LAURA HUDSON (NOW STANBERY) V. DONALD HUDSON
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE. DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: AUGUST 25, 2011
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2011-SC-000091-DGE
LAURA HUDSON (NOW STANBERY)
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2009-CA-002392-ME
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 09-CI-503251
V.
APPELLEE
DONALD HUDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed an
order of the family court modifying the father's child support obligation. The
family court entered its order prior to this Court's April 2010 decision in Artrip
v. Noe, 311 S.W.3d 229 (Ky. 2010). We remand to the family court with
directions to recalculate child support in light of this Court's directives in
A rtrip.
The parties were married February 19, 1993. The marriage was
dissolved by decree entered January 19, 1996 in Jefferson Circuit Court The
parties are the parents of a son born July 28, 1994, and per the decree,
Appellee (the father) paid child support in the amount of $210 per month. In
August of 2009, Appellant (the mother) moved for an increase in child support.
The father is employed as a high school assistant principal, earning
approximately $86,000 per year. The mother is currently disabled, receiving
Social Security disability benefits in the amount of $1,026 per month. The son,
as the mother's dependent, receives $513 per month in Social Security. The
money is kept in a savings account for the son's college, though the mother
testified that she sometimes makes withdrawals for her son's unexpected
needs.
At the hearing, the primary dispute between the parties was over the
proper treatment of the son's $513 per month Social Security payment in
calculating the father's child support obligation. The mother argued that, while
her Social Security disability payments constituted gross income, the payments
to the son should not be considered to be part of her income for child support
calculation purposes. The father argued that, given the son's independent
source of income from Social Security, application of the child support
guidelines in KRS 403.212(7) would be inappropriate, and that a deviation was
warranted. See KRS 403.211(2) ("Courts may deviate from the guidelines
where their application would be unjust or inappropriate."); KRS 403.211(3)(d)
(permitting deviation from the guidelines based on the independent financial
resources of the child).
The family court concluded that a deviation from the child support
guidelines was proper "based on the 'child's receipt of Social Security benefits
related to Mother's disability." The court found that the son's Social Security
income constituted "an emergency nest egg and college fund" that, when
2
combined with regular child support from the father, would result in a windfall
to the son, and that this justified a deviation from the standard child support
guidelines. The family court considered the parties' combined income
(excluding the son's Social Security benefits) and found that the parties' base
monthly support obligation to the son totaled $969 per month. The court
reduced this base monthly total by $513 (the amount of the son's Social
Security payments). The family court then calculated the father's portion of
this reduced base obligation to be $369.72 per month, and modified the
father's child support obligation accordingly.
The mother appealed to the Court of Appeals, filing her brief prior to this
Court's decision in Artrip v. Noe. In Artrip, this Court concluded that Social
Security benefits received by a child as a result of a parent's disability—unlike
other types of benefits, such as SSI—are not the type of "independent financial
resources" that would permit a deviation from the child support guidelines
pursuant to KRS 403.211(3)(d). 311 S.W.3d at 233. 1
Atrip became final before the mother's reply brief was due in the Court of
Appeals, giving the mother's counsel an opportunity to cite the case. However,
the mother's counsel chose not to file a reply brief. In its opinion, the Court of
Appeals noted the mother's counsel's failure to cite Artrip, while also
'In Artrip, this Court also interpreted KRS 403.211(15), and held that the nondisabled parent is not entitled to a credit against that parent's child support
obligation for Social Security disability payments to the child grounded upon the
disability of the other parent. 311 S.W.3d at 232. In this case, the father did not
attempt to claim a credit against his child support obligation based on KRS
403.211(15), and that issue is not before us.
3
recognizing that Artrip had "facts virtually indistinguishable from those before
us."
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the mother had failed to
preserve the error, because her brief to the Court of Appeals failed to comply
with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), which requires that the beginning of each argument in
an appellant's brief contain "a statement with reference to the record showing
whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what
manner." Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that, while the mother's
"argument would be persuasive" if properly preserved, the family court's child
support calculations did not amount to manifest injustice under CR 61.02.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the family court; this Court then
granted discretionary review.
The facts in this case are undisputed. The only issue is one of law, i.e.,
whether a deviation from the child support guidelines is proper based on the
Social Security benefits received by the son as a result of the mother's
disability. In Artrip, this Court concluded that such a deviation is not proper,
and amounts to an abuse of discretion by the family court. 311 S.W.3d at 233.
The Court of Appeals tacitly acknowledged this, but held that the mother had
failed to preserve the issue, because her brief did not comply with CR
76.12(4)(c)(v). The Court of Appeals erred in this conclusion. Error
preservation is distinct from the requirements of CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).
4
The purpose of CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) 2 is "to save the appellate court the time
of canvassing the record in order to determine if the claimed error was properly
preserved for appeal." Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. App. 1990)
(quoting 7 Bertelsman and Phillips, Kentucky Practice, CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv),
Comment 4 (4th ed. 1989 supp.)). However, a failure to comply with CR
76.12(4)(c)(v) does not render a properly preserved issue unpreserved; rather, a
substantial failure to comply permits the appellate court to strike the
noncompliant brief. CR 76.12(8)(a). 3 The exercise of an appellate court's
authority to strike a brief that does not comply with CR 76.12 is, however,
discretionary. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Ky. App.
2007) ("While Simmons's brief did not fully comply with the rule, dismissal for
failure to comply with the provisions of CR 76.12 is discretionary rather than
mandatory."); Baker v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 180 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Ky.
App. 2005) ("But dismissal based upon a failure to comply with CR 76.12 is not
automatic."); see also Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Ky.
2009) (exercising discretion and not striking a brief for a technical violation of
CR 76.12).
In particular, Kentucky's appellate courts have been reluctant to strike a
brief for violation of CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) when the record is not voluminous and
preservation is clear from the face of the record. In Corvette v. Holiday Inn
2
Formerly CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv), renumbered CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) effective February 1, 2001.
3
Where an appellant has failed to comply with CR 76.12 with respect to a particular
argument, an appellate court is also free to disregard that argument, rather than
strike the entire brief. See Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583, 587 n.11 (Ky.
2008); Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Ky. App. 2006).
5
Express, an appeal from a summary judgment, the appellant's brief failed to
comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) (current CR 76.12(4)(c)(v)). 32 S.W.3d 106, 109
(Ky. App. 2000). The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded "that the failure
to comply with the rule is not fatal in this instance because the record consists
only of a few pleadings, a few brief hearings related to the motions for summary
judgment, and a few very brief depositions." Id. In Baker v. Campbell County
Board of Education, the appellant appealed from a motion to dismiss, but failed
to comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). 180 S.W.3d at 481-82. The Court of Appeals
noted that "dismissal based upon a failure to comply with CR 76.12 is not
automatic. In fact, as the record in this case is sparse and it is clear that
Baker vigorously opposed the [appellee's) motion to dismiss, sanctions for
Baker's technical violation of CR 76.12 are not warranted." Id. at 482
(footnotes omitted).
The written record in this case consists of 75 pages, and much of that is
from the parties' original divorce action in 1995 and 1996. The proceedings in
this case consist of a 21-minute hearing. The facts are undisputed and the
record is uncomplicated. The only disputed issue before the family court was
the proper treatment of the son's Social Security payments in calculating the
father's child support obligation. While the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the issue was unpreserved, we opine that, as in Corneae and
Baker, striking the mother's brief in this case would have been too harsh a
penalty given that preservation was clear from the face of the limited record. 4
Artrip is authority clearly on point, which this Court did not render until
after the mother tendered her brief in the Court of Appeals. Although an issue
may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief, see Catron v. Citizens Union
Bank, 229 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Ky. App. 2006), an appellant is, of course, free to cite
new authority in a reply brief. Also, this Court routinely grants motions for
leave to file supplemental authority when new cases are rendered after briefing
has been completed. However, even when the parties fail to cite clearly
controlling legal authority, the Court of Appeals is still bound by the
precedents of this Court. See SCR 1.030(8)(a) ("The Court of Appeals is bound
by and shall follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the
Supreme Court and its predecessor court."); Dutschke v. Jim Russell Realtors,
Inc., 281 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Ky. App. 2008); Wright v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 161
S.W.3d 341, 345 (Ky. App. 2004); Smith v. Vilvarajah, 57 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Ky.
App. 2000).
This case falls squarely within the holding of Artrip v. Noe, 311 S.W.3d at
233. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Family Court for
consideration under Art rip.
4
The mother's counsel has, unfortunately, once again failed to comply with CR
76.12(4)(c)(v) in his brief to this Court. We decline to strike the mother's brief,
however, for the reasons just stated.
7
Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, Scott, and Venters,
JJ., concur. Noble, J., dissents herein for the reasons stated in her dissent in
Artrip v. Noe.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
John T. Fowler III
121 S. 7th St., 4th Floor
Suite 400
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Christy Hanley Shircliff
De Renzo Durrett, PLLC
239 S. 5th St., Suite 600
Louisville, KY 40202
8
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