TREVOR ANDREW SMITH; AND BETHANY SMITH V. ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
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AS MODIFIED : R)NE 22, 2010
RENDERED : JUNE I7, 2010
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2009-SC-000738-MR
TREVOR ANDREW SMITH ; AND
BETHANY SMITH
V.
APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2009-CA--000973-OA
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 08-J-506574
ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE, JEFFERSON
FAMILY COURT
AND
ANDREW CAHILL (REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
AFFIRMING
This matter originated in a suit by Andrew Cahill in Jefferson Family
Court seeking to establish paternity and obtain custody of T.E .S ., a minor child
born to Bethany Smith, the former wife of Trevor Smith . The Smiths sought a
writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals enjoining the family court from
ordering genetic testing. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. Because the
family court was acting within its jurisdiction to order genetic testing in such
cases, this Court affirms .
I. Background
On July 16, 2004, T.E .S. was born to Appellant Bethany Smith, the
former wife of Appellant Trevor Smith. Appellants were first married on
October 26, 2002 . In December, 2003, they filed a verified joint petition for
dissolution of marriage . In the petition, they alleged that at the time of the
petition, Bethany Smith was pregnant with the child of a man other than her
husband. They further alleged that they had separated as of July, 2003, and
that the child had been conceived sometime in October, 2003 . Appellants'
divorce was finalized on February 19, 2004 . Then on July 15, 2004 they
remarried, just prior to T.E .S.'s birth the next day.
That marriage also failed, and the Appellants divorced again in
September 2007 . In that dissolution, Bethany and Trevor Smith were awarded
joint custody of T.E.S . Soon thereafter, however, Bethany Smith informed
Andrew Cahill, the Appellee/Real Party in Interest in this matter, that he was
in fact T. E. S.'s father. In December 2008, Appellee filed a petition in Jefferson
Family Court to establish paternity and seek custody of T.E.S . After overruling
motions to dismiss the petition, Jefferson Family Court Judge Eleanore Garber
ordered genetic testing to resolve Andrew Cahill's claim of paternity.
Attempting to block the genetic testing, Appellants sought a writ of
prohibition from the Court of Appeals against Judge Garber and real party in
interest Andrew Cahill . The Court of Appeals denied the writ in a 2-1 opinion.
Appellants now appeal to this Court, urging us to find that the Jefferson Family
Court is acting outside of its jurisdiction .
11. Analysis
Kentucky's family courts have been granted jurisdiction to handle all
"[p]roceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity, KRS Chapter 406." KRS
23A. 100(2)(b) . The section of the Act entitled "Applicability," KRS 406.180,
specifies that the chapter applies to "cases of birth out of wedlock." As a
result, to invoke the family court's jurisdiction under KRS 406, a petition must
allege that the underlying birth occurred out of wedlock.
The only description of an out-of-wedlock birth in Chapter 406 is
provided in KRS 406 .011, which states that "a child born out of wedlock
includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband
where evidence shows that the marital relationship between the husband and
wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child." Presumably, "child
born out of wedlock" also includes its ordinary meaningthat is, a child born
to an unmarried woman-in addition to the example. The necessary elements
for determining that a child is born out of wedlock, other than in the case of an
unmarried woman are (1) that the child be by a man other than the mother's
husband and (2) that there is evidence that the marital relationship between
husband and wife ceased ten months before the child was born .
KRS 406.011 establishes a presumption of paternity when a child is born
during a marriage: if born during lawful wedlock or within ten months
thereafter. If strictly construed, this statute gives Trevor Smith the
presumption that T.E.S. is his child, no matter how ridiculous that assumption
may be, if based only on the fact that the child was born one day after Trevor's
second marriage to Bethany. And, he would have this presumption even
though the Appellants both made the judicial admission that Trevor is not the
father of T.E.S . in their first divorce petition, which could be offered in rebuttal
of the presumption in the second divorce . However, the question of paternity
was not raised during the second divorce action, and the trial court granted
joint custody to the Appellants .
In fact, Appellee Andrew Cahill was not informed that he was the alleged
father of the child until after the second divorce was final, and he had no
opportunity to raise the question of whether the child was born out of wedlock
until the allegation was made, though one can reasonably presume that he
knew that the possibility existed from his previous contact with Bethany Smith.
However, the actions of Appellants could reasonably have led to the belief that
the child was not his, under this on-again, off-again fact pattern .
The question for the Court to decide is thus who can raise the question
of paternity, and when or how must the issue be raised?
While Cahill is an obvious party to raise the question of paternity once he
was informed that the child was his, the dilemma in this case is that he was
not able to do so until after both divorces between Appellants were final . His
only possible option was, therefore, an original paternity action. Obviously,
both the Appellants could have raised the paternity question in the second
divorce as they did in the first, but neither did. In fact, both of them let the
trial court believe T.E.S . was Trevor's child, and he has remained in a
parenting role with T.E.S . since birth, having been given joint custody in the
second divorce .
The primary question concerns Cahill's status and his ability to seek
relief in Jefferson Family Court. In an extremely divided Opinion, this Court
grappled with these issues in J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W .3d 587 (Ky. 2008) .
Two members of the Court held that the putative father had failed to plead that
the marriage of husband and wife ceased ten months prior to the birth of the
child in question, and that there was no evidence that the relationship had
ceased. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the
putative father had no standing because he could not establish that the
marriage had ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child .
Two other justices were of the firm opinion that the putative father had
no standing because he was an interloper to the marriage, and that the
statutory language of KRS 406.011 limited who could challenge paternity to the
wife or husband, finding strong public policy in preserving existing marriages
and families if neither party wished to raise the paternity issue (as was the case
with Appellants in their second divorce) .
Two other justices argued for a common sense reading of the term
"marital relationship" as used in KRS 406 .011, as contrasted with "marital
relations" which generally refers to sexual relations . Those justices found that
the marital relationship entailed more than mere sexual relations, including
ideas such as fidelity and common purpose. Under that theory, when a woman
entered into an affair with another man during the marriage, and became
impregnated by that man, the marital relationship had ceased, allowing proof
of paternity by a man other than her husband in the divorce action in Family
Court in order to determine paternity.
The final view expressed was that the issues were procedural, and that
the Court was doing impermissible fact-finding . Central to that view was the
notion that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction generally to
decide the question ofjurisdiction, and specifically over paternity matters in
Family Court; and that as a putative father, J.G .R . did have standing to pursue
a paternity determination. Also, that justice held that there was ample
evidence in the record to create a question of paternity, including evidence of
the mother's acknowledgement of J .G.R. as the biological father of the child
and a DNA test establishing paternity, which he referenced in his pleadings.
While the decision in J.N.R. clearly did not give much guidance, it did
frame the issues presented in the case before the Court at present. Since no
action was pending, did Cahill have the standing to bring an original paternity
action to establish his paternity status and thus challenge the grant of joint
custody to Trevor? Did the Jefferson Family Court have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear his original paternity petition when it had already vested
custody in another "father"?
The wrinkle in this case that points out the problem with a strict
construction of the statute is that at one point in time, there was a prior
judicial admission (in the first divorce action) that Trevor was not the father of
T.E.S . Are we to ignore a judicial fact in order to make a strict construction of
obviously debatable statutory language the rule? In the final analysis, is this a
statutory construction case, or a case about policy?
Both Trevor and Bethany waived any contest of paternity by not raising it
in the second divorce . Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170 (Ky. 2007) But
what about Cahill?
In looking at whether the family court judge had jurisdiction to hear this
case, it is apparent that the family court, since its constitutional enactment,
does have jurisdiction over a paternity action . Cahill fits the statutory
requirement that a paternity action may be brought, regarding a child born out
of wedlock, by the putative father. He has standing to bring this action, since
his is not a bare claim or fishing expedition . KRS 406.021 . When Cahill filed
his paternity suit, the trial court then had to determine if there were allegations
and evidence sufficient to raise the question of whether the child was born out
of wedlock, the primary allegation in a paternity suit . To make that
determination, the court is required to review the prima facie evidence that
supports the allegations . Cahill began his claim by stating that the mother of
the child had identified him as the father, that he had opportunity to be the
father, and that the Appellants had made a judicial admission that Trevor was
not the father of T.E.S. in the first divorce action .
These were sufficient evidentiary grounds to invoke the subject matter
jurisdiction of the family court. The family court judge rightfully found that
she had jurisdiction to go forward, and consequently ordered paternity testing
to establish biological paternity. Since this case came to the Court on a writ
action, the paternity case has not advanced to a sufficient degree to know
definitively whether the evidence will support a finding that the marital
relationship ceased ten months before the birth of T.E.S ., but there is evidence
in the record that Appellants stated in their joint petition for dissolution that
they "separated" in July 2003 (which for purposes of divorce is construed as no
longer having sexual relations), and the child was not conceived until October
2003.
Short of a divorce, proof of separation is the clearest evidence one can
present that the marital relationship has ceased. In J.N.R., the plurality
emphasized the distinction of two prior cases where a birth was held to be out
of wedlock because of the very fact that the couple had separated. Id. at 591
(citing Montgomery, 802 S .W .2d 943,
Commonwealth,
705
S.W.2d
944 (Ky. App .
470 (Ky. 1986)) .
1990) ; Bartlett v.
Certainly, Appellants now sing a
different tune, which would require the trial court to judge the credibility of the
testimony. But the allegation and evidence of separation certainly further
satisfies whatever possible jurisdictional requirements KRS 406.011 might
entail.
However, another possible jurisdictional question is whether, having
determined the custody of T.E .S. by granting joint custody to the Appellants,
there has already been a "paternity" determination for this child. Neither
Bethany nor Trevor raised paternity as an issue in the second divorce . In
granting joint custody, the trial court relied on the presumption of paternity
that a child born during the marriage is the child of the parties. Until and
unless that judgment is modified according to law, Bethany and Trevor are the
legal parents of T.E.S .
Where does that leave Cahill? He has his own claim, which has never
been litigated, through no fault of his.
Certainly, everything that needed to be done in the divorce action was
done. The parties were divorced, property divided, and custody was
determined. Does Cahill now have a legal right that would allow him to in
some way collaterally attack the final custody decree? Certainly there is a
distinctive difference between this case and J.N.R. v O'Reilly in that there is no
concern about supporting the sanctity of the marriage since Trevor and
Bethany are once again divorced.
This is a difficult and weighty issue that truly is grounded more in equity
than in law or procedure, and its answer becomes a matter of policy going
forward. On one hand, an argument can be made that a paternity action filed
subsequent to a final divorce action that found another man to be the legal
father of the child comes too late in the process . The only father the child has
ever known is Trevor, and he clearly wishes to maintain that relationship since
he sought joint custody of the child in the second divorce . On the other hand,
Cahill has been denied parenting of his biological child, and has personal
rights toward his "own flesh and blood" that are recognized by all at a visceral
level. He joined the legal fray as soon as he had a reasonable basis to do so,
and clearly wants to have a relationship with the child and support him if he is
his biological father, or he would not have voluntarily sought this status.
There is an inherent injustice in denying his suit under these facts.
Cahill has shown that he could proceed, and that the trial court would
otherwise have jurisdiction. Through Appellants' sworn affidavits from their
divorce proceeding in December 2003, he has established that "[we] are not
living together and we have lived apart continuously since we separated on or
about July 2003," in reference to Bethany and Trevor. This means they
separated 12 months prior to the birth. They stated further, "There is no
likelihood of a reconciliation . The marriage is irretrievably broken. We had
differences that we could not work out and we filed this action ." In other
words, they admitted that their relationship had ceased. Notably, Bethany
Smith also declared that "she [was] pregnant, however, the Co-Petitioner Trevor
A. Smith [was] not the father. . . ."
While Appellants now contradict their own sworn affidavits, among other
ways by insisting their relationship never ceased, that does nothing to negate
the fact that Appellee made sufficient allegations, which are susceptible to
being proved, and has presented the requisite evidence. Not only are these
statements in their affidavits evidence, but they would be admissible evidence
at trial under multiple hearsay exceptions . See KRE 801A(a) (1) (prior
inconsistent statement) ; KRE 801A(b)(1) (admission by a party-opponent) ; KRE
803(8) (public records and reports) . Whether Appellants' prior affidavits are to
be believed over their current, contradictory claims is a matter appropriate for
resolution at trial, not on a writ of prohibition petition .
It bears final note that if Bethany and Trevor had not remarried (and
redivorced) there would be absolutely no bar to Cahill bringing this paternity
10
action, and there would be no dispute about jurisdiction, given that the final
judgment in the first divorce action held that Trevor was not the father.
At
most, Trevor could also allege that he was the father, and participate in his
own paternity action.
Given the unusual facts of this case, and recognizing the inherent,
equitable rights of biological parents who are deprived of parenting through no
fault of their own, the grant ofjoint custody to Trevor cannot prevent Cahill
from going forward with his paternity action . This is a case which
demonstrates the importance of leaving fact-finding and equitable orders to the
sound discretion of the family court, which was largely founded to deal directly
with such matters . The Jefferson Family Court thus has jurisdiction both
legally and equitably to make the proper balancing of the rights of the parties
and to determine the best interests of the child after fully developing the proof
relating not only to paternity, but also to custody, visitation and support.
III. Conclusion
Because the Jefferson Family Court had jurisdiction to determine
Andrew Cahill's paternity claim, the Court of Appeals' denial of a writ of
prohibition is hereby affirmed.
Abramson, Schroder and Venters, JJ., concur. Minton, C.J ., concurs in
result only by separate opinion. Cunningham and Scott, JJ ., concur in result
only without separate opinion.
MINTON, C.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY : I continue to believe
my opinion in J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2008), is a correct
exposition of the law; but I do concur in the result reached by the majority in
this case. The unique facts here make this case distinguishable from J.N.R. for
two interrelated reasons.
First, the parties in this case admitted in their first joint dissolution
petition that Trevor was not the father of T.E.S . And, second, the parties
admitted in that same joint petition that they had been separated since July
2003, a year before the birth of T.E.S. Accordingly, unlike J.N.R., there is
compelling evidence in this case that "the marital relationship between the
husband and wife ceased ten . . . months prior to the birth of the child[,]"
KRS 406 .011, even though T.E .S. was born one day after Trevor and Bethany
remarried.
Although the unusual facts of this case cast considerable doubt on the
level of guidance the holding in this case will provide for future courts
grappling with these types of issues, I concur in the result reached by the
majority .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, TREVOR ANDREW SMITH :
Grant M. Helman
Stuart A. Scherer
Helman & Rice
539 West Market Street
4th Floor, Old Portland Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3308
James Russell Lloyd
J. Russell Lloyd, P.S .C.
600 West Main Street
Suite 100
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, BETHANY SMITH :
Ann Holland Houston
Bank of Louisville Building
510 West Broadway - Suite 805
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
APPELLEE, ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE, JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT :
Honorable Eleanore Garber
700 West Jefferson Street, 5th Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, ANDREW CAHILL (REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) :
David J . Thompson, Jr.
1412 Bardstown Road
Louisville, Kentucky 40204
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2009-SC-000738-MR
TREVOR ANDREW SMITH ; AND
BETHANY SMITH
V.
APPELLANTS
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2009-CA-000973-OA
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 08-J-506574
ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE, JEFFERSON
FAMILY COURT
AND
ANDREW CAHILL (REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEES
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court by Justice Noble
rendered June 17, 2010, shall be modified on page 6, lines 5 and 8, by
changing the word from "O'Reilly" to "J.G.R." Pages 1 and 6 shall be
substituted, as attached hereto, in lieu of pages 1 and 6 of the Opinion as
originally rendered . Said modification does not affect the holding .
Entered : June 22, 2010 .
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