LARRY LEE DAVENPORT, II V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
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2009-SC-000344-MR
DAT
LARRY LEE DAVENPORT, II
ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00157
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Larry Lee Davenport, II, appeals as a matter of right from a May C, 2009
Judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court convicting him of three counts of
robbery in the first degree and one count of assault in the second degree. The
court sentenced Davenport to twenty-five years imprisonment . Davenport was
accused of robbing two convenience stores in Owensboro on January 22, 2008
and of criminal attempt to commit murder. On appeal, Davenport contends
that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a
mistrial and instead admonished the jury after a witness referenced
Davenport's prior "trouble" with the law and jail time . Finding no reversible
error, we affirm .
RELEVANT FACTS
Two convenience stores in Owen.sboro were robbed on January 22, 2008 .
The first robbery occurred at 6 :15 p .m . at a store located at the intersection of
Eighteenth Street and Leitchfield Road . An armed man entered the store,
demanded money, fired. a shot that hit the wall, and fled with $500 .00 cash..
The second robbery occurred at 11 :45 p .m . at a store located at the
intersection of Fifth Street and Crabtree Road . Two men entered the store and
the taller and thinner of the two, armed with a. gun, demanded money. He fired
a shot into the ceiling and then shot Robert Ashby, a clerk who was getting off
his shift when the robbery occurred, in the leg when Ashby refused. to give up
his wallet. The robbers fled the store with $50 .00 cash.
Owensboro Police Lieutenant Tim Clothier testified that early in the
morning on January 23, 2008 he observed a vehicle that appeared to be
occupied by two black men . After following the vehicle for several blocks and
seeing it swerve back and forth, Lt. Clothier made a traffic stop . It turned. out
there were five people in the car; Davenport was sitting in the middle of the
back seat. After discovering that the driver's license was suspended, Lt .
Clothier arrested the driver and searched the vehicle . During the search, all.
officer discovered a black .22 revolver under the seat where Davenport had
been sitting. Davenport told the police he found the gun behind the
convenience store at Fifth Street and Crabtree Road on the night of January
22, 2008 and denied any involvement in the robberies . Owensboro Police
officer Steve Smith testified that two officers and a trained police dog conducted
a thorough search of the premises immediately after the robbery and did not.
find a gun, or anything else, behind the store.
This gun and the bullets recovered from the scene and from Ashby's leg
were sent to the Kentucky State Forensic Laboratory, but the firearms expert
could not definitively match the bullets to the gun. The expert testified that,
while the bullets from the robberies had similar physical characteristics to
"test" bullets fired from the gun, a conclusive match could, not be made
because the gun did not leave unique marks on. any bullets .
The video surveillance tapes of the robberies played to the jury showed
one of the robbers wearing a black coat with a large Nike "swoosh" mark on the
back and a smaller "swoosh" mark on the hood . The police recovered a jacket
with a large Nike "swoosh" on the back and a smaller "swoosh" on the hood
from the apartment of Kelsey Dixon and Anthony Higgs, friends of Davenport.
Davenport told the police the coat belonged to him. Dixon and Higgs also
testified that the coat belonged to Davenport, but noted that a few other people
had worn the jacket on occasion ; however, Dixon stated she had not seen
anyone other than Davenport wear the coat since December, 2007 .
Anthony Higgs testified that on the day of the robberies Davenport told
Higgs he was going to "hit a lick"' later that day and showed Higgs a gun he
was carrying . Later that same day, Davenport told Higgs he had indeed "hit a
lick." Fhggs also testified that, on January 23, 2008, he, Davenport and a few
Owensboro Police Lieutenant Tim Clothier testified that to "hit a lick" means to
commit a crime .
other people were watching television when a story about the robberies came
on the news . Higgs stated that, after the news ended, Davenport bragged
about having committed the robberies .
Owensboro Police Detective Mike Walker interviewed Davenport at the
police station after Davenport was arrested . Det. Walker testified that
throughout the interview Davenport asked hypothetical questions, such as "If I
was the person who did this, could I get ten years? I think ten years is fair"
and "How can they charge anybody with attempted murder because the person
shot down like this (made a hand motion with a gun pointing downwards)
instead of like this (made a hand motion with a gun pointing straight ahead)?"
Det . Walker testified that such information had not been released to the public .
Donta Johnson, a longtime friend of Davenport's, was charged with
robbing the second store and pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery in the
second degree . At his plea hearing, Johnson told the judge under oath that
Larry Davenport was his accomplice in the robbery. At trial, Johnson's
testimony was convoluted and he made several contradictory statements .
First, when asked by the Commonwealth who was with him when he robbed
the store, Johnson was quiet for a long time before finally saying that he could
not remember because he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the
time of the robbery. However, Johnson was able to remember other details
from the night of the robbery, such as the coat he wore, that he covered his
mouth with a white bandana, and that his accomplice shot someone in the leg
when the man would not turn over his wallet. Second, when Johnson's earlier
statement from the plea hearing, identifying Davenport as his accomplice, was
read back to him at trial, Johnson testified that the statement was true when
he made it . However, Johnson later testified that the statement was not true
and he had lied to the police and the judge.
Kelsey Dixon testified on the first day of the trial regarding her
relationship with Davenport. Her testimony is the crux of Davenport's appeal .
When asked to characterize her relationship with Davenport, Dixon. testified
that she cared for Davenport because he did not have anyone since he was
"always in trouble," but that "out ofjail" they did not have a much of a
relationship. When asked how often she had seen Davenport around the time
of the robberies, Dixon stated, "[H]e comes to our house every single day
because we were, he, uh, basically, I mean, he's been locked up his whole life .
. . .
Defense counsel made no objection to the first two statements but
objected to the third statement as impermissible KRE 404(b) evidence and
moved for a mistrial . The Commonwealth's attorney said this information had
never come up in prior conversations with Dixon and thus the statements were
totally unexpected . The judge denied the motion for a mistrial and admonished
the jury that it was not to consider Dixon's last statement.
On appeal, Davenport argues that Dixon's testimony was so prejudicial
that it prevented him from receiving a fair trial and, thus, a mistrial was
required. Dixon's final statement, that Davenport was "locked up his whole
life," is the only issue preserved for appeal. Any error in the other two
statements made by Dixon was not preserved and those statements are
reviewed under the palpable error standard pursuant to RCr 10.26 . We first
address the issue of whether the court erred in denying Davenport's motion for
a mistrial after Dixon stated that Davenport was "locked up his whole life ."
ANALYSIS
I. The Court's Denial of Davenport's Motion For a Mistrial Was Not
Reversible Error.
On appeal, Davenport argues extensively that Kelsey Dixon's statement
that Davenport had been "locked up his whole life" was impermissible KRE
404(b) evidence . Under KRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
may not be admitted to prove a person's character and that he or she acted in
conformity with that character on a particular occasion. However, such
evidence may be admitted as either (1) proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, or (2)
if the evidence is "inextricably intertwined" with other evidence essential to the
case so that the two can not be separated without serious adverse effects. KRE
404(b) .
We agree with Davenport that Dixon's statement was impermissible KRE
404(b) evidence because Dixon's statement does not fall under either KRE
404(b) exception. However, this particular argument is misplaced because the
trial court did not rule that Dixon's statement was admissible . The
Commonwealth did not intend to solicit such a response nor did it expect
Dixon to discuss Davenport's prior crimes or bad acts. The defense promptly
objected to Dixon's statement and, while the court denied the motion for a
mistrial, it agreed that the evidence was impermissible and admonished the
jury accordingly . The issue, then, is not whether the evidence was admissible,
as it clearly was not admissible, but instead whether the admonition cured the
erroneous testimony so that a mistrial is not warranted.
A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is warranted only when the record
reveals "a manifest necessity for such an action. or an urgent or real necessity."
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S .W .2d 672, 678 (Ky. 1985) (quoting Wiley v.
Commonwealth, 575 S-W.2d 166 (Ky . App. 1978)) ; see also Sherroan v.
Commonwealth, 142 S .W.3d 7, 17 (Ky. 2004) . The occurrence complained of
must be of such magnitude that the litigant would be denied "a fair and
impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way."
Gould v. Charlton Co., 929 S.W .2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996) . There is a well-
established presumption that the jury will follow the trial court's admonition,
which usually cures any harm caused by the occurrence . Sherroan, supra
(quoting Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S .W .2d 856, 859 (Ky . 1993)) ; Graves
v. Commonwealth, 17 S .W.3d 858, 865 (Ky. 2000) . This presumption is
overcome in only two situations: (1) when an overwhelming probability exists
that the jury is incapable of following the admonition and a strong likelihood
exists that the impermissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant;
or (2) when the question was not premised on a factual basis and was
"inflammatory" or "highly prejudicial." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S .W .3d
430, 441 (Ky. 2003) . When evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is "introduced
into evidence through the non-responsive answer of a witness, this [C]ourt
must look at all of the evidence and determine whether the defendant has been
unduly prejudiced by that isolated statement." Phillips v. Commonwealth, 679
S.W .2d 235, 237-38 (Ky. 1984) . The trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether to grant a mistrial, Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S-W-3d
11, 17 (Ky . 2005), and that court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion . Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W .3d 741, 752
(Ky . 2005) .
Davenport does not argue that the admonition was insufficient or that
the jury should not be presumed to have followed the admonition . Instead.,
Davenport argues that Dixon's statement is analogous to either the jury being
shown booking photographs of him or of him being seen by the jury in
handcuffs and shackles . We do not agree that the situations are analogous,
but find the situation before us is as it appears to be : namely, inadmissible
KRE 404(b) evidence was inadvertently introduced at trial and was dealt with
by the trial court through an admonition . Having reviewed the record, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a.
mistrial and choosing to instead give an admonition to the jury. Given the
totality of the evidence, which overwhelmingly pointed to Davenport as being
involved in both robberies and as the person who shot the clerk in the second,
Davenport was not unduly prejudiced by Dixon's statement . Any harm caused
by Dixon's statement was cured by the trial court's admonition to the jury .
The presumption that an admonition cures any harm has not been
overcome because neither Johnson exception is met in this case. Applying the
first Johnson exception, there is no reason to think that the jury could not
follow the admonition or that Dixon's remarks would be "devastating" to
Davenport. 105 S .W .3d at 441 . There is nothing in the record to rebut the
presumption that the jury would heed the admonition to disregard Dixon's
remarks and, given the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, it cannot be
said that there is a strong likelihood that Dixon's brief and undetailed remarks
were (devastating to Davenport . See, e.g., Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S .W .3d
679 (Ky. 2006) (finding the admonition sufficient to cure any harm caused
when the Commonwealth played the defendant's taped statement, in which he
mentioned being in jail and on probation) ; Matthews, 163 S .W .3d at 17
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
for a mistrial after a witness testified that she had not long known the
defendant because, "he hadn't been out of prison that long.") ; Bray, supra,
(holding that prejudicial effect was not sufficient to warrant a mistrial when the
prosecutor pointedly asked the defendant on cross-examination, "Didn't you
call [the victim's boyfriend] on the phone and threaten him?") .
Nor does the second Johnson exception apply. Not only did the question
have a factual basis, but Dixon's remarks were not responsive to the question .
See Sherroan, 142 S.W.3d at 17 ("Both remarks were unsolicited . . . so the
requirement that the impermissible testimony originate from a question lacking
a factual basis is unmet") . Nor do we find the remarks inflammatory or highly
prejudicial . Dixon's comments were made in passing, not in response to a
question alluding to Davenport's criminal history, and the comments were
vague and unspecific, not referring to any particular crime or bad act. Id.
("[T]he testimony was not "inflammatory ;" both references to Appellant's
probation lacked any description of the underlying offense .") Any prejudice
caused by Dixon's statement was cured. by the trial court's admonition to the
jury.
Davenport relies on Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S .W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992),
and the unpublished opinion in Byrd v. Commonwealth, 2007-SC-000923-MR,
2009 WL 2706747 (Ky. Aug . 27, 2009), to support his argument that the broad
statement that he had been "locked up his whole life" created a manifest
necessity for a mistrial . In Funk, we held that the evidence of prior misconduct
was unduly prejudicial. 842 S .W .2d at 480-81 . In that case, the defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter of a young girl and. argued on
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior offense
through the testimony of a police officer, the examining physician in the prior
crime, and the mother of the victim in that prior crime. A The court admitted
extensive and detailed testimony by all three witnesses, much of which was
irrelevant and hearsay. Id. In Byrd, we held that the cumulative effect of the
KRE 404(b) testimony from three of the Commonwealth's witnesses warranted
a mistrial . Byrd, supra. During Byrd's trial for drug trafficking, two detectives
and a key witness made specific statements, on four separate occasions
throughout the trial, about Byrd's general criminal history and his history of
drug trafficking . Id. The trial court rejected the defense's motions for a
mistrial and instead admonished the jury in two of the instances . Id.
Davenport argues that his case is similar to Byrd and Funk because in
his trial there were also multiple references to his prior crimes and bad acts
and, specifically, the statement that he had been "locked up his whole life" was
overkill . We are not persuaded by Davenport's argument and find Byrd and
Funk distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Funk, unlike in Davenport's
case, the trial court actually admitted the testimony, which was deliberately
solicited, extensive, detailed, and made by three separate witnesses . The court
in Funk found the testimony to be overkill because the purpose of the
testimony was to establish identity under IRE 404(b)(1) and the testimony
given was far more than what was necessary to establish such identity . In
Byrd, unlike in Davenport's case, the statements were made by three separate
witnesses throughout the prosecutor's case ; were more than passing,
unresponsive comments; and were specifically about drug trafficking, the crime
with which Byrd was charged . Moreover, the trial court failed to give an
admonition in two of the instances to remedy the harm caused by the
statements . In Byrd, we stated, "Had there been only an isolated reference to
other drug deals by Byrd, we agree that the admonition would have been
sufficient to cure any resulting prejudice." Byrd, supra, (citing Matthews,
supra. Here, the admonition was sufficient .
II . Dixon's Two Other Statements About Davenport's Prior Crimes And
Bad Acts Do Not Constitute Palpable Error.
Dixon's two other statements about Davenport's prior crimes and bad
acts - he was "always in trouble" and "out of jail we didn't have much of a
relationship" - do not warrant a reversal. Any error in admission of these
statements was unpreserved and so we review them under the palpable error
standard of RCr 10.26 . Under that rule, we may only grant relief for an
unpreserved error when the error is (1) palpable ; (2) affects the substantial
rights of a party; and (3) has caused a manifest injustice. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 283 S .W .3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009) . The standard is not met in the present
case because, even assuming the statements were subject to KR.E 404(b), they
were not so prejudicial as to bear upon Davenport's substantial rights, and
they came nowhere near rendering Davenport's trial manifestly unjust.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a
mistrial . The trial court's admonition to the jury cured any harm caused by
Dixon's statements about Davenport's prior crimes and bad acts. There is
simply no evidence suggesting that the jury could not or did not heed the
admonition . Finally, given the totality of the evidence, Davenport was not
unduly prejudiced by the statements and there was no manifest or real
necessity for a mistrial. Accordingly, we affirm the May 6, 2009 Judgment of
the Daviess Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Jason Bradley Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capitol Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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