GARRETT ADAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDE,RED: MAY 20, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-000296-MR
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GARRETT ADAMS
V
ON APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM G. CLOUSE, JR ., JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00130-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Garrett Adams, appeals as a matter of right' from a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict convicting him of first-degree manufacturing
methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled substance . For
these crimes, he was sentenced to a total term of twenty years' imprisonment .
On appeal Adams contends : (1) the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his residence; (2) that
he was entitled to a directed verdict upon the charges that he possessed
equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine and that he
possessed a controlled substance ; (3) that the Commonwealth improperly
impeached him and his alibi witness, Crystal Tartt; and (4) that the
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Commonwealth improperly impeached him with his suppression hearing
testimony.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm .
I . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial
was as follows. On February 17, 2008, Officer Jason Parker received a tip from
an identified tipster that Adams and co-defendant Gary Owens were
manufacturing methamphetamine at a residence located on Old Wallacetown
Road in Madison County, Kentucky . The residence was owned by Owens, but
he had not stayed there since January 26, 2008, because he was evading a
warrant. Though denied by Adams, substantial evidence was presented that
he lived at the residence during the relevant time period. Indeed, Owens
testified that Adams was the only resident of the house in February 2008 .
Adams testified that he never lived at the residence and that during the
relevant time period he lived in a trailer with his friend Crystal Tartt. Tartt
corroborated Adams's testimony.
As a result of the tip, police reviewed the pseudoephedrine2 logs from
several stores in the Richmond and Berea area. 3 From the review it was
determined that Adams made purchases of pseudoephedrine on four occasions
between August 23, 2007, and October 2, 2007, that Owens made purchases of
pseudoephedrine on five occasions in September 2007, that co-defendant
2 Pseudoephedrine is an essential ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine .
Nichols v. Commonwealth, 186 S .W .3d 761, 762 (Ky.App. 2005) .
3 The maintaining of records of pseudoephedrine sales is prescribed by KRS
218A.1446 .
Rebecca Adams had purchased pseudoephedrine on two occasions in
November 2007, and that an acquaintance of the co-defendants, Jessica Day,
purchased pseudoephedrine on eight occasions between September 11, 2007,
and November 17, 2007 .
Based upon the tip and the recorded pseudoephedrine purchases, Officer
Parker and Deputy Tim Humble went to- the Old Wallacetown Road residence.
Adams, Rebecca Adams, Jessica Day, and two other persons unrelated to the
litigation were at the residence when he arrived . Rebecca Adams called Owens,
and he soon arrived at the scene. According to police testimony, Adams then
told them that he lived at the residence and occupied the back right bedroom.
In their later search of the residence, police found a letter in the back right
bedroom addressed to Adams along with clothing Adams admits may have
been his.
Once at the residence, Officer Parker believed he detected the smell of
ether coming from inside the house; on the cluttered porch, he saw a propane
tank with a rubber hose attached and ajar containing a clear liquid . From his
law enforcement experience Officer Parker knew that ether and propane tanks
are frequently used in the methamphetamine manufacturing process, and that
jars with a clear liquid are frequently found at meth labs. As further discussed
below, no source was discovered for the ether smell, and the propane tank and
clear liquid were determined to be unrelated to any criminal activity .
Based upon what he saw and smelled, Officer Parker called Officer Rick
Johnson to the scene . Owens consented to allowing police to search the
residence, but the police decided to obtain a search warrant before doing so.
Officer Johnson executed the affidavit in support of the warrant, and the
warrant was issued by a Madison District Court Judge. On the evening of
February 19, 2008, police executed the warrant and searched the residence .
In the course of the search the police located a cooler in the attic space
accessible only through the back right bedroom. Inside the cooler, police found
ajar containing lye and ammonium nitrate ; a whiskey bottle covered with a
sock; two pieces of hose, and a glove . Also found in the cooler were valves
which fit the propane tank found on the porch, though there is no evidence the
fittings were used for that purpose. Police also found four lithium batteries
with their lithium strips removed, anti-freeze, and Coleman fuel. Also
recovered were plastic tubing in the trash on the front porch, two plastic
funnels, two wooden spoons, a box of glass jars, and filters .
Two metal spoons which tested positive for methamphetamine residue
were also found in the residence . One was found in a drawer in the right-rear
bedroom and the other was found on top of a kitchen cabinet. The residue on
the spoons was the basis for the possession of a controlled substance charge
against Adams.
On July 3, 2008, the Madison County Grand Jury returned an
indictment against Adams, Owens, and Rebecca Adams. Adams was charged
with manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a
controlled substance, and with being a second-degree persistent felony
offender.
On November 18, 2008, Adams filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of the police search of the Old Wallacetown Road
residence . In support of his motion, Adams stated that "[t]he affidavit in
support of the search warrant executed in the case at bar contained material
false statements ." As further discussed below, following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
Appellant Adams, Gary Owens and Rebecca Adams were tried together.
Adams was convicted of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and
manufacturing methamphetamine . His defense at trial was that he never lived
at the Old Wallacetown Road residence . The jury could not reach a unanimous
verdict on his sentence, and by agreement he was sentenced to a total of
twenty-years' imprisonment, with the second-degree persistent felony offender
charge being dismissed.4 This appeal followed .
II . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS
THE EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AT APPELLANT'S RESIDENCE
Adams first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained in the search conducted pursuant to a warrant
of the Old Wallacetown Road residence. He argues that the affidavit for a
search warrant executed by Officer Johnson contained "reckless and
4 Owens was found guilty of unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor
and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to a total
of seven-years' imprisonment ; Rebecca Adams was found guilty of unlawful
distribution of a methamphetamine precursor and was sentenced to two-years'
imprisonment.
untruthful statements" relating to the smell of ether detected by Officer Parker
and the propane tank and glass jar observed on the porch of the residence.
The relevant portions of Officer Johnson's affidavit were as follows:
. . . . In plain view on the front porch Detective Parker observed a
propane tank with a piece of hose sitting on the front porch and
also detected an order [sic] that he believed to be ether, an item
commonly used in the production of methamphetamine. At that
time Detective Parker asked that [sic] occupants to exit the
residence .
Your affiant responded to the residence after speaking with
Detective Parker who stated that there were numerous persons at
the residence. While at the residence your affiant observed a clear
glass quart size jar with a clear unknown liquid sitting in plain
view on the front porch . From training and experience your affiant
knows that clear glass jars are frequently used in the production of
methamphetamine . Also in plain view on the front porch your
affiant observed the above described propane tank that is
commonly uses [sic] with a gas grill . There was not a gas grill in
the area of the propane tank and the gas grill was located on the
opposite side of the porch. The propane tank had a plastic or
rubber hose placed on the valve. Your affiant has also seen this
used in the past in the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine . The propane is used in the Birch Reduction
process of manufacturing methamphetamine, and further used to
make anhydrous ammonia which is an ingredient that is necessary
for the illicit production of methamphetamine . Beside the propane
tank, a piece of rubber or plastic hose was observed that had been
fitted with a brass type fitting that appeared to be consistent with
the valve on the propane tank on the porch.
From training and experience, your affiant knows that the above
described items are commonly used by persons manufacturing
methamphetamine using the Birch Reduction or "Nazi" method.
The affiant has received Clandestine Laboratory Investigations
Training from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and has
been involved in the investigation of numerous Methamphetamine
Labs and the arrest and prosecution of persons involved in
manufacturing methamphetamine . From training and experience,
the affiant knows that the above listed items are ingredients and
items that are commonly utilized in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine .
During the course of the search, no ether or any likely source for the
aroma detected by Officer Parker was found. The liquid content of the glass jar
was analyzed and was not linked to methamphetamine production . The
identity of the liquid is not reflected in the record . Further, it was later
determined that the hose attached to the propane tank was fitted with a torch,
and evidence was presented that Owens used the apparatus to do roofing work.
The propane tank and glass jar were not offered by the Commonwealth at trial
as evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing.
"To attack a facially sufficient affidavit, it must be shown that (1) the
affidavit contains intentionally or recklessly false statements, and (2) the
affidavit, purged of its falsities, would not be sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause." Commonwealth v. Smith, 898 S .W .2d 496, 503 (Ky. App .
1995) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U .S . 154 (1978)) . "Statements in an
affidavit that are intentionally false or made with reckless disregard for the
truth must be stricken ." United States v. Ayen, 997 F.2d 1150, 1152 (6th Cir.
1993) (citing Franks, 438 U.S . 154) . "After setting aside the affidavit's false
material, if the remaining content of the affidavit is insufficient to establish
probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
must be suppressed." Id. "It is not enough for defendants to show that the
affidavit contains false information ; in order to obtain a Franks hearing,
defendants must make a `substantial preliminary showing' that the false
statements originated with the government affiant, not with the informants, or
that the government affiant repeated the stories of the [informant] with reckless
indifference to the truth." United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 475-476
(6th Cir. 1988) . "[T]he fourth amendment does not require `that every fact
recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be
founded upon hearsay and upon information within the affiant's own
knowledge that sometimes may be garnered hastily.'
d. at 476 (quoting
Franks, 438 U.S. at 165) . "Under Franks, suppression is required only when
the affiant deliberately lied or testified in reckless disregard of the truth ." Id. at
477 .
An evidentiary hearing consistent with the foregoing requirements was
held on November 20, 2008 . In its order denying Adams's motion to suppress,
the trial court made the following finding: "The issue before the Court is
whether or not the law enforcement officers prepared the affidavit and
application for the search warrant with deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth . Under the totality of the circumstances, they did not do
so." (emphasis added) .
RCr 9 .78 provides that "If supported by substantial evidence, the factual
findings of the trial court shall be conclusive." Commonwealth v. Neal, 84
S .W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App . 2002) . For the reasons stated below, we conclude
that the trial court's finding that Officer Johnson's affidavit was not prepared
with deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth is supported by
substantial evidence, and is, accordingly, conclusive upon the issue .
At the hearing, Officer Johnson testified that he had ten years of
experience with the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force, had received
DEA Clandestine Laboratory Investigation Training, had previous investigative
and clean-up experience with methamphetamine lab operations, and was
certified to clean-up such sites .
Officer Johnson testified that based upon his experience and training, he
is aware that propane tanks and jars with clear liquid are routinely found at
methamphetamine labs and are used in the manufacturing process . While in
this particular case the tank and the jar were not shown to be connected to
contemporaneous methamphetamine manufacturing, it does not follow that
Officer Johnson intentionally or recklessly included false information in his
affidavit. It is undisputed that propane tanks and jars containing clear liquids
are commonly found at methamphetamine lab sites, 5 and that the tank and jar
were on the porch of the residence . Therefore, the observations contained in
the affidavit were truthful, as were the corresponding statements that these
items are often found in connection with a methamphetamine lab. Thus, the
information contained in the affidavit relating to the propane tank and the jar
was truthful, not false, notwithstanding that the items were unrelated to an
active methamphetamine lab .
Officer Parker's detection of the ether smell is more problematic. Neither
5 See, eg., Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Ky. 2005) .
9
ether, nor source for the ether odor was discovered during the search. It is
unclear whether Parker was mistaken in his belief that he smelled the
substance, whether he lied about it, or whether the source of the odor
disappeared in the interval between his first visit to the site and the execution
of the warrant. While there is no readily apparent explanation for the absence
of an apparent source of the smell, it was for the trial court to judge Officer
Parker's credibility in reporting that he had smelled ether, and the court
determined that there was no deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth associated with Officer Parker's determination.
In any event, if the ether reference is stricken from the affidavit, probable
cause nevertheless would have existed to support the search warrant. The
original report that methamphetamine manufacturing was occurring at the
residence was from a known tipster. Reports of criminal activity from known
tipsters are entitled to more weight than reports from anonymous tipsters, and
in some cases, standing alone, may support probable cause. Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 180 S .W .3d 474, 478 (Ky. 2005) . Further, the substantial purchases of
pseudoephedrine by persons linked to the residence strongly supported
probable cause that illegal drug manufacturing was occurring there.6 When
the foregoing is combined with the presence of the propane tank and the jar
containing a clear liquid, items which are commonly found at
methamphetamine lab sites, we are persuaded that probable cause existed for
issuance of the search warrant, even if the references to the ether odor are
6 Adams does not raise the issue of whether those purchases were stale .
10
struck . See Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S .W.3d 43, 49 (Ky. 2010) (Noting that
standard for issuing a search warrant is whether under the "totality of the
circumstances" as presented within the four corners of the affidavit, a warrantissuing judge would have a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause exists) .
In summary, the trial court properly denied Adams's motion to suppress
the evidence seized during the search of the Old Wallacetown Road residence .
III . APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
ON THE CHARGES OF MANUFACTURING METHAMPHETAMINE
AND POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Adams next contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the
manufacturing methamphetamine charge and the possession of controlled
substance charge . The basis for his argument is that there was insufficient
evidence that he resided at the Old Wallacetown Road residence, and,
therefore, there was insufficient evidence to link him to the incriminating
evidence discovered during the search . For the reasons stated below, we
disagree.?
7 Adams does not contend that sufficient chemicals and/or equipment were not found
at the residence to support a conviction under KRS 218A.14321432(1)(b) (providing that
a person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he knowingly and
unlawfully with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine possesses two or
more chemicals or two or more items of equipment for the manufacture of
methamphetamine) . See Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S .W.3d 363, 368 (Ky.
2004) for a listing of the chemicals and equipment to manufacture
methamphetamine using the Nazi method of manufacture. Nor does he contend
that the methamphetamine residue found on the two spoons would not support a
conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance . See Hampton v.
Commonwealth, 231 S .W.3d 740, 750 (Ky. 2007) (noting that the "any quantity"
language in KRS 218A.1415 is satisfied by possession of the residue of an illegal
narcotic) .
In considering a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is required
to draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) .
[I]f the evidence is sufficient to induce reasonable juror to believe
beyond reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty, directed verdict
should not be given; for purpose of ruling on motion, trial court
must assume that evidence for Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to jury questions as to credibility and weight to be given
to such testimony.
On appellate review, test of directed verdict is, if under evidence as
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for jury to find guilt, only
then defendant is entitled to directed verdict of acquittal . . . there
must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly
authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution
produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence .
Id. (internal citations omitted) .
As noted, Adams's claim to a directed verdict turns upon whether he
"possessed" the evidence seized during the police search of the residence. For
purposes of KRS Chapter 218A, "possession" includes constructive possession
as well as actual possession . Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S .W.2d 925, 927
(Ky. 1998) ("Kentucky courts have continued to utilize the constructive
possession concept to connect defendants to illegal drugs and contraband.") ;
Franklin v. Commonwealth, 490 S .W.2d 148, 150 (Ky. 1972) ("Two or more
persons may be in possession of the same drug at the same time and this
possession does not necessarily have to be actual physical possession . It may
be constructive as well as actual .") . "To prove constructive possession, the
Commonwealth must present evidence which establishes that the contraband
was subject to the defendant's dominion and control." Pate v. Commonwealth,
134 S.W .3d 593, 598-599 (Ky . 2004) (citing Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31
S .W.3d 878, 881 (Ky . 2000) and Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 202,
203 (Ky. 1986)) .
While Adams vehemently denies that he at anytime resided at the Old
Wallacetown Road house, at trial, five witnesses testified to the contrary. Codefendant Owens, the owner of the residence, testified that Adams was the only
resident of the house at the time of the search, and that he occupied the back
right bedroom . Owens testified that he had not resided at the house since
January 26, 2008, because he was trying to avoid an arrest warrant. Detective
Parker testified that Rebecca Adams told him that Adams lived at the residence
and occupied the right rear bedroom; Officer Parker and Detective Hampton
both testified that Adams told them he lived at the residence . Detective
Hampton further testified that Adams told him that he occupied the back right
bedroom. Finally, Owens's mother testified that Adams resided at the house .
Adams testified that during February 2008 he lived in a trailer with Tartt,
and that while he had at times stayed at the Old Wallacetown Road residence,
he never lived there . Tartt testified that Adams lived with her during February
2008. Thus there was conflicting testimony concerning whether Adams lived at
the Old Wallacetown Road residence . It was for the jury to resolve the conflict .
As discussed above, Benham requires us to accept as true the testimony
of those witnesses who testified that Adams resided at the residence over the
testimony presented by Adams that he did not. Moreover, we must credit the
testimony that he occupied the back right bedroom, the source of much of the
incriminating evidence.
As to constructive possession, this case is similar to Clay v.
Commonwealth, 867 S .W .2d 200 (Ky. App . 1993) . In Clay, following the
execution of a search warrant on her residence, the defendant was charged
with various drug offenses. Clay denied ownership of cocaine found during the
search, and, in fact, her brother claimed to be its owner. Clay was nevertheless
charged with trafficking in cocaine . In upholding her denial of a directed
verdict, the Court of Appeals stated as follows :
In a related argument, Clay maintains that a directed verdict also
was appropriate because the Commonwealth failed to show that
Clay was in possession of the cocaine at the time of the search.
Again we find no error. As no cocaine was found on Clay's person,
the Commonwealth relied on the theory of constructive possession
to connect Clay to the three ounces of cocaine found in her kitchen
and bathroom . This connection may be accomplished by
establishing that the contraband was subject to the defendant's
dominion and control . Leavell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S .W.2d
695 (1987) ; Rupard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 475 S.W.2d 473 (1971) .
It is uncontroverted that Clay owned the house where the cocaine
was found, that she lived in the house, and that she used the
kitchen and bathroom where the cocaine was stored. Morgan
maintained, however, that the cocaine belonged to him and was for
his personal use only. The court ultimately concluded that the
evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue, and we are
sufficiently convinced that pursuant to the standard set forth in
Benham, supra, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to
conclude that Clay constructively possessed the cocaine.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Clay's motion for
a directed verdict as it relates to the issue of constructive
possession.
Id. at 202-203 .
While here, Owens owned the residence, sufficient evidence was
presented to support the conclusion that Adams was its sole occupant during
February 2008 . As in Clay, we believe that a reasonable jury could have
similarly concluded that Adams constructively possessed the incriminating
evidence located throughout the residence. In any event, as the occupant of
the right rear bedroom, he would by any standard be adjudged to have been in
constructive possession of the evidence discovered in that location . This would
include the methamphetamine manufacturing contraband located in the attic
above the bedroom, and the spoon with methamphetamine residue located in a
drawer in that room - sufficient evidence to support a conviction for both
manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled
substance.
In summary, the trial court properly denied Adams's motion for a
directed verdict on the manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of a
controlled substance charges.
IV. APPELLANT AND HIS ALIBI WITNESS WERE
IMPROPERLY QUESTIONED CONCERNING PRIOR BAD ACTS,
BUT THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Adams next contends that he was improperly questioned concerning : (1)
the arrest of Tartt's mother, Dottie Croucher, for manufacturing
methamphetamine; (2) the condemnation of Croucher's former trailer (where
Adams claimed to have lived in February 2008) in December 2007 as a result of
the methamphetamine manufacturing ; and (3) Tartt's arrest in February 2008
for, among other things, trespass for living in the condemned trailer. Adams
also claims that Tartt was improperly questioned concerning whether she knew
that Adams had been incarcerated in 2007 . In a multi-pronged attack, Adams
argues that the questioning was improper impeachment upon collateral
matters, in violation of KRE 404(b), and improper as eliciting irrelevant
evidence .
As previously discussed, Adams's alibi was that he did not live at the Old
Wallacetown Road residence in February 2008, but, rather, lived in a trailer
occupied by Crystal Tartt located in Phillips Trailer Park on Baugh Street in
Berea . The trailer had previously been occupied by Tartt's mother, Ms .
Croucher .
It appears uncontested that in December 2007 Croucher was arrested for
manufacturing methamphetamine in the trailer, and that the trailer was
thereafter quarantined as a safety hazard . While the trailer was still
quarantined, during the latter part of January 2008, Tartt moved into the
trailer. . Adams and Tartt both testified that he moved into the trailer at about
this time and that he had continued to reside there until his arrest on
February 19, 2008. The Commonwealth contends that because the trailer was
quarantined during February 2008, questions relating to its status were proper
to challenge Adam's claim that he resided there .
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Adams if it was true
that Tartt's mother, Croucher, had been arrested for manufacturing
methamphetamine . Adams objected, arguing that the purpose of the testimony
was to impeach Adams's character because he was acquainted with Croucher
and her daughter . The Commonwealth argued that the purpose of the
question was "to establish relationship ." Upon this basis, the trial court
permitted the question. In a related question, the Commonwealth asked
Adams was it not true that Croucher was arrested with one of his relatives,
Phillip Adams. Adams responded that he was not related to this person .
Adams's principal argument is that this questioning served to impeach
his character on a collateral matter. "[A]lthough there is no provision in the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence prohibiting impeachment on collateral facts, we
have consistently recognized that prohibition as a valid principle of evidence ."
Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Ky. 2005) (citing Purcell v.
Commonwealth, 149 S .W.3d 382, 397-98 (Ky. 2004)) . "Although a witness in a
criminal case may be impeached by contradictory evidence, `such evidence is
not admissible for that purpose unless it pertains to a material matter.'
Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S .W.2d 488, 495-496 (Ky. 1995) (quoting
Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W .2d 761, 764 (Ky. 1982)) . .
Impeachment on a collateral matter is most generally intended to refer to
impeachment by the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement irrelevant to
any issue in the trial . See, Chumbler, 905 S .W .2d . at 488 . The questioning
concerning Tartt's mother does not fall within this framework; accordingly, we
will focus our review of the line of questioning under the rules of relevancy
contained in KRE 402 and KRE 403.
In order to be admitted, evidence must be relevant. KRE 402 . Relevant
evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence ." KRE 401 . However, even
relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence ." KRE 403 .
Croucher's arrest for manufacturing methamphetamine was of no
consequence to any issue in the trial. On the other hand, it linked Adams,
through Tartt and the trailer, to Croucher's methamphetamine manufacturing
activities . The message of the questioning was that Adams associated with
methamphetamine manufacturers. Further, the credibility of Tartt was
essential to Adams's defense, and the fact that her mother was a
methamphetamine manufacturer was harmful to that. Thus, there was
considerable potential for undue prejudice and confusion of the issues .
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by permitting introduction of
the evidence of Croucher's arrest for manufacturing methamphetamine . Love
v. Commonwealth, 55 S .W.3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001) (trial court's KRE 401
relevancy determinations and KRE 403 prejudice determinations are reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard) . If the Commonwealth wanted to show
that Croucher, the prior occupant of the trailer, was Tartt's mother (the
Commonwealth's stated purpose of the questioning was "to show relationship"),
it was unnecessary to introduce Croucher's arrest in order to do that.
Nevertheless, while the introduction of Croucher's arrest for
methamphetamine manufacturing should not have been admitted, RCr 9 .24
requires us to disregard an error if it is harmless . A non-constitutional
evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with
fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U .S . 750 (1946) . The inquiry is not simply
"whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the
phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had
substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction
cannot stand ." Id. at 765 ; Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S .W.3d 678, 68889 (Ky. 2009) . While there was a guilt-by-association aspect to the
introduction of Croucher's arrest for methamphetamine manufacturing,
nevertheless, the evidence did not directly incriminate Adams and, therefore,
did not have a substantial influence on the verdict. Thus, the error was
harmless .
Adams also complains of questioning relating to the condemnation of
Croucher's trailer as a result of the manufacturing and Tartt's arrest in
February 2008 for, among other things, living in the condemned trailer .
Because of Adams's failure to timely object to the questioning, the alleged
errors are not preserved . RCr 9 .22; Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d
343, 346 (Ky. 1995) . We accordingly review the alleged errors under the
palpable error standard contained in RCr 10.26 . A palpable error is one which
"affects the substantial rights of a party" and will result in "manifest injustice"
if not considered. Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95 S .W.3d 830, 836 (Ky.
2003) . "Manifest injustice" means that "a substantial possibility exists that the
result of the trial would have been different ." Brock v. Commonwealth, 947
S .W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997) .
The condemnation of Croucher's trailer as a result of manufacturing
methamphetamine was, again, of no relevance to any fact in issue and, because
of its tendency to associate Adams with Croucher's criminal conduct, there was
undue prejudice as a result of its admission. The Commonwealth attempts to
argue that the fact that the trailer was condemned casts doubt on whether
Adams lived there ; however, on the other hand, it is uncontested that Tartt did
live in the condemned trailer in February . 2008 with her children and was
arrested for so doing. The fact that the trailer was condemned as a result of
methamphetamine manufacturing does not demonstrate that Adams could not
also have lived there illegally as well . Further, it could have been shown that
the trailer was condemned without reference to Croucher's illegal conduct. The
evidence that the trailer was condemned for Croucher's methamphetamine
manufacturing (as opposed to that the trailer was condemned in general) should
not have been admitted . However, the error does not rise to the level of
palpable error. Absent the evidence there is not a substantial possibility that
the result of the trial would have been different.
The Commonwealth's questioning of Adams about Tartt's February 2008
arrest was inadmissible under KRE 404(b) . KRE 404(b) provides as follows :
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts . Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith . It may, however,
be admissible :
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident;
As is clear from the language of the rule, application of KRE 404(b) is not
limited to criminal defendants . Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook, § 2 .25[2] (4th ed. 2003) . As this Court has previously stressed,
KRE 404(b) is "exclusionary in nature," and as such, "any exceptions to the
general rule that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible should be `closely
watched and strictly enforced because of [its] dangerous quality and prejudicial
consequences .' Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Ky. 2007) .
(quoting OBryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S .W .2d 153, 156 (Ky.1982)) . As
recognized in Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998), the list
of exceptions enumerated in the rule is illustrative, not exclusive .
Tartt's arrest was inadmissible character evidence implicating no other
legitimate purpose for admission such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . 8 In
addition, the evidence was irrelevant, and its admission resulted in undue
prejudice, that is, the impugning of the character of Adams's principal alibi
witness. However, again, the error does not rise to the level of palpable error.
The final alleged improper questioning we are referred to under this
argument heading is the cross-examination of Tartt by Owens's attorney
wherein she was asked if she was aware that Adams had been incarcerated in
May 2007. Tartt stated that she was not aware of this. The Commonwealth
argues that this question was proper under KRE 404(b) because Tartt
previously testified that she first met Adams in May 2007 . If the date that the
two met were relevant to some matter at issue in the trial, the evidence would
have been admissible under KRE 404(b)(1) as being offered for a purpose other
than to reflect on Adams's character. However, it was not relevant for any such
purpose, and demonstrated a prior bad act for which Adams was incarcerated .
As such, the question amounted to impeachment on a collateral matter,
Chumbler, 905 S.W.2d at 495-496, which, in addition, improperly boot-
strapped in improper KRE 404(b) evidence . Because it made no practical
difference when Adams and Tartt first met, the information was also irrelevant.
8
In connection with the questioning Adams was also asked if the police found any of
his possessions at the trailer at the time of Tartt's arrest . Adams answered that he
was not there and did not know . While this may have been a proper exception so
as to permit the introduction of the prior bad act evidence, the question did not
establish that none of Adams's possessions were at the location, and we are cited to
no other testimony establishing this assertion by the Commonwealth . Questioning
of, for example, a police officer who was present when Tartt was arrested and had
knowledge that none of Adams's possessions were at the trailer may have laid a
proper foundation for admission of the evidence .
22
The issue was not preserved by proper objection, however, and the admission
of the evidence does not rise to the level of palpable error.
In summary, while Adams does cite to several instances where
inadmissible evidence was allowed into the trial, for the reasons explained
above, no reversible error occurred .
V. APPELLANT WAS NOT IMPROPERLY IMPEACHED
WITH HIS SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY
Finally, Adams contends that he was improperly impeached at trial with
his suppression hearing testimony.
"[W]hen a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at the trial on the issue
of guilt unless he fails to object." Shull v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 469, 472
(Ky. 1972) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S . 377 (1968)) ; see also
Commonwealth v. Bertram, 596 S .W .2d 379, 380 (Ky. App. 1980) (Identifying
that the right "is clear as a matter of state constitutional law[ .]") .
The first alleged misuse of his suppression hearing testimony occurred
when the Commonwealth asked him on cross-examination if he had admitted
at the hearing that he had clothes in the back right bedroom of the Old
Wallacetown Road residence. Adams responded that he did not remember.
The Commonwealth then read Adams's suppression hearing testimony
transcript out loud . 9 At the suppression hearing, Adams testified that it was
possible that he had clothes at the residence . Adams then conceded that he
9 The trial court asked the prosecutor if this was for the purpose of refreshing his
memory and she responded that it was .
23
may have had clothes at the residence.
We are persuaded that the Commonwealth's use of the suppression
hearing testimony as it did was improper . First, at the time the
Commonwealth asked the question, Adams had not contradicted his
suppression hearing testimony, and thus there had arisen no basis for the
impeachment. 10 Second, the undertone of the question was directed to the
issue of guilt (placing Adams's clothing at the residence in contradiction of his
alibi that he lived at the Tartt trailer) and Adams timely objected; this brings
the use of the suppression hearing testimony squarely into the prohibition as
stated in Shull. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that any error was harmless .
In light of the multiple other witnesses who had testified concerning Adams's
residency at the house, Adams's testimony that he may have had clothing at
the location would not have had a substantial impact on the verdict. Winstead,
283 S .W .3d at 688 .
The second instance of alleged improper impeachment with suppression
hearing testimony involved a letter written by Adams's girlfriend, addressed to
him, which was found in the right back bedroom during the search . The letter
was not seized, but a photograph of it was introduced at trial .
On direct-examination, Adams testified that he had received letters from
his girlfriend at the Old Wallacetown Road residence . During crossexamination the Commonwealth referenced the letter and asked Adams
whether it was true that he denied receiving the letter during his suppression
to If the Commonwealth had simply asked Adams whether he had clothing at the
residence first, if he gave an answer inconsistent with his suppression hearing
testimony, as discussed infra, the questioning would have been proper.
24
hearing testimony. No objection was entered to the question . Adams
responded he could not remember. The Commonwealth then read Adams's
suppression hearing testimony on the issue wherein he testified that it was not
possible that he had received mail from his girlfriend at the residence.
The Commonwealth's theory was that Adams did receive the letter at the
Old Wallacetown Road residence. Adams's suppression hearing testimony was
that he did not receive mail there . Thus, the Commonwealth's use of the letter
evidence was not upon the issue of guilt, and Shull does not apply. Rather, the
purpose of the use of the suppression hearing testimony in the instance of the
letter was as a prior inconsistent statement contradicting Adams's trial
testimony." The Supreme Court has noted that a defendant's suppression
hearing testimony could likely be used for impeachment purposes if the
defendant took the stand and testified to the contrary. See United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S . 83, 88 n . 8 (1980) (noting, without deciding, that "[a]
number of courts considering the question [of whether a defendant's
suppression hearing testimony could be used to impeach a defendant at trial]
have held that such testimony is admissible as evidence of impeachment ."))
(citations omitted) . See also United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 543 (2d Cir.
1995) ("Prior inconsistent suppression hearing testimony may properly be used
i l In order to introduce a prior inconsistent statement, a proper foundation must first
be established, whereby the witness is "inquired of concerning it, with the
circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining
party can present them ." KRE 613 ; see also Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S .W .3d 923,
929-931 (Ky. 2002) (noting strict compliance with the foundation requirements) .
Adams does not raise as error the procedure used by the Commonwealth to
introduce the prior inconsistent statement.
25
to impeach a defendant during trial.") . As such, we find no error in the use of
Adams's suppression hearing testimony in regards to the letter.
In regards to the letter, Adams also objects to its use at trial on the
grounds of the Best Evidence Rule, KRE 1002 . The foundation of the best
evidence rule, found in KRE 1002, provides that "[t]o prove the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules, in other rules adopted
by the Kentucky Supreme Court, or by statute."
As previously noted, neither the letter nor the envelope it was contained
in was seized during the search. A photograph of the letter was introduced for
the purpose of connecting Adams with the residence and bedroom . As such,
the purpose of introducing the picture of the envelope was not "[t]o prove the
content" of the letter. It was, rather, to establish that mail addressed to Adams
was located in the residence and bedroom. Thus, we do not believe KRE 1002
is applicable under these circumstances .
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
F. J. Anderson
269 W. Main St. Suite 400
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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