THE COURIER-JOURNAL, INC.; ET AL. V. LEONARD LAWSON; ET AL.
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2009-SC-000756-I
THE COURIER-JOURNAL, INC. ;
.
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER CO .,
AND ASSOCIATED PRESS
V.
BAT F=
S 1,1211
MOVAN S
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2009-CA-001530-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 09-CI-01155
LEONARD LAWSON ;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
RESPONDENTS
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT
BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION .
The Courier-Journal, Inc. ; Lexington Herald-Leader Co . ; and the
Associated Press (Movants) have filed a motion under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 65 .09 asking us to modify or vacate an order of the Court of
Appeals dismissing their motion for CR 65.07 relief from a temporary
injunction issued by the Franklin Circuit Court. Movants had asked the Court
of Appeals ,to dissolve a temporary injunction issued by the Franklin Circuit
Court enjoining the Attorney General from releasing a proffer of evidence
provided by Respondent Leonard Lawson in 1983 . The Court of Appeals did
not reach the merits of Movants' appeal. Instead, the Court of Appeals
b.c .
dismissed the case because Movants had failed to name the Office of the
Attorney General of Kentucky (OAG) as a party in the CR 65.07 motion .
Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the OAG, as custodian of the
1983 proffer, is an indispensable party to the action, we affirm.
11. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
The facts necessary to resolve this controversy do not appear to be in
dispute . In 1983, a business owned by Lawson pleaded guilty in federal court
to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. As part of the plea agreement in that
case, Lawson gave a proffer of evidence, a statement offered by Lawson, to
assist the OAG in its investigation of a related matter.
Two years ago, a federal grand jury indicted Lawson and others in
relation to an alleged conspiracy to obtain confidential Kentucky
Transportation Cabinet cost estimates for certain state road contracts .
Following return of the federal indictment, Courier-Journal Reporter Tom
Loftus submitted an open records request to the OAG seeking a copy of
Lawson's 1983 proffer. In its response, the OAG decided to give Loftus an
audiotape of Lawson's 1983 proffer and accompanying documents because
those items were not exempt from Kentucky's Open Records Act. 1 Within a
short time, a reporter from the Herald-Leader and a reporter from the
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61 .870, et seq.
Associated Press made similar open records requests to the OAG for Lawson's
1983 proffer.
After unsuccessfully asking the federal court to stop the OAG from
disclosing his 1983 proffer, Lawson filed a complaint and motion for temporary
injunction in the Franklin Circuit Court asking that court to block the OAG
from providing the requested records until after Lawson's federal criminal trial
or until a permanent injunction could be issued . Movants filed a written
objection to Lawson's motion for a temporary injunction, but the OAG did not.
Instead, the OAG submitted the disputed records to the trial court under seal
and did not take a position in favor of, or opposed to, Lawson's motion. The
Franklin Circuit Court granted Lawson's motion and issued a temporary
injunction that enjoined the OAG "from the release and/or disclosure of the
[sic] Mr. Lawson's 1983 proffer and any related documents."
Movants then filed a CR 65.07 motion in the Court of Appeals . Styled an
"APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT[,]" that CR 65.07 motion
listed only Lawson as an "APPELLEE." The OAG was listed as having received
a courtesy copy of Movants' motion, but the OAG was not named as a party to
that action. Lawson filed a response in which he argued, among other things,
that Movants' CR 65 .07 motion should be dismissed because it failed to name
an indispensable party -- the OAG.
The Court of Appeals found that the OAG was an indispensable party,
reasoning that it was "clear, almost beyond dispute, that the party who would
be required to act upon reversal would be the party now enjoined -- the
Attorney General." So the Court of Appeals dismissed Movants' CR 65 .07
motion. Movants then filed the CR 65.09 motion at hand.
III. ANALYSIS.
The merits of the underlying action are not at issue in temporary
injunction proceedings.2 So the question of whether the 1983 proffer should be
disclosed under the Open Records Act is not before us. Instead, the only
question properly before us is whether the Court of Appeals acted correctly by
dismissing Movants' CR 65.07 motion. In resolving that question, we must
remember that a movant bears an "enormous burden . . . when requesting
relief pursuant to CR 65.07 and CR 65 .09 ."3
Movants do not dispute that precedent clearly holds that a failure to
name an indispensable party in a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect that
must result in the dismissal of the appeal. But Movants contend that
principle is inapplicable to this case because this is not a traditional appeal
and the OAG is not an indispensable party. We agree that there are some
differences between this action and a traditional appeal from a final judgment,
2
s
Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Ky.App . 1978) .
Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership v. Lutrell, 190 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Ky. 2006) .
4
See, e.g., Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Ky.App. 2006) ("It is well-
established that failure to name an indispensable party in the notice of appeal
results in dismissal of the appeal."); Braden v. Republic-Vanguard Life Insurance
Co., 657 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Ky. 1983) ("Failure to specify any party whose absence
prevents the appellate court from granting complete relief among those already
parties would be fatal to the appeal .") .
but we disagree with Movants' contention that the Court of Appeals acted
erroneously.
A. KRS 61 .880(3) Inapplicable to this Case.
We reject Movants' contention that the OAG is specifically exempted from
being named as a party by virtue of KRS 61 .880(3) . In order to understand
fully KRS 61 .880(3), it is necessary to examine KRS 61 .880(1)-(2) .5
KRS 61 .880(1) provides that a public agency receiving an open records
request has three business days in which to notify the requestor of its decision
to make available, or decline to make available, the records being sought.6
Subsection two of that statute provides that a party dissatisfied with an
agency's denial of an open records response may ask the Attorney General to
review the agency's decision.? So the general framework of an open records
5
6
7
See, e.g., Felts v. Linton, 217 Ky. 305, 289 S.W . 312, 314 (1926) ("The statute must
be considered as a whole as passed and its intention derived from a consideration
of all of its clauses and provisions .") .
KRS 61 .880(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Each public agency, upon any request for records made under
KRS 61 .870 to 61.884, shall determine within three (3) days,
excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the receipt of
any such request whether to comply with the request and shall notify
in writing the person making the request, within the three (3) day
period, of its decision . An agency response denying, in whole or in
part, inspection of any record shall include a statement of the specific
exception authorizing the withholding of the record and a brief
explanation of how the exception applies to the record withheld. The
response shall be issued by the official custodian or under his
authority, and it shall constitute final agency action.
KRS 61 .880(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) If a complaining party wishes the Attorney General to review a public
agency's denial of a request to inspect a public record, the
complaining party shall forward to the Attorney General a copy of the
written request and a copy of the written response denying
inspection . If the public agency refuses to provide a written response,
a complaining party shall provide a copy of the written request. The
5
request is that a requestor asks the custodian of the records for disclosure ; if
that custodial agency denies disclosure, then the requestor may ask the OAG
to review the agency's decision .
Subsection three of KRS 61 .880 only comes into play if subsections one
and two have been satisfied. In other words, in order for subsection three to
apply, a requestor (or public agency) must be dissatisfied with the OAG's
opinion regarding whether the records being sought are subject to the Open
Records Act; and an action contesting the OAG's opinion must have been filed
in circuit court.
KRS 61 .880(3) provides,
Each agency shall notify the Attorney General of any actions filed
against that agency in Circuit Court regarding the enforcement of
KRS 61 .870 to 61 .884 . The Attorney General shall not, however,
be named as a party in any Circuit Court actions regarding the
enforcement of KRS 61 .870 to 61 .884, nor shall he have any duty
to defend his decision in Circuit Court or any subsequent
proceedings .
When read in context with subsections one and two, subsection three
stands for the proposition that the OAG need not be named as a party in a
typical appeal from an open records decision by the OAG. In a typical open
records case, the OAG is not the custodian of the records being sought. The
OAG's only role in the typical case is to issue a formal opinion about whether
the custodial agency acted properly in declining to comply with the open
records request. The custodial agency must defend its own actions in court.
Attorney General shall review the request and denial and issue within
twenty (20) days, excepting Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, a
written decision stating whether the agency violated provisions of
KRS 61 .870 to 61.884.
Logically, therefore, the OAG does not need to be a party in a typical open
records court action because the OAG has acted only in an advisory capacity
and has no institutional interest in, or custody over, the records being sought.$
But this case is not a typical open records action because the OAG itself
is the custodian of the records being sought. 9 So it logically follows that the
OAG, as the custodian of the records being sought, must be named as a party
to any action
that would determine whether the OAG's records must be
disclosed . In other words, absent the OAG, complete relief cannot be afforded
in this action .lo
This conclusion is reinforced by the plain language of KRS 61 .880(3),
which requires the agency against which an open records court action has
been filed to notify the OAG . It would be illogical and utterly futile for the OAG
to notify itself that it had been sued. The plain language of KRS 61 .880(3)
shows that it is aimed at the typical open records action in which the custodian
of the records being sought is another agency -- not the OAG itself.
In sum, KRS 61 .880(3)'s declaration that the OAG must not be a named
party in an open records action in court is simply inapplicable when the OAG
itself is the custodian of the records in question.
s Although we call the OAG's open records decisions advisory in nature, we are
9
10
aware that those decisions "have the force and effect of law" if not timely appealed.
KRS 61 .880(5)(b) . Once properly appealed, however, the OAG's open records
decisions are not strictly binding on a circuit or appellate court.
KRS 661 .870(6) (-'Custodian' means the official custodian or any authorized person
having personal custody and control of public records . . . .") .
See CR 19.0 1 (setting forth persons who shall be joined in actions if feasible) .
B. The OAG is an Indispensible Party to this
Action and Dismissal was Proper.
In simple terms, the OAG, like any other custodial agency in a typical
open records action, has a vested institutional interest in whether documents
or materials in its possession are disclosed to the public . M And no one could
seriously contend that the OAG was not a necessary party to Lawson's Franklin
Circuit Court action. So we fail to see how the OAG, which remains the
custodian of the records being sought, becomes any less important in these
appellate proceedings. 12
Of crucial importance also is the indisputable fact that the OAG was the
only party enjoined by the Franklin Circuit Court. Precedent holds that "[olnly
the parties to an appeal are bound by the appellate court's disposition of the
proceeding."13 Since the Movants sought to have the Court of Appeals order
the trial court to order the OAG to take an affirmative action (disclose the
1983 proffer), Movants were obligated to ensure that the OAG was a party to
the action . A party cannot seek to have an appellate court vacate or modify a
temporary injunction without ensuring that the entity enjoined is a party to the
appellate court action .
We recognize that for reasons not divulged in the record, the OAG has not formally
taken a position on Lawson's motion for a temporary injunction . However, the fact
that in this unique case, the OAG did not take a position in circuit court does not
alter the broader conclusion that the OAG, like any public agency, does have an
institutional interest in the public disclosure of its own records.
is As the Court of Appeals noted, "if the Attorney General is an indispensable party
below and, in fact, a temporary injunction was issued against him in his capacity
as custodian, logic dictates that he is also an indispensable party to proceedings in
this court ."
13 Levin v. Ferrer, 535 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Ky. 1975) .
We agree with Movants that there are some obvious differences between
this type of case and a typical appeal. For one thing, this is not an appeal from
a final judgment . For another, unlike a typical appeal, a movant does not need
to file a notice of appeal before filing a motion for relief under CR 65 .07
or 65.09 . So we agree with Movants that the precedent requiring an appeal be
dismissed for failure to name an indispensable party does not precisely cover
these specialized types of appellate proceedings.
But the principle underneath the precedent applies with equal force to
these specialized proceedings . Namely, we believe it inarguable that all parties
without whom complete relief cannot be granted must be named as parties in
any CR 65 .07 or 65.09 proceeding . And we also find it curious that Movants
now contend that their action in the Court of Appeals was not really an
"appeal" when the Movants themselves styled their CR 65 .07 motion as an
"APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT" and referred to themselves as
"APPELLANTS" and to Lawson as an "APPELLEE." We have also referred to
CR 65.07, or 65.09 proceedings as "appeals ."14 Although they do not share all
the characteristics of typical appeals, CR 65 .07 or 65 .09 actions are, in fact,
appeals. So the bedrock principle that a failure to name a necessary party to
14
Breathitt County Board ofEducation v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Ky. 2009)
("CR 65.07 permits an interlocutory appeal from an order 'grant[ing], den[ying],
modifjying], or .dissoly[ing] a temporary injunction[ .]'") ; Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs v.
Williams, 892 S.W.2d 584, 585-86 (Ky. 1995) (dismissing writ petition concerning
an injunction because petitioner should have filed CR 65.07 action instead,
explaining that "Williams filed an original action in the Court of Appeals, seeking
relief pursuant to CR 76.36. It should again be noted that Williams, however, had
never appealed from the injunction under CR 65 .07 .") .
an appeal is a fatal jurisdictional error applies with equal vigor to CR 65 .07
or 65.09 proceedings as it does to more typical appeals .
We reject Movants' related contention that reliance upon that bedrock
principle in this case elevates form over substance because the OAG knew of
the pendency of the CR 65 .07 action and declined to take any position on
Lawson's circuit court action . To the contrary, we conclude that jurisdictional
defects are substantive matters that cannot be lightly swept aside, regardless of
whether a necessary party chooses to argue a position before an appellate
court. In other words, in these types of situations, an appellate court's ability
to acquire jurisdiction over the necessary party is paramount, even if the
necessary party takes no position on the outcome.
In a similar vein, we reject Movants' contention that the Court of Appeals
should have taken a curative approach instead of dismissing the CR 65 .07
action. To the contrary, precedent clearly holds that a failure to name an
indispensable party is a fatal error requiring dismissal . 15 And, as stated before,
we conclude that principle applies with equal vigor to CR 65.07 or 65 :09
motions.
C. Precedent does not Reauire Movants to be Afforded Relief.
Finally, we disagree with Movants that precedent, specifically Braden and
Hiatt v. Clark, 16 compel a different result. We find both cases to be
distinguishable .
15
16
Braden, 657 S.W.2d at 243 ("Failure to specify any party whose absence prevents
the appellate court from granting complete relief among those already parties
would be fatal to the appeal."). See also Slone, 194 S.W.3d at 337.
194 S.W.3d 324 (Ky. 2006) .
10
In Braden, Paul T. Braden was the named insured on a Republic-
Vanguard life insurance policy, which would cover the balance owed on
Braden's home mortgage at his death. 17 The policy provided that the
mortgagee was the beneficiary of the policy to the extent of the mortgage, with
Braden's estate receiving any remaining funds . When Braden died, his widow,
Wanda, sued Republic-Vanguard for the mortgage payoff amount stated in the
policy; but Republic-Vanguard claimed that it was not required to pay because
Paul had committed suicide and had failed to report in his policy application
that he had received psychiatric treatment. 18 Republic-Vanguard also moved
to dismiss for failure to join the mortgagee, Baldwin-United Mortgage Co. The
trial court ordered Baldwin-United joined as a party or the action to be
dismissed . Wanda then filed an amended complaint naming Baldwin-United
as an additional party. 19
The trial court granted summary judgment to Republic-Vanguard and
denominated the dismissal of Wanda's claim to be a final and appealable order.
The trial court also dismissed Baldwin-United's claims but did not denominate
that dismissal as a final and appealable order . 20 Wanda appealed from the
summary judgment granted to Republic-Vanguard, but the Court of Appeals
657 S.W.2d at 242.
is Id.
19 Id.
17
Zo
Id. at 243.
dismissed the appeal for failure to name Baldwin-United as a necessary
party.21
The case then came to this Court upon discretionary review. We held
that there was "no error in the trial court requiring the joinder of BaldwinUnited under CR 19.01 because Baldwin is the named beneficiary of the
policy[,]" but we failed to see a "reason to require Baldwin-United as an
indispensable party to the appeal."22 We reasoned that Baldwin-United had no
real stake in the suit because it would be paid from either insurance proceeds
if Wanda's appeal succeeded or regular mortgage payments if it did not. Thus,
we concluded that we did "not interpret the rules as requiring joinder as an
indispensable party to an appeal of a party who is unnecessary to the decision
of the appeal and who would incur an unnecessary expense if its presence was
required ."23
Movants contend that the OAG is in the same position as was BaldwinUnited in Braden: indifferent to the outcome of the appeal and merely waiting
guidance from the Court. But we agree with Lawson that the OAG's status is
more akin to that of the insurance company, Republic-Vanguard. Like
Republic-Vanguard, the OAG is the custodian of the item at the center of the
controversy (the insurance policy in Braden and the 1983 proffer in the case at
hand) and is awaiting the Court's guidance on whether to release that
21
22
23
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244 .
12
document (or the proceeds in Braden) to a requesting party (Wanda in Braden
and Lawson in the case at hand) .
Likewise, this case is distinguishable from Hiatt. Hiatt involved a
prisoner's post-conviction contention that he had received ineffective assistance
of counsel. The question before us in Hiatt was whether a writ of mandamus
was proper so that the prisoner could obtain his former attorney's case file.
Obviously, the case at hand is markedly different than a mandamus case
deriving from a criminal post-conviction motion . Also, the prisoner in Hiatt
only wanted to obtain his attorney's case file - material that was "his in the
first place . . . . "24 The material Movants seek to obtain and Lawson seeks to
shield belongs neither to Movant nor to Lawson . Instead, the 1983 proffer
belongs to the OAG, a non-party to Movants' CR 65.07 motion. Because it is
readily distinguishable from the case at hand, application of our narrow
holding in Hiatt affords Movants no relief.
IV . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that the order of the Court
of Appeals dismissing Movants' CR 65.07 motion is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
ENTERED: March 18, 2010.
24
194 S .W.3d at 327 ("Appellant is seeking to obtain that which is his in the first
place - his file.").
13
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