CHARLES BRENT BEARD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JANUARY 21, 2010
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2008-SC-000079-DG
CHARLES BRENT BEARD
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2006-CA-001947
CRITTENDEN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CR-00053
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NOBLE
REVERSING
Appellant, Charles Brent Beard, appeals the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming his conviction for drug trafficking. He raises only one
assignment of error: that his appointed trial counsel had a sufficient conflict of
interests that the trial court's failure to appoint different counsel constituted
reversible error. This Court agrees that the trial court erred and therefore
reverses .
I . Background
Appellant's arrest and conviction resulted from series of controlled buys
performed by Jackie Davis for the police . Davis, who was on probation at the
time, had approached the police and offered to assist them as a confidential
informant. Though it was against Probation and Parole policy for Davis to
participate in a police operation without prior approval by his probation officer,
the police did not know he was on probation and Davis did not volunteer that
fact. Over the course of three buys, Davis purchased marijuana and
methamphetamine, allegedly from Appellant .
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss his attorney,
Jason Pfeil, and to have new counsel appointed due to a conflict of interests .
He claimed that Pfeil had a conflict because he represented two other clients,
Jackie Davis and Ron Damron, whose interests were adverse to him. At a
hearing on the matter, the trial court asked Appellant how he felt that the
representation of Davis was a conflict of interests, to which he replied, "How
could it not be a conflict of interest when he's sitting here and he's going to
defend me at trial but here he's going to defend this man for a P.B . revocation
hearing or whatever it's called? He represented Jackie Davis to get him
probation ." The judge then stated, "But that was unrelated to your case ."
Appellant replied by noting that it was the same person who "brung these
charges against" him. The trial court then asked Appellant how he had been
prejudiced by his attorney's representation of the other clients. Appellant had
no good answer, stating only that it may have put "bad thoughts" in his
attorney's mind and made him think that Appellant was guilty. The judge then
gave Pfeil an opportunity to address the claims .
Pfeil admitted that he had previously represented Jackie Davis in a
criminal case that resulted in probation. Also, Davis was in danger of having
his probation revoked for failure to report, and Pfeil had been appointed to
again represent him. Pfeil indicated that upon being reappointed to represent
Davis, one of the things he wanted to explore was the extent to which Davis
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had cooperated in any other investigation with the Commonwealth "because
that might have some bearing on whether or not he gets revoked again ." He
also stated that before the revocation motion could be heard, the
Commonwealth moved to have it held in abeyance, presumably to see how
Davis performed in the cases in which he was to be a witness . He stated that
the motion was still pending and that he would represent Davis in the future if
the motion was pursued, at which time he would address any cooperation
between Davis and the Commonwealth "because that has some bearing on this
court's decision ."
Pfeil admitted he had also questioned Appellant in the course of
representing Ron Damron in another criminal case . Pfiel had obtained a recess
during Damron's trial to talk to Appellant at the local jail about Damron's case
(specifically about his relationship with Damron and the victim in Damron's
case) . Pfeil stated that Appellant told him he knew nothing about the other
case.
Thus, Pfeil effectively admitted Appellant's factual claims about his
representation of Davis and Damron, but he went even further in noting that
the matter against Davis was still pending and that Davis's performance could
affect the outcome of this matter. Nevertheless, Pfeil indicated that he saw no
conflict and stated, "I defend everyone that I am appointed to represent
equally."
The judge stated that a conflict would arise as to Davis only if Pfeil had
learned anything during that representation that might be beneficial to
Appellant's case that he then did. not disclose . Pfeil stated that he had not
learned any such information .
After hearing this discussion, the trial court denied Appellant's motion,
noting on the docket sheet that the "Court finds no evidence to support
Defendant]'s claim of conflict of interest ."
Appellant's defense at trial consisted of an attack on Davis's credibility
and the police's compliance with the rules concerning use of informants . His
attorney specifically asked Davis why he had not told the police he was on
probation, to which Davis responded that he did not know he was on
probation . He also asked Davis about the probation violation, to which Davis
replied that he did not report because he had not known he was on probation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding that
Appellant failed to show prejudice because his attorney actually represented
him vigorously. The court noted, "Indeed, Beard failed to show in any way how
the performance of his counsel was adversely affected by counsel's prior
representation of the Commonwealth's chief witness or that his defense was
otherwise prejudiced ." In reaching its decision, the court cited Kirkland v.
Commonwealth, 53 S .W.3d 71 (Ky. 2001), which it read as requiring a showing
of prejudice for a claim of conflict of interests to succeed.
This Court granted discretionary review to address the proper standard
to apply to claims of a conflict of interests between a criminal defendant and
defense counsel .
II. Analysis
The basic question in determining the proper standard to apply to
Appellant's case is whether he was required to demonstrate prejudice . The
Court of Appeals in this case relied on a single line from Kirkland stating that
"a defendant must show an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the
performance of his lawyer." Id. at 75 . The Court of Appeals thus read Kirkland
as requiring that a defendant make a specific showing of prejudice when
claiming a conflict of interests, and then concluded that Appellant had failed to
do so. Kirkland, however, is inapplicable to this case .
In Kirkland, this Court held that the harmless error rule applied to a trial
court's failure to notify a defendant of a potential conflict as required by RCr
8 .30(1) where his attorney worked in the same DPA office as the attorney for
his codefendant. Admittedly, this amounted to a holding that a showing of
prejudice was necessary in that case, which led the Court to require an actual
conflict that adversely affected defense counsel's performance .
But the Court's ruling in that case turned on the determination that "the
record supports the clear conclusion that no claim of conflict of interest arose
at trial and none is identified on appeal because no such conflict of interest
ever actually existed ." Id. The facts in Kirkland were substantially different
than in this case because in Kirkland no claim of a conflict was ever raised or
shown at trial . In fact, as the Court noted, "The narrow issue before this Court
is whether there is a presumption of a conflict of interest when an RCr 8.30
waiver is not executed and each defendant has his or her attorney, but those
two attorneys work for the same legal aid or public defender's office ." Id. at 74.
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One of the cases that Kirkland primarily relies on, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S . 335 (1980), was an attempt to address the issue of conflicts of interests
that are not raised at trial . Cuyler noted in language later employed in
Kirkland that "a defendant ,who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance ."
Id. a t 348. Cuyler, however, did not create a broadly applicable rule as it
answered only the question that had been left open in Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U .S . 475 (1978), in which the conflict issue had been raised at trial .
Holloway provides the analytical framework for a claimed conflict of
interests that is actually raised at trial. In that case, the Court held that the
harmless error rule (i .e ., a showing of prejudice) was inapplicable where a
conflict of interests is shown and raised at trial, noting that "a rule requiring a
defendant to show that a conflict of interests-which he and his counsel tried
to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation-prejudiced him in
some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded
application." Id. at 490. The Court went so far as to state that "whenever a
trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection
reversal is automatic." Id. at 489 (emphasis added) . This is because such a
conflict of interests has the effect of denying the defendant the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because the attorney has an incentive not to act
in one of the defendants' best interest. Id. a t 489-90 ("Joint representation of
conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney
from doing. . . .The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the
Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have
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effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters . . . . [1]n a case of joint
representation of conflicting interests the evil--it bears repeating--is in what
the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but
also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process .") ;
see also Glasser v. United States, .315 U .S . 60, 70 (1942), superseded. in part on
other grounds by Rule, Fed. R . Evid . 104(a) ("[T)he `Assistance of Counsel'
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be
untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall
simultaneously represent conflicting interests . If the right to the assistance of
counsel means less than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is
substantially impaired .") .
Though Holloway specifically addressed joint representation of
codefendants in the same trial, ultimately, a conflict is a conflict . Thus, the
Holloway rule is equally applicable where an attorney represents defendants
with conflicting interests in separate matters, at least where those conflicting
interests converge at the trial of one of the defendants, as was the case here .
Because Appellant raised the conflict issue at trial, Holloway provides the
controlling standard, not Cuyler or Kirkland. The rule in Cuyler and Kirkland
is only for when the alleged conflict was not raised at trial (usually because the
alleged conflict was not disclosed to the defendant), whereupon it becomes an
issue akin to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel .
Because Appellant raised the issue at trial, the proper inquiry then is
whether Appellant raised an actual conflict at trial, not whether he was
prejudiced by Pfeil's representation of other defendants. This is a more difficult
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question, at least in part because the trial judge addressed it and concluded
there was no evidence of a conflict .
The problem with the way the trial court looked at the alleged conflict is
that she confused prejudice resulting. from the conflict with the conflict itself.
The Commonwealth has continued to address the existence of a conflict in this
manner, arguing essentially that because Appellant has not shown prejudice,
he suffered only a potential conflict, and that a "real" conflict did not exist.
A conflict arises from competing duties or interests that create the
potential for prejudice . The conflict does not come into being only when the
potential turns into actual prejudice; it exists from the instant that
inconsistent duties or interests arise. Thus, a conflict of interests is generally
thought of as both "[a] real or seeming incompatibility between the interests of
two of a lawyer's clients . . . ." Blacks Law Dictionary 318 (8th ed. 2004)
(emphasis added) . Actual prejudice is not necessary for the conflict to exist.
This is in fact why Holloway discusses the impossibility of evaluating a
conflict that is raised at or before trial-i .e ., before the competing interests are
played out-for harmless error. The prejudice is merely a potential at that
point in that it would result only if counsel refrained from doing something in
his client's interest, when, in fact, counsel may not actually refrain from doing
anything and may instead zealously represent the client.
With this view of conflicts in mind, this Court concludes that Appellant's
trial counsel had multiple conflicts of interests from his representation of
Appellant, Davis, and Damron.
The obvious conflict stems from the duty of zealous representation,
which Pfeil owed to both Appellant and Davis . As Pfeil himself noted, Davis's
performance as a confidential informant would be a factor in the subsequent
probation revocation hearing at which Pfeil would represent Davis . Thus, this
case is different from one in which defense counsel has only previously
represented the adverse witness . - Going forward, Pfeil had two clear options:
he could either pursue Davis vigorously on cross-examination and seek to
impeach him, which would require possibly asking incriminating questions
(e.g., by inferring that Davis knowingly violated his probation), or he could go
easy on Davis in the hopes of maximizing his chances at the probation
revocation hearing. Either option would require that Pfeil help one client at the
expense of the other, and thus neither would be permissible .
Nor could Pfeil attempt to balance the interests of his clients by, for
example, semi-vigorously cross-examining Davis in the hopes of assisting
Appellant but pulling the punch sufficiently to avoid harming Davis's chances
at the probation revocation hearing. This would be a worse alternative, as it
would require doing only half the job for both clients. Such a course of action,
rather than harming one client, would harm both by denying them full
representation .
It may be that Pfeil chose to actively pursue and confront Davis,
sacrificing his interests in favor of Appellant (in which case, only Davis could
complain) . The Court of Appeals disposed of the case in this way, finding that
Pfeil had vigorously defended Appellant . But as noted in Holloway, making
such a determination is effectively impossible, because any rule requiring
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Appellant to show specific prejudice "would not be susceptible of intelligent,
evenhanded application ." 435 U .S at 490 . And while we know what Pfeil did do
at trial, we cannot know what he may have refrained from doing because of his
concurrent representation of Davis. Such a conflict when raised (and not
remedied) at trial requires automatic reversal because it results in a structural
error. Thus, regardless of how Pfeil actually chose to run the gauntlet between
Davis and Appellant, the conflict existed, was raised at trial, and requires
reversal .
The subtler but no less real conflict stemmed from Pfeil's directly
competing duties of confidentiality and disclosure of information to his clients .
Pfeil had a duty of confidentiality that required him not to disclose information
learned from Davis in the course of representing him in the revocation process .
But Pfeil also had a duty to disclose to Appellant any information that might
have been helpful to his defense, including what he learned from Davis. These
duties are in direct conflict with each other and cannot be reconciled . Under
Holloway, such a conflict violates the Sixth Amendment and requires reversal.
In the end, Pfeil represented a client (Davis) who was to testify against
another client (Appellant) in a proceeding that, depending on the client's
performance, would likely have some effect on another proceeding involving the
client (Davis) at which Pfeil would represent him . Though the proceedings
against Davis and Appellant were not directly related, they became inextricably
intertwined because Davis was to be the prosecution's main witness against
Appellant and his performance in that capacity directly affected his own
proceeding. In fact, Appellant and Davis essentially pointed the finger at each
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other in the course of the trial, with Davis testifying that he bought drugs from
Appellant and Appellant claiming that Davis violated his probation (and
thereby at least implying that he was lying) . Despite the efforts of both Pfeil
and the judge to treat the proceedings as unrelated, the simple fact of the
matter is that Pfeil represented both a criminal defendant and a witness
against that defendant who had an interest in the defendant being convicted.
Davis was the nexus connecting the two cases . As some might say, Davis had
a dog in both fights . Indeed, this Court agrees with Appellant, who when asked
how a conflict could exist, stated, "How could it not be a conflict of interest?"
III. Conclusion
Because Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by
the existence of a conflict of interests, and such an error cannot be harmless
error, the conviction cannot stand . The Court of Appeals is therefore reversed .
The judgment of the Crittenden Circuit Court is also reversed and this matter
is remanded to that court for further proceedings as may be necessary .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Joseph Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Joshua D . Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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