KATHERINE D. BAILEY V. HON. ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE, MARION CIRCUIT COURT, ET AL.
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KATHERINE D . BAILEY
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2008-CA-002238-OA
MARION CIRCUIT COURT NO . 08-CI-00191.
V.
HON . ALLAN RAY BERTRAM,
JUDGE, MARION CIRCUIT COURT; AND
DANIEL E. BAILEY, JR.
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
Appellee, Daniel Bailey, petitioned the Court of Appeals to prohibit the
Marion Circuit Court from ordering him to submit to paternity testing. Daniel
argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the testing or, in the
alternative, that the trial court was acting erroneously and enforcement of the
order would cause great and irreparable injury. The Court of Appeals agreed
on other grounds and issued a writ of prohibition. Appellant, Katherine Bailey,
appeals as a matter of right from the opinion granting the writ. We now
reverse .
I. Facts
The parties were married on May 25, 2005 . One son, T.B ., was born
during the marriage on February 12, 2007 and Daniel was named as his father
on the birth certificate . The parties later separated in September of 2007, and
Daniel petitioned the Marion Circuit Court for dissolution of the marriage on
May 28, 2008 . 1
In his petition, Daniel requested joint custody of T .B. Katherine, in her
sworn answer, asked for an award of child support, that the parties be awarded
joint custody (with Katherine being named the primary custodian), and
acknowledged that T. B was born of the marriage and lived "in the custody of
[Daniel] and [Katherine] during the marriage ."
Thereafter, on September 16, 2008, Katherine sought an emergency
protective order against Daniel. In response, Daniel filed motions for relief,
including a motion for a mutual restraining order and for custody of T.B . On
October 2, 2008, the Marion Circuit Court granted Daniel's motion for a
mutual restraining order and set forth a time-sharing schedule for T.B . The
matter was set for review on December 9, 2008 .
On October 2, 2008, however, Katherine also filed a motion requesting
paternity testing. Daniel objected at the hearing on grounds that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to order the testing. The trial court ultimately granted
the motion and ordered Daniel to submit to paternity testing.
1 The Marion Circuit Court does not have a family court division .
Daniel then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition,
arguing that the circuit court acted outside its jurisdiction in ordering the
paternity testing, as KRS 406 .051 vests the district court with sole jurisdiction
over paternity matters. Daniel further asserted that KRS Chapter 406 only
applies to children born "out of wedlock" and that T.B . does not fit within that
definition . Alternatively, even if the court was acting within its jurisdiction,
Daniel argued that it was acting erroneously and that great and irreparable
injury would result to both him and T.B . if testing was ordered .
The Court of Appeals determined that the Marion Circuit Court had
jurisdiction to determine paternity insofar as such determination is inextricably
connected with its decisions as to custody and support. However, it also found
that Katherine was equitably estopped from challenging paternity. Because it
concluded that great and irreparable injury would result to Daniel and T.B . if
paternity testing was required, the Court of Appeals granted the writ of
prohibition.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The standard by which we review petitions for a writ was set out in
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) :
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing
that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate
court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction,
and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury
will result if the petition is not granted.2
Here, the Court of Appeals, given its conclusion that equitable estoppel was
applicable, found the trial court was acting erroneously under the second
prong of Hoskins. 3 In cases where a writ under the second prong has been
granted, as here, we review the Court of Appeals' findings of fact - such as its
determination that great and irreparable injury will result - for clear error.
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004) . We review its
decision to issue the writ for an abuse of discretion . Id.
However, "whether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is not [always] a
question of jurisdiction, but [often] of discretion." Hoskins v. Maricle, 150
S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2004) . "Because writs interfere with both the orderly, even if
erroneous, proceedings of a trial court and the efficient dispatch of our
appellate duties, the courts of this Commonwealth have periodically attempted
to formulate a rule governing the discretionary choice between issuing a writ
and relegating a petitioner to the right to appeal." Id. at 5-6 .
B. The Contentions
On appeal, Katherine contends, inter alia, that as the Marion Circuit
Court had jurisdiction to determine the paternity issue, and the presumption of
paternity is rebuttable by the parties to the marriage, the Court of Appeals
2 There is an exception where "this Court will entertain a petition for prohibition in the
absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, provided
a substantial miscarriage ofjustice will result if the lower court is proceeding
erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of
orderly judicial administration ." Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 20 .
3 It did not, however, explicitly address the question of whether "an adequate remedy
by appeal existed."
abused its discretion in granting the writ, thereby precluding Katherine from
fully developing evidence by which to rebut the presumption upon appropriate
considerations and findings . Daniel accepts that a circuit court in a
jurisdiction without a family court has jurisdiction to make paternity decisions
insofar as the determination is inextricably connected with its decisions on
custody and support. He contends, however, that Kentucky's paternity
statutes, in this instance, do not grant subject matter jurisdiction to any court
since there is no evidence or allegation that the marital relationship ceased ten
months prior to T.B .'s birth, citing to J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587, 588
(Ky. 2008) (plurality opinion) ("We hold that Kentucky's paternity statutes do
not grant subject-matter jurisdiction to our courts to determine paternity
claims where, as here, there is no evidence or allegation that the marital
relationship ceased ten months before the child's birth .") .
Daniel further contends that Katherine cannot meet the threshold
requirements for challenging Daniel's presumption of paternity, that Katherine
is equitably estopped from challenging Daniel's paternity, and that Daniel and
T.B . will otherwise be irreparably harmed and subjected to grave injustice
should the prohibition of testing be lifted.
C . Circuit Court Jurisdiction
First, we agree that a family or circuit court (where there is no family
court) has jurisdiction over paternity issues, insofar as such a determination is
inextricably connected with the court's decisions on custody and support. See
Moore v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Res., 954 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Ky.
1997) ("[P]aternity and the issues related thereto were necessary issues to the
dissolution action which [the party] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate .") ;
Simmons v. Simmons, 479 S .W.2d 585, 587 (Ky. 1972) (circuit court determined
paternity of child in dispute between husband and wife in action of dissolution,
based upon blood test) ; Cain v. Cain, 777 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Ky. App. 1989)
(The Kenton Circuit Court "not only has the authority but the duty under KRS
406.081 to order the appropriate blood tests to determine whether [the former
husband] is [the child's] father.") ; see also Montgomery v. McCracken, 802
S .W .2d 943 (Ky. App. 1990) ("It is uncontroverted that evidence adduced
during the divorce proceedings excluded the mother's husband as being the
father of the child .") .
Here, the Marion Circuit Court did not have a family court.
However, the judicial article was passed in 1976, many years before the advent
of family courts . See Ky . Const. ยงยง 109-124 (effective January 1, 1976) . The
family court amendment, Section 112(6) was not effective until November 5,
2002 . Section 112(5) provides in relevant part: "[t]he Circuit Court shall have
original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court."
Thus, prior to the establishment of family courts in their various jurisdictions,
the Circuit Courts historically handled actions for Divorce or Dissolution with
all pertinent powers . Although KRS 406 .051(1) explicitly grants the District
Court "jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter," (emphasis added),
meaning under the Uniform Act of Paternity, such a grant does not deny the
Circuit Courts their general jurisdiction power to make all necessary
determinations, including paternity in dissolution actions . See Moore, 954
S .W.2d at 320.
Now, Section 112(6) of the Kentucky Constitution reflects that a "Circuit
Court division [designated as a family court] shall retain the general
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and shall have additional jurisdiction as may
be provided by the General Assembly ." KRS 23A.100(1) (a) confirms that "a
family court . . . shall retain jurisdiction in . . . [d]issolution of marriage" cases
and KRS 23A . 100(2)(b) grants the family court additional jurisdiction in
"[p]roceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity, KRS Chapter 406 ."
Family Courts were necessarily granted this additional jurisdiction as to
traditional paternity actions, as they now generally supplant the District Court
in these matters. See KRS 23A .100(3) (Family Courts "shall be the primary
forum for [such] cases .") This reordering of jurisdiction for Family Courts,
however, did not deprive Circuit Courts - in jurisdictions without a Family
Court - of their preexisting jurisdiction over matters pertinent to dissolution
actions .
D. J
.N.R v. O'Reilly
We turn next to Daniel's argument, ostensibly supported by J.N.R., that
the Marion Circuit Court was acting outside its jurisdiction, as KRS Chapter
406 does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to any court to determine
paternity of a child born during a marriage where there is no evidence or
allegation that the marital relationship ceased ten months prior to the child's
birth . In this regard, KRS 406 .011, in pertinent part, provides :
A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10) months
thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife .
However, a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a
married woman by a man other than her husband where evidence
shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife
ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child .
As the parties' marriage has yet to be dissolved, there is no question that T.B.
was born during the marriage .
Although J.N.R., supra, does ostensibly support the proposition asserted
by Daniel, and purports to overrule Montgomery and other similar authority in
so doing, only two (2) Justices concurred in the main opinion, with two (2)
others concurring in result only, and three (3) Justices dissenting . "When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of [four] Justices, `the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . . "' Marks v. United States, 430, U .S . 188, 193 (1977) .
Moreover, "a minority opinion has no binding precedential value . . . [and] if a
majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority
could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis
effect." Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17, 21-22 (Ky. 2006) (citing
Fugate v. Commonwealth, 62 S .W.3d 15, 19 (Ky. 2001)) .
Here, a review of the plurality opinion in J.N.R., patently discloses that
the statement cited to by Daniel, as well as the purported overruling of
Montgomery and other similar authority in J.N.R., do not fall within the
concurrence of four (4) Justices within the narrowest confines of their separate
opinions . This conclusion, however, does not resolve the underlying question .
E. Wedlock and the Rebuttable Presumption
Under common law, the terms "wedlock" and "out of wedlock" were fairly
well understood :
But it is insisted that under this section only children begotten and
born of an illicit intercourse between a single man and a single
woman are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father
and mother, and that the section has no application to a state of
case in which either the father or mother were married at the time
the children were begotten and born as the result of an illicit
intercourse with another man or woman. If this construction of
the statute should be adopted, it would not, of course, apply to the
facts of this case, and the result would be that the common law,
which prevails in this state except in cases where it has been
modified or abrogated by statutory enactment, would determine
the status of these children, and under that law they would remain
illegitimate notwithstanding the marriage of their parents .
Bates v. Meade, 174 Ky. 545, 192 S .W. 666, 667 (1917) (citing Blackstone's
Commentaries, vol. 1, p . 455; Kent's Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 208) . Now,
however, the terms are defined statutorily by KRS 406.011, which, as
aforementioned, states in relevant part:
A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10) months
thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife .
However, a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a
married woman by a man other than her husband where evidence
shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife
ceased ten (10) months prior to the birth of the child.
(Emphasis added) .
Although rebuttable ("presumed") between the parties to the marriage,
the presumption of legitimacy :
[C]an be overcome only by evidence so clear, distinct and
convincing as to remove the question from the realm of reasonable
doubt. [For we have said], that proof necessary to [illegitimatize] a
child must go beyond a reasonable doubt and must be of a higher
degree than that required to convict a person of even a minor
criminal offense .
Simmons, 479 S.W.2d at 587 (internal citations omitted) ; see also Hinshaw v.
Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Ky. 2007) ("While acknowledging that KRS
406 .011 creates a presumption of paternity, [the wife] correctly argues the
presumption is rebuttable.") ; Tackett v. Tackett, 508 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Ky.
1974) ("Though the presumption of paternity and legitimacy is one of the
strongest known to the law, it is not conclusive but is rebuttable [by the parties
to the marriage] and may be overcome by factual evidence.") . 4
Here, the parties disputing paternity are husband and wife . Thus, the
presumption is rebuttable . See Moore, 954 S .W.3d at 317 ; Cain, 777 S.W.2d at
239-40 ; Montgomery, 802 S .W .2d at 943 .
Under such circumstances, genetic tests are undoubtedly admissible and
informative on issues of paternity. KRS 406.091(3) . Moreover, if appropriate
within the context of the other evidence, "a chancellor is entitled to rely on the
tests." Simmons, 479 S.W.2d at 587 ; but see Hinshaw, 237 S .W .3d at 174
("Under these unique circumstances, equitable estoppel precludes Jacqueline
from [using uncontroverted DNA testing to challenge] Ren's status as [the
4 Tackett was a dissolution action between a husband and wife with an issue of
paternity.
10
child's] father, a status she created and accepted .") . This then brings us to the
issue of equitable estoppel.
F. Equitable Estoppel
In this instance, the Court of Appeals determined equitable estoppel to
be applicable and, therefore, determined that the Marion Circuit Court was
acting erroneously. Equitable estoppel is appropriately applied when the
following elements are established :
(1) Conduct, including acts, language and silence, amounting to a
representation or concealment of material facts ; (2) the estopped
party is aware of these facts; (3) these facts are unknown to the
other party; (4) the estopped party must act with the intention or
expectation his conduct will be acted upon ; and (5) the other party
in fact relied on this conduct to his detriment.
Gray v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit Assoc., 691 S .W.2d 904, 906 (Ky. App.
1985) . However, it is not generally the province of an appellate court to make
the findings of fact necessary for the application of equitable estoppel - such
findings and weighing of the equities are the province of the trial court. "The
thread which runs through CR 52 is that the trial court must render findings of
fact based on the evidence. . . ." Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S .W.2d 713, 716 (Ky.
1997) . Thus, an "appellate court should not engage in fact-finding or resolve
conflicting evidence." Kurt A . Phillips Jr., et al., Kentucky Practice, Rules of
Civil Procedure Annotated, Rule 52 .01, p. 279 (6th ed . 2005) (citing General
Motors Corp. v. Herald, 833 S .W.2d 804 (Ky. 1992)) . "The appellate court is
[simply] not authorized to `substitute its judgment as to the credibility of the
witnesses and/or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact."'
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 240 S .W.3d 662, 664 (Ky. App . 2007) .
Relying on Hinshaw, 237 S.W .3d 170, the Court of Appeals concluded
that equitable estoppel was appropriate. Hinshaw, however, involved an
appeal wherein the trial court had resolved all the appropriate findings and
thereafter, "concluded equitable estoppel precluded [Appellant] from
challenging [Appellee's] custody rights based on DNA testing." Id. at 172 . In
addition, "[t]he [trial] court, applying the best interests of the child standard,
concluded the parties should share joint custody with [Appellee] designated as
the primary residential custodian." Id.
To this point in this case, there have been no findings by the trial court.
Moreover, although the evidence is yet to be heard, weighed, and evaluated by
the trial court, Katherine asserts that Daniel made prior claims that he was not
the father of the child and that the parties were aware from the time of the
birth of the child that a third party was the biological father. Thus, absent
appropriate findings on the material questions presented by the evidence, the
application of equitable estoppel by an appellate court is inappropriate .
In Hinshaw, the parties lived together for four (4) years after the birth of
the child. 237 S.W.3d at 173 ; see also S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d at 502 (Ky.
App . 2005) (challenge made six (6) years after divorce) . In this case, the child
lived in the family setting for seven (7) months . In addition, the Court in both
Hinshaw and S.R.D., had the benefit of the trial court's analysis of the child's
best interest . Hinshaw, 237 S .W.3d at 172 ("Dr. Berla concluded that `severing
12
[the relationship between Ren and [the child] would at the very least cause [the
child] severe emotional and psychological harm .') ; S.R.D., 174 S.W .3d at 504
("Agreeing with Charney's recommendations, the court stated that `there is no
doubt that the best interest of the child is for the father-daughter relationship
to continue in the same manner as it has to this point in time . Any disruption
in that relationship, financial or emotional[,] would pose potentially serious
ramifications for the child .') . To date, these matters have yet to be addressed
in a forum where, at least initially, the presumption of paternity can generally
be challenged between the parties to the marriage . 5
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the issuance of the writ was
an abuse of discretion, and we therefore reverse the Court of Appeals .
All sitting. Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, Scott, and
Venters, JJ., concur. Minton, C .J., dissents for the reasons expressed in his
opinion in J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S .W.3d 587 (Ky . 2008) .
5 We do not intend by this analysis to prejudge any issue the trial court may confront,
whether it be equitable estoppel, admissions by pleadings, or allowable amendments
thereto. The essence of this opinion is that these are matters which necessarily
should be addressed by the trial court in its normal course and upon appropriate
evidentiary consideration and findings .
13
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
George G. Seelig
144 W. Main Street
Lebanon, KY 40033
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, HON . ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE, MARION
CIRCUIT COURT:
Hon . Allan Ray Bertram
One Courthouse
203 N. Court Street
Campbellsville, KY 42718
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, DANIEL E. BAILEY, JR. :
Susan Hanrahan McCain
Mattingly, Simms & Robinson PLLC
108 W. Main Street
Springfield, KY 40069
Daniel E. Bailey
6790 Calvary Road
Campbellsville, KY 42718
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