BRANDON LEON WATKINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
'~Uyrrmr (~Vurf
of
RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2010
TO BE PUBLISHED
2008-SC-000567-DG
BRANDON LEON WATKINS
V.
APPELLAN
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2007-CA-000869-MR
TODD CIRCUIT COURT NO . 06-CR-00103
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM
AFFIRMING
In the early afternoon on November 18, 2006, Appellant, Brandon Leon
Watkins, was observed by policeman, Brian Atkinson of the Elkton Police
Department, speeding down Highway 68 in Todd County, Kentucky at
approximately 30 miles over the speed limit.
When Officer Atkinson attempted to stop the vehicle for speeding,
Appellant sped away and attempted to elude the pursuing officer. Officer
Atkinson illuminated his overhead lights . After what was apparently a
relatively short, high-speed chase, Appellant spun out in the median of the
highway and blew out a tire . The vehicle came to a stop, totally in the grass
median and outside of any lane of traffic . He then exited the vehicle and
attempted to escape on foot by running into the adjoining countryside .
Prior to exiting his police vehicle and chasing Appellant on foot, Officer
Atkinson radioed for backup assistance . Chief of the Elkton Police
Department, Bruce Marklin, and other officers responded to the call . Appellant
was soon apprehended by officers from the Elkton Police Department . After
learning by radio of the capture of Appellant, Officer Atkinson returned to
Appellant's vehicle . He was met there by both Chief Marklin and Officer
Rodney Moberly. The officers were able to ascertain that the vehicle was owned
by an unknown female in another town . From the video taken from the camera
mounted on the dash of Officer Atkinson's police vehicle, it appears that Chief
Marklin reached into the car and turned off the ignition.
Before having the vehicle towed, the officers conducted a search of both
the interior of the car, as well as the trunk . In the trunk, they discovered
marijuana and crack cocaine inside a red and white cooler. Therefore, the
officers considered the search of the vehicle to be an inventory search prior to
arrival of the tow truck . Also, they were fulfilling a policy of the Elkton Police
Department to tow all vehicles that are stranded on the "travel portion" of the
roadway.
A motion to suppress the evidence was made by Appellant and denied by
the trial court . The trial court made findings that Appellant lacked standing to
challenge the search since he had abandoned the vehicle . The trial court also
concluded that the search was properly conducted pursuant to an inventory
exception to the warrant requirement .
Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to speeding in excess of 26
miles per hour over the speed limit ; failure to comply with instructional permit;
fleeing or evading police in the second degree ; possession of marijuana under 8
ounces; and possession of controlled substance (cocaine) in the first degree,
second offense . He was sentenced to a total term of six (6) years in the state
penitentiary .
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, including the trial court's
ruling that Appellant forfeited his standing to contest the search when he
abandoned the car.
We granted discretionary review and hereby affirm.
In upholding the search of the vehicle, the trial court held that Appellant
had abandoned the vehicle and had no expectation of privacy as to it or its
contents . The trial court also concluded that even if there was standing to
challenge the search, it was proper as being conducted pursuant to the
inventory exception to the warrant requirement.
Since we affirm the Court of Appeals in holding that Appellant lacks
standing due to abandonment, we do not address the inventory issue .
The Fourth Amendment to the U .S . Constitution and Section 10 of the
Kentucky Constitution afford our citizenry protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures . However, in order to have standing to make such a
claim, the person claiming must have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
the place to be searched . Katz v. United States, 389 U .S . 347 (1967) . See also
Colbert v. Commonwealth, 43 S .W .3d 777 (Ky. 2001) . It is important to point
out that, in the Colbert case, we do not construe Section 10 of our Kentucky
Constitution to extend a greater protection against warrantless searches than
that afforded warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S .
Constitution . With that in mind, we recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court
has long held that an individual does not hold any reasonable expectation of
privacy to abandoned property. California v. Greenwood, 486 U .S. 35 (1988) .
Under both Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S . Constitution, abandoned property is outside of
constitutional protection. Hunt v. Commonwealth, 488 S .W .2d 692, 694 (Ky .
1972) . What constitutes abandoned property has to be determined on a caseby-case basis. Therefore, the act of abandonment itself turns to a large degree
upon the possessor's state of mind. Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697,
704 (8th Cir. 1965) . To that extent, trial courts must weigh the evidence and
consider the circumstances in reaching a conclusion as to whether the
property has, in fact, been abandoned . Hunt, 488 S.W.2d at 694.
It is clear from the facts in this case that Appellant abandoned the
vehicle. First of all, we consider it significant that the automobile he was
driving was registered in the name of another person. He led the police on a
high-speed chase when law enforcement attempted to pull him over for
speeding. That chase came to an end when he spun out in the median and
blew out a tire. He immediately left the vehicle and ran off, leaving
incriminating evidence in the trunk of the car . The police continued to give
pursuit on foot. It stretches the imagination to the breaking point to believe
that the fugitive Appellant would have returned to the disabled vehicle,
changed the tire, and driven away.
Leaving property behind, when in flight from apprehension by law
enforcement, must be considered in and of itself an abandonment of that
property. When one or more persons are fleeing and evading law enforcement
officers, who are in hot pursuit, and the car is stopped or becomes disabled
and all occupants flee from the vehicle, that vehicle is considered abandoned
and may be subject to a warrantless search .
Our holding today should be narrowly applied to the facts of fleeing
fugitives . We are sensitive to the many legal ramifications of the word
"abandonment" in property law and otherwise . "Abandonment of property" has
a long history in common and statutory law. See KRS 189 .752(3) ; KRS
189 .753; KRS 393 .020; and Cam. by Geary v. Johnson, 668 S .W .2d 569
(Ky.App. 1984) . We use "abandonment" here strictly in the constitutional
context. It goes only to the surrender of standing by a fleeing fugitive to
contest a search and seizure as to property discarded in that escape . Our
holding should not be stretched beyond these narrowly drawn facts.
The trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress and,
therefore, the conviction is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.