RAYMOND KEETON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER-JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLIS
,;Vuyreme Courf of
2008-SC-000659-MR
RAYMOND KEETON
V.
ON APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES CLAUD BRANTLEY, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00044
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
Appellant, Raymond Keeton, was convicted by a Hopkins Circuit Court
jury of two counts of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sodomy .
For these crimes, Appellant received a sentence of sixty years' imprisonment.
Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky. Const. § 110.
Appellant asserts three arguments on appeal: 1) that the identical jury
instructions given for each rape count denied him due process because they
did not protect against a non-unanimous verdict or double jeopardy; 2) that he
was entitled to a directed verdict on all charges; and 3) that testimony from the
victim's stepmother was impermissible hearsay. Because the identical jury
instructions for each rape charge constitute palpable error per Miller v.
Commonwealth, 283 S .W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009), we reverse Appellant's convictions
for the two counts of first-degree rape, and remand this matter to the Hopkins
Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion . We affirm
Appellant's conviction and sentence for first-degree sodomy .
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2007, the victim, H.F., told her stepmother that Appellant
had sexually abused her. As a result of this disclosure, the stepmother
contacted Officer Justin Jones of the Madisonville Police Department . Officer
Jones interviewed H .F., and based on that interview, sought and obtained a
warrant for Appellant. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by Officer
Jones in the presence of Officer Jason Lutz and Officer Corey Miller.
At Appellant's trial, Officer Jones testified that during the interrogation,
Appellant made an incriminating statement. Officer Jones testified that
Appellant said he woke up one morning to discover he had an erection and was
wet from sexual intercourse . Appellant's statement seemed to imply that H.F.
had raped him. Officer Lutz verified Officer Jones's testimony, except he
testified that Appellant never actually stated that H .F. raped him, but that he
instead answered affirmatively to Officer Jones's question "so you're saying she
[H .F.] raped you?" H .F. testified that Appellant had sexual intercourse with her
twice and that Appellant had also licked her genitalia .
Appellant testified at trial that he did not commit any of the alleged acts
against H.F. He believed that H.F. made up the allegations against him
because he reported H.F.'s biological mother to law enforcement for drug
related crimes and food stamp fraud . However, rebuttal testimony was
provided that there was no record of Appellant reporting the biological mother
to law enforcement. Based on the testimony at trial, the jury found Appellant
guilty on all counts .
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EACH RAPE COUNT WERE IDENTICAL AND
THUS VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT BY POTENTIALLY
DEPRIVING HIM OF THE RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Appellant first argues that the jury received identical instructions for
each count of first-degree rape, which denied him due process by depriving him
of the right to a unanimous verdict and by violating double jeopardy .' The jury
received the following instruction for both rape charges :
You will find the Defendant guilty of First Degree Rape under this
Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following :
A . That in this county sometime in the summer of 2005 and before
the finding of the Indictment herein, he engaged in sexual
intercourse with [H .F.];
AND
B. That at the time of such intercourse [H .F.] was less than twelve
(12) years of age .
Since the jury instructions for the two counts of first-degree rape were
identical, Appellant argues that our decision in Miller, 283 S .W .3d at 696,
mandates he receive a new trial on the charges . In Miller, we held that
providing identical jury instructions for multiple charges of third-degree rape
' Appellant did not raise this issue in his initial brief to this Court, but on August 27,
2009, moved to file a supplemental brief in light of our decision in Miller, 283
S .W.3d 690 . We granted the motion .
and sodomy constituted palpable error and that the error "prejudiced the
substantial rights of the defendant" by denying him the right to a unanimous
verdict and to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the individual
convictions on appeal. Id. This was due to the fact that "there is no assurance
that the jurors were voting for the same factually distinct crime under each of
the indistinguishable instructions." Id. at 694 .
The Commonwealth argues that this matter is factually different from
Miller, and that the identical jury instructions provided for the two counts of
first-degree rape do not constitute palpable error. First, the Commonwealth
argues that Appellant agreed to the jury instructions at trial, and thus has
waived any allegation of error pertaining to them. However, Appellant's
agreement to the jury instructions only indicates that the alleged error was
unpreserved and we may conduct a palpable error review . RCr 14 .26 . Second,
the Commonwealth argues that Appellant was only charged with two counts of
first-degree rape, unlike the defendant in Miller, who was charged with six
counts of third-degree rape as well as two counts of third-degree sodomy. The
Commonwealth further argues that since evidence was presented at Appellant's
trial to differentiate between the two first-degree rape charges he has suffered
no harm . However, the introduction of facts which differentiate between the
charges does not automatically cure the error, and the Commonwealth has the
burden of proving that "no prejudice resulted from the error" in the jury
instructions. Id. at 695 . In this case, the Commonwealth fails to meet that
burden. While Appellant was charged with only two counts of first-degree rape,
he has a Constitutional right to a unanimous verdict on those two charges. Ky .
Const. § 7 . The jury instructions provided do not guarantee that he received
such a verdict. We note that the error in the instructions could have been
easily corrected because the same facts in evidence, which the Commonwealth
says differentiates the two rapes, could have been used in the instructions to
distinguish the two charges .
Thus, we find that the error committed in Miller is identical to the error
committed in this case, and we reverse Appellant's convictions and sentences
for the two counts of first-degree rape and remand this matter for a new trial
consistent with this opinion . We will now address Appellant's other allegations
of error.
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
a directed verdict on all charges. Appellant's main argument in support of his
motion is that the testimony given at trial by H.F. and the two police officers
provided insufficient grounds for a jury to find him guilty. Appellant also
argues that he should have been granted a directed verdict because the
Commonwealth never established that he committed the offenses in the
"summer of 2005" as stated in the jury instructions. We find that the trial
court correctly denied Appellant's directed verdict motion .
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony .
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W .2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . Accordingly,
"[c]redibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the exclusive
province of the jury." Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Ky. 1999) .
"Jurors are free to believe parts and disbelieve other parts of the evidence
including the testimony of each witness ." Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 113
S .W .3d 647, 650 (Ky. App. 2003) (citing Smith, 5 S.W .3d at 129) . Here, the
Commonwealth presented adequate evidence to convict Appellant. H .F .
unambiguously testified that Appellant raped and sodomized her. The
testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support a rape conviction. Garrett
v. Commonwealth, 48 S .W.3d 6, 8 (Ky. 2001) ("Corroboration in a child sexual
abuse case is required only if the unsupported testimony of the victim is ` . . .
contradictory, or incredible, or inherently improbable ."' (quoting Robinson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 147, 150 (1970))) ; Fletcher v. Commonwealth,
250 Ky. 597, 63 S.W.2d 780, 781 (1933) . The jury was properly given the
ability to judge the credibility of all witnesses and chose to believe their
testimony.
Further, while the trial record indicates that H.F. did not specifically
testify that the criminal acts occurred during the summer of 2005, she did
provide testimony about events which occurred that summer. Such testimony
included what grade of school she would be entering in after the summer, what
job her mother worked, where she lived, and most importantly, that Appellant
babysat her that summer. All of this testimony regarding the summer of 2005
provides a sufficient basis for a jury to infer that the criminal acts happened at
that time. Additionally, in child sexual assault cases, failure to prove specific
offense dates is not fatal to the charge as long as each allegation is supported
by sufficient evidence. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S .W.2d 737, 740 (Ky .
1984) . Looking at all of the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences "in
favor of the Commonwealth" the trial court correctly denied Appellant's directed
verdict motion. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 .
III . THE TESTIMONY OF H.F.'S STEPMOTHER WAS INADMISSIBLE
HEARSAY, BUT WAS NOT PALPABLE ERROR
Appellant finally argues that testimony provided by H.F .'s stepmother
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Appellant failed to object to this testimony,
but we will review the allegation for palpable error. RCr 10.26 . At trial, the
Commonwealth asked H .F.'s stepmother if H.F. had identified the perpetrator.
She testified that H.F. stated it was "her mother's ex-boyfriend [Appellant] ."
Appellant argues that this statement is inadmissible hearsay because it falls
under no specific exception to the hearsay rule. Benjamin v. Commonwealth,
266 S .W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008) . The Commonwealth presents no exception to the
hearsay rule which would have made this testimony admissible . We also can
find no exception which would apply to the testimony, and thus the admission
of this testimony was error. However, we do not find that this error is palpable .
Palpable error is one "which affects the substantial rights of a party."
RCr 10.26. Such error only affects the substantial rights of a party if "it is
more likely than ordinary error to have affected the judgment." Ernst v.
Commonwealth, 160 S .W.3d 744, 762 (Ky. 2005) . While the stepmother's
testimony may have provided some limited bolstering to H.F.'s testimony, her
testimony likely did not affect the judgment . H .F. herself testified at trial that
Appellant raped and sodomized her and told the jury that she told her
stepmother about it. The stepmother's testimony was cumulative to other
evidence presented, and therefore not palpable error. On retrial, effort should
be made to keep such testimony from being admitted unless the facts develop
as such where the testimony falls under an exception to the hearsay rule.
CONCLUSION
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant's convictions and sentences
for the two counts of first-degree rape are reversed and the matter is remanded
to the Hopkins Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion .
Appellant's conviction and sentence for first-degree sodomy is affirmed.
All sitting. Minton, C.J ., Abramson, Noble, Schroder and Venters, JJ.,
concur. Scott, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in
which Cunningham, J., joins.
SCOTT, J ., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART OPINION :
Although I concur on the other issues, I respectfully dissent on issue I-the
unanimous verdict issue. I do not see Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S .W .3d
690 (Ky. 2009) as applicable here, since Miller involved three (3) convictions out
of six (6) third-degree rape charges and only one (1) of two (2) counts of thirddegree sodomy. Thus, in Miller, one could not assert that each of the jurors
found guilt under the same factual circumstances. Here, Appellant was
charged and convicted of both charges and the evidence plainly demonstrated
that there were two separate offenses . Plainly then, each juror found the same
occurrence .
Cunningham, J ., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.