CHARLES MCCLENDON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER. JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-000283-MR
BAT
CHARLES MCCLENDON
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ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
NO. 07-CR-00808
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On the evening of September 28, 2007, Deborah Deaton and her friend,
Patricia Aistok, sat and drank several beers at Deaton's home. Sometime
around 11 :50 p.m., they walked to a Sunoco gas station, approximately six or
seven blocks away, to get some food. Afterwards, while the two women were
walking back to Deaton's home, they were approached on foot by Appellant,
Charles McClendon. McClendon was carrying an open beer and the remains of
a twelve pack and appeared to be highly intoxicated. McClendon asked the two
women where he could buy some more liquor, and Deaton suggested Big
Daddy's liquor store. McClendon then asked Deaton to drive him there in his
truck, which he said was parked in a nearby alley. According to Deaton, she
agreed to drive McClendon to the store because he was visibly intoxicated and
she did not want him to harm himself or others in an accident .
Aistok went her separate way. Deaton followed McClendon to a nearby
alley and became frightened when she did not see a vehicle. McClendon
responded by telling Deaton that she had better be scared. McClendon then
grabbed Deaton by her hair and pulled her through a side yard and up against
a wall by an air conditioner. Deaton tried to call for help on her cell phone, but
McClendon grabbed the phone and placed it on a nearby windowsill .
McClendon told Deaton that, once she did her "business," she could leave . At
that point, McClendon forced Deaton to get on her knees and perform oral sex.
After a short period of time, Deaton told McClendon that she did not want to
continue. McClendon then ordered her to turn around and pull her pants
down . Deaton did as she was told while protesting that she did not want to
have intercourse with McClendon. McClendon then forced Deaton to resume
performing oral sex. Deaton's cell phone rang repeatedly during this
encounter.
Chenae Vickers testified that she heard someone crying through her
open window. Vickers indicated that she heard the woman say: "Why are you
doing this? I have no money." When Vickers looked outside, she saw a man
pushing a woman up against an air conditioner. After calling the police,
Vickers watched as the man pushed the woman down towards his groin .
Apparently seeing Vickers through the window, Deaton began waving her
hands frantically. Moments later, police arrived . Officer Brian Steffen
observed McClendon fleeing on foot and jumping over a nearby fence . With the
assistance of another officer, Officer Steffen subsequently apprehended
McClendon. McClendon did not comply with either officer's commands and
had to be tasered . While being placed in the back of the police cruiser,
McClendon indicated that Deaton had performed oral sex on him in exchange
for crack cocaine.
At all times during trial, McClendon maintained his innocence .
McClendon consistently stated that he and Deaton knew each other, and that
Deaton had on at least two occasions performed oral sex in exchange for crack
cocaine. McClendon also stressed that the encounters, including the one
which gave rise to these charges, were entirely consensual . The jury, however,
did not believe McClendon's version of events, and he was ultimately convicted
of "first-degree sodomy and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He
was sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment, enhanced to twenty years due
to his persistent felony offender status. He now appeals the final judgment
entered as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
McClendon raises two issues on appeal: (1) his federal and state due
process rights were violated when the examining nurse was permitted to read
the victim's prior consistent statement, thereby bolstering her testimony; and
(2) the trial court committed reversible .error in admitting improper character
testimony.
Testimony of examining nurse
The Commonwealth offered the testimony of Leslie Mertens, a nurse who
examined Deaton after the attack. Mertens is a trained Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner ("SANE") who, during the trial, effectively read Deaton's history
statement verbatim. McClendon now objects, believing that Mertens' testimony
did little more than bolster that of Deaton, thereby violating his state and
federal due process rights . In addition, McClendon claims that he was
prejudiced by allowing the SANE report to go to the jury room as an exhibit
during deliberation .
As both parties make clear in their briefs, there is some question as to
whether these allegations of error are preserved for appellate review . After
extensively reviewing the record, we believe that this issue is a very close call .
However, out of an abundance of caution, given the crimes charged and the
lengthy sentence McClendon received, we will treat the issue as being
preserved.
Kentucky law has long been clear that "a witness cannot be corroborated
by proof that on previous occasions [she] has made the same statements as
those made in [her] testimony." Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514, 517
(Ky. 1995) . As this Court stated in Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 174 S .W .3d
451 (Ky. 2005) :
It is improper to permit a witness to testify that
another witness has made prior consistent statements,
absent an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence .
KRE 801A(a)(2) . Otherwise, the witness is simply
vouching for the truthfulness of the declarant's
statement, which we have held to be reversible error.
Bussey v. Commonwealth, 797 S .W.2d 483, 484-85
(Ky.1990) . See also LaMastus v. Commonwealth, 878
S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky.App.1994) . We perceive no
conceptual distinction between testimony that repeats
the witness's prior consistent statement verbatim and
testimony that the witness previously made
statements that were consistent with her trial
testimony. Either way, the evidence is offered to prove
that the declarant's trial testimony is truthful because
it is consistent with her prior statements .
Id. at 472 .
Though defense counsel did, at various times during cross-examination
of Deaton, attempt to find some contradictions between her testimony and the
history contained in the SANE report, there was no allegation of recent
fabrication or improper influence . To the extent that Mertens' testimony
merely showed prior consistent statements from Deaton, its introduction
clearly was in error. However, we believe that the error in this instance was
harmless . Initially, we note that Mertens never directly asserted that she
believed Deaton's history statement in the SANE report to be credible . See
Roach v. Commonwealth, 313 S .W .3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2010) . Moreover, the SANE
report that Mertens read did not identify McClendon as the perpetrator. See
Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S .W.3d 239 (Ky . 2010) . Furthermore, Mertens'
testimony was clearly within the bounds of the medical treatment or diagnosis
exception to the hearsay rule embodied in KRE 803(4). The statements
contained in the SANE report were provided for the purpose of allowing
Mertens to assess any and all injuries, those outwardly visible and not, that
may have been sustained by Deaton and which were reasonably related -to the
"inception or general character of the cause or external source" of the injury.
Id.
Even without Mertens' testimony, the jury could still have reasonably
believed the testimony of Deaton, which was corroborated in part by that of
both Aistok and Vickers. "The testimony of even a single witness is sufficient
to support a finding of guilt, even when other witnesses testified to the contrary
if, after consideration of all of the evidence, the finder of fact assigns greater
weight to that evidence." Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S .W.3d 424, 426 (Ky.
2002) (citing Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1986)) . In addition,
McClendon's own actions in fleeing the scene weaken his suggestion that the
act was consensual . Accordingly, while allowing Mertens to read directly from
Deaton's SANE report was error, we are confident that "the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error." Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S .W.3d
678, 689 (Ky. 2009) .
McClendon also argues that he was prejudiced when the jury was
allowed to take a copy of the SANE report into the jury deliberation room. Our
extensive review of the proceedings reveals that this allegation of error is
unpreserved for our review . In any event, we cannot determine what prejudice,
if any, McClendon suffered as a result . We find nothing so manifestly unfair or
prejudicial that warrants this Court disturbing the jury's verdict. RCr 10.26.
Character testimony
When asked by the prosecutor if she was surprised that Deaton would
offer to drive a man whom she allegedly did not know to a nearby liquor store,
Aistock replied that she wasn't surprised because, "[Deaton's] like that, she'd
do anything for anybody." Defense counsel immediately objected on the
grounds of improperly putting the victim's character in evidence. This
objection was overruled by the trial court. McClendon now claims that this
testimony was so prejudicial and seriously undermined his defense in violation
of his state and federal due process rights .
We believe that the prosecutor's question was a logical one and
addresses a doubt the jury might have had about the plausibility of Deaton's
testimony. The answer was also a reasonable answer to the question . In other
words, there was nothing unusual about Deaton's actions . Neither the
question nor the answer was error. But even if error, it was harmless . As
noted above, the jury could have disbelieved McClendon's version of events and
found Deaton's testimony more credible. Accordingly, we do not believe that
the statement "so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them
fundamentally unfair." Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S .W.3d 14, 35 (Ky .
2005) .
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby affirm the decision of the Kenton
Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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