ROBERT M. BLANKENSHIP, M.D. V. HORACE COLLIER
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2007-SC-000916-DG
AND
2007-SC-000921-DG
ROBERT M. BLANKENSHIP, M.D.
AND
CARITAS HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., D/B/A CARITAS MEDICAL
CENTER
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2006-CA-001612-MR
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CI-001583
HORACE COLLIER
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON
REVERSING
The central question in this medical malpractice case is whether and
when a trial court may grant summary judgment against a plaintiff who has
failed to identify any expert witnesses . Pursuant to Kentucky law, in most
medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff is required to put forth expert medical
testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, any breach that
occurred and any resulting injury to the plaintiff . This case being a typical
medical malpractice case, Horace Collier, the plaintiff, never disputed that an
expert was necessary to prove that Dr. Robert Blankenship and Caritas Health
Services were negligent in the diagnosis and treatment of his appendicitis .
Despite his repeated representations to the trial court that he would be using
expert testimony and his request for an extension for more time to locale and
identify an expert, Collier still had failed to provide the names of any expert
witnesses more than one year following the filing of the complaint . Because
under Kentucky substantive law Collier would be unable to sustain his burden
of proof without expert testimony, the trial court granted Dr. Blankenship's
and Caritas's motions for summary judgment . After the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, this Court granted
discretionary review .
According to CR 56.02, a defendant "may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor . - - ."
Although a defendant is permitted to move for a summary judgment at any
time, this Court has cautioned trial courts not to take up these motions
prematurely and to consider summary judgment motions "only after the
opposing party has been given ample opportunity to complete discovery ."
Pendleton Bros . Vending, Inc . v. Commonwealth Finance and Admin. Cabinet,
758 S .W .2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988) . Thus, even though an appellate court always
reviews the substance of a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo, i.e.,
to determine whether the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact, a
reviewing court must also consider whether the trial court gave the party
opposing the motion an ample opportunity to respond and complete discovery
before the court entered its ruling. In a medical malpractice action, where a
sufficient amount of time has expired and the plaintiff has still "failed to
introduce evidence sufficient to establish the respective applicable standard of
care,,". then the defendants -are entitled to summary-judgment as a matter of. -,
law. Green v. Owensboro Medical Health System, Inc. , 231 S .W.3d 781, 784
(Ky . App. 2007) ; See also Neal v . Welker , 426 S .W.2d 476, 479-480 (Ky . 1968) .
The trial court's determination that a sufficient amount of time has passed and
that it can properly take up the summary judgment motion for a ruling is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion .
In this case, the issue before this Court is not simply whether Collier had
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact at the time Dr. Blankenship
and Caritas filed their summary judgment motions-without a doubt, there is
no genuine issue of material fact in the record because Collier has no expert to
support his claim of medical negligence. Rather, the more specific issue is
whether the trial court was correct to take up the defendants' summary
judgment motions and enter a ruling when it did and, secondarily, whether the
court was required first either to enter a separate order requiring Collier to
obtain expert testimony or to enter an order sanctioning Collier for failing to
meet the court's expert disclosure deadline.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the defendants'
summary judgment motions were properly before the trial court and it did not
abuse its discretion in taking them up and deciding to rule on the motions
approximately four months after they were filed and seventeen months after
the lawsuit was initiated. Collier had completely failed to identify any expert
witnesses and could not sustain his burden of proof without expert testimony
and, thus, no material issue of fact existed in the record and the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Bei ause Collier never.
disputed that a medical expert was necessary to prove his claim of medical
negligence and continually represented to the trial court that he would obtain
an expert witness, no separate ruling stating the obvious -- the need for an
expert witness -- was required before the court ruled on the defendants'
summary judgment motions. Further, because CR 56 operates independently
of the discovery rules (and specifically CR 37 .02), the trial court was not
required to enter a sanctions order prior to granting the defendants' summary
judgment motions . Thus, the Court of Appeals opinion is reversed, and the
Jefferson Circuit Court's summary judgments granted to Dr. Blankenship and
Caritas are reinstated .
RELEVANT FACTS
On February 17, 2004, Collier was admitted to Caritas Medical Center in
Louisville, Kentucky, after suffering from abdominal pain . The following day,
after undergoing tests and being diagnosed by Dr. Blankenship as having
appendicitis, Collier had an appendectomy. Subsequently, on February 23,
2004, Collier was released from Caritas and returned home. Approximately
one year later, on February 17, 2005, Collier filed suit against Dr. Blankenship
and Caritas in Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging that both parties were negligent
in their failure to re-evaluate and treat Collier in a timely manner . Specifically,
Collier contended that he had been ignored for several hours while awaiting
treatment, during which he suffered from severe abdominal pain, and further
that the x-ray of his abdomen had not been stored properly, contributing to the
-delay in his diagnosis and treatment . In his complaint, Collier alleged that as a=_result of Dr . Blankenship's and Caritas's medical negligence, he sustained
permanent physical and mental injuries, prolonged pain and mental anguish,
impairment of his power to labor and earn money and significant medical
expenses .
After Dr. Blankenship and Caritas filed their answers denying Collier's
allegations, the parties began pre-trial discovery. More than nine months after
Collier filed his complaint, on November 30, 2005, the trial court entered a
Civil Jury Trial Order, which required Collier to disclose his expert witnesses
by January 30, 2006, and scheduled the case for jury trial on October 10,
2006 . On February 2, 2006, two days after the expert disclosure deadline,
Collier filed a motion with the court requesting a thirty-day extension . In his
motion, Collier stated that he was moving "the Court for an extension of time to
identify and disclose the expert witnesses) who will offer expert opinion(s) at
the trial of this matter." Without an objection from the defendants, the trial
court granted Collier's request and extended the plaintiff's expert disclosure
deadline to February 28, 2006 .
On March 14, 2006, after Collier had still failed to disclose any experts,
Dr. Blankenship and Caritas filed motions for summary judgment, each
arguing that there could be no issue of material fact in this medical
malpractice case without expert testimony. In his response to the defendants'
motions, Collier contended that summary judgment was inappropriate in this
instance because it was only being used as a sanctioning tool to punish him for
failing W timely disclose his- experIs and becauseAhere was a ~`Serious-,-question"
as to whether Collier would even. need experts to prove his medical malpractice
case . On July 7, 2006, nearly four months after the defendants moved for
summary judgment, the trial court entered its order granting the defendants'
motions . Although the trial court recognized that an expert was not required in
all medical malpractice cases, it stated that "[i]n this case, however, a
layperson would not be able to discern (without specialized knowledge that an
expert in that field possessed) whether Dr. Blankenship's delay in treatment, if
any, caused Plaintiff permanent physical and mental injuries ." Concluding
that without any expert witnesses, Collier would be unable to prove causation
in his medical malpractice case, the trial court held that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Collier appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals . Relying primarily on Baptist Healthcare Systems,
Inc . v. Miller, 177 S .W.3d 676 (Ky. 2005), the Court of Appeals reversed. The
Court of Appeals explained that Baptist Healthcare outlines a procedure to be
used when trial courts are deciding summary judgment motions in medical
malpractice cases and that the trial court did not follow that procedure in this
case . Applying Baptist Healthcare, supra, the Court of Appeals held that
before granting summary judgment in a medical malpractice case based on a
plaintiff's failure to identify an expert, a trial court should first make a separate
ruling determining whether an expert is actually needed in the case . If the
court decides that an expert is needed, the court should then give the plaintiff
a reasonable amount of time to identify-und disclose an expert-witness .
Concluding that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper in
this case, the Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded the case to
Jefferson Circuit Court . As noted, this Court then granted discretionary review
to consider when it is appropriate for trial courts to grant summary judgment
in medical malpractice cases based on a plaintiff's failure to disclose expert
witnesses.
ANALYSIS
Dr. Blankenship and Caritas contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying cases that involved a legitimate dispute about the need for expert
witnesses because, in this case, Collier never disputed that expert medical
testimony was required. In response, Collier contends that Baptist Healthcare ,
su ra, Ward v . Housman , 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App . 1991), and Poe v. Rice,
706 S .W.2d 5 (Ky. App . 1986), are on-point with the facts of this case and
mandate a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment . However,
each of these cases cited by Collier differs from the facts of this case and none
addresses the common scenario presented here.
1. The Procedure Outlined in Baptist Healthcare Does Not Apply Because
Collier Never Legitimately Disputed the Need for a Medical Expert and
Because Collier's Claim Could Not Be Presented Without An Expert.
Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice is generally
required :;to put forth expert testimony to show that the defendant medical
provider failed to conform to the standard of care . Perkins v . Hausladen, 828
S .W .2d 652, 655-56 (Ky. 1992) . Expert testimony is not required, however, in
res ipsa loquitur cases, where "the jury may reasonably infer both negligence
and causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the defendant's
relation to it", and in cases where the defendant physician makes certain
admissions that make his negligence apparent . Id (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Comment b, p . 157) . Medical malpractice cases can
therefore be divided into two categories : cases where the parties do not dispute
the need for expert testimony, which encompass the vast majority of medical
malpractice claims, and cases where the plaintiff disputes the need for expert
testimony because he contends one of the narrow exceptions applies. Baptist
Healthcare Systems, Inc. v . Miller, supra, falls into the latter, somewhat rare,
category while Collier's case fits into the former, much more common, category
wherein expert testimony is essential .
In Baptist Healthcare , 177 S.W.3d at 678, the plaintiff, Ms. Miller,
experienced nerve damage after the hospital's phlebotomist' left a tourniquet
on her arm for over ten minutes while she was having blood drawn at Central
A phlebotomist is a person who is trained in withdrawing blood from a person's vein
through an incision or a needle puncture . Stedman's Medical Dictionary (27th ed.
2000) .
Baptist Hospital. Ms. Miller subsequently brought an ordinary negligence
claim against the hospital. Prior to trial, Baptist Healthcare moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Miller's case was actually a medical
malpractice claim and not amordinary negligence-claim, and -that~~her lack of
expert testimony meant that Ms . Miller could not prove either the applicable
medical standard of care or a breach of that standard. Although Ms. Miller
responded that the hospital's phlebotomist breached his own employer's
standard of care as set forth in a training manual and that a. medical expert
was not needed, the trial court disagreed . The court held that medical
standard of care testimony was necessary, denied the hospital's summary
judgment motion, and gave Ms. Miller a thirty-day continuance to identify an
expert . Id. Ms . Miller secured an expert and the case was tried, resulting in a
verdict for the plaintiff.
On the hospital's appeal, the Court of Appeals and ultimately this Court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. This Court first held
that because the standard of care in drawing blood "is not within the scope of
common experience of jurors, requiring expert testimony as to the standard of
care of a phlebotomist was a proper exercise of trial court discretion ." Id . at
680-681 . Second, this Court concluded that the trial court did not err in
denying Baptist Healthcare's motion for summary judgment even though at the
time the motion was made, the record reflected that Ms. Miller had no expert
witness to establish the medical standard of care . Id . at 681-682 .
This Court based its ruling on the fact that up until the trial court
required her to do otherwise, Ms . Miller had planned on proceeding to trial
without expert testimony. Id. In other words, Ms . Miller had from the outset of
.her case legitimately--;disputed the need for expert testimony. Commenting on
,
this strategy, this Court stated that because phlebotomy is an "unlicensed"
field of practice in Kentucky it "was not unreasonable for Ms. Miller to contend
that no expert witness was necessary to determine that her injuries were
caused by leaving the tourniquet [on] her . . . arm too long or that the principle
of res ipsa loquitur applied to the case ." Id . at 681 . Because Ms . Miller had
disputed the need for expert testimony in her case and had a reasonable basis
to do so, this Court held that the trial court proceeded correctly by first making
a separate ruling on the necessity of an expert witness and then giving Ms .
Miller a reasonable amount of time to identify an expert before ruling on
Baptist Healthcare's summary judgment motion . Id .
The Baptist Healthcare Court reiterated it would have been clearly
inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment because at the
time the defendant filed its motion, the trial court had not even resolved the
"dispute as to the need for an expert ." Id. In cases where there is a real
dispute regarding the need for expert testimony, imposing sanctions on the
plaintiff for failing to comply with a scheduling order requiring disclosure of the
expert's name and testimony is a more appropriate remedy than a summary
judgment . Id . at 681-682. We have recited this Court's analysis in Baptist
Healthcare , supra, to emphasize the essential fact on which its holding was
10
based-a reasonable, legitimate dispute about the necessity for expert
testimony given the facts of that case . Because there was no such dispute in
Collier's case, the procedure followed in Baptist Healthcare , supra, is simply
not applicable .
,. . . .
.,.^,.
..
..
Collier, unlike the plaintiff in Baptist Healthcare , never created a
legitimate dispute about the need for expert testimony . On the contrary, he
made affirmative representations to the trial court that he would be using
expert witnesses, but that those witnesses had not yet been secured . For
example, in his response to Dr . Blankenship's requests for admissions, Collier
stated that the "expert witnesses) who will testify has/have not been
determined ." In addition, Collier filed the aforementioned written motion with
the trial court requesting "an extension of time to identify and disclose the
expert witnesses) who will offer expert opinion(s) at the trial of this matter ."
Only when Collier was facing a summary judgment motion for not identifying
any experts did he argue for the first time that he could meet his burden of
proof without expert testimony. Collier's belated response, when considered in
the context of the medical malpractice claims he stated in his complaint,
simply did not create a legitimate dispute about the need for expert testimony.
In addition, unlike- the plaintiff in Baptist Healthcare , supra, Collier did
not have a reasonable basis on which to dispute the need for medical experts in
his case . Having reviewed the negligence allegations, the trial court found that
Collier could not succeed on his medical malpractice claim without expert
testimony. The record supports this conclusion. In his complaint, Collier
alleged that Dr . Blankenship and Caritas were negligent in their failure to reevaluate and treat him in a timely manner. As to each defendant, Collier
specifically stated that the defendant deviated "from acceptable standards of
medical care and ,.said deviations, constitute medical negligence ." Complaint
9, 11 . (emphasis supplied) . Before this Court, Collier claimed that "it does not
take an expert to offer an opinion that as a medical doctor AppellantBlankenship had deviated from the standard of care for being a (sic) lazy and
angry because he did not want to be on call" and treat patients. Assuming
Collier could have offered evidence that Dr. Blankenship was lazy and angry,
such lay testimony would in no way establish the medical standard of care as
to a patient presenting with symptoms of appendicitis and whether Dr.
Blankenship breached it In the trial court, in his response to the defendants'
summary judgment motions, Collier also argued that an expert was not needed
in this case because a breach of the medical standard of care occurred when
his abdominal x-ray was left unattended instead of being scanned promptly
into a computer database . However, even this allegation of negligence would
have required a medical expert to testify regarding the standard of care for
handling, storing, and reading x-rays ; any breach that may have occurred here ;
and how such breach caused injury to Collier. Simply put, Collier failed to
timely dispute the need for expert testimony and because Collier did not have a
reasonable basis to do so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to rule on the summary judgment motion without first entering an
order declaring that experts were necessary.
12
In order to give guidance to the bench and bar regarding this recurring
issue, we reiterate that where a plaintiff does create a legitimate dispute about
the need for an expert witness prior to the expiration of the court's expert
disclosure deadline, the trial court -st-iould first make - a separate ruling on."t, hat
issue, i .e ., the need, or lack of need, for expert testimony in the case . If the
court determines within its discretion that an expert is needed, it should give
the plaintiff a reasonable amount of time to identify an expert as outlined by
this Court in Baptist Healthcare, supra . However, if the need for an expert is
never disputed and if it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to argue that an
expert is not needed, (and most particularly if the plaintiff requests an
extension for the express purpose of securing more time to identify his experts),
there is no reason for a trial court first to enter a separate ruling informing the
his
plaintiff that
case requires expert testimony before considering a
defendant's summary judgment motion based on the plaintiff's failure of proof.
Here, Collier never suggested to the trial court that he could prove medical
negligence without expert witnesses until he responded to the defendant's
motions for summary judgment filed some thirteen months following the filing
of the complaint . Because Collier failed to identify any expert witnesses, never
seriously disputed that an expert would be needed and had asserted medical
malpractice claims which clearly required expert testimony, the summary
judgment motions were properly before the trial court for ruling and the trial
court correctly found there was no genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment.
13
II. Ward v. Housman and Poe v. Rice Are Factually Distinguishable From
Collier's Case and the Trial Court Was Not Required First to Enter a
Sanctions Order Pursuant to CR 37.02 .
Collier argues that the cases of Ward v. Housman , supra, Poe v. Rice,
supra,,:both of-which involve the Kentucky b.Court of Appeals reversing a trial
court's grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, also
mandate a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case.
Although those cases are not binding on this Court, each is distinguishable
from the present case and neither is inconsistent with the procedure we have
outlined .
Ward v . Housman, supra, involved a plaintiff who did not disclose an
expert-until nine months after the deadline in the trial court's scheduling order
had passed . After Kelly Ward and her husband brought a typical medical
malpractice action against her doctor, the trial court entered a scheduling
order, setting the trial date for September 5, 1989, and requiring the Wards to
disclose expert witnesses by October 31, 1988. 809 S.W.2d at 718 . Nine
months passed after the disclosure deadline without any pertinent motions
filed by the plaintiffs or defendant and then on July 24, 1989, the Wards filed
supplemental answers to the defendant's interrogatories, finally naming an
expert witness . Id. In response, the defendant filed a motion to exclude the
Wards' expert witness because the disclosure had occurred well-after the
deadline, and, in the alternative, he asked for a continuance because the
witness was "a surprise" expert . The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to exclude the Wards' expert, ruling that the plaintiffs were not allowed to have
14
any witnesses at trial who were not known to the defendant by the October 31,
1988 disclosure deadline. A Although the Wards argued in a motion for
reconsideration that they would not be able to sustain their burden at trial
without the expert .; the 1riat court denied reconsideration and, subsequently, on
September 6, 1989, entered summary judgment against the Wards .
Significantly, the defendant had
never
moved for summary judgment thus
presenting for consideration the Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 issues
of absence of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. As
the Court of Appeals bluntly put it "[t]he result [the defendant] got was more
than what he asked for." 1 A . at 719 .
In concluding that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment,
the Ward Court held that the trial court did not dismiss the case because it
lacked a genuine issue of material fact, but rather, because the Wards had not
complied with a scheduling order. The Court of Appeals distinguished the
Wards' case from one in which the plaintiff never discloses an expert, noting
that "the case at hand was not one where the dismissed party had no expert
but [instead] was [one where the dismissed party was] prevented from using
the expert's testimony as a sanctioning technique for the dilatory conduct of
the Wards' counsel." Id . To reiterate, Ward, su-pra, held that summary
judgment is not appropriate when entered sua
sponte
as a sanction because
expert witnesses have been identified in an untimely manner . Id. Notably,
even though the disclosure deadline had long since expired, the Wards actually
identified an expert witness before the defendant raised the absence of proof
issue via a summary judgment motion .
Here, Collier never attempted to identify or disclose any expert witnesses.
When, the trial court granted summary judgment- agai~rr&t Collier on July 7,
- .,
2006, seventeen months had passed since Collier had filed his complaint, more
than four months had passed since the extended disclosure deadline, and
approximately four months had passed since the filing of the defendants'
summary judgment motions. 2 During all this time, Collier never created a
genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr . Blankenship's negligence by
identifying a medical expert who could testify about a breach of the standard of
care. Thus, when the trial court granted summary judgment against Collier, it
was not simply sanctioning Collier for failing to meet a deadline, but rather
correctly applying the legal standard in medical malpractice cases regarding
the expert testimony necessary to meet Collier's ,burden of proof. When it is
evident that the plaintiff has not secured a single expert witness and has failed
to make any expert disclosures after a reasonable period of time, there truly is
a failure of proof and a summary judgment motion is appropriate .
Poe v. Rice is also distinguishable from the case at hand . After Ms . Poe
initiated a medical malpractice action against Dr. Rice, he requested through
interrogatories that Poe disclose her expert witnesses. 706 S .W.2d at 6. In her
replies, Poe repeatedly objected to "producing" her expert witnesses at that time
2 We deliberately refrain from setting any time lines for identification of expert
witnesses because each case must be considered by the trial court on a case-bycase basis. In this case, Collier was given adequate time .
16
(for reasons not explained in the opinion), but continued to maintain their
existence. Id . Nonetheless, because Poe did not disclose her experts as
requested by the defendants, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment . The-,Court- of Appeals reversed and rerngnded.
w
Poe is a very cursory opinion in which the Court of Appeals did not
include any facts regarding when Poe filed her complaint, when or if the court
had set a trial date, or when or if Poe was required by the court to disclose her
experts although it appears that, at the time the trial court granted summary
judgment, the parties were still engaging in early discovery. Regardless, Poe,
supra , was certainly not a case where the plaintiff had acknowledged the
requirement that she disclose her experts and then, after the first and second
expert disclosure deadlines expired, still had failed to identify any experts .
Rather, Poe repeatedly had objected to Dr. Rice's early requests to disclose her
experts (again for reasons unexplained) and yet the trial court apparently never
imposed a deadline or ordered Poe to respond to the defendant's
interrogatories . Id.
In this case, Collier was on notice of the importance of the expert
disclosure deadline from the time the court entered its November 30, 20-05 Civil
Jury Trial Order, and he specifically requested an extension of that deadline to
locate a potential expert. Unlike Poe's objections to Dr. Rice's requests, Collier
never objected to the court-ordered expert disclosure deadline and never
suggested, until his response to the motion for summary judgment, that his
was the type of medical malpractice case that did not require expert testimony .
17
Finally, while CR 37.02 allows a trial court to enter an order sanctioning
a party for failing for failing to provide or permit. discovery, there is no
requirement that a party first be sanctioned under CR 37.02 before the trial
court grants a properly supported and timely, filed summary judgment motion .
CR 56 stands independently of the discovery sanction rules and, provided the
non-moving party has been given sufficient time to respond, the trial court may
grant the summary judgment motion without preliminarily sanctioning the
plaintiff for failing to identify and to produce an expert witness.
III. Plaintiffs In Typical Medical Malpractice Cases Cannot Proceed to
Trial Without Disclosing Medical Experts.
Finally, Collier contends that plaintiffs are entitled to proceed to trial,
and simply reserve the right not to call an expert witness . Collier admits that
this course of action may have resulted in a directed verdict against him, but
insists that such trial strategy is within a plaintiff's right. Although this trial
strategy may be appropriate for a plaintiff alleging an ordinary negligence
claim, that is simply not the case with medical negligence cases in Kentucky .
As explained previously, a plaintiff bringing a typical medical malpractice case
is required by law to put forth expert testimony to inform the jury of the
applicable medical standard of care, any breach of that standard and the
resulting injury. Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S .W .2d at 655. A jury trial
without the requisite proof is a futile exercise, wasteful of judicial time, jurors'
time and the litigants' time and resources. CR 56 is intended to avoid such
unnecessary proceedings . Neal v. Welker, 426 S.W.2d at 479-480 "the curtain
must fall at some time upon the right of a litigant" to put forth the most basic
18
level of proof and the plaintiff's bare assertion "that something will `turn up'
cannot be made basis for showing that a genuine issue as to a material fact
exists") ; Green v. Owensboro Medical Health System, Inc. , 231 S .W .3d at 784
.(the trial .court properly granted su-Ma -mart' judgment for the defendant- doctor
because the plaintiff, by not identifying any expert witnesses, "failed to
introduce evidence sufficient to establish the respective applicable standard of
care") .
CONCLUSION
Despite Collier's argument that the summary judgments were actually a
sanction for his failure to meet an expert disclosure deadline, the trial court
based its grant of summary judgment on Collier's failure of proof. The trial
court properly held, pursuant to CR 56 .03, that without expert testimony there
was no issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, Collier could not sustain
his burden of proof. Although Collier asserts that the trial court should have
followed the procedure in Baptist Healthcare , supra, and first entered a
separate ruling regarding whether experts were needed before ruling on the
defendants' summary judgment motion, Collier's failure to create a reasonable,
legitimate dispute about the need for expert testimony rendered the procedure
in Baptist Healthcare , supra, inapplicable . Thus, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in deciding to take up and rule on the summary judgment motion
at a point when it had not entered CR 37 .02 sanctions against Collier or an
order requiring him to obtain experts. Because the trial court correctly found
that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
19
defendants were entitled to a judgment. as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals
Opinion is reversed, and the Jefferson Circuit Court's summary judgments for
Dr. Blankenship and Caritas are reinstated .
; - Cunningham, Noble and Schroder, , -JJ ., concur . Minton, C.J ., dissent's
by separate opinion . Scott, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Venters,
J., joins . Venters, J ., dissents by separate opinion .
MINTON, CHIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING : I believe the majority's
approach to this recurring issue in medical malpractice cases is sound.
However, under the specific facts of this case, I agree with Justice Venters that
the trial court (and, by extension, this Court) impermissibly shifted the burden
on summary judgment from the movants, Caritas and Blankenship, to the
respondent, Collier. Had the movants presented an adequately particularized
and supported motion for summary judgment, I would join the majority
opinion . Because they did not do so, however, I respectfully dissent .
SCOTT, JUSTICE, DISSENTING OPINION : I share the majority's desire
to terminate doubtful malpractice claims as early as practical, but I must
dissent, since such a practice under CR 56 - similar to the federal practice is totally inconsistent with our summary judgment standard established under
Steelvest, Inc. v . Scansteel Service Center, Inc . , 807 S .W.2d 476, 483 (Ky.
1991) ("[I)t should only be used `to terminate litigation when, as a matter of
law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the
movant .') (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co . v . Rose, 683 S .W.2d 255, 256 (Ky.
20
1985)) . This is a standard that this Court has continued to follow for decades.
See Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc . v. Miller, 1.77 S .W .3d 676, 681 (Ky. 2005)
("It is inappropriate to use a CR 56 summary judgment to resolve what is
essentially -a- procedural dispute as to the need for an expert, the disclosure of
the expert's identity, and the substance of the testimony.") ; Ward v. Housman ,
809 S .W .2d 717, 719 (Ky. App. 1991) ("CR 56, Summary Judgments, is not to
be used as a sanctioning tool of the trial courts .") ; see also Poe v . Rice , 706
S . W.2d 5, 6 (Ky. App. 1986) ("In essence then, the court below has improperly
attempted to resolve an essentially procedural conflict arising from discovery
with a rule founded upon the resolution of legal issues arising upon
undisputed facts . This it cannot do .") .
Moreover, we have previously rejected adoption of the federal summary
judgment standards. "[W]e perceive no oppressive or unmanageable case
backlog or problems with unmeritorious or frivolous litigation in the state's
courts that would require us to adopt a new approach such as the new federal
standards ." Steelvest, 807 S .W.2d at 482-83 . We have done so in the belief
that, in such circumstance as here, a judicious application of CR 37 .02(2)(3) is
more appropriate .3
3 CR 37 .02 provides:
(1) Sanctions by court in judicial district where deposition
is taken.
If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after
being directed to do so by the court in the judicial district in
which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be
considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending.
21
CR 56 on the other hand, is predicated upon the trial court's finding that
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. ,
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30 .02(6) or
31 .01(2) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order
to provide or permit discovery, including an order made
under Rule 37.01 or Rule 35, the court in which the action
is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(a) An order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence ;
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party;
(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure
to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical
or mental examination;
(e) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under
Rule 35 .01 requiring him to produce another for
examination, such orders as are listed in subparagraphs
(a), (b) and (c) of this paragraph (2), unless the party failing
to comply shows that he is unable to produce such person
for examination .
(3) Expenses on failure to obey order .
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,
the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or
the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
22
177 S .W .3d at 681 . The distinction between the two rules - which we ignore
in this instance -- is that under one (CR 37 .02), a party has not disclosed his
proof as ordered, while, under the other (CR 56), the material fact is
undisputed and,thus- there can be no proof to the contrary:
Here, Appellants filed no motion for CR 37 sanctions upon the Appellee's
failure to provide his experts as previously ordered. To the contrary,
Appellant's first response was a motion for summary judgment, which was
ultimately granted . While such action may, in rare instances, be an
appropriate sanction for counsel, it is not necessarily so for one's client, who in
fact may have a meritorious claim. This effect on a party who asserts a wrong
subject to redress is why - for many years - we have maintained the
distinctions between CR 56 and CR 37 .02 and have refused to rush to the
federal standards for summary judgment . This is because CR 37.02 is better
situated to address the nature and extent of the conduct, rather than
assuming the non-existence of a material fact merely as punishment . Thus, as
the Court noted in Ward:
Considering whether a case should be dismissed for dilatory
conduct of counsel, it would be well for our trial courts to consider
. . . these relevant factors :
1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility ;
2) the history of dilatoriness ;
3) whether the attorney's conduct was willful and in bad
faith;
4) meritoriousness of the claim;
5) prejudice to the other party, and
23
6) alternative sanctions.
Ward, 809 S .W .2d at 71.9 .
If this Court perceives the need for a "heavier hand" toward dilatoriness,
it can be accomplished in precise and tailored steps under CR 37 .02, giving the
client a "shot across the bow" and thus a the chance to save a meritorious
claim . However, a "heavier hand" under CR 56 destroys the client's case with
the first blow. This seems to me to unnecessarily take away what our
forefathers so wisely granted, to wit: "every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay . KY Const ยง
14 . Thus, I must respectfully dissent.
Venters, J., joins this dissent.
VENTERS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING : I join Justice Scott's dissenting
opinion and I write separately to emphasize my concern that both the trial
court and the majority decision in this court have, for medical malpractice
cases, created a rule that shifts the burden on summary judgment away from
the movant, to the respondent.
Caritas and Blankenship moved for summary judgment, each stating
simply that Collier's failure to disclose an expert medical witness entitled them
to summary judgment . Neither Caritas nor Blankenship presented with its
motion any facts or evidence in the record to show that Collier could not
succeed without expert testimony. Collier responded accurately citing Baptist
Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S .W .3d 676 (Ky. 2005), for the point that
24
an expert witness is not an essential element of a medical malpractice tort, and
accordingly the failure to disclose one in advance of trial does not, in and of
itself, justify dismissal of the claim by summary judgment . The trial judge
granted summary judgment, without reference to any specific facts of-record
that would negate the ability of Collier to prevail at trial other than his failure
to have an expert, and further stated, "The Plaintiff has been instructed by the
Court to demonstrate such expert testimony is available . . . . Since the
Plaintiff has failed to identify and disclose any expert witness, summary
judgment, as a matter of law is appropriate . . . ." By not requiring the
movants to particularize their claim with facts to show why Collier could not
prevail, the trial court shifted the burden on the summary judgment motion to
Collier .
The trial judge may have been aware of specific undisputed facts in the
record to support her conclusion that Collier could not prevail without expert
testimony. But, where the only specific fact upon which the summary
judgment is grounded is Collier's violation of the order to disclose his expert,
the obvious conclusion is the one reached by Justice Scott, that Rule 56 is
being misused to discipline a Rule 37 .02 violation.
It is the party moving for summary judgment that bears the burden to
establish that the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Only after that
burden has been met does the opposing party have any need to show that
evidence is available justifying a trial . Continental Casualty Company, Inc. v.
Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S .W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. 1955) . The Majority
25
opinion holds that since Collier did not dispute the need for an expert, he failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact at the time Dr. Blankenship and
Caritas filed their summary judgment motions . Thus, the Majority opinion
creates a presumption for medical malpractice cases that a plaintiff must -- employ expert witnesses . It thereby relieves the defendants from the need to
support a summary judgment motion with facts demonstrating the need for an
expert, and shifts the burden on summary judgment to the plaintiff to show
that no expert is needed, or that he will obtain the required expert testimony
from another source, such as the defendant's witnesses, the defendant's
admissions, or medical records. The summary judgments entered herein
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings which could include a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
ROBERT M. BLANKENSHIP, M.D . :
David Bryan Gazak
James Eric Smith
Darby &, Gazak, PSC
3220 Office Pointe Place
Suite 200
Louisville, KY 40220
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
CARITAS HEALTH SERVICES,
INC ., D/B/A CARITAS MEDICAL
CENTER:
David R. Monohan
Elizabeth U. Mendel
Rebecca Lynn Didat
Woodward, Hobson &, Fulton, LLP
2500 National City Tower
101 South Fifth Street
Louisville, KY 40202-3175
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Karl Price
Law Offices of Karl Price
Suite 1011, Kentucky Home Life Building
239 South Fifth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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