CHARLES DEARMOND V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
N
BE PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-x000204-MR
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DATE
CHARLES DEARMOND
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
NO. 09-CR-00026
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Charles Alan Dearmond, appeals from a Judgment of the
Muhlenberg Circuit Court, entered upon a conditional guilty plea. Subsequent
to the trial court's partial denial of his suppression motion, Appellant pled
guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine and to being a first-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO1), reserving the right to appeal the trial court's
suppression ruling. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on the
primary offense, enhanced to twenty-four years by the PFO 1 status.
Accordingly, Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง
110(2)(b), asserting error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
certain evidence seized from his girlfriend's residence as well as his confession .
Discerning no error in the trial court's suppression ruling, we affirm
Appellant's convictions and sentence.
RELEVANT FACTS
Appellant's convictions stem from evidence discovered during a search of
the home of Appellant's girlfriend, Mary Dukes. There was an outstanding
arrest warrant for Dukes' son, Jeff Oliver, and the police had been searching
for him for several days when they received information that Oliver would be at
Dukes' home on January 8, 2009, around 8 :30 p.m. for the purpose of picking
up some Sudafed. In response, the police set up surveillance of the home .
Around 10 :00 p.m ., two persons emerged from some woods behind the home
and went in, but the police could not identify them. At that point, the police
knocked on the door and asked Dukes for permission to search the home for
Oliver. With her consent, the officers began searching the home. In his search
of an upstairs bedroom, Deputy Sheriff Terry Vick opened a closet and saw a
mound of clothes piled up on the closet floor. Suspecting that Oliver might be
hiding under the clothes, Deputy Vick lifted them up only to find two clear
mason jars containing a wet, white substance along with wadded up coffee
filters. Deputy Vick also smelled a strong odor, which he recognized as ether.
Based on his prior experience, Deputy Vick suspected these materials were
part of a methamphetamine lab. Testing later confirmed the substance in the
jars to be pseudoephedrine . Continuing the search, officers also discovered
several items in plain view including a baggie containing a crushed white
substance and a police scanner and monitoring system . The officers also
retrieved. some lithium batteries from a pair of coveralls hanging in the
bedroom. After discovering these materials, Appellant and Dukes were both
Mirandized and arrested . Appellant then admitted to manufacturing
methamphetaminebut maintained that he was the only one involved.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant was indicted for manufacturing
methamphetamine, second or subsequent offense, or by complicity; possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree, second or subsequent offense, or
by complicity; and for being a PFO1 . Appellant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized from the home . The trial court granted the motion only with
respect to the lithium batteries . Although the search of the coveralls exceeded
the scope of the consent given to search, the trial court found that all other
items were discovered in the course of a search consistent with the consent
given. Specifically, Dukes expressly consented to a search of the home for her
son, Oliver . The trial court found that it was objectively reasonable for Deputy
Vick to suspect that Oliver might be hiding inside the closet under the pile of
clothing. Although Dukes testified at the suppression hearing that the clothes
were contained in a silver tub that was too small for a person to fit in, Deputy
Vick testified that the clothes were merely piled up in the closet floor, two to
three feet deep. In its suppression ruling, the trial court found Deputy Vi.ck's
testimony more credible than that of Dukes and further concluded that it was
reasonable for Deputy Vick to suspect Oliver could be hiding beneath the
clothes, rendering Deputy Vick's search under the clothes to be within the
scope of the consent Dukes had granted . Moreover, except for the batteries,
the trial court found that the remaining items were in plain view. Additionally,
the trial court concluded that Appellant's confession was admissible because it
was made only after he had been advised of his constitutional rights.
Upon the trial court's substantially adverse suppression ruling, Appellant
entered a conditional plea agreement. wherein the possession charge was
dropped and the second or subsequent aspect of the manufacturing charge
was dropped, with Appellant pleading guilty to manufacturing
methamphetamine and PFO1 in exchange for a twenty-four-year sentence .
Before this Court, Appellant asserts error in the trial court's suppression
ruling, the issue he explicitly reserved the right to appeal .
ANALYSIS
The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellant's Suppression
Motion Because the Officer Did Not Exceed the Scope of
Dukes' Consent to Search.
Appellant maintains that lifting up the pile of clothes exceeded the scope
of the consent to search because a person could not have been hiding
underneath them . Thus, he reasons that the mason jars and coffee filters
should have been suppressed. Further, he asserts that his subsequent
confession was fruit of this poisonous tree and should have been suppressed
as well. We disagree.
A two pronged approach is utilized to review a trial court's suppression
ruling. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. App . 2002) . First, we must
determine whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence . If so, then they are conclusive . RCr 9 .78 . Next, we must
determine whether, based on those findings, the trial court properly, applied the
law. In this regard, our review is de nova. Neat, 84 S.W .2d 920 .
Turning to the first prong, the trial court's factual findings in the instant
case are supported by substantial evidence; namely, Deputy Vick's testimony.
Although Dukes testified that the clothes in question were contained in a tub
that was too small to contain a person, Deputy Vick testified that the clothes
were merely piled up, two to three feet deep, on the closet floor . Moreover, a
photograph taken the right of the search was submitted by the
Commonwealth . Although the photograph was taken after the clothes had
been removed from the closet and had been restacked in front of the closet, no
silver tub can be discerned in the photograph. The photograph submitted by
Dukes was taken after she recreated the scene as she claimed it to have been
prior to the search . Additionally, the trial court stated that while Deputy Vick
had no prior connection with Appellant, Dukes was Appellant's girlfriend,
suggesting a stronger possibility of bias in her testimony. Furthermore, as the
trier of fact in a suppression hearing, the trial court is in the best position to
judge the credibility of the witnesses . Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S .W-3d
466 (Ky. 1999) . Overall, the trial court's factual findings here were supported
by substantial evidence and are conclusive .
Turning now to the second prong of the analysis, the trial court did,
indeed, properly apply the law to its factual findings . Appellant contends that
it was unreasonable to construe Dukes' consent to search for a person as a
consent to search every nook and cranny of her home, including under a pile of
clothes in a small closet. In measuring the scope of a person's consent to
search under the Fourth Amendment, an objective reasonableness standard is
employed . In other words, "what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U .S . 177
(1990)) .
In the case at bar, it was certainly objectively reasonable for Deputy Vick
to suspect that the person for whom he was searching might be hiding in the
closet . Moreover, the Commonwealth cites to several cases wherein suspects
were found hiding under clothes . For example, in Butler v. Commonwealth,
536 S .W.2d 139 (Ky. 1976), a suspect was discovered "lying under a pile of
clothes in a bedroom closet." Likewise, State v. Hanson, 528 P.2d 660 (N .M .
App. 1974) and United States v. Meyers, 308 F .3d 251
(3rd
Cir. 2002), involved
suspects who were found hiding under a pile of clothes . Further, Deputy Vick
testified that he, himself, had encountered suspects hiding under clothes in
confined areas . Accordingly, we cannot say that it was objectively
unreasonable for Deputy Vick to suspect that Oliver might have been hiding
under the pile of clothes in the bedroom closet. As such, he did not exceed the
scope of Dukes' consent and the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion
to suppress the evidence seized . Consequently, Appellant's subsequent
confession cannot be said to be fruit of a poisonous tree.
Finally, Appellant attempts to argue before this Court that the officers
had probable cause to obtain a search warrant prior to their entry of Dukes'
home . The Commonwealth responds that Appellant's suppression motion
asserted that the "the search was conducted without probable cause," and
Appellant never asserted otherwise to the trial court. There is no merit to
Appellant's assertion and given his failure to raise the argument in the trial
court, we need not address it further. Shelton v. Commonwealth, 992 S .W .2d
849 (Ky. 1999) .
CONCLUSION
Because it was objectively reasonable for Deputy Vick to search for Oliver
under the pile of clothes, the search did not exceed the scope of the consent
given to search . Therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to
suppress the evidence found under the clothes and his subsequent confession.
Appellant's convictions and sentence are affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Renee Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Michael Louis Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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