COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ANGELLA PRATER
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 21, 2010
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLA
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2008-CA-000387-MR
BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CR-00089
ANGELLA PRATER
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING
The Court of Appeals vacated a judgment convicting Angella grater of
reckless homicide' for her son's death in a vehicular collision, concluding that
the trial court erred in allowing extrinsic evidence to impeach Prater on a
collateral matter. Specifically, the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth
to introduce extrinsic evidence to disprove Prater's assertion in direct testimony
that she had undergone nasal surgery a few days before the collision and, as a
result of the nasal surgery, had received prescriptions for two painkillers .
Because Kentucky precedent recognizes that a trial court's decision to admit
evidence despite claims of improper collateral impeachment is subject to review
'
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507 .050 ("(1) A person is guilty of reckless
homicide when, with recklessness he causes the death of another person .
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class D felony.") .
for abuse of discretion and because we discern no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's admitting the evidence under the unique facts and circumstances
presented in this case, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS.
Prater was the driver in a single-vehicle collision in which her truck left
the road and hit a tree . Eyewitness testimony indicated that Prater may have
been traveling too fast or inattentively . But other evidence suggested that a tire
came off the truck causing it to leave the road. Prater's two-year-old son, who
was a passenger in the truck at the time of the collision, died as a result of
blunt-impact trauma to the head .
Soon after the accident, the Kentucky State Police laboratory tested
Prater's blood for drugs and alcohol. The test results were positive for
prescription painkillers Tramadol and Methadone at or below therapeutic
levels. The test results were also positive for Zoloft, an antidepressant for
which the laboratory did not have a standard for therapeutic levels at that
time . Apparently, no alcohol or other drugs were found in her blood; and a
laboratory official later testified that she could not determine whether Prater
was impaired as a result of the prescription drugs .
Prater was indicted and tried on a charge of reckless homicide, a Class D
felony. At trial, she testified to having taken the three prescription drugs the
day before the accident. She further stated that a counselor had prescribed
the Zoloft and that a doctor prescribed the painkillers following nasal surgery,
which she alleged she underwent "three or four" days before the accident .
Upon cross-examination, Prater admitted that she was uncertain about when
the nasal surgery occurred. She allowed on cross-examination that perhaps
the nasal surgery could have occurred more than the three or four days before
the accident . The Commonwealth's attorney then suggested that perhaps
Prater could have easily obtained her medical records in advance of trial to
facilitate quick verification of the precise date of the nasal surgery.
At a bench conference that followed, the Commonwealth asked the trial
court for an order to obtain Prater's medical records from the nasal surgery.
Prater's counsel objected, based on relevancy; questioned what the
Commonwealth expected to find in the records; and informed the court that the
nasal surgery actually occurred after the accident. The trial court overruled
the objection and issued an order permitting the Commonwealth to obtain
Prater's medical records from the doctor whom Prater identified as having
performed her nasal surgery and having prescribed the two painkillers .
After the jury returned from a break, the medical records custodian and
nurse of the physician who performed the nasal surgery testified. The
custodian's review of the records revealed that the nasal surgery occurred over
two years after the accident and that the physician had prescribed one
painkiller, Methadone; but he had not prescribed the other painkiller.
Prater later resumed the witness stand and explained that she had
misremembered the nasal surgery as occurring a few days before the accident.
She testified that she had had a number of medical problems, including a head
injury from the accident, and had become confused. She testified then that
she had suffered an ankle injury before the accident for which she took
painkillers. Over the Commonwealth's objection to lack of authentication, the
trial court permitted Prater to present evidence of records indicating that she
had been seen by a doctor for an ankle injury several weeks before the accident
and that she had filled prescriptions for the two painkillers at a particular
pharmacy before the accident.
Upon further cross-examination, the Commonwealth attempted to cast
doubt on Prater's claims that she was taking two prescription painkillers for
the ankle injury by eliciting Prater's admission that there was no radiology
report for the ankle injury. This suggested, of course, that no fracture had
occurred or was even suspected. Prater also admitted that she had no direct
record that a doctor had prescribed any painkillers for the ankle injury. She
went on to state that she could not actually recall the medical condition for
which she began taking the painkillers, and she was hesitant or unsure about
identifying the name of the doctor who had prescribed them . And we are not
aware of any request by Prater for further intervention by the trial court, such
as a request for a continuance, in order to gather and present other medical
records or other evidence concerning her treatment for her ankle injury or
other medical conditions .2
Prater's brief points out that during the course of her cross-examination by the
Commonwealth, she asked whether she was being tried for medical records or for
The jury found Prater guilty of the reckless homicide charge and
recommended the maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment. The trial
court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and sentencing
recommendation .
On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and
remanded for further proceedings on the basis that the trial court had "erred to
[Prater's] substantial prejudice in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
evidence that impeached her testimony that the pain medication in her system
was the result of prescriptions connected to nasal surgery."
The Court of Appeals determined that the reason for Prater's admitted
use of the prescription drugs in her system was irrelevant to determining her
guilt or innocence on the reckless homicide charge and was, thus, a collateral
issue . Noting that Prater's objection on relevancy grounds was closely related
to the concept of collateral impeachment and, thus, determining the collateral
impeachment issue adequately preserved for review, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court had erroneously allowed the Commonwealth to
driving recklessly . And she also points out that the trial court explained to her
that she had testified on direct examination to undergoing nasal surgery shortly
before the accident, that records indicated the nasal surgery occurred after the
accident, and that was why she was being cross-examined about her medical
records. We note that this explanation for the cross-examination did not occur at a
bench conference but, apparently, within the hearing of the jury. Also, other
objections were occasionally discussed by the trial court in the hearing of the jury.
While our preference would be for such discussion of objections and legal issues to
be outside the hearing of the jury, Prater has not asserted any error from such
discussions before the jury; and we see no indication of any palpable error (as
defined by Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10 .26 ) occurring as a
result .
introduce evidence to impeach Prater on a collateral issue . The Court of
Appeals vacated the conviction . 3
II. ANALYSIS.
A. We Assume that the Issue of Collateral Impeachment is Adequately
Preserved .
The Commonwealth contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
determining that the issue of collateral impeachment was adequately preserved
by Prater's objection on grounds of relevancy .4 Although we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the issue of collateral impeachment is closely related to
the concept of relevancy, Prater's objection on relevancy grounds did not clearly
invoke the prohibition against collateral impeachment, meaning that
We also note that the Court of Appeals rejected Prater's argument that she was
entitled to a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence and her
argument that the trial court erred in not admonishing the jury that it could not
consider her failure to secure the child in a safety seat to be reckless conduct. But
Prater did not file a protective cross-appeal on these issues that the Court of
Appeals did not resolve in her favor. So none of those issues are properly before
us .
The Court of Appeals took note that Prater did not explicitly raise the issue of
collateral impeachment when objecting to the admission of her medical records.
Nonetheless, it concluded that the issue of collateral impeachment was adequately
preserved by Prater's objection on relevancy . Its conclusion was based on Court of
Appeals precedent that recognized that collateral impeachment issues are closely
related to relevancy issues, quoting Simmons v. Small, 986 S .W .2d 452, 455
(Ky.App. 1998) : "A matter is considered collateral if the matter itself is not relevant
in the litigation to establish a fact or consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose
other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness ." (quotation
marks omitted) .
Since the result in this case does not change whether the issue is preserved or not,
this opinion should not be construed as a definitive holding that an objection
based on relevancy will always suffice to preserve an appellate argument that
evidence was inadmissible on collateral impeachment grounds .
preservation of the collateral impeachment issue may be somewhat
questionable .
Given the imprecise preservation of the issue, the issue should arguably
only be reviewed under a palpable error standard under RCr 1.0.26. But even
assuming that the issue is properly preserved, we do not believe the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence; and so we believe that the
Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that Prater was entitled to relief.
We certainly agree that a more specific objection on collateral
impeachment would have been more effective in bringing this issue to the trial
court's attention;5 but we will, nonetheless, accept for the sake of argument
that the issue of collateral impeachment is adequately preserved in order to
address this issue and provide guidance to the bench and bar .
B. Court of Appeals Erred in Vacating Conviction for Collateral
Impeachment.
This case forces us to apply the somewhat confusing rule against
collateral impeachment. In fact, there is no particular rule in the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence (KRE) clearly addressing impeachment on collateral facts,
matters, or issues .6 Yet, our case law continues to hold that impeachment on
As we recognized in West v. Commonwealth, 780 S .W.2d 600, 603 (Ky. 1989), that
stating objections with specificity may help prevent error by trial courts by
directing their attention to issues that otherwise might not be fully considered until
appeal.
See ROBERT G. LAwsON, THE KENTucKYEviDENcELAW HANDBOOK (4th ed. 2003)
4 .05(3) . ("Kentucky's Evidence Rules, like the Federal Rules, say nothing specific
about impeachment on collateral facts.") .
collateral matters by extrinsic evidence is not allowed.? Despite the clear
prohibition from case authority against impeachment on collateral matters by
extrinsic evidence, we still review the trial court's decision to admit evidence
over objections of collateral impeachment under an abuse of discretion
standard of review as we explain below.
Professor Lawson notes that rules concerning collateral impeachment
"are easy to describe but very difficult to apply, because of the complexity
involved in determining `collateralness. "'8 And because determinations of the
collateralness are so fact-specific and generally not clear-cut, Kentucky
precedent provides that a trial court's decision to admit impeachment evidence
on a purportedly collateral matter is subject to an abuse of discretion standard :
"decisions on collateralness fall within the discretion of the judge and are
reviewed for abuse of that discretion[; and this is] no surprise since they
depend so heavily on the specific facts of the case and require a careful
exercise of sound judgment in the heat of courtroom battle."9
Applying the proper abuse of discretion standard of review, we disagree
with the Court of Appeals' determination that Prater's conviction must be
vacated. We hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to permit
See, e.g., Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S .W.3d 382, 397-98 (Ky. 2004) ("Although
there is no provision in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence prohibiting impeachment
on collateral facts, we have continued to recognize that prohibition as a valid
principle of evidence .") ; Woodard v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Ky.
2007) ("this would be impeachment on a collateral matter, which is allowed while
the witness is still on the stand, although not by extrinsic evidence") .
LAwsON at § 4 .05(2) .
Id., citing, e.g., Wickware v. Commonwealth, 444 S .W .2d 272, 275-76 (Ky. 1969) .
impeachment on this issue because Prater created the issue by offering on
direct examination a misleading explanation of why she was taking the
painkillers. It is plausible to infer that she did so in an effort to present herself
to the jury in a sympathetic light.
I . Regardless of Whether Issue of Reason for Prater's Painkiller Use Was
Collateral, Trial Court had Discretion to Allow Admission of Extrinsic
Evidence to Disprove Prater's Assertion on Direct Examination
Because She Injected this Issue into the Trial.
Perhaps the most hotly disputed issue in this case is whether the reason
for Prater's admitted ingestion of the two prescription painkillers is truly a
collateral matter. And we note that whether Prater had taken the prescription
painkillers as a result of a particular surgery or injury or for other reasons was
not necessarily the linchpin of her guilt or innocence on the reckless homicide
charge. For example, it is possible that one might be held liable for reckless
homicide for fatal injuries resulting from driving impaired'O from the side
effects of properly prescribed and administered drugs - particularly where the
defendant was warned of side effects such as drowsiness ." Nonetheless, the
fact remains that Prater first injected into the trial the issue of her reason for
io We note that the jury was not specifically asked to determine if Prater was
impaired as a result of her use of prescription drugs and that it is possible that the
jury found her behavior to have been reckless for other reasons.
See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 852 N.E .2d 1124, 1126, 1130 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006)
(upholding conviction for "vehicular homicide by reckless or negligent operation
while under the influence of narcotic drugs or depressants (felony vehicular
homicide)" where evidence indicated that defendant was impaired due to taking
certain prescription drugs (prescription painkiller and Valium) as prescribed by
medical professionals where defendant had received written and oral warnings as
to drugs' tendency to induce drowsiness and impair driving) .
taking the painkillers ; and we must consider the effect of her injecting the
issue into the trial .
Even assuming that the reason for her taking the prescription painkillers
was a collateral matter, Professor Lawson recognizes that an unsettled issue
arises, namely: "May a party who first opens the door to a collateral issue take
advantage of the prohibition against collateral facts impeachment?" 12 On the
one hand, "[t]he damaging effects of issue proliferation do not depend upon
who takes the initiative to introduce a collateral issue into the case ." 13 On the
other, "one must harbor at least some doubt as to whether a party should be
permitted to raise a collateral matter and then use the law as a shield against
full contradiction of that matter." 14
And Professor Lawson notes a split among Kentucky cases before
adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence . He cites Dixon v. Commonwealth 15
as indicating that impeachment on collateral matters may be permitted when a
party "opens the door" to a collateral issue through that party's testimony on
direct examination . He also cites Keene v. CommonwealthM as an opposing
example where impeachment on
a collateral matter was considered improper
without any discussion of the fact that the collateral issue was first raised by
12
13
14
15
16
LAwSON at § 4 .05(4) .
Id.
Id.
487 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1972).
3'07 Ky. 308, 210 S.W.2d 926 (1948), overruled on other grounds by Colbert v.
Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Ky. 1957). Colbert itself has been overruled
on grounds not germane to the case at hand.
10
the defendant upon direct examination . 1 `' Professor Lawson concludes that
this split "may suggest that outcomes should depend upon specific facts and
circumstances of a case and the exercise of sound discretion by the trial
judge ."18
In light of the concerns raised in Professor Lawson's discussion - desire
to avoid issue proliferation versus potential use of collateral impeachment rules
as a "license to lie" 19 - including an apparent split in authority, we conclude
that the trial court has discretion to determine whether or not to permit
impeachment on collateral issues when a party has opened the door to such
issues by raising them in direct testimony . And we believe that our conclusion
is supported by Kentucky precedent .20 To the extent that some Kentucky cases
17
18
We also note that Prater cites Rowe v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 216, 224
(Ky.App. 2001), in her brief for the proposition that regardless of who opened the
door on a collateral issue, impeachment on a truly collateral issue is not permitted .
LAwsON
at § 4 .05[4] .
See KEVIN MCMUNIGAL 8v CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE, REFORMING EXTRINSIC IMPEACHMENT,
33 Conn.L.Rev. 363, 379 (2001) (arguing for use of weighing approach rather than
bright line rule forbidding all impeachment by extrinsic evidence of collateral
matters in Federal Rules because "in the context of impeachment, the predictability
of bright line rules may not be entirely desirable . Ironically, it may have the
negative consequence of encouraging perjury. If a witness and the lawyer calling
the witness know, for example, that if the witness falsely denies a non-conviction
act offered on truthfulness, the cross-examining lawyer is absolutely barred from
disproving the witness' denial by extrinsic proof, the witness and lawyer calling him
may be tempted to offer perjured testimony. In other words, they may view a . . .
bright line exclusion as a license to lie. By contrast, if the lawyer and witness are
unsure whether the judge will or will not allow such extrinsic proof under a caseby-case approach, they have a greater incentive not to offer a lie because there is a
greater chance the perjury will be exposed before the fact finder by extrinsic
proof.") . See also FREDERICK C. MOSS, THE SWEEPING CLAIMS EXCEPTION AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 1982 DukeL.J.. 61 (1982) .
ao See Dixon, 487 S.W .2d at 930 (holding that in light of defendant's statement on
direct examination that he had never been previously arrested on a morals charge,
19
might appear to hold that a trial court invariably lacks discretion to permit
impeachment on a collateral issue raised by a party on direct examination,
such cases are hereby overruled .
We believe the trial court is in the best position to decide whether the
facts and circumstances of that case present a scenario in which the evil of
allowing a party to offer voluntarily what may be knowingly false testimony
with impunity outweighs the evil of having to devote trial time to impeachment
on collateral matters . And we now clearly hold that the trial court has
discretion to permit or deny impeachment by extrinsic evidence on a collateral
issue raised by a party on direct examination .
evidence of prior convictions of morals charges, if properly authenticated, could
have been properly admitted in rebuttal) ; Cox v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 642,
160 S.W .2d 201, 201-02 (1942) (no reversible error from trial court permitting
presentation of witness's testimony concerning specific prior bad act due to
defendant "opening door" to issue by testifying on direct examination that he had
never been charged with similar crimes in past, especially as trial court gave
limiting admonition) ; Dowell v. Bivins, 586 S.W.2d 297, 299-300 (Ky.App . 1979) (in
trial of parents' civil lawsuit to recover for death of child hit by vehicle on public
highway, defense was properly permitted to present testimony of other witnesses
concerning prior occasions when child was seen playing unsupervised near same
highway to rebut parents' testimony that child always played close to home under
parental supervision and never played near highway) ; Stallworth v. Commonwealth,
No. 2000-SC-000821-MR, 2001-SC-000569-TG, 2002 WL 32083941., at *4 (Ky.
Oct. 1.7, 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion. in trial court's allowing
Commonwealth to identify defendant's prior convictions as being for the same
crime he was presently charged with (drug trafficking) in light of defendant
"opening door" to this collateral issue by his statement on cross-examination that
he had never sold drugs, despite KRE 609's limits on specifically identifying the
nature of prior convictions) . See also Purcell, 149 S.W.3d at 397-98 ("Although
there is no provision in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence prohibiting impeachment
on collateral facts, we have continued to recognize that prohibition as a valid
principle of evidence," but noting that "Professor Lawson suggests that the issue is
more properly decided by applying the KRE 403 balancing test, i.e., weighing the
probative value of the impeachment against the prejudicial effect of that evidence
and its possible confusion of issues" before ultimately also stating that the
prejudicial effect of prior bad acts will almost always outweigh their probative
value .) (citations omitted) .
12
2. Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting the Evidence.
Under the unique facts of this case, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's admission of Prater's medical records to impeach her assertion
on direct examination that she took the prescription painkillers because they
had been prescribed to her following nasal surgery shortly before the accident.
Prater chose to create the issue of the reason behind her taking the painkillers
to the jury and was allowed to present other records - despite concerns over
lack of authentication - in her efforts to show other medical reasons for taking
the prescription painkillers once the Commonwealth effectively cast doubt on
her initial assertion . Because she opened the door to inquiry on why she was
taking the prescription drugs, we believe that the trial court had latitude to
allow the Commonwealth to attack the veracity of her assertion or to require
that the matter drop on grounds of issue proliferation, jury confusion, or waste
of time.
Here, Prater's assertion on direct examination that she took the drugs as
prescribed following surgery might cast her in a more sympathetic light than,
for example, leaving the jury to guess whether she was taking the drugs
recreationally or had obtained the drugs in violation of the law. 21 Because
Prater herself raised the reason for her prescription painkiller use to the jury in
a way likely to increase its sympathy toward her, denying the Commonwealth
the opportunity to investigate and rebut the truth of her assertion could
21
To our knowledge, Prater was not charged with illegal possession of the
prescription drugs.
13
obviously impede the interests ofjustice and search for the truth. So the trial,
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to impeach
her on a matter that she injected into trial with the likely, if not intended, effect
of appealing to the jury's sympathy .
Because Prater chose to raise the issue of why she had taken the
prescription painkillers to the jury as part of her defense and because flatly
foreclosing the Commonwealth from any opportunity to impeach this assertion
through extrinsic evidence could have had the effect of condoning false
testimony without consequences, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's allowing impeachment by extrinsic evidence under the facts here .
III. CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed; and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Barbara Anderson
F. J. Anderson
400 Court Square Building
269 West Main Street, Suite 400
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
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