WALTER A. STONE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY X, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED: OCTOBER 21, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,;VuPreme Courf -of
~fimw,
2009-SC-000650-MR
DQ~C
WALTER A. STONE
V
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-01610
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Walter A. Stone, appeals as a matter of right' from a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict by the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of firstdegree sodomy and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment . In this
appeal, Stone raises three arguments : (1) that the trial court erred by not
holding a hearing to determine if he was competent to stand trial; (2) that the
trial court erroneously excused a juror for cause over his objection ; and f3) that
he was entitled to a directed verdict on the sodomy charge. For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm.
1 Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
l . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial
was as follows. The victim, C .M ., who was age twelve at the time, met Stone in
May 2008 because Stone's apartment was in the same area where C .M . lived .
As C.M . passed by Stone's apartment the two would speak with each other.
Around the end of May 2008, C .M . again stopped at Stone's apartment to
talk. After talking for a while, Stone said he would be right back and went
inside. When Stone came back out he grabbed C .M . by his wrist and pulled
him inside the apartment. The victim told Stone to let him go and to "get off
me ." After pulling C .M . inside, Stone took him into his bedroom, threw him
onto the bed, pulled down the victim's pants, and held him down with one arm.
Stone then orally sodomized the child. After a few minutes Stone stopped and
went into another room . C.M . pulled his pants up and ran out of the
apartment. As he was leaving he heard Stone say "don't tell anybody."
C .M . eventually told his mother about the incident, and she contacted
the police. Detective James Root of the Lexington Police Department was
assigned to investigate the case. Following the investigation, Stone was
arrested .
Following Stone's arrest, based upon his past record of mental problems
and unusual conduct at the detention center, the District Court ordered
Comprehensive Care Center (Comp Care) to perform a mental status
evaluation . Following its evaluation, Comp Care recommended that Stone be
referred for a formal competency evaluation . Stone was subsequently ordered
to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) for a determination of
whether he was competent to stand trial . As further discussed below, following
its examination, KCPC concluded that Stone was competent to stand trial, and
"was intentionally exaggerating cognitive deficits in order to avoid legal
consequences consistent with his diagnosis of malingering."
On December 15, 2008, after the completion of the KCPC evaluation,
Stone was indicted for one count of first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion .
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Stone guilty of first-degree sodomy
and recommended a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment . The trial court
subsequently sentenced Stone pursuant to the jury's verdict and sentencing
recommendation . This appeal followed.
II . STONE WAIVED HIS ENTITLEMENT TO A COMPETENCY HEARING
Stone first argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on
his competency to stand trial, citing his statutory rights under KRS 504.100(3),
and his constitutional right, under Drope v. Missouri, 420 U .S . 162 (1975) not
to be tried if he is incompetent.
Upon commencement of this prosecution in the district court, the district
judge learned of Stone's past record of mental problems and of his recent
conduct in the Fayette County Detention Center, and concluded "there is
reason to believe that [Stone] is not mentally capable of understanding the
charges against [him], or aiding [his] counsel in the trial of said case[.]" Based
upon this conclusion, the district court ordered Comp Care to evaluate Stone's
mental status . However, the Comp Care evaluation was largely unsuccessful
because Stone refused to cooperate with the evaluators . Comp Care ultimately
recommended that Stone "be referred for a formal competency evaluation ." The
district court thereafter referred Stone to KCPC for an evaluation of his
competency to stand trial.
The KCPC report noted Stone's prior history of mental problems,
including several prior admissions to Eastern State Hospital as a result of
psychiatric problems . The report also noted Stone's history of drug and alcohol
abuse. His IQ was found to be in the 70s . The report stated the following in
relation to Stone's competency to stand trial :
During this admission, Mr. Stone was intentionally
exaggerating cognitive deficits in order to avoid legal consequences
consistent with his diagnosis of malingering . . . . . His level of
functioning on the unit was inconsistent with his report of
cognitive impairment . Results of psychological testing suggested
malingering of cognitive deficits .
Despite malingering, Mr. Stone demonstrated the ability to
tolerate the stress of trial and while awaiting trial. He did not
appear to be experiencing symptoms of a major mood or psychotic
disorder. He was eating and sleeping well. He did not make
threats or attempts to harm himself or others . He demonstrated
adequate ability to discuss his legal situation and interest in
discussing his case with an attorney. In summary, Mr. Stone
demonstrates the capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him and the ability to
rationally participate rationally [sic] in his own defense. He is
capable ofproceeding to trial.
(Emphasis added) .
After Stone was indicted, at an April 3, 2009, status conference, based
upon the KCPC report, stand-in counsel for Stone stated that he was satisfied
that Stone was competent to stand trial. Further, shortly before the trial
commenced, Stone's trial counsel acknowledged. the KCPC report and
stipulated that he was competent to stand trial .
KRS 504 . 100(l) provides as follows : "If upon arraignment, or during any
stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall appoint at least one (1)
psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant's
mental condition ." Moreover, KRS 504 .100(3) states that "[after the filing of a
report (or reports), the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether or not
the defendant is competent." (emphasis added) . In addition, the United States
Constitution, as a matter of due process, bars trying a defendant who is
incompetent to stand trial . Drope, 420 U .S. 162 .
We recently discussed the scope of a defendant's entitlement to a
competency hearing in Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S .W .3d 336 (Ky. 2010),
wherein we criticized prior cases, including Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 208
S .W .3d 848 (Ky. 2006), for failing to recognize that, when analyzing whether a
defendant is competent to stand trial, two separate interests - a statutory right
and a constitutional right - are at stake. More importantly, we noted in
Padgett, that different standards govern those interests . Due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that where substantial evidence2 that a
defendant is not competent exists, the trial court is required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's competence to stand trial. In contrast,
2
Such evidence may include "a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on competence ." Drope, 420 U.S . at 180 .
5
under IRS 504 . 100, "reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial" mandates a competency examination, followed by a
competency hearing. Thus, while the failure to conduct a competency hearing
implicates constitutional protections only when "substantial evidence" of
incompetence exists, mere "reasonable grounds" to believe the defendant is
incompetent implicates the statutory right to such a hearing. Padgett, 312
S .W.3d at 347.
With respect to the ability of a defendant to waive a competency hearing,
we noted in Padgett :
[The] U .S . Supreme Court cases "indicate strongly that a defendant
cannot waive a competency hearing." What Mills[31 and our other
cases were not careful to point out, however, was that these U .S .
Supreme Court cases deal with the federal, constitutional right to a
hearing which is invoked when there is substantial evidence in the
record of incompetency. In contrast, our statutory right to a
hearing is not constitutional, and can be waived when there is not
substantial evidence of incompetency in the record, because our
long-standing rule is that defendants may generally waive
statutory rights. Our prior cases have not recognized this either.
Id. at 348-349 .
We resolved in Padgett that before determining whether the failure of a
trial court to conduct a competency hearing was error, and whether a
defendant waived entitlement to such a hearing, we must first assess the
strength of the evidence of incompetence to ascertain if either the
constitutional or the statutory right to a competency hearing has been
implicated .
3
Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1999) .
6
Turning to this case, we conclude that the trial court's failure to hold a
competency hearing is not constitutional error because there was not
substantial evidence to give the trial court doubt concerning Stone's
competence at the time of the trial. While initial concerns regarding Stone's
competency led to the Comp Care and KCPC evaluations, the KCPC evaluation
negated any doubts about his competence to stand trial . The fact is that
Stone's competency was no longer questioned after the KCPC report specifically
concluded that he was competent to stand trial and able to participate
rationally in his own defense . At that point in the proceedings, instead of
"substantial evidence" that Stone was not competent, the evidence
overwhelmingly pointed to Stone being competent to stand trial, and a
competency hearing was not required by due process. Id. at 349 .
Furthermore, no hearing pursuant to KRS 504 .100 was required in this
matter. Prior to the commencement of trial, Appellant's counsel specifically
acknowledged the KCPC report and stipulated to Stone's competency to stand
trial . Further, after the filing of the KCPC report, the issue of a competency
hearing was never raised. Thus, any right to a competency hearing was
waived, and the trial court's failure to hold one was not error.
S.W.3d at 349 .
Padgett,
312
e
III . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCUSED JUROR 545 FOR CAUSE
Stone next contends that there was an insufficient basis for the trial
court to excuse Juror 545 for cause over his objection . During voir dire the
trial court asked the jury panel whether any of them had a close friend or
family member who had ever been the victim of a sexual offense or had been
accused of a sexual offense . After the question, Juror 545 approached the
bench and the following exchange took place :
Juror 545:
I'm a sexual offender. It was expunged, it was that
long ago because . . . but still, I think it would have an impact . And I
think that . . . my brother molested my two nieces. So, I'm sure of that,
but that's my opinion . And also I have another problem your honor . As
a juror, it is my responsibility to tell when the jury pool is possibly
tainted .
Court :
Ok .
Juror 545 :
You called the person involved a victim twice.
Court:
as the victim.
And [he] is named as the alleged victim . [He] is named
Juror 545:
But that implies that wrong was done to [him] . . . you
see how nervous I am? I really feel uncomfortable doing this . But that
implies that wrong was done to this person .
Court:
Uh-huh .
Juror 545:
And that implies that he's guilty.
Court:
you sir.
Ok, I can see your opinion on that. Alright. Thank
Court:
Sir, I'm sorry. I think I failed to ask you the ultimate
question . Based upon your personal experience and your family's
experience, then do you believe that that would have an impact on your
ability to be fair?
Juror 545 :
I don't think it would .
Court:
You don't think it would?
Juror 545:
would .
No, but I can see how other people would think it
Court:
Ok.
Juror 545 :
I don't know. I'm kind of on both sides of the fence . I
went through counseling on all this and I understand that these things
happen and I understand that people do these things and that . . . you
know . . . I don't think that would taint the evidence that I would see.
Court:
Ok, so you don't think that you would hold the
Commonwealth to a higher standard?
Juror 545 :
Oh, because of . . . because of what you said or
because of what I feel?
Court:
Both.
Juror 545 :
I understand what you're saying, and I don't think that
you know . . . and I don't think that my sexual offenses or the victims in
my family make a difference .
Following the above exchange the Commonwealth moved to excuse Juror
545 for cause . The Commonwealth stated its reasoning as follows :
I would move to strike him for cause . When he first came up he
said he couldn't be fair, and then when he was asked more
pointedly he said he could be fair. He has a long history of . . . he
was charged with a sex crime and it's been expunged and then he's
convinced that his brother has. And just his comments about the
victim and the wording. I would ask to strike him. I don't think he
can be fair and impartial .
Defense counsel objected to the strike, stating that Juror 545 was "the
kind of person we ought to have on the jury." The trial court sustained the
Commonwealth's motion to strike, reasoning as follows :
I'm going to sustain the motion of the Commonwealth . I'll strike
Juror 545 for cause . When he first came up he very clearly said he
could not be fair.[ 4 1 He was shaking, his eyes were watery. He was
obviously very upset about this type of case . And I do know at the
end he did say an inconsistent statement . But, I think based upon
4 This is apparently how the trial court interpreted Juror 545's statement that his
prior conviction for a sex offense "would have an impact ."
the totality of the statements he made, I do find that it's proper to
strike him for cause.
RCr 9 .36 provides, in relevant part "[w]hen there is reasonable ground to
believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on
the evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified ." "[T]he decision to
exclude a juror for cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, not [in]
response
to
any one question ." Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d 604, 613
(Ky. 2008) . "The test for determining whether a juror should be stricken for
cause is `whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror
can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and
impartial verdict.' Thompson v. Commonwealth,
(quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth,
party alleging bias bears
the
884
147
S .W.3d 22, 51 (Ky. 2004)
S .W .2d 668, 671
(Ky . 1994)) .
"[T]he
burden of proving that bias and the resulting
prejudice." Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S .W.3d 351, 357 (Ky. 2004) (citing
Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1982)) . Where there is
such a showing, "[t]he court must weigh the probability of bias or prejudice
based
on
the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor ." Shane v.
Commonwealth, 243 S .W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007) .
"A trial court's decision whether a juror possessed `[a] mental attitude of
appropriate indifference' must be reviewed in the totality of the circumstances .
It is not limited to the juror's response to a `magic question." Montgomery v.
Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky . 1991) . This Court reviews a trial
court's determination regarding the exclusion of a juror for cause for an abuse
of discretion . Fugett, 250 S.W.3d at 613 .
Upon the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in striking Juror 545 . He was a convicted sexual offender
and this was a sexual abuse case . 13y the juror's own admission he believed
his experience with his past conviction "would have an impact." While the
juror did later state in response to questioning "I don't think that my sexual
offenses or the victims in my family make a difference," there is no "magic
question" which rehabilitates an otherwise disqualified juror . Montgomery, 819
S.W.Zd at 717-18 .
Add to this. Juror 545's demeanor - his shaking, watery eyes and
nervousness - when discussing the matter, there existed sufficient doubt
concerning his impartiality for us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in striking the juror.
IV. STONE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
Finally, Stone contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict based
upon insufficiency of the evidence. 5 More specifically, Stone argues that there
was a lack of physical evidence for the crime, the victim provided inconsistent
statements, the victim delayed reporting the incident, and the victim had a
5 The Commonwealth contends that this argument is not properly preserved because
in moving for a directed verdict at the conclusion of trial Stone did not specify the
grounds in support of his motion. While Stone's motion indeed did not comply with
CR 50.01, we nevertheless decide to address the issue on the merits .
reputation for being untruthful . In light of these factors, Stone contends his
absolute denial of the crime should prevail.
The proper standard of review on a motion for directed verdict is stated
in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
a
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.
. . . [T]here must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is
expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the
prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence .
1d. a t 187-188 (internal citations omitted) .
Upon examining the evidence introduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, we find no error in the trial court's decision to
deny Stone's motion for a directed verdict . The record contains sufficient
evidence to support a first-degree sodomy conviction.
The first-degree sodomy statute, KRS 510.070, provides as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when :
(a) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person by forcible compulsion ; or
(b) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person who is incapable of consent because he :
12
1 . Is physically helpless ; or
2 . Is less than twelve (12) years old .
KRS 510.010(1) defines deviate sexual intercourse as "any act. of sexual
gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another; or penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object
manipulated by another person ."
At trial, C .M. testified that Stone grabbed him by his wrist and pulled
him inside his apartment. C.M. told Stone to let him go and to "get off me ."
After pulling the victim inside, Stone took him into the bedroom, threw him
onto the bed, pulled down his pants, and held him down with one arm . Stone
then orally sodomized C .M . while holding him down . Thus, the attack
described by the victim meets the statutory definition of first-degree sodomy by
forcible compulsion . While there was a delay in reporting the incident and no
physical evidence was found, C .M . was able to describe the inside of Stone's
residence, thereby corroborating that he had been inside the apartment.
Stone's claims are directed more towards the credibility and weight of the
victim's testimony, arguing, in effect, that the jury should have believed him
instead of the victim. Because credibility and weight are exclusively jury
issues, and we are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for its
determinations, Stone's argument fails. Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S. W.2d
3 (Ky. 1983) .
Moreover, the testimony of the victim, alone, was sufficient to withstand
Stone's motion for a directed verdict. See Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S .W .3d
13
424, 426 (Ky. 2002) ("The testimony of even a single witness is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt, even when other witnesses testified to the contrary if,
after consideration of all of the evidence, the finder of fact assigns greater
weight to that evidence.") ; see also Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W .3d 6, 8
(Ky. 2001) (The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support: a rape
conviction .) .
As demonstrated above, there was sufficient evidence to support the
first-degree sodomy conviction by forcible compulsion. Accordingly, we find no
error.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Thomas More Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Dr., Ste 200
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.