BRANDON CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
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BRANDON CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON
74
6,10%
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-01228
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Brandon Robinson appeals as a matter of right from a Judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of murder, in violation of KRS 507 .020,
and of tampering with physical evidence, in violation of KRS 524 . 100. In
accord with the jury's sentencing determination, the Judgment fixes
Robinson's sentences at forty and five years' imprisonment, respectively, to be
served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-five years. The
Commonwealth alleged, and the jury found, that Robinson murdered David
Smith in the parking lot of the Fairington Apartments, in Lexington, as Smith
was attempting to repossess Robinson's automobile. Robinson then fled the
scene and attempted to dispose of the murder weapon, a nine-millimeter
handgun. Robinson did not deny the killing, which several people witnessed,
but through his cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses he
attempted to show that the shooting was prompted by an extreme emotional
disturbance and thus constituted at most first-degree manslaughter and not
murder . On appeal, Robinson raises four allegations of error. He contends, (1)
that his right to a unanimous verdict: was infringed by a faulty murder
instruction ; (2) that his right against compelled self-incrimination was infringed
when the prosecutor referred adversely during her closing argument to his
decision not to testify ; (3) that the court erred during the penalty phase of trial
by not allowing Robinson's mother to testify that in her opinion Robinson's
display of emotion during an interview with detectives was genuine; and (4)
that also during the penalty phase, the court erred by permitting evidence of
which the Commonwealth had not given timely notice, i.e., evidence that as a
juvenile Robinson had been found guilty of second-degree assault . Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
RELEVANT FACTS
The proof at trial established beyond dispute that at about 7 :30 pm on
June 28, 2007, David Smith, on behalf of a used-car dealership, Cars `R' Us, of
Lexington, located in the parking lot of the Fairington Apartments the white,
1986 Oldsmobile which Robinson had purchased from the dealership about
three weeks previously . Smith started it with a key provided by the dealer, and
was driving it out of the parking lot to return it to the dealer, when Robinson
ran yelling from his apartment, chased the car a short distance, and then fired
seven shots from a nine-millimeter handgun into the ear. Three of the shots
struck
smith . According to the medical examiner any one of them-two to the
upper back and one to the head-could have been fatal.. The principal issue at
trial was Robinson's state of mind at the time of the shooting and hence his
degree of culpability .
The Commonwealth argued that because Robinson armed himself before
giving chase and fired seven times into the retreating vehicle it was apparent
that he intended to kill the person, who, he believed, was stealing his car. The
killing
defense, too, conceded that the
may have been intentional, but argued
that the repossession was the culmination of an aggravating three weeks of
problems with the car and arguments with the dealer, all of which resulted in
an extreme emotional disturbance when Robinson heard his car start and
believed that someone was stealing it. The jury was instructed in accord with
those theories, namely intentional murder and first-degree manslaughter, and
was also instructed with respect to wanton murder, second-degree
manslaughter, and reckless homicide . Robinson's first contention on appeal is
that the murder instruction, by combining the intent theory, which was
supported by the evidence, with the wantonness theory, which, he maintains,
was not supported, deprived him of a unanimous verdict. We begin our
analysis with this contention .
ANALYSIS
I. The Alternative Murder Instruction Did Not Infringe Robinson's Right
To A Unanimous Verdict.
Following the pattern instruction given in section 3 .24 of Cooper,
Kentucky Instructions to Juries, p . 3-30 (20 10), the trial court instructed the
jurors in this case as follows:
You will find Defendant Brandon Robinson guilty of
Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the following :
(A)
That in Fayette County on or about June 28,
2007,and before the finding of the Indictment
herein, the Defendant killed David Smith by
shooting him with a gun:
AND
(B)
That in so doing:
(1) He caused the death of David Smith
intentionally and not while acting under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as
that term is defined under Instruction No . 2 ;
OR
(2) He was wantonly engaging in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and
thereby caused the death of David Smith under
circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life .
Because the jury returned a general verdict simply finding Robinson guilty of
murder, it is impossible to know whether the jury believed the intent theory in
(B)(1) or the wantonness theory in (B)(2), or whether some jurors believed one
theory and some the other. At trial, Robinson objected to this instruction on
the ground that this last scenario-some jurors believing intent, some
wantonness-violated his right under Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution to
a unanimous verdict; he requested a verdict form which would require the jury
to specify its unanimous agreement as to one theory or the other. The trial
court denied that request as inconsistent with our case law, and Robinson does
not dispute that ruling on appeal. Instead, he has changed tack and now
argues that the instruction violated the unanimity requirement because the
evidence did not support at wantonness finding and thus it was error to instruct
on wanton murder . Because this issue was not preserved, our review is limited
to the palpable error standard of RCr 10.26. Under that rule, we may grant
relief for an unpreserved error only if the error was palpable, affected the
complaining party's substantial rights, and if uncorrected would result in a
manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665 (Ky. 2009) .
It is true, as Robinson observes, that instructions not supported by the
evidence should not be given, Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S .W.2d 925 (Ky.
1998), and that alternative instructions, such as the murder instruction here,
violate the unanimous verdict requirement if any of the alternative theories of
the crime lack evidentiary support. In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S .W.2d
583 (Ky. 1981), for example, we held that an alternative murder instruction
violated the unanimous verdict requirement because the only evidence of the
defendant's state of mind came from his confession, which indicated an
intentional rather than a wanton killing .
If the evidence supports both the intentional and wanton theories,
however, an alternative instruction does not implicate unanimous verdict
concerns . Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008) ; Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 12 S .W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999) . Where direct evidence of the
defendant's state of mind is lacking, or is unclear, or is at odds with other
evidence that can be deemed substantial, we have held that intent to kill can
be inferred from the extent and character of the victim's injuries and from the
defendant's actions preceding and following the charged offense, but "whether
a defendant actually has an intent to kill remains a subjective matter," Hudson
v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Ky . 1998), and other inferences are
not ruled out. Thus, in Hudson, this Court stated : "The state of [the
defendant's] mind at the time of the killing is almost never clear, not even to
the defendant himself. . . . To say that the method and means of [the victim's]
death only support an instruction on intentional murder [would be] to' make
the inference of intent mandatory." Id. at 110 . Accordingly, we have upheld
alternative murder instructions where the evidence supported an inference of
intent, but also included substantial indications that the defendant "went
crazy" or otherwise may have killed wantonly in an emotionally wrought state .
Johnson, supra; Hudson, supra.
Those cases are controlling here, for while, as the Commonwealth argued
at trial, Robinson's arming himself and shooting Smith repeatedly support an
inference that he intended to kill, there was also evidence that Robinson ran to
the parking lot in a highly emotional state . One witness testified that she
heard Robinson's girlfriend yelling, "You're crazy; you're crazy." Several
witnesses testified that they heard Robinson yelling and that he was obviously
upset. The fact that he fired seven shots in rapid succession, some into the
trunk of the car, some into the passenger side of the rear windshield, as well as
those that struck Smith, could be thought to imply not that Robinson was
determined to kill Smith, but that indifferent to Smith's life and ignoring the
obviously grave risk he was creating, he shot in a frenzy so as to prevent the
loss of his car. Robinson's statement to the investigating detectives, unlike the
statement in Hayes, in no way settled the ambiguity, for he told the
investigators that at the time of the shooting he did not know what he was
doing, he only remembered raising the gun and pulling the trigger . Because
the evidence thus supported both the intentional and wantonness theories of
murder, the trial court did not err, much less palpably so, by giving an
alternative murder instruction .
11. The Prosecutor Did Not Violate Robinson's Right Not To Testify.
Robinson next contends that the prosecutor infringed his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination when she invited the jury to infer
guilt from his decision not to testify and that the trial court erred by failing to
remedy the prosecutor's breach by suitably admonishing the jury. Toward the
end of her closing argument, after she had detailed why, in her view, the
evidence implied that the killing had been intentional, including several
references to Robinson's statement to the detectives, the video recording of
which had been played for the jury, the prosecutor turned to the issue of
extreme emotional disturbance and argued that the evidence did not support
such a finding. Specifically, she stated, "You have heard absolutely no proof
that this defendant got so enraged or inflamed that he could not control his
actions . No statement that he snapped and he lost it. No statement that his
actions were not for malicious or evil purposes ." At that point Robinson
objected, and without more the court sustained the objection . The prosecutor
then rephrased her remarks by stating, "there is nothing that you have heard
from the testimony today to show that this defendant's actions were for
anything other than evil or malicious purposes . . . . There has been absolutely
no proof that he was acting under any kind of extreme emotional disturbance."
She finished her remarks a few minutes later without additional objection and
was thanking the jury for its attention when Robinson asked for a bench
conference and moved that the jury be admonished to the effect that the
prosecutor had improperly referred to Robinson's silence and that his decision
not to testify was not to be used against him. The trial judge explained that he
did not agree that the prosecutor had commented on Robinson's silence, but he
had sustained the objection to ensure that she would not. The judge
considered an admonition, but when the parties could not agree on one and
the trial judge could not fashion one that did not seem to endorse one side or
the other he decided against giving one .
Robinson contends that by referring to "no statement that he
snapped . . . no statement that his actions were not . . . malicious or evil" the
prosecutor drew the jury's attention to the fact that he had not testified and
invited it to treat his silence as evidence of his guilt . We disagree .
We will reverse for prosecutorial misconduct where it was objected to if
proof of the defendant's guilt was not such as to render the misconduct
harmless, and if the trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient
admonishment to the jury . Where there was no objection, we will reverse only
where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to render the trial
.
fundamentally unfair. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S .W.3d 564 (Ky . 2002) ;
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W .2d 219 (Ky. 1996) . This case presents a
hybrid situation, for although Robinson objected in a. timely manner to the
remarks he contends were improper, his request for an admonition, more than
five minutes later, was not timely and so not properly preserved . Winstead v.
Commonwealth, 283 S .W.3d 678 (Ky. 2009) (timeliness required in part to give
the trial court a meaningful opportunity to fashion a remedy .) Robinson's
delay here in seeking an admonition clearly frustrated the trial court's
opportunity to fashion a remedy. See also Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171
S.W .3d 14, 29 (Ky. 2005) (characterizing objection without request for an
admonition as "incomplete," and noting that a defendant must "ask for a
remedy in order to get the remedy.") We need not belabor this point, however,
for we agree with the trial court that the prosecutor's remarks did not amount
to misconduct .
As Robinson correctly notes, the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbids comment by the prosecution on the defendant's silence at trial . Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) . That rule is violated by statements that
invite the jury to infer -guilt from the defendant's decision not to testify.
Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S .W .3d 569 (Ky. 2006) ; United States v. Snook,
366 F.3d 439
(7th
Cir. 2004) . On the other hand, it is -generally not improper
for the prosecutor to comment on defense tactics, to comment on the quantity
or quality of evidence, or to comment as to the falsity of a defense position .
Davis v. Commonwealth, 967 S .W.2d. 574 (Ky. 1998) (citing Slaughter
V.
Commonwealth, 744 S .W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987)) . A prosecutor crosses the
boundary between permissible comment on the evidence and impermissible
reference to the defendant's silence if the prosecutor manifestly intended to
refer to the defendant's silence or, alternatively, if a jury would naturally and
necessarily understand the comments to refer to that silence . Ragland, supra;
Webb v. Mitchell, 586 IT3d 383 (60 (24. 2009) . Thus, comments to the effect
that a prosecution position is "uncontradicted" or "uncontested," or that "no
evidence" supports a defense position, generally do not cross the line unless
the defendant is the only person who could have supplied the evidence the
prosecutor asserts is lacking. Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S .W.2d 722 (Ky.
1997) ; Webb, supra; Snook, supra. Context is important, moreover, and the
court may take into consideration such factors as whether the comment was
an isolated occurrence or part of a pattern, as well as whether it was a fair
response to comments by the defense. Ragland, supra; Webb, supra.
Here, the prosecutor's "no statement that he snapped . . . no statement
that his actions were not for evil or malicious purposes" comments were not
manifestly intended to refer to Robinson's silence, nor would the jury
necessarily have understood them to do so . They were isolated assertions
following a lengthy discussion of Robinson's statement to the detectives and
were thus likely to be understood as references to the fact that in that
statement to police Robinson did not expressly claim to have been overcome by
emotion . Following Robinson's objection, moreover, the prosecutor clarified her
point by asserting that nothing in the testimony the jury had heard leant
credence to Robinson's EED defense .
Robinson contends that he was the only person who could have supplied
such testimony and thus that the prosecutor's comments necessarily referred
to his silence . This contention, is clearly belied, however, by Robinson's own
trial strategy in which he sought to establish his EED defense by eliciting
testimony from other witnesses to the effect that his experience with the car
and the car dealer went from bad to worse until it culminated in his "losing it"
over the repossession . The prosecutor's assertion that none of that testimony
justified an EED conclusion did not refer the jury to Robinson's silence nor
would the jury have a strong tendency to perceive it as a reference to his
silence . , Because the prosecutor's assertions did not cross the line between
permissible comment on the evidence and comment on Robinson's silence, they
did not infringe Robinson's constitutional rights or entitle him to the
admonition he requested.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding Testimony
Vouching For Robinson's Sincerity.
Next, Robinson maintains that the trial court erred when, during the
trial's penalty phase, it would not allow his mother to testify that in her opinion
the emotions he displayed during his interview with the detectives were sincere .
The DVD recording of the interview was played in its entirety for the jury and
was introduced as one of the Commonwealth's exhibits . Unfortunately, it was
recorded in a manner incompatible with this Court's ability to replay it. From
the audio portion captured on the trial recording, however, it is apparent that
during the interview Robinson seemed, at least, to become very emotional,
wailing and apparently sobbing. One of the detectives testified, however, that
at no point during Robinson's interview did his eyes become red or produce any
tears . During her guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor relied on that
testimony to assert that Robinson had feigned his emotional reaction .
During the penalty phase Robinson sought to dispel that impression by
asking his mother, who had watched the recording of the interview, whether he
"appear[ed] to be sincere in his emotion?" The trial court sustained the
Commonwealth's objection to that question on the ground that it asked her to
speculate about Robinson's state of mind . The court made it clear, however,
that Mrs. Robinson was not precluded from testifying that she had seen
Robinson behave similarly on other occasions . Nevertheless, she was then
asked only whether she had seen Robinson cry before, and she stated that she
had. Later, by avowal, Mrs . Robinson testified that she was familiar with her
son when he was upset and she had no doubt that his display of emotion
during the interview was genuine.
Robinson contends that the exclusion of his mother's opinion impaired
his right, under KRS 532 .055(2)(b) to "introduce evidence in mitigation or in
support of leniency," and that the trial court's ruling was thus an abuse of its
discretion . We disagree.
Robinson's right under the statute to introduce mitigating evidence is
subject, of course, to the rules of evidence . KRE 701 limits opinion testimony
by lay witnesses to opinions "helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue ." One of our most firmly
settled corollaries to this rule is that one witness may not express an opinion
about the truthfulness or sincerity of another witness, because the jury does
not need help making credibility determinations . Moss v. Commonwealth, 949
S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) . In Lanham, supra, we indicated that this corollary
extends to characterizations of a defendant's responses to interrogation as
presented to the jury on an interrogation tape . Speculative opinions likewise
provide no assistance to the jury. Such opinions are also properly excluded
under the rule . Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W .3d 203 (Ky. 2005) . Here,
Robinson asked his mother both to vouch for the sincerity of his emotional
display and to speculate as to his state of mind during his interrogation. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing that testimony .
It is true, of course, as Robinson insists, that lay witnesses who observe
the defendant in the aftermath of a crime are permitted to testify regarding the
defendant's demeanor, describing it and characterizing it as, say, "very calm
and collected," Garland v. Commonwealth, 127 S .W.3d 529, 542 (Ky. 2003), or
"mocking," Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S .W .3d 635, 663 (Ky. 2003), or "calm
. . . normal . . . non-emotional," McKinney v. Commonwealth, 60 S .W .3d 499,
503 (Ky . 2001) . Testimony merely describing one's observations of the
defendant immediately following the crime, however, is not the same as
testimony purporting to read the defendant's state of mind nor is it the same as
testimony characterizing as genuine and sincere a person's behavior on an
interrogation tape, the genuineness of which the jury may assess for itself. The
trial court made clear that only these latter types of evidence were precluded .
Mrs . Robinson was free to testify regarding her observations of her son in the
past, and to compare his prior behavior with that displayed on the
interrogation video . The exclusion of her "genuineness" opinion did not deprive
Robinson of proper demeanor evidence.
IV. The Admission Of Evidence Not Properly Disclosed During Discovery
Was A Harmless Error.
Finally, Robinson contends that the trial court erred by permitting the
Commonwealth to introduce during the penalty phase proof that when
Robinson was seventeen years old he was adjudicated guilty of second-degree
assault for having used brass knuckles in a fight on a school bus . Generally,
of course, KRS 532 .055 permits the introduction for sentencing purposes of a
defendant's more serious juvenile record, but Robinson maintains that the
record should have been excluded here because the Commonwealth did not
provide timely discovery.
Apparently, the Commonwealth initially acquired the juvenile record of a
different Brandon Robinson, provided that record to Robinson's counsel, and
did not correct the mistake until guilt phase closing arguments had been
concluded . Robinson moved to exclude penalty-phase evidence of his juvenile
record-two fourth-degree assaults when Robinson was quite young in addition
to the later brass-knuckle offense-on the ground that he had not been given a
reasonable opportunity to prepare a response. The trial court agreed to
exclude the two fourth-degree assaults, primarily because of their remoteness,
but denied Robinson's motion with respect to the more recent second-degree
assault, explaining that in its view Robinson was not dependent on the
Commonwealth for notice of his own juvenile record .
Robinson does not address the trial court's point, but does reassert that
he was denied a fair opportunity to respond to the second-degree assault
evidence . We are inclined to agree . Pursuant to RCr 7 .24, the parties had
agreed to reciprocal discovery and under that rule the Commonwealth was to
provide notice of items in its possession that "may be material to the
preparation of the defense ." The purpose of the rule is not to inform Robinson
of his own record, but to give Robinson and his counsel notice of what the
Commonwealth possesses and is preparing to employ at trial. Chestnut
V.
Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d 288 (Ky. 2008) . Clearly the Commonwealth
understood its obligation and meant to meet it when it gave Robinson notice of
the juvenile record for what turned out to be the wrong Brandon Robinson .
The Commonwealth's last minute attempt to correct the mistake did not satisfy
its discovery obligation, and that fact is not altered by the Commonwealth's
good faith. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 864 S .W .2d 909 (Ky. 1993) (discovery
violation is a violation, the prosecutor's good faith notwithstanding .)
As the Commonwealth correctly notes, however, unless the violation
somehow prejudiced Robinson's ability to present his penalty-phase case and
appears reasonably likely to have borne on the jury's decision, it must be
deemed harmless . Chestnut, supra. We are convinced the discovery violation
was harmless here. Robinson's counsel complains that he was not afforded an
opportunity to look into the juvenile incident and perhaps discover mitigating
circumstances he could have presented to the jury. He has failed to indicate,
however, that there is any reason to think that mitigating circumstances
actually exist, much less that they were such as might have made a difference
with the jury. Mere speculation is not enough .
Again, for the violation to entitle Robinson to relief, it must appear
reasonably likely that it bore on the jury's decision . Robinson was only twenty
years old at the time of the murder . In addition to the juvenile assault, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of three adult assault convictions, one
stemming from an incident during Robinson's custody pending trial. Given
this other evidence of Robinson's recent assaultive behavior as well as the
guilt-phase evidence of a senselessly and egregiously violent crime, there is
little likelihood that the exclusion of the juvenile assault would have altered the
jury's decision . The Commonwealth's discovery violation does not, therefore,
entitle Robinson to relief.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the jury instruction allowing a finding of murder under
alternative theories did not implicate Robinson's right to a unanimous verdict
because both theories were amply supported by the evidence. The prosecutor
did not exceed her right to comment on the evidence or infringe Robinson's
right not to testify when she stated that none of the statements or testimony
the jury had heard indicated that Robinson had acted under an extreme
emotional disturbance . Robinson's sentencing, finally, was not prejudiced
-either by the proper exclusion of his mother's opinion regarding the sincerity of.
the emotion he displayed during his police interrogation or by the introduction
of the belatedly produced evidence of his juvenile adjudication for assault .
Accordingly, we affirm the April 14, 2009 Judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Russell James Baldani
Baldani, Rowland & Richardson
300 West Short Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Suite 200
Frankfort, KY 40601
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