HOLLIS DESHAUN KING V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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HOLLIS DESHAUN KING
APPEL
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2006-CA-002033-MR
FAYETI'E CIRCUIT COURT NO. 05-CR-1500-2
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCHRODER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
At issue in this case is whether exigent circumstances existed, which
justified the warrantless entry of the apartment occupied by Appellant Hollis
Deshaun King. We hold that police were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,
and that, with regard to the imminent destruction of evidence, any exigency
was police-created. We also note that no "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule applies in this case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals .
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of October 13, 2005, Lexington-Fayette County police
were conducting a "buy bust" operation at an apartment complex on Centre
Parkway in Lexington. Police arranged for a confidential informant to purchase
crack cocaine from a "street level" dealer. Officer Steven Cobb and several
narcotics detectives were nearby in marked police cars waiting to make an
arrest after a. sale was complete.
After a suspected dealer sold crack tocaine to"the confidential informant;'
undercover officer Gibbons gave a prearranged signal, informing officers to
move in and make an arrest. As Cobb drove toward the location of the sale to
make the arrest, Gibbons radioed a. description of the suspect, and stated that
he had entered a specific breezeway at the apartment complex . Cobb testified'
that Gibbons told officers to hurry, in order to keep the suspect from entering
an apartment .
Cobb exited his vehicle, and continued toward the breezeway on foot with
two narcotics detectives . After Cobb had exited his vehicle, Gibbons informed
officers via radio that the suspect had entered the back right apartment.
Because they were no longer near a radio, Cobb and the narcotics detectives
did not hear this final piece of information. The officers heard a door slam
shut, but did not see which apartment the suspect had entered.
When the officers reached the breezeway, they detected the "very strong
odor of burnt marijuana." It soon became clear that the smell of marijuana
was emanating from the back left apartment. Officer Cobb testified at the
suppression hearing that this strong odor led him to believe that the left
apartment door had been recently opened. However, Cobb stated that he did
not know which door he had heard close.
1
Officer Cobb was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing.
Detective Maynard, one of the narcotics detectives, knocked loudly on the
back left apartment door and announced "police ." The three officers then
heard movement inside the apartment, which lead the officers to believe that
evidence was about to be destroyed.
At this point, the officers made a forced entry into the left apartment. As
the circuit court noted in its findings of fact, when asked to articulate the
reasons which he thought justified the forced entry, Cobb testified that the
officers thought (1) that a crime was occurring based on the strong odor of
marijuana, and (2) that evidence was possibly being destroyed based on the
sound of movement inside the apartment.
Cobb kicked the back left apartment door open, and officers performed
an initial protective sweep looking for the original suspect. Though police did
not find the suspected drug dealer, they found three people sitting on couches
in the apartment: Jamela Washington, Clarence Johnson, and Appellant Hollis
King. Johnson was smoking marijuana, while Washington and King sat
nearby. Police found approximately 25 grams of marijuana and 4 .6 ounces of
powder cocaine in plain view. Upon further search, police found crack cocaine,
scales with cocaine residue, $2500 in cash, three cell phones, and other drug
paraphernalia. Police eventually entered the back right apartment, and found
the suspected drug dealer who had been the original target.
King and his co-defendants argued that the police's entry into the
apartment was unlawful, and filed motions to suppress all evidence obtained
as a result of that entry. Following a suppression hearing, the circuit court
issued extensive Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Opinion and
Order. As a preliminary matter, the circuit court concluded that King had
standing to challenge the search. 2 Next, the court concluded that the smell of
marijuana gave the officers probable cause to continue with their investigation.
And finally, the court concluded that the lack of response to the knock on the
door-coupled with the sound of movement, which the officers believed to be
the destruction of evidence---created the requisite exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless entry. Therefore, the circuit court denied King's motion to
suppress evidence.
King entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the
circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress . The circuit court found King
guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance; possession of marijuana; and
persistent felony offender, second degree (PFO 11). For the trafficking charge,
the court imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment, enhanced to ten
years by King's PFO status . For the possession charge, the court imposed a
sentence of twelve months in jail.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found fault with the circuit court's
conclusions of law. The Court concluded that smelling burning marijuana,
knocking on the door, and hearing movement within the residence cannot
justify a warrantless entry. Rather, the Court of Appeals noted, such a search
2 The record indicates that Jamela Washington leased the apartment, that Washington
was King's girlfriend, and that King stayed at the apartment at least part of the
time.
is invalid if the police created their own exigent circumstances. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals concluded that, "under the circumstances of this case,"
police did not create their own exigency because they did not engage in
deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement, citing
United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005) . The Court of
Appeals also noted a "good faith" exception, and affirmed the circuit court's
judgment. 3 This Court then granted discretionary review .
11. ANALYSIS
We apply a two-prong test when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a
suppression motion following a hearing. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S .W.3d
376, 380 (Ky. App. 2000) . First, the circuit court's factual findings are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id.; RCr 9.78. However, we
conduct "a de novo review to determine whether the court's decision is correct
as a matter of law." Stewart, 44 S.W.3d at 380.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court's findings of
fact were supported by substantial evidence, and are therefore conclusive . We
now conduct a de novo review of the law as applied to the circuit court's
findings of fact.
3
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction of Jamela Washington, King's codefendant, in Washington v. Conunonwealth, 231 S .W.3d 762 (Ky. App . 2007) .
Because Washington conflicts with our opinion in this case, it is hereby overruled.
A.
Police Did Not Have Proper Exigent Circumstances to Justify a
Warrantless Entry
It is well established that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, police may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure
within a private residence unless there exist both (1) probable cause and (2)
exigent circumstances. 4 Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U .S. 635, 638 (2002) ; Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) . Any other search is per se unreasonable. Id.
at 587 .
Both parties agree that the smell of burning marijuana created probable
cause, which would have been sufficient for the police to obtain a warrant to
search the back left apartment. Because the police chose not to seek a
warrant, we must now address whether there existed exigent circumstances to
justify the warrantless entry. The Commonwealth argues that two types of
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry: (1) "hot pursuit," and (2)
imminent destruction of evidence. We address each of these in the context of
this case .
1.
The Police Were Not In Hot Pursuit of a Fleeing Suspect
The "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect (when accompanied by probable
cause as required by Payton) is an exigent circumstance justifying the
warrantless entry of a home . United States v. Santana, 427 U .S. 38, 42-43
(1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ; Styles v.
4
Consent also authorizes a warrantless search, but consent is not an issue in this
case.
Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1974) . See also Minnesota u. Olson,
495 U.S . 91, 100-01 (1990) (reaffirming hot pursuit exception) .
An important element of the hot pursuit exception is the suspect's
knowledge that he is; in fact, being- pursued . Santana, 4-27 U .S . at 48: -see also
State u. Nichols, 484 S.E.2d 507, 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("Rather, the key to
`hot pursuit' is that the defendant is aware he is being pursued by the police,
and is therefore likely to disappear or destroy evidence of his wrongdoing if the
officer takes the time to get a warrant.") . In this case, uniformed officers were
in pursuit of the suspected drug dealer, but there is no evidence that he was
aware of this . According to testimony at the suppression hearing, the suspect
sold drugs to a confidential informant, and then returned to his apartment.
Officer Cobb testified that police officers had hurried to the scene to
prevent the suspect from entering an apartment . Although the suspect entered
an apartment before he could be apprehended, there was no testimony that
police feared he would escape. Nothing in these circumstances created an
exigency that would have made it impracticable for the police to post officers in
the breezeway and obtain a warrant. For these reasons, there was no hot
pursuit justifying the warrantless entry of the back left apartment.
2.
The Warrantless Entry Was Not Justified by the Imminent
Destruction of Evidence
The imminent destruction of evidence is recognized as an exigent
circumstance, which justifies a warrantless search when accompanied by
probable cause. Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W .3d
170, 173 (Ky. 2006) .
See also Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U .S . 496, 505 (1973) ("Where there are
exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be `now or never' to
preserve the evidence of the crime, it is, reasonable to permit. action without-prior judicial evaluation .") (citations omitted) .
As found by the circuit court, Officer Cobb gave two reasons for the
decision to enter the left apartment without a warrant: the fact that a crime
was occurring based on the odor of marijuana, and the possible destruction of
evidence based on the sound of movement inside the apartment.
a.
The odor of marijuana did not create exigent
circumstances
Odor alone is generally an insufficient basis for the warrantless search of
a home based on imminent destruction of evidence . In Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948), the Supreme Court held the warrantless search
of a hotel room invalid where the officers detected "a strong odor of burning
opium which to them was distinctive and unmistakable ." Id. at 12 . The Court
stated that an odor, sufficiently distinctive to be recognized as an illegal
substance, and detected by one qualified to recognize it, can be sufficient to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 13. However, odor alone did not justify
a warrantless search based on imminent destruction of evidence: "No evidence
or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the
fumes which we suppose in time will disappear. But they were not capable at
any time of being reduced to possession for presentation to court ." Id. a t 15.
The odor of marijuana alone can justify the warrantless search of an
automobile. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 577 S .W.2d 34, 37 (Ky. 1979), overruled
on other grounds by Mash v. Commonwealth; 769 S.W.2d 42 (Ky . 1989) .
However, there is a strong distinction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
between an automobile and a home. The mobility of an automobile creates an
exigent circumstance per se. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)
(citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)). By contrast,
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed ." Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)) .
We also note that, in some circumstances, the odor of an illegal
substance alone will create exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
search. This is particularly true where public safety is a concern . See, e.g.,
Bishop v . Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567 (Ky. App . 2007) (strong chemical
smell consistent with production of methamphetamine created exigent
circumstances based on public safety due to inherent dangers in
methamphetamine production) . However, such circumstances are not present
in this case.
b.
By knocking on the apartment door and announcing
their presence, police created any resulting exigency
The odor of marijuana emanating from the left apartment did not create
an exigency based on destruction of evidence. Therefore, the sounds police
heard after knocking on the door provide the only possible justification for
entry based on imminent destruction of evidence. There is certainly some
question as to whether the sound of persons moving was sufficient to establish
that evidence was being destroyed. However, we assume for the purpose of
argument that exigent circumstances existed, and proceed to the more
important question of whether police created their own exigency.
We agree with the well established principle that police may not rely on
an exigent circumstance of their own creation. United States u. Chambers, 395
F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); United States u. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th
Cir. 1990); see also United States u. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir.
1983) (citing cases so holding). But this general holding is rarely dispositive,
because "in some sense the police always create the exigent circumstances that
justify warrantless entries and arrests." Duchi, 906 F.2d at 1284. Kentucky
courts have not firmly addressed under what circumstances police may not rely
on an exigency of their own creation . However, we draw guidance from other
courts that have addressed the issue.
1.
The proper test for a police-created exigency
In United States u. Duchi, the Eighth Circuit adopted an "antecedent
inquiry," which focused on "the reasonableness and propriety of the
investigative tactics that generated the exigency." 906 F.2d at 1284. The court
went on to clarify that "bad faith is not required to run afoul of the standard we
adopt and apply today." A The Third Circuit has used similar language,
stating that "we must look to the reasonableness and propriety of [police]
actions and investigative, tactics preceding their warrantless entry." United
States- v. Cogs,. 437,.F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir.:2006)(emphasis in original). Basedon Duchi and other decisions of the Eighth Circuit, the Arkansas Supreme
Court succinctly stated the proper test as being "[w]hether, regardless of good
faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by
the police would create the exigent circumstances relied upon to justify a
warrantless entry." Mann v . State, 357 Ark. 159, 161 S.W.3d 826, 834 (2004) .
The Fifth Circuit employs a two-part test: "first whether the officers
deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to
avoid the warrant requirement, and second, even if they did not do so in bad
faith, whether their actions creating the exigency were sufficiently
unreasonable or improper as to preclude dispensation with. the warrant
requirement ." United States v. Could, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004) .
The Sixth Circuit gives slightly more deference to law enforcement,
requiring "some showing of deliberate conduct on the part of the police evincing
an effort intentionally to evade the warrant requirement." Chambers, 395 F-3d
at 566 (quoting Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir.
2002)) (emphasis added in Chambers) . However, the Sixth Circuit seems to
stop short of restricting created-exigency cases to those where the police acted
in bad faith. See Chambers, 395 F.3d at 569 .
The Second Circuit appears to give the most deference to law
enforcement, holding that "when law enforcement agents act in an entirely
lawful manner, they do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances ."
United States . v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 [2d Cire 1990 ..(en banc) . "[T]he
reasonableness of the police investigative tactics precipitating the exigency does
not seem to figure into the Second Circuit's analysis." Coles, 437 F.3d at 369.
With the exception of the Second Circuit, these various approaches are
similar, and will usually reach the same result. Even the Sixth Circuit's
standard stops short of requiring bad faith on the part of police. In reviewing
these approaches, we believe that a two-part test like that used by the Fifth
Circuit, but including the language of the Arkansas Supreme Court, would
provide the greatest clarity.
Therefore, for Kentucky, we adopt a two-part test. First, courts must
determine "whether the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances
with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement." Gould, 364 F.3d at
590 . If so, then police cannot rely on the resulting exigency. Second, where
police have not acted in bad faith, courts must determine "[whhether, regardless
of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics
employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances relied upon to
justify a warrantless entry." Mann, 161 S.W.3d at 834. If so, then the exigent
circumstances cannot justify the warrantless entry.
2.
Application of the test
Turning to the facts of this case, it does not appear that the officers acted
in bad faith. Though other officers were aware that the suspect had not
entered the left apartment,, Officer Cobb and the two narcotics detectives were
not aware of this fact . Therefore, we cannot say that the officers acted
deliberately with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.
However, it was reasonably foreseeable that knocking on the apartment
door and announcing "police," after having smelled marijuana emanating from
the apartment, would create the exigent circumstance relied upon, i .e.
destruction of evidence . It was reasonably foreseeable that, upon hearing
police announce their presence, the persons inside the apartment would
proceed to destroy evidence of their crime. Before police announced their
presence, there would have been no reason to destroy evidence of either the
marijuana which the officers had smelled, or evidence of the original drug
transaction .
When the imminent destruction of evidence is a. concern because a
suspect has become aware of police presence, the primary distinction is the
manner by which the suspect gained that knowledge . Where police are
observing a suspect from a lawful vantage point, and the suspect sees police,
then the exigency is generally not police-created. But where police
unnecessarily announce their presence, and this creates the fear that evidence
will be destroyed, police have created their own exigency, and cannot rely on
the fear of evidence being destroyed as a
justification
for a. warrantless entry.
See United States v. Munoz-GueiTa, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986) (agents
created their own exigency by knocking on patio door after seeing marijuana in
plain view through a window,, . where premises could have been covertly secured
and warrant could have been obtained prior to approaching the patio) ; see also
United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1993) (agents created
exigent circumstances by announcing presence) .
The odor of marijuana did not create an exigency based on imminent.
destruction of evidence. In addition, any exigency that did arise when police
knocked and announced their presence was police-created, and cannot be
relied upon as a justification for a warrantless entry.
B.
The "Good Faith" Exception Does Not Apply to a Warrantless Entry
Finally, the Commonwealth argues, consistent with the Court of Appeals'
opinion, that although Officer Cobb was mistaken about the suspected drug
dealer being in the left apartment, the "good faith" exception prevents the
warrantless entry from being invalidated due to his mistake . This argument is
without merit.
We assume the Court of Appeals was referring to the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule established by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) . However, the Leon good faith exception is "clearly limited to warrants
invalidated for lack of probable cause" and does not create a broad good faith
exception for any illegal search. United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698
(9th Cir. 1986) . See also United States u. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1165 (6th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to extend the good faith exception to a warrantless search
that the government argued was justified by exigent circumstances) . 5
.III. CONCLUSION . .
:.
.;. .
-;
While probable cause existed for police to obtain a warrant to enter the
apartment occupied by King,, police did not have proper exigent circumstances
to justify a warrantless entry. Police were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect. Further, the entry was not. justified by imminent. destruction of
evidence. The odor of marijuana alone did not provide a justification, and any
exigency arising from the sounds of movement inside the apartment was
created by police, and therefore cannot be relied upon as a justification.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed. The denial of King's motion to suppress evidence is reversed, and
King's judgment of conviction is vacated . The case is hereby remanded to
Fayette Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
The Commonwealth's and the Court of Appeals' reliance on Perkins u.
Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. App. 2007), is misplaced. The issue in
Perkins was whether a search was consensual, and the Perkins court quoted Illinois
u. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990): "The Constitution is no more violated when
officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously)
believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the
premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they
reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is
about to escape ." Perkins, 237 S.W.3d at 219 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186) .
To support the quoted language, Rodriquez cites Archibald u. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (1st
Cir. 1982), which stands only for the proposition that, when a warrantless entry is
justified by exigent circumstances, the entry in pursuit of a felon is not invalid
simply because the police do not find the felon in the premises. In the case at bar,
however, the warrantless entry was not justified by exigent circumstances .
15
All sitting. Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Noble, Scott, and Venters, JJ.,
concur. Cunningham, J ., concurs in result only without separate opinion.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Johsua D . Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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