CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS BANKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 21, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-000631-MR
CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS BANKS
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Christopher Douglas Banks, was convicted in Montgomery
Circuit Court of multiple felony charges, including manufacturing
methamphetamine and fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a
child. He challenges his convictions on multiple grounds . Finding no
reversible error, his conviction is affirmed.
I. Background
In July 2007, police executed a search warrant at Appellant's home .
Along with Appellant, police found his two young children residing in the
house . In their initial sweep of the residence, police discovered items
associated with manufacturing methamphetamine in the garage behind the
house. Among these were four plastic hydrogen chloride gas generators,
rubber tubing, filters with dough residue, drain cleaner, acetone, empty lithium
battery casings, dry ice bags, a wooden spoon coated with a white substance,
rock salt, Liquid Fire, a bottle containing ammonium nitrate pellets, a grinder,
a duffel bag, and a backpack .
The presence of these items led police to consider the garage a "meth
lab." No heat source, essential to the manufacture of methamphetamine, was
found in the garage, however, suggesting that the stove in the kitchen of the
house was used in the process. Police also discovered five bags of marijuana at
the residence .
When questioned by police, Appellant initially claimed ignorance of any
methamphetamine being manufactured in his house . Even after police
confronted him with incriminating statements purportedly coming from the co
defendants, Appellant continued to deny manufacturing methamphetamine
himself, but admitted renting the garage to Gerald Mullis for that activity .
Appellant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana, fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to
a child, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Three alleged co-participants in
Appellant's methamphetamine scheme were also charged, but pleaded guilty.
Appellant was convicted on all charges. The jury recommended a sentence of
twenty years on manufacturing methamphetamine, twelve months for
possession of marijuana, five years on each count of controlled substance
endangerment to a child, and twelve months for possession of drug
paraphernalia. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total
sentence of 30 years .
This appeal was then filed directly to this Court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
11. Analysis
Appellant challenges his convictions on four grounds . He first claims it
was reversible error for the trial court to inform the jury of the guilty pleas by
co-defendants. Second, he asserts the infringement of his Confrontation
Clause rights by the admission into evidence of an interrogation by police in
which they informed Appellant of how his co-defendants had incriminated him .
Third, he challenges his conviction on two counts of controlled substance
endangerment to a child because the meth lab was not located in the house,
where the children resided, but in the garage . Finally, he urges that evidence
of the children's otherwise poor living conditions, insinuating that Appellant
was a poor father, should have been excluded from trial.
A. Guilty Pleas by Co-Defendants
All three co-defendants entered guilty pleas shortly after trial proceedings
began . They each entered their plea after voir dire, but before opening
statements . Following the final guilty plea, the trial judge instructed the jury
that all three co-defendants had pleaded guilty, thus leaving Appellant as the
only defendant on trial.
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the court to tell the jury
that his co-defendants had entered guilty pleas and for the Commonwealth to
subsequently comment on the pleas in opening argument . He reasons that the
guilty pleas of co-defendants unfairly implied to the jury that he must be guilty
as well. Appellant argues that such prejudice amounts to reversible error.
While on the one hand Appellant is correct that knowledge of codefendants' guilty pleas may damage a remaining defendant's credibility, on
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the other hand he may be advantaged by their acceptance of responsibility .
Indeed, Appellant's own theory of the case was that he did not directly
participate in the illegal drug operations, but simply rented the space out for
use by the co-defendants. In other words, his entire trial strategy was to depict
the co-defendants as the truly guilty parties. Thus, Appellant cannot identify
any overall prejudice to his case through the revelation to the jury that those
co-defendants had pleaded guilty.
Appellant did not complain at trial about the mention of these guilty
pleas . On the contrary, when asked whether he was ready to proceed following
the entering of the pleas, Appellant stated that he was "ready to roll ."
Moreover, in a conference held the following day, Appellant clarified that it was
his informed decision to proceed in light of the jury's awareness of the guilty
pleas.
As this Court recently explained, "Ordinarily, it is `improper for the
Commonwealth to show during its case-in-chief that a co-indicaee has already
been convicted under the indictment .' King v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d
270, 277 (Ky. 2009) (quoting St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 544
(Ky. 2004)) . 1 This general caution applies equally to the court, which should
not ordinarily inform the jury of such developments . "However, if it is apparent
from the record that the defendant did not object to the introduction of this
1 The best practice when co-defendants are dropped from the trial is for the trial judge
to simply state that they will no longer be part of the trial . As our other cases
indicate, there is potential prejudice in telling the jury about the guilty plea.
evidence and that the defendant tried to use that information as part of his
trial strategy, no reversible error occurred ." Id.
Clearly, Appellant should not be permitted to have his cake and eat it,
too. He did not object to the mention of the guilty pleas and attempted to foist
responsibility onto his former co-defendants at trial, in part by referencing their
guilty pleas. No reversible error occurred.
B. Statements from Interrogation
When first questioned by police, Appellant denied any knowledge of
manufacturing methamphetamine . Attempting to undermine his denial, police
fabricated statements, purportedly from the co-defendants, that incriminated
Appellant . The fabrication was designed to convince Appellant to admit
culpability. These statements consisted of claims that the co-defendants
bought Appellant pseudophedrine for the manufacturing process as well as an
assertion that Appellant was manufacturing methamphetamine to stave off the
pending foreclosure of his house. After being confronted with these
statements, Appellant admitted knowledge of the methamphetamine, but
insisted he merely rented out the storage building for other people to
manufacture it.
Over Appellant's objection, the Commonwealth played a recording of this
interrogation for the jury. He now claims that admission of portions of this
interrogation violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause . Specifically,
he challenges the introduction of the underlying statements supposedly made
by the co-defendants.
This Court essentially ,resolved this issue in Earner v. Commonwealth,
248 S .W.3d 543 (Ky. 2008) . There, we followed federal precedent to conclude
that, although hearsay exceptions cannot immunize an out-of-court statement
from Confrontation Clause review, if a statement is not hearsay at all, i .e . not
offered for the truth of the matter, no constitutional dilemma exists. Id. at 54546 . The basis for this rule is that the Confrontation Clause protects a
defendant's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him ." U .S .
Const. amend . VI . If a statement is not offered for its truth, its declarant is not
serving as a witness .
The Commonwealth did not seek to introduce the fabricated statements
of co-defendants for their truth, but instead to provide the context of the
interrogation. In context, they serve to demonstrate how police caught
Appellant in a lie-that he didn't know anything about the methamphetamine.
This helped prove Appellant's manufacturing of methamphetamine by
illustrating how he attempted to cover it up. A cover-up is highly relevant,
"constituting circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and hence of the
fact of guilt itself." Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004)
(cover-up by false identification) . To the extent these statements were offered
for this purpose, they were constitutionally permissible .
Of course, as is often the case, the introduction of these statements for a
legitimate purpose contains the potential for abuse. It obviously would be
improper to rely on these fabricated statements to confirm that Appellant did in
fact know about the methamphetamine or that he was manufacturing it to
offset his financial woes . Such misuse would not only deprive Appellant of his
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confrontation right, but would also have the absurd effect of permitting police
to simply fabricate incriminating assertions against Appellant.
Thus, the introduction of the recording would unquestionably have been
subject to an admonition against use for truth, if Appellant had so requested .
Appellant did not, however, request an admonition at trial, nor has he asserted
his right to one on appeal. As Appellant failed to request the only remedy he
was entitled to, this Court will not disturb the verdict resulting from proper
rulings by the trial court. See Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 752
(Ky. 2005) .
C. Controlled Substance Endangerment to a Child
Appellant next contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the
two counts of fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child . The
crime for which he was convicted is laid out in KRS 218A.1444, which states in
relevant part:
A person is guilty of controlled substance endangerment to a child
in the fourth degree when he or she knowingly causes or permits a
child to be present when any person is illegally manufacturing . . .
methamphetamine or possesses a hazardous chemical substance
with intent to illegally manufacture a controlled substance or
methamphetamine under circumstances that place a child in
danger of serious physical injury or death, if the child is not
injured as a result of the commission of the offense .
KRS 218A.1444(1) . The basis of Appellant's claim is that none of the
components of the meth lab were found in Appellant's house, where the
children resided, but instead in the neighboring garage. Thus, Appellant
reasons, manufacturing methamphetamine posed no danger to his children.
Notwithstanding the discovery of the manufacturing components in the
garage only, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Appellant did
endanger his children through the manufacture of methamphetamine. First, it
was reasonable for the jury to infer that Appellant used the stove in the house's
kitchen to manufacture the methamphetamine, based on expert testimony that
a heat source is required and none existed in the garage . Second, even more
direct evidence was offered by Brad Isaacs, a confidential informant, who
testified to observing Appellant in that kitchen wearing a chemical mask with
the materials used to manufacture methamphetamine alongside him, while the
children played in the next room. Finally, when Appellant was asked by Isaacs
whether the chemicals bothered his children, he responded that one of his
children was a "tough little f****," thereby implicitly admitting that the
chemicals posed some hazard and that the children were exposed to them.
Because there was ample evidence to demonstrate that the children were
exposed to the danger of methamphetamine manufacture in the house, this
Court need not address whether the existence of such a danger in the garage
alone is sufficient for a conviction . Based on the evidence in this case,
Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
D. Poor Living Conditions
The Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant's children were
found hungry and that their home was in disarray, with animal excrement and
urine throughout, and marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the living room .
Appellant did not object to this evidence, but had unsuccessfully objected to
discussion of it in opening statement.
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Appellant's objection to the Commonwealth's discussion of the poor living
conditions in opening statement was inadequate to preserve any error with
regard to admission of such evidence. Without delving into the precise
requirements of the contemporaneous objection rule, it suffices to say that to
preserve an evidentiary error, a party must object to the admission of evidence.
See RCr 9 .22 . Opening statements are not evidence, Morgan v. Commonwealth,
189 S .W.3d 99, 11.4 (Ky. 2006), and thus an objection thereupon fails to
preserve an evidentiary error.
This result is clear in light of the broader latitude afforded to parties in
their discussion of the evidence during opening statement. Id. A court may
properly permit discussion, offered on a good faith basis in opening, of evidence
that is ultimately inadmissible . See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W .2d
575, 578 (Ky. 1967) ("Counsel has the right to direct the attention of the jury to
all facts and circumstances that he in good faith believes will be allowed to
develop in the evidence.") . Consequently, the overruling of an objection made
during opening is not necessarily dispositive of the admissibility of the same
subject matter in the form of evidence. To give the trial court an adequate
basis for evaluating its admissibility, therefore, a party must object to the
admission of evidence at the time it is presented.2
Due to Appellant's failure to properly preserve this matter, it is reviewed
solely for palpable error. For an error to be palpable, and thus reversible, it
must result in a manifest injustice . Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W .3d 1, 3
2 This is not to say that a proper pre-trial motion in limine would not preserve the
error. But no such motion was made in this case.
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(Ky. 2006) . "[T]he required showing is probability of a different result or error
so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law."
Id.; see also id. at S ("When an appellate court engages in a palpable error
review, its focus is on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest,
fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial
process.") . The implication of Appellant's poor fathering, though possibly
improper KRE 404 evidence, certainly was not "so manifest, fundamental and
unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process ." Nor is
there any real possibility in this case of a different result when considering the
other, overwhelming evidence of guilt supplied by the Commonwealth .
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court
is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
V. Gene Lewter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael John Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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