirm the conviction and sentence FACTS On February 9 2008 between 6 a and 6 a Bogalusa resident 00 m 30 m Michael Cotton was driving to a restaurant when he observed a man turned in an overturned wheelchair in the ditch along Shriner Drive Cotton called 911 The man later identified as 75 year old Stanley Willett had been shot twice in the head from close range According to the pathologist who performed the autopsy Willett died within minutes after being shot Willett was a paraplegic and thus confined to a wheelchair The investigation by the Bogalusa Police Department quickly led to the defendant as a suspect in Willett murder The defendant had been living across s the street from Willett at the home of the defendant half and sisterin s brother law The defendant knew Willett The police discovered that on February 9 the morning Willett was killed the defendant and Willett went together to the Hancock Bank automated teller machine ATM in Bogalusa At 5 a that morning 17 m Willett withdrew 80 Over the next two days subsequent to Willett death the s defendant withdrew over 1 from Willett bank account using Willett ATM 400 s s 2 card The defendant went to various places in Bogalusa to withdraw the money such as Citizen Savings Bank and Junior Food Mart s When the defendant was apprehended by the police on February 11 he was brought to a detective office at the police station where he gave a recorded s statement After being advised of his Miranda rights the defendant initially denied that he shot Willett The defendant stated he heard that a black man named Charles shot Willett Later however as the questioning continued the defendant admitted that he took Willett ATM card and shot Willett twice The defendant s further stated that he withdrew money using Willett ATM card to buy cocaine s The defendant shot Willett with Willett own gun a 38 revolver Willett carried s with him in a pouch around his waist The defendant stated that after shooting Willett he threw the gun into the woods behind the VFW Hall The police took the defendant to those woods and had him point out the area where he discarded the gun The following day the police found Willett gun where the defendant s indicated it was located The defendant testified at trial that he lied about killing Willett He stated that he told the police he killed Willett only because he was promised by a police officer who questioned him that he would be facing a manslaughter charge instead of a first degree murder charge and a sentence of ten to twenty years The defendant testified that Barry also known as Charles a person from whom the defendant purchased cocaine shot and killed the victim The defendant indicated he had prior convictions for misdemeanor carnal knowledge of a juvenile and theft over 500 The defendant also testified that he had a cocaine addiction FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In his first assignment of error the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement Specifically the defendant contends 3 that one of the police officers questioning him promised him he would face a manslaughter charge instead of a first degree murder charge if he confessed Before a confession can be introduced into evidence it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear duress intimidation menaces threats inducements or promises Ann La Rev Stat 451 15 Confessions obtained by any direct or implied promises however slight or by the exertion of any improper influence are involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law State v Brown 481 So 2d 679 684 La App 1 Cir 1985 writ denied 486 So 2d 747 La 1986 It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a confession is admissible State v Hernandez 432 So 2d 350 352 La App 1 Cir 1983 The trial court s conclusion about the admissibility of a confession or statement if supported by the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal State v Washington 540 So 2d 502 507 La App 1 Cir 1989 Although the burden of proof is generally on the defendant to prove the grounds recited in a motion to suppress evidence such is not the case with the motion to suppress a confession In the latter situation the burden of proof is with the State to prove the confession admissibility s La Code Crim Proc Ann art D 703 The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made freely and voluntarily State v Seward 509 So 2d 413 417 La 1987 Therefore if the defendant alleges police misconduct in eliciting a confession it is incumbent upon the State to rebut these allegations specifically State v Welch 448 So 2d 705 La App 1 Cir writ denied 450 So 2d 952 La 1984 In determining whether the ruling on defendant motion to suppress was correct we s Ell are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case State v Chopin 372 So 2d 1222 1223 n La 1979 2 At the police station Captain Joel Culpepper Detective Tommie Sorrell and Detective Troy Tervalon all of the Bogalusa Police Department were present for the defendant questioning regarding the circumstances of Stanley Willett death s s Captain Culpepper operated the camera while Detectives Sorrell and Tervalon did most of the questioning After about 45 minutes of questioning the interview was stopped while Captain Culpepper and Detective Sorrell took a restroom break Before Captain Culpepper left the interview room he turned off the camera The camera stayed off for about eleven minutes During these eleven minutes where nothing was recorded Detective Tervalon remained in the interview room with the defendant Willett Prior to the elevenminute break the defendant denied shooting After the break when the camera was turned back on the defendant admitted that he shot Willett In his brief the defendant concedes that he was advised of his Miranda rights and was not threatened or physically forced into making the inculpatory statements The defendant argues however that during the elevenminute break from recording Detective Tervalon promised the defendant that if he confessed the detective would see to it that he would be charged with manslaughter instead of first degree murder and therefore the defendant would be facing a ten to twenty year sentence instead of the death penalty At the hearing on the motion to suppress the confession the defendant testified that during the break Detective Tervalon promised him that if he came clean he would get the defendant manslaughter According to the defendant Detective Tervalon told him that if he was charged with first degree murder the E State would seek the death penalty but that if he admitted to manslaughter he would get a ten to twentyyear sentence The defendant further testified that he asked for a lawyer during that time but Detective Tervalon told him that it would not help him to get a lawyer at that time The defendant further stated that no one physically abused him but that he confessed to killing Willett because they promised me that they get me manslaughter if I did it At trial the defendant d testified essentially the same He stated that during the break Detective Tervalon promised him manslaughter and ten to twenty years instead of the death penalty if he confessed Detective Tervalon also said the defendant could help himself by confessing Detective Tervalon testified at the motion to suppress hearing that neither he nor anyone else promised the defendant anything Detective Tervalon further stated that at no time did the defendant request an attorney Detective Tervalon admitted that he told the defendant to come clean and that he could help himself out When asked what he meant by that Detective Tervalon stated By telling the truth to tell the truth to set the record straight meaning that he needed to tell the truth the whole story as to what happened and not bits and pieces Regarding the elevenminute break where Detective Tervalon was alone with the defendant the following colloquy at the hearing took place Q Was there a conversation between you and Mr Maulden before you went back on the tape A Yes sir Q Would you tell the Court what happened there A Just casual conversation I think he asked for a drink I gave him a drink Q Did you get him a drink A Yes sir D Q Okay A I gave him a drink He asked me some just regular questions I told him I felt like he should tell the truth that I think I stated the same things in the recording that people would understand that he had a drug problem If he made a mistake he just needed to tell the truth and you know get it on record as to what had truly occurred Q And at that time he was not on the record A At that time he wasn but I had made that previous statement t prior to Q It was not during that 12 minutes that you said hey if you tell the truth or if you admit to this we get you manslaughter ll A No We can make that decision t Q Did anyone on your behalf say that A No sir Q Or did anyone in your presence say anything of that nature I At trial Detective Tervalon testified on direct examination about the unrecorded eleven minute break when he was alone with the defendant Q Now during the break while Captain Culpepper and Sergeant Sorrell are using the restroom what occurs while you remain in the room with the defendant A Mr Mauldin and I are speaking He asks for a cold drink I gave him one a Coke We had conversation I told him you know he needed to tell the truth you know set his conscious clear and people could understand if he was strung out on drugs and had committed this murder people could understand that that he needed to tell the truth We sat back there for several minutes I want to say Culpepper may have come in and left and eventually everyone came back in the room and we started the interview again Q During that opportunity when you have an occasion to engage in a little bit more casual conversation with the defendant did you feel like you were making a connection with him A I did Q Did you see a response from him towards you that was more favorable than the response he was showing toward Detective Sorrell 7 A Yes sir Detective Tervalon further testified that the defendant never requested an attorney Captain Culpepper and Detective Sorrell also testified at trial that the defendant never requested an attorney The record before us establishes that the defendant confession was free and s voluntary and not made under the influence of fear duress intimidation menaces threats inducements or promises and that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights prior to making a confession while in police custody s defendant claim that Detective Tervalon promised him a conviction The of manslaughter and a reduced sentence is unsupported by the testimonial evidence The State rebutted the defendant allegations specifically and the trial court in s choosing to believe Detective s Tervalon testimony over the s defendant testimony found that no promises were made Detective Tervalon comments to s the defendant that he needed to come clean or tell the truth or that he could help himself by confessing were not promises or inducements designed to extract a confession Compare State v Petterway 403 So 2d 1157 1160 La 1981 State v Dison 396 So 2d 1 125758 La 1981 254 A confession is not rendered inadmissible because officers exhort or adjure an accused to tell the truth provided the exhortation is not accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or which implies a promise of reward State v Robertson 970177 La 98 4 3 712 So 2d 8 31 cent denied 525 U 882 1998 S See also State v Lavalais 950320 La 11 685 So 2d 1048 1053 54 cent denied 522 96 25 S U 825 1997 We also note that the defendant admitted to killing Willett at the motion to suppress hearing On direct examination the following colloquy between defense counsel and the defendant took place 8 Q And as a matter of fact you were strung out on cocaine at the time this incident happened right A Yes sir sure was Q Is this the first person you ever killed A Yes Q Under normal circumstances are you a violent person A No Q Have you ever been convicted of a violent crime before MM Emphasis added At trial the defendant maintained that he did not shoot and kill Willett Instead according to the defendant a person named Barry whom the police never found or identified as an actual person shot and killed Willett During his confession before admitting that he shot Willett the defendant said that a black person named Charles shot Willett At trial the defendant testified that Barry and Charles were the same person On cross examination at trial when the defendant was asked about admitting at the motion to suppress hearing that he killed Willett the following colloquy took place Q Your response is Yes sir sure was Then Mr Alford next s question is That the first person you ever killed s What is your response A I said Yes but I should have answered a little different Q Okay So here we have you under oath back on December 4th 2008 once again saying that you killed Stanley Willett as a result of a question asked by your attorney not by some police officer who you claim of trying to influence you A Like I said that should have been answered differently I took the question the wrong way really On redirect examination defense counsel sought to explain the defendant s admission at the motion to suppress hearing to killing Willett Q Mr Mauldin I think on Monday you and I went over the transcript of your testimony at the motion to suppress A Yes sir Q At that time we both agreed that there was something wrong with that statement on page 39 A Yes sir we sure did Q That it should have been in there Is this the first person you ever seen killed And of course there nothing we can do about that is s there A Right there nothing no s We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court denial of the motion to s suppress Accordingly this assignment of error is without merit SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In his second assignment of error the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction Specifically the defendant contends that he is not guilty of first degree murder because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who shot Willett A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process See U Const amend XIV La Const art I S 2 The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt Jackson v Virginia 443 U 307 319 1979 S The defendant admission to killing s transcript of the motion to suppress hearing The Jackson y illett is actually on page 42 of the original 10 standard of review incorporated in La Code Crim Proc Ann art 821 is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence both direct and circumstantial for reasonable doubt State v Patorno 01 2585 La App 1 Cir 6 822 So 02 21 2d 141 144 When analyzing circumstantial evidence La R 15 provides S 438 that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence Furthermore when the key issue is the defendant s identity as the perpetrator rather than whether the crime was committed the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses and this court will generally not secondguess those determinations State v Hughes 05 0992 La 11 943 So 2d 1 1051 06 29 047 First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of a list of enumerated felonies La Rev Stat Ann 1 30A 14 First degree murder is also the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is sixtyfive years of age or older La Rev Stat Ann 5 30A 14 Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act La Rev Stat Ann 1 10 14 Such state of mind can be formed in an instant State v Cousan 942503 La 11 684 So 2d 96 25 382 390 Specific intent need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant State v Graham 420 So 2d 1 1127 La 1982 The existence of specific intent is an ultimate 126 11 legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact State v McCue 484 So 2d 889 892 La App 1 Cir 1986 Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range are circumstances that will support a finding of specific intent to kill See State v Robinson 021869 La 4 874 So 2d 66 74 cent denied 543 04 14 S U 1023 2004 The defendant asserts in his brief that his confession notwithstanding the only other evidence to prove he killed Willett was circumstantial According to the defendant there was the reasonable hypothesis that his former cocaine dealer whom he knew as Barry committed the murder The defendant further maintains that there was no physical evidence linking him to Willett murder and that he s was able to lead the police to the area where the gun was located only because he had observed Barry throw the gun in that area of the woods The testimony and evidence introduced at trial established that the defendant was with Willett on February 9 2008 at 5 a when Willett withdrew 80 17 m from the ATM machine at Hancock Bank Twenty five minutes later the defendant used Willet ATM card to withdraw 200 at the Citizen Savings s s Bank Almost five hours later at 10 a the defendant made another 200 27 m withdrawal using Willett ATM card at the Junior Food Mart Willett had already s been shot and killed by this time Michael Cotton testified at trial that while driving he discovered Willett body in a ditch between 6 a and 6 a on s 00 m 30 m February 9 Over the next two days the defendant used Willett ATM card seven s more times at various locations withdrawing over 1 400 According to the defendant he used that money to purchase cocaine which he consumed During the defendant questioning by Detectives Sorrell and Tervalon the s defendant admitted that he shot Willett twice When asked how many times the gun was discharged the defendant said he thought it 12 was three times The defendant explained that he took Willett gun and it accidentally discharged s firing a shot into the air The next two shots were then fired at Willett The defendant told the detectives he threw the gun into some woods behind the VFW Hall Police officers took the defendant on the same day he was questioned to the VFW Hall The defendant pointed out the general area where he threw the gun The officers searched only briefly for the gun because it began turning dark limiting their visibility Unable to find the gun officers returned the following morning with a canine trained to smell gunpowder Within two minutes the canine located the gun The gun a revolver had in its cylinder three live rounds and three spent casings The bullet that lodged in Willett head when he was shot s was recovered during Willett autopsy s The trial testimony of Deputy Lloyd Morse an expert in firearms examination confirmed that the bullet in Willett s head was fired from the same gun the defendant had thrown into the woods Christie Taylor the defendant sisterinlaw testified at trial that on the s same day after the defendant was interviewed by the police the defendant called her home where the defendant had also been living from the police station Taylor testified that she asked the defendant if he killed Willett and the defendant admitted that he did that he did not know why and that he was sorry The defendant testified at trial that his confession that he had shot and killed Willett was not true According to his testimony he and Willett were on good terms Willett agreed to lend the defendant 80 After withdrawing the money the defendant kept Willett ATM card because Willett told the defendant to put it in s his defendant pocket As Willett and the defendant were heading toward the s VFW Hall they encountered Barry also known as Charles a person from whom the defendant used to buy a lot of cocaine After briefly conversing Barry asked Willett for some money When Willett refused to give him money Barry grabbed 13 s Willett gun which was beside Willett leg In response to this the defendant s gave Barry the 80 Willett had given the defendant As Willett and the defendant began to move away Barry shot Willett in the head Willett fell in a ditch and his wheelchair fell on top of him Barry then stood over Willett pointed the gun at him and shot again The defendant ran As the defendant was running Barry shot at him and missed The defendant explained that this was where the third gunshot had come from Barry followed the defendant As Barry got near the VFW Hall a car drove near him According to the defendant the approaching car scared Barry which caused Barry to throw the gun into the woods behind the VFW Hall The defendant then made various withdrawals with Willett ATM card over the next s couple of days and bought cocaine The defendant further testified that he did not tell Taylor that he killed Willett According to Detective Tervalon the police did not receive any information during their investigation that suggested someone else other than the defendant killed Willett The jury heard all of the testimony and viewed all of the evidence presented to it at trial and found the defendant guilty as charged circumstantial When a case involves evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant own testimony that hypothesis falls and s the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt State v Captville 448 So 2d 676 680 La 1984 The defendant confessed to shooting Willett yet attempted to retract his own admission of guilt at trial by testifying that someone else shot and killed Willett It is clear from the finding of guilt that the jury concluded the testimony of several of the State s witnesses including Captain Culpepper Detective Sorrell and Detective Tervalon was more credible than the testimony of the defendant 14 The trier of fact is free to accept or reject in whole or in part the testimony of any witness Moreover when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses the matter is one of the weight of the evidence not its sufficiency The trier of fact determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to s appellate review An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a s factfinder determination of guilt State v Taylor 972261 La App 1 Cir 98 25 9 721 So 2d 929 932 The fact that the record contains evidence which conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient State v Quinn 479 So 2d 592 596 La App 1 Cir 1985 We note as well that a finding of purposeful misrepresentation reasonably raises the inference of a guilty mind as in the case of flight following an offense or the case of material misrepresentation of facts by the defendant following an offense Lying has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing Captville 448 So 2d at 680 n The facts in this case established acts of both 4 flight and material misrepresentation by the defendant After killing Willett the defendant fled the scene Instead of attempting to offer aid to Willett or call 911 the defendant used Willett ATM card to withdraw over a thousand dollars of s s Willett money which he used to buy cocaine Further when the defendant gave his statement to the detectives for about 45 minutes he denied that he shot Willett However as his story continually evolved the defendant according to Captain Culpepper and Detectives Tervalon and Sorrell put himself closer and closer to the murder scene until finally he admitted shooting Willett Thus in finding the defendant guilty the jury reasonably rejected misidentification 15 the s defendant theory of After a thorough review of the record we find the evidence clearly negates any reasonable probability of misidentification and supports the jury unanimous s verdict We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defendant in shooting and killing Stanley Willett who was 75 years old was guilty of first degree murder This assignment of error is also without merit CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED Sol
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