State Of Louisiana VS Alvin Betts
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NUMBER 2010 KA 0420 STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS ALVIN BETTS Judgment Rendered September 10 2010 Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Trial Court Number 03 080420 Honorable Louis Daniel Judge Presiding Hillar C Moore III Jesse H Bankston Jr Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Jeanne Rougeau Baton Rouge LA James P Manasseh Counsel for Defendant Appellant Andre Belanger Baton Rouge LA Alvin Betts BEFORE WHIPPLE McDONALD AND McCLENDON JJ WHIPPLE J The defendant Alvin Betts was charged by bill of information with fourth offense DWI a violation of LSAR 14 He pled not guilty The defendant S 98 E filed a motion to quash the bill of information based on an allegedly invalid predicate DWI conviction listed therein quash The trial court denied the motion to Subsequently the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a Crosby plea of guilty to fourth offense DWI reserving his right to challenge the s court ruling on the motion to quash See State v Crosby 338 So 2d 584 588 La 1976 The defendant was sentenced to ten years at hard labor with the first sixty days of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation parole or suspension of sentence The trial court further ordered that the defendant be sentenced to home incarceration for the last four years of his sentence The trial court also imposed a 5 fine The defendant now appeals designating one 00 000 assignment of error We affirm the conviction and sentence FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY The defendant was charged by bill of information with fourth offense DWI committed on or about December 1 2007 The defendant filed a Motion to Quash and a Supplemental Motion to Quash attacking his October 25 2006 predicate DWI conviction on the grounds that he was not advised of his Boykin rights at the April 16 2007 hearing at which he reentered his guilty plea See Boykin v Alabama 395 U 238 242 244 89 S Ct 1709 1711 1713 23 L Ed 2d 274 S 1969 The particular circumstances surrounding the defendant withdrawing his guilty plea and subsequently reentering that same guilty plea are as follows On October 25 2006 the defendant pro se pled guilty to second offense DWI No BR00303968 Baton Rouge City Court Subsequently on January 3 The three DWI predicate convictions were No BR0082493 on July 15 1998 Baton Rouge City Court No BR00303968 on October 25 2006 Baton Rouge City Court and No 3 07 0359 on April 25 2007 19th Judicial District Court 7 2007 the defendant pro se withdrew his October 25 2006 guilty plea and entered a not guilty plea Then on April 16 2007 the defendant pro se reentered his October 25 2006 guilty plea However no Bow colloquy was conducted at this hearing On April 21 2009 a hearing was held on the motion to quash the bill of information based on the defendant allegedly invalid October 25 2006 predicate s DWI conviction The trial court denied the motion On June 19 2009 the defendant filed an application for supervisory writs with this court based on the trial court denial of the motion to quash On August 17 2009 the defendant s entered a Crosbv guilty plea to fourth offense DWI reserving his right to challenge the court ruling on the motion to quash s On September 24 2009 this court denied the defendant writ application as moot holding that in light of the Crosbv s reservation the proper method for review of the matter was by appeal ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In his sole assignment of error the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his October 25 2006 predicate DWI conviction Specifically the defendant contends that when he withdrew his October 25 2006 guilty plea at the January 3 2007 hearing his constitutional rights were restored Thus he contends when he later reentered his guilty plea at the April 16 2007 hearing he should have been advised again of his Boykin rights and should have entered another valid waiver of counsel When a trial court denies a motion to quash factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial s court discretion See State v Odom 2002 2698 p 6 La App Ist Cir 6 03 27 861 So 2d 187 191 writ denied 2003 2142 La 10 855 So 2d 765 03 17 However a trial court legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review s Nine 2 days later on April 25 2007 the defendant pled guilty to his third DWI offense 3 See State v Smith 990606 992094 992015 992019 p 3 La 7 766 So 00 6 2d 501 504 In denying the motion to quash the bill of information urged on the basis of the allegedly invalid predicate offense the trial court stated in pertinent part For whatever reason Mr Betts came back into court on April 16th after having previously been allowed by Judge Alexander to withdraw his guilty plea He came back in and again apparently unrepresented and apparently expressed the interest to reenter that Well one way you can look at it is it just a s guilty plea withdrawal of the withdrawal of the guilty plea so to speak T he next statement by the court Judge Alexander is okay so and the you have already gone over all your rights and everything so and the defendant Mr Betts replies yes ma Which is the court am s exact reference as to the fact that the defendant has already been has already gone over all of his rights previously referring back obviously to both the previous guilty plea form and the colloquy between Judge White and Mr Betts at that time Okay So let me go back to the original guilty plea and discuss it for a second And so we have again where the State has shown a guilty plea in this case uncounseled with a properly executed waiver of rights form There is also a Boykin examination which Judge White at length goes over the defendant constitutional rights with the defendant s The court determined that it a knowingly voluntarily entered and s In January the court allows the intelligently entered plea defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and then the court comes back in April and allows the defendant to reenter the guilty plea Whether the court must go through all of the constitutional rights again and do another waiver of rights form andor colloquy with the defendant and s that the issue that I am presented with squarely in this case What the court simply did as I pointed out the court acknowledges the defendant simply wants to go back to where he was before And the court said do you want to go back to the guilty plea that you previously entered The defendant says yes ma The court am says okay and you have already gone over your rights and everything and so and the defendant says yes ma to that And that am s exactly what the court did And I can say that there is anything t improper about that I not saying it the way I would do it But m s I don find that the trial court had to go back over all of those rights t again I find that the court could from the record in that case find that the defendant was had been advised of and was advised of and made a knowing and voluntary intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights and reentered the guilty plea The finishing of the I left one thing out of my ruling analysis is that under State versus Carlos I think the State has borne the initial burden The defendant has not shown any procedural irregularity in this case Therefore the defense motion to quash is 4 denied and the state has borne it sic burden of proof s In his brief the defendant indicates that at the April 16 2007 hearing he was not advised of his right to counsel or of his Boykin rights He contends that the invalid waivers of counsel and constitutional rights constitute the infringement of rights or procedural irregularities that reverts sic the burden back upon the State to prove the constitutionality of the plea by producing a perfect transcript of the April 16 2007 plea colloquy We do not agree The April 16 2007 hearing did not constitute a defective Boykin colloquy because it was not the Boykin colloquy at all At this brief hearing prior to the defendant being sentenced to a sixmonth suspended sentence the colloquy between the court and the defendant was as follows THE COURT On the traffic ticket it already it already has a date s s It July 12 2007 Okay I previously allowed you to withdraw your guilty plea and enter a not guilty plea and we set it for status You re going to you want to go back to the guilty plea that you previously entered MR BETTS Yes Yes ma am THE COURT Okay So and the your rights and everything so ve you already gone over all MR BETTS Yes ma am The defendant pled guilty at the October 25 2006 hearing withdrew his guilty plea at the January 3 2007 hearing He then At the April 16 2007 hearing the defendant indicated to the court that he wanted to go back to the guilty plea he previously entered Thus the defendant withdrew the withdrawal of his guilty plea which put him in the same position he had been when he entered his guilty plea at the October 25 2006 hearing Accordingly the court at the April 17 2007 hearing was not required to reBoykinize the defendant for a guilty plea for which he had already been Boykinized Our review of the jurisprudence has revealed little regarding the narrow 5 issue in this case namely the validity of a guilty plea that has been reinstated by a court over five months after that initial guilty plea was made While not directly on point State v Gonsoulin 2003 2473 La App 1st Cir 6 886 So 2d 04 25 499 en banc writ denied 20041917 La 12 888 So 2d 835 nonetheless 04 10 provides some support for our decision At a habitual offender hearing the defendant was not informed of his rights namely the right to remain silent However a month earlier the defendant had been fully advised of his rights at his arraignment on the habitual offender bill of information This court in finding the trial court did not err in not advising the defendant of his rights a second time at the habitual offender hearing stated he T defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights at his arraignment and that advice of rights was sufficient to comply with the requirements of LSA R 15 D and 3 The defendant S 529 1 1 who was represented by counsel clearly understood those rights by choosing to remain silent at the arraignment hearing which prompted the setting of the hearing concerning the habitual offender allegations It would be unnecessarily redundant to advise him again of his right to remain silent at the second hearing particularly because the only reason he was there was because he had exercised his right to remain silent after being advised he had this right The law does not expressly state that the court is required to inform the defendant of his rights at each phase of the habitual offender proceeding The law requires that the record demonstrate that the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and accorded the defendant due process of law Gonsoulin 2003 2473 at p 5 886 So 2d at 502 Another factor in support of our conclusion that a valid guilty plea resulted from the April 16 2007 hearing is the defendant own extensive criminal history s as noted by the trial court during sentencing for the instant offense Our review of the presentence investigation report confirms the trial court finding that the s defendant has been engaged in criminal activity for twenty years since 1990 Aside from his four DWI convictions spread out over a decade the defendant has had various drug convictions has received probation many times during his life and is classified by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections as a third 9 felony offender The defendant is no stranger to the criminal justice system and his constitutional rights Given his repeated encounters with the courts in this state we are convinced that he clearly understood that at the April 16 2007 hearing he was merely reentering his original guilty plea for which he had already been properly Boykinized See State v Hart 472 So 2d 280 282 La App 1st Cir 1985 See also State v Leger 2005 0011 p 29 La 7 936 So 2d 108 06 10 134 cert denied 549 U 1221 127 S Ct 1279 167 L Ed 2d 100 2007 State S v Hardesty 93 1280 pp 3 4 La App 1st Cir 4 635 So 2d 755 757 The 94 8 issue to be resolved therefore is whether the defendant October 25 2006 guilty s plea was valid In order for a guilty plea to be used as a basis for actual imprisonment enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony the trial judge must inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives a his privilege against compulsory self incrimination b his right to trial and jury trial where applicable and c his right to confront his accuser The judge must also ascertain that the accused understands what the plea connotes and its consequences If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information the State has the initial burden to prove the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel when it was taken If the State meets this burden the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea If the defendant is able to do this then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State State v Henry 20002250 p 8 La App 1st Cir 5111101 788 So 2d 535 541 writ denied 2001 2299 La 6 02 21 818 So 2d 791 The State will meet this burden by producing a perfect transcript of the guilty plea colloquy Anything less than a perfect transcript such as a guilty plea form or minute entry will require the trial judge to weigh the evidence 7 submitted by both sides and determine whether the defendant Bodkin rights were s prejudiced State v Carlos 981366 p 7 La 7 738 So 2d 556 559 99 Everything that appears in the entire record concerning the predicate as well as the trial judge opportunity to observe the defendant appearance demeanor and s s responses in court should be considered in determining whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights occurred Boykin only requires that a defendant be informed of the three rights enumerated above The jurisprudence has been unwilling to extend the scope of Boykin to include advising the defendant of any other rights which he may have Hei 20002250 at pp 89 788 So at 541 2d Additionally an uncounseled DWI conviction may not be used to enhance punishment of a subsequent offense absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel When an accused waives his right to counsel in pleading guilty to a misdemeanor the trial court should expressly advise him of his right to counsel and to appointed counsel if he is indigent The court should further determine on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently under the circumstances Factors bearing on the validity of this determination include the age education experience background competency and conduct of the accused as well as the nature complexity and seriousness of the charge Determining the s defendant understanding of the waiver of counsel in a guilty plea to an uncomplicated misdemeanor requires less judicial inquiry than determining his understanding of his waiver of counsel for a felony trial Generally the court is not required to advise a defendant who is pleading guilty to a misdemeanor of the dangers and disadvantages of self representation The critical issue on review of the waiver of the right to counsel is whether the accused understood the waiver What the accused understood is determined in terms of the entire record and not just by certain magic words used by the judge Whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel is a question which depends on the U facts and circumstances of each case State v Cadiere 990970 pp 3 4 La App 1st Cir 2 754 So 2d 294 297 writ denied 20000815 La 11 774 00 18 00 13 0 6 4011 At the October 25 2006 Boykin hearing the defendant was unrepresented by counsel However after the court ascertained the defendant address and date s of birth the following colloquy in pertinent part took place between the court and the defendant Q Mr Betts as I appreciated you and Mr Bell the prosecutor have worked out an agreement where you will be accepting responsibility for a DWI Second Offense ah on August 26 2006 A Yes sir um and in consideration therefore the government will be dismissing certain other charges against you Is that correct Q A Yes sir DWI Second Offense Q Well sir when you plead guilty to you give up certain important legal rights that I have going sic over in details earlier this morning Were you in the courtroom for that explanation A Yes sir Q Did you hear and understand what was said A Yes sir Q Do you have any questions about your legal rights then A No sir trial Q What I went over in more detail sir was the right to a while conducting your trial you would have the right to be represented by a licensed attorney at that time And if unable to hire one to have one appointed by the Court to defend you You have the right to d confront and cross examine your accusers the right to compulsory process of witnesses the right against self incrimination the presumption of innocence and the right to insist that the government prove beyond all reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense to which you are pleading guilty Do you understand that A Yes sir Q So your exposure for punishment sir is a fine of up to One 7 Thousand Dollars or six months imprisonment either or both Do you understand that A Yes sir Furthermore the DWI is an escalating punishment or stepladder type of offense such that if you repeat this conduct again you would be subject to prosecution as a felon Do you Q understand that A Yes sir Q Okay So do you still plead guilty to the ah DWI Second Offense in consideration for the dismissal of the other charges mindful of the legal rights that you giving up and your exposure for re punishment A Yes sir THE COURT The Court declares that Mr Alvin Earl Betts Jr has knowledgeable voluntary sic and intelligently waived the legal and constitutional rights applicable to the case Notably the defendant also signed a Waiver of Rights Acknowledgment and Acceptance of Plea form The rightswaiver form signed by the court and the defendant indicated the defendant understood that he was pleading guilty and giving up the flight to an attorney and if unable to afford an attorney service s right to a courtappointed attorney at no cost to defendant The form also stated I further understand that self representation has the disadvantage that I may not know as much about the criminal justice system as an attorney would Additionally the box on the form stating I AM WAIVING RIGHT TO COUNSEL was checked In Carlos the defendant had been represented by counsel at the time he entered his prior guilty plea Our supreme court therefore had no occasion to discuss how the presumption of regularity would apply to a case in which the defendant entered his prior guilty plea while unrepresented by counsel but after executing a waiver of his right to counsel recorded in the contemporaneous documents of the guilty plea as in the instant matter See State v Deville 2004 10 1401 p 4 La 7 879 So 2d 689 691 per curiam In Deville the Supreme 04 2 court noted that its decision in Carlos entitled the State to rely on the waiver form in discharging its initial burden of proving a prior valid DWI conviction Deville 2004 1401 at p 5 879 So 2d at 691 The Supreme court then found If a court may in the context of a collateral attack on a prior conviction used in recidivist proceedings presume from the fact of conviction alone i e from a silent record that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial then a court may also presume from a record which is not silent with respect to the waiver of counsel that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent decision to proceed without the guiding hand of an attorney and that the trial court would not have accepted the waiver if the contrary had appeared Deville 20041401 at p 5 879 So 2d at 691 92 The transcript of the October 25 2006 Bow hearing indicates the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights and that he would be waiving those rights by pleading guilty A wellexecuted waiverofrights form including the waiver of the right to counsel was signed by the court and the defendant on the same day as the October 25 2006 hearing The defendant has failed to produce any affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea Accordingly the State proved a valid guilty plea and a valid waiver of counsel at the defendant October 25 2006 guilty plea hearing s Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to quash The assignment of error is without merit SENTENCING ERROR Under LSAC art 920 we are limited in our review to errors P Cr 2 discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence After a careful review of the record we have found a sentencing error See State v Price 2005 2514 pp 18 25 La App 1st Cir 06 28 12 952 So 2d 112 123 125 en banc writ denied 20070130 La 11 08 22 2 976 So 2d 1277 As part of the defendant tenyear sentence at hard labor the trial court s ordered that the defendant be sentenced to home incarceration for the last four years of his sentence Louisiana Revised Statutes 14 provides that c 3 E 98 offenders sentenced to home incarceration shall be subject to all other applicable provisions of LSAC art 894 The trial court erroneously relied on the P Cr 2 recently amended LSAC art 894 by 2009 La Acts No 159 P Cr G 2 1 which provides that the sentence for home incarceration shall be for a period of not more than four years in felony cases The defendant committed the instant offense on December 1 2007 A defendant must be sentenced according to sentencing provisions in effect at the time of the commission of the offense State v Sugasti 2001 3407 p 4 La 6 820 So 2d 518 520 Prior to the change in 2009 02 21 Article 894 provided that the portion of a sentence allowed to be served by home 2 incarceration shall be for a period of not more than two years in felony cases Under the applicable law therefore the portion of the defendant sentence s imposed as home incarceration should not have exceeded two years Accordingly the sentence of four years for home incarceration is illegally lenient However since the sentence is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant and neither the State nor the defendant has raised this sentencing issue on appeal we decline to correct this error See Price 2005 2514 at pp 21 22 952 So 2d at 12425 For the above and foregoing reasons the defendant conviction and s sentence are affirmed CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED 12
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
