SOUTHERN FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY V. HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, (PIKE CIRCUIT COURT), ET AL.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
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2010-SC-000244-MR
SOUTHERN FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
DATE
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2009-CA-002183
PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 07-CI-00114
HONORABLE STEVEN D . COMBS
(PIKE CIRCUIT COURT) ; AND
ROGER MULLINS (ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF VALERIE MULLINS)
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Southern Financial Life Insurance Company appeals from an order of the
Court of Appeals denying its petition for a writ to compel the trial court to
dismiss a complaint filed against it on the basis of the filed-rate doctrine
Because we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion2 in
denying the writ, we affirm.
a
See Commonwealth ex. rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Companies, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48,
51 (Ky.App. 1999) ("In general terms, the filed rate - or filed tariff - doctrine
provides that tariffs duly adopted by a regulatory agency are not subject to
collateral attack in court .") .
Saleha v. Schrand, 300 S .W.3d 177, 180 (Ky. 2009) ("Whether to grant or deny a
writ . . . is within the sound discretion of the court with which the petition is filed.
Thus, an appellate court ultimately reviews that decision for an abuse of
discretion.") (citations omitted) .
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS.
Roger Mullins's late wife, Valerie Mullins, filed a purported class action
in circuit court alleging problems with insurance she had purchased from
Southern . After Valerie Mullins died, Roger Mullins, as Administrator of her
Estate, "moved to file a second amended complaint naming himself as the party
plaintiff." Southern "did not oppose this amendment, as the substance of the
complaint did not change ."3
Mullins then filed a Third Amended Complaint. Southern moved to
dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 12 .02 (fl for failure to state a claim. Southern asserted that the
third amended complaint alleged for the first time in the litigation that
Southern's premiums were excessive and illegal. Southern contended that any
challenge to the lawfulness of its premiums was barred under the filed-rate
doctrine because its premiums had been approved by the Kentucky
Department of Insurance .4
Southern further stated in its motion that the alleged charging of
excessive or unlawful premiums "is the only new claim in the third amended
complaint" and that the remaining allegations in the third amended complaint
had already been stated in the second amended complaint. So Southern
Other than the third amended complaint, which is directly at issue, none of the
other complaints filed by the Mullinses are included in the limited record we are
provided with in this writ case .
In the alternative, Southern argued that, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, these new allegations of unlawful premiums should be referred to the
Kentucky Department of Insurance and that the case should be stayed "in its
entirety until resolution by the Department ."
demanded dismissal of the third amended complaint and reinstatement of the
second amended complaint.
In Mullins's response to the motion to dismiss, Mullins essentially
argued that Southern had misunderstood the nature of the new allegations in
the third amended complaint. Mullins asserted that he was not arguing that
the rates themselves were excessive or unlawful but rather that Southern had
improperly charged the statutory "credit health insurance" rates5 without
meeting the requirements for a "credit health insurance" under Kentucky law.6
Accordingly, he asserted that the filed-rate doctrine was inapplicable because
the Department of Insurance had not adopted the rates at issue ; but, rather,
the rates were statutorily adopted under Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 304.19-080(4) .
Southern contended in its reply brief that the insurance product that
Mullins had bought from Southern was not a credit health insurance product
regulated by Subtitle 19 of the Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS 304 .19-010,
et. seq.) but, rather, was a debtor group insurance product regulated by
,See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 304.19-080(4) (which provides that "[t]he
following premium rates, or actuarially equivalent rates, shall be charged for the
coverages set forth hereunder" for credit health insurance and then provides a
chart of premium rates) .
See KRS 304 .19-010 ("All life insurance and all health insurance in connection
with loans or other credit transactions shall be subject to the provisions of this
subtitle, except health insurance in connection with a loan or other credit
transaction of more than five (S) years' duration or life insurance in connection
with a loan or other credit transaction of more than ten (10) years' duration ; nor
shall insurance be subject to the provisions of this subtitle, where the issuance of
such insurance is an isolated transaction on the part of the insurer not related to
an agreement or a plan for insuring debtors of the creditor .") . We note that what is
referred to as "credit health insurance" in Kentucky is elsewhere known as "credit
disability insurance."
Subtitle 16 of the Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS 304.16-010, et. seq.) . It
asserted that the rates at issue were filed with the Department of Insurance as
a Subtitle 16 Group Debtor Insurance product and approved by the
Department, and that any claims of excessive or unlawful premiums were
therefore barred under the filed-rate doctrine .
The trial court entered a written order denying the motion to dismiss,
stating that it had reviewed the parties' pleadings and heard argument of
counsel. But the written order did not explain the reasoning underlying its
ruling.?
Southern then filed a petition for a writ in the Court of Appeals seeking
to compel the trial court to dismiss the third amended complaint. Southern
argued that the trial court should have dismissed the third amended complaint
under the filed-rate doctrine and that a writ should issue to compel dismissal
of the third amended complaint because "[i]n ignoring this [filed-rate] doctrine,
the Pike Circuit Court is acting outside of its jurisdiction and attempting to
adjudicate a matter lying squarely within the exclusive province of the
[Kentucky Department of Insurance] ."
The Court of Appeals denied the writ rejecting application of the filed-rate
doctrine . But the Court of Appeals did take note of possible bases for the
argument that the filed-rate doctrine should apply. The court noted that
Mullins's allegation that a question common to the class she purported to
While it is possible that the trial court orally explained the reasons for its ruling to
the parties at some point, any such oral explanation is not contained in the limited
record provided to us .
represent was "[w]hether the premiums charged for the credit disability
insurance exceeded the premiums allowable under Kentucky law ." The court
also noted other allegations in the complaint that Southern "failed or refused to
notify [its customers] that the premiums charged and collected violated
Kentucky law" and that "the policies and practices of Southern . . . violate
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 304 .12-010 et seq. and 304 .12-230 in that
`credit disability' insurance premiums were charged to and collected from
[certain class members or customers] although the insurance product did not
comply with Kentucky law." The Court of Appeals further noted Mullins's
expert disclosure statement indicating that a proposed expert would testify
about damages suffered by class members because of premiums charged in
excess of the "statutorily mandated premium" as well as what would be an
"actuarially appropriate premium" for class members sold "something other
than a credit health product or a credit life product."
Despite the fact that some of these allegations and the subject matter of
proposed expert testimony seem on their face to attack the legality of
Southern's premium rates, the Court of Appeals accepted Mullins's argument
that the third amended complaint did not actually attack the reasonableness of
the rates, which it viewed as having been set by the legislature . It explained
that the filed-rate doctrine was not applicable because Mullins did not attack
"the rates established under Kentucky law, but rather the way in which
[Southern) applied those statutory rates" and that the trial court therefore had
jurisdiction to hear Mullins's claims :
Petitioner [Southern] contends that the lower court is acting
outside of its jurisdiction by entertaining claims that are within the
sole province of the Kentucky Department of Insurance under the
"filed rate" doctrine. The filed rate doctrine provides that rates
approved by a regulatory agency are immune from challenge in
court. Com. ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Co., 8 S .W .3d 48, 51
(Ky .App. 1999) .
Here, the questions of law and fact presented by the third
amended complaint will be settled through the interpretation of the
certificates of insurance issued to Ms . Mullins and by the
application of various Kentucky statutes to the facts . Both
contract interpretation and statutory construction are questions of
law to be decided by the trial court. See Equitania Ins. Co. v.
Slone & Garrett, P.S.C., 191 S .W.3d 552, 556 (Ky. 2006) ; Osborne v.
Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Ky. 2006) .
In this case, the real party in interest argues in the third
amended complaint that the product sold to Ms. Mullins did not
qualify under Kentucky law as "credit health insurance," and thus,
the use of the statutory "credit health insurance" rates violated
Kentucky law. For example, the real party in interest argues that,
pursuant to Kentucky law, the statutory rates for credit health
insurance are to be used for loans not exceeding sixty months in
duration. KRS 304 .19-080(4) . Because the disability product sold
to Mrs . Mullins was issued for one loan with a period of seventythree months and another loan with a period of one hundred eight
months, [Mullins] claims that the product sold to Mrs . Mullins did
not qualify under Kentucky law as "credit health insurance ." The
real party in interest's [Mullins's] claims that petitioner [Southern]
charged premiums that violate Kentucky law is not an attack on
the rates established under Kentucky law, but rather the way in
which [Southern] applied those statutory rates . Therefore, the filed
rate doctrine is not applicable and [Mullins's] claims fall within the
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction .
Southern argues that a writ must issue because the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims alleging excessive or unlawful
premiums under the filed-rate doctrine:$
Southern does not argue that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine . Southern states in its reply brief that
"the primary jurisdiction doctrine and questions of deference to agency decisions
Southern contends that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
"the allegations of the third amended complaint present only matters of
contractual and statutory interpretation." It further argues that the Court of
Appeals "erroneously held that, because Mr . Mullins claims that the products
at issue violate Section 19 of the Insurance Code, KRS 304 .19-010, et seq., and
he is not directly challenging the premium rates established by that Subtitle,
the filed-rate doctrine does not apply in this case." It claims that the insurance
product at issue was actually approved by the Kentucky Department of
Insurance as a Subtitle 169 "debtor group product" rather than as a
"Subtitle 19 credit disability product"l0 and that the Court of Appeals relied
upon the wrong Subtitle of the Insurance Code and erroneously concluded that
the filed-rate doctrine did not apply. Mullins responds that the trial court
should sort out the facts and applicable law, including resolving whether
Subtitle 16 or Subtitle 19 - or perhaps both - apply.
Upon our review of the limited record before us, we are not so firmly
convinced that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the third amended
complaint or otherwise acted so erroneously that a writ should issue . We
conclude that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying a
9
10
are irrelevant to this appeal" and that "only the Circuit Court's failure to apply the
filed rate doctrine presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction ."
See KRS 304.16-010 ("This subtitle applies only to group life insurance and may be
known and cited as the `Group Life Insurance Law."') .
Subtitle 19 of the Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS 304 .19-010 et. seq.) is nominated
as governing "Credit Life Insurance and Credit Health Insurance ."
writ, and we do not elect to exercise our discretion to issue a writ even if
circumstances might otherwise permit. issuance of a writ.
II. ANALYSIS.
As this Court has frequently made clear, a writ is an extraordinary
remedy which may only be permitted in very limited circumstances II and the
granting of writs is disfavored . 12 Even where the petitioner is able to establish
the prerequisites to make a writ available, "whether to grant the writ is in the
sound discretion of the Court." 1 3
Because writs are disfavored and the granting of writs is discretionary
even where prerequisites for the availability of writs are met, we conclude that
the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for a
writ to compel dismissal of the third amended complaint under the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) ("A writ of prohibition may be
12
13
granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to
an intermediate court ; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act
erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy
by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the
petition is not granted.") .
Powell v. Graham, 185 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2006) .
Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W .3d 49, 53 (Ky. 2007)
("This is not to say, however, that the appellant is automatically entitled to the
requested writ. The appellant must still satisfy the Hoskins writ standard for the
remedy even to be available . Even then, whether to grant the writ is in the sound
discretion of the Court ."). See also id. at 56 . ("when the remedy of a writ is
available, whether to grant it remains within the sound discretion of the court
hearing the petition, or, as in this case, the court hearing the appeal of the writ
action .").
Southern did not clearly attack the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the
claims in its motion to dismiss because its motion to dismiss was not expressly
premised on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction . 14
More precisely, the basis
of its motion to dismiss was failure to state a claim, 15 citing the filed-rate
doctrine. 16
Although Southern did not clearly argue to the trial court that it lacked
jurisdiction, we are aware that lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time. 17 But from our review of the limited record before us, it does not
appear so clear to us that a writ should issue on the basis of the trial court's
lacking jurisdiction or acting erroneously in not dismissing the third amended
complaint under the filed-rate doctrine . It appears to us more accurate to say
that the parties have fundamentally different understandings of the facts and
issues presented and that the trial court - not this Court - must necessarily
resolve such fundamental factual controversies as (1) which particular
insurance products are implicated in Mullins's claims of statutory violations
and (2) whether any particular insurance product was sold as "credit health
insurance" under Subtitle 19 of the Insurance Code.
14
15
16
17
See CR 12.02(a) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) .
See CR 12 .02 (fl (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) .
Southern also stated an alternative basis for relief that the trial court "should" refer
questions concerning the legality of premiums to the Department of Insurance
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction . We note that it appears that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction would not necessarily indicate that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction . See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed . 2004)
(defining primaryjurisdiction doctrine as "[a] judicial doctrine whereby a court tends
to favor allowing an agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in
which the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.") (emphasis added) .
Kentucky Employers Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S. W.3d 9, 15 (Ky. 2007) .
According to Mullins, the primary claim asserted in the third amended
complaint is that Southern violated Kentucky law by charging statutory rates
for "credit health insurance" under KRS 304 .19-080(4) 18 when the insurance
sold did not qualify as "credit health insurance" under KRS 304 .19-010
because it was issued in connection with a loan of more than five years'
duration . Although this argument may appear to involve a challenge to a rate,
we agree with the Court of Appeals majority that the gist of this claim appears
to be violation of state law (KRS 304 .19-010) by improperly selling "credit
health" insurance policies that do not qualify as "credit health" insurance
policies-not necessarily a challenge to the rates established for "credit health
insurance" in KRS 304.19-080(4) .
Southern contends that the rates at issue here were actually approved by
the Kentucky Department of Insurance under Subtitle 16 of.the Insurance
Code,' KRS 304 .16-010 et seq., which purports to govern life insurance
contracts rather than under Subtitle 19 of the Insurance Code . Mullins
contends that the trial court should resolve the question of whether Subtitle 16
or Subtitle 19 or both apply to the instant case .
We are inclined to agree with Mullins, especially on the limited record
provided to us in this writ case, because we cannot discern for example,
whether Southern was employing the statutory premium rates or actuarially
1s
KRS 304 .19-080 appears somewhat unusual in that the legislature actually
determines certain rates to be offered itself instead of, for example, delegating
authority to an administrative agency such as the Department of Insurance to
approve rates sought by insurance companies. See KRS 304 .19-080(7) ("The
foregoing rates and procedures are deemed to be legislative prerogatives and shall
not be subject to administrative or executive change or modification .") .
10
equivalent rates provided in KRS 304 .19-080(4) or whether the Department of
Insurance approved some other schedule of rates filed by Southern for
insurance policies governed by Subtitle 16 of the Insurance Code or some other
provision of the Insurance Code .
Southern appended to its petition copies of correspondence in which its
Compliance Manager requested approval of a "Debtor Group Gross/Net
Program" and "Debtor Group Certificate [s,]" which appear to be stamped as
"approved" by the Kentucky Department of Insurance . But even this
correspondence does not directly refer to which Subtitles of the Insurance Code
are applicable and does not specifically indicate the rates that were approved .
Nor can we ascertain whether this correspondence actually refers to the
products for which Mullins has asserted claims in the third amended
complaint . And perhaps there is some confusion about what insurance
products are actually at issue as evidenced by the following footnote in
Southern's reply to Mullins's response to the motion to dismiss :
This case has raised claims from the beginning concerning the
scope of [Mullins's] credit disability benefits under Southern's
Debtor Group certificates purchased by Mrs . Mullins . While
[Mullins] seems to imply in his opposition .that he is making credit
life and other expanded product claims, Southern has inadequate
notice from the pleadings of such an expansion of Plaintiff's claims
to involve other Southern products .
In short, the parties seem to have fundamentally different
understandings about what is at issue before the trial court, particularly any
new claims raised in the third amended complaint. We believe that such
issues must be resolved by the trial court rather than prematurely addressed
in a writ action.
If, in the course of further litigation, Mullins directly attacks the legality
of a rate charged by Southern and Southern offers proof that such rate was
approved by the Department of Insurance, perhaps Southern could obtain
relief through means of a properly supported motion for partial summary
judgment based upon the filed-rate doctrine. But on the limited record before
us now, we will not issue a writ to require the trial court to dismiss the third
amended complaint given the state of confusion concerning what types of
insurance are at issue, whether the rates at issue were approved by the
Department of Insurance, what allegations are made, and what relief is sought
by Mullins .
III. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals
denying the petition for a writ.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jason Charles Kuhlman
Jeffrey C . Mando
Adams, Stepner, Woltermann & Dusing, PLLC
40 West Pike Street
P. O. Box 861
Covington, Kentucky 41012-0861
12
Joseph L. Hamilton
Marjorie Ann Farris
Stites Ss Harbison
400 West Market Street
Suite 1800
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3352
Russell H. Davis, Jr.
Baird & Baird, PSC
162 Second Street
P. O. Box 351
Pikeville, Kentucky 41502-0351
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
HONORABLE STEVEN D . COMBS
(PIKE CIRCUIT COURT) :
Steven Daniel Combs
Circuit Judge, Division II
Hall of Justice, Suite 423
172 Division Street
Pikeville, Kentucky 41501
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
ROGER MULLINS (ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF VALERIE MULLINS) :
Miller Kent Carter
Herman Michael Lucas
Miller Kent Carter and Michael Lucas, PLLC
P. O . Box 852
Pikeville, Kentucky 41502
Richard Eric Circeo
Wilkes & McHugh, P.A.
429 North Broadway
Lexington, Kentucky 40508
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