JUAN R. PELEGRIN-VIDAL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2007-SC-000848-MR
JUAN R. PELEGRIN-VIDAL
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
NO . 02-CR-002886
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
Appellant, Juan Pelegrin-Vidal, was found guilty by a Jefferson Circuit
Court jury of murder and burglary in the first degree. Appellant was later
sentenced to twenty years for his burglary conviction and life without parole for
the murder conviction, to be served concurrently . He now appeals his
convictions as a matter of right. Ky. Const. 110(2)(b) .
I . Back round
In 1995, Appellant moved to the United States from Cuba . He later
married Sonia Ramos in February of 1999. In July of 2002, however, Appellant
met the victim, Elaine Fonseca, herself a Cuban immigrant, and the two began
dating despite their twenty-year age difference . About a month later, Appellant
and Sonia separated. Neither Appellant nor Elaine informed her parents of
their relationship.
In December of 2002, Elaine became pregnant . She decided to terminate
the pregnancy and informed Appellant of her decision . Thereafter, Appellant
admitted their relationship to Elaine's mother, telling her that he was the
father of Elaine's child . Elaine's mother demanded that Appellant never return
to their house.
Subsequently, Elaine asked her friend, Zaurys Batista, to drive her to a
local abortion clinic. I Calling Appellant from the clinic, Elaine informed
Appellant that her mother was forcing her to have an abortion . Upset,
Appellant later entered the clinic and confronted Batista, telling her that Elaine
should not be getting an abortion. Appellant then attempted to enter several
examination rooms before clinic personnel arrived and asked him to leave the
premises.
Apparently trying to halt Elaine's abortion, Appellant then visited
Elaine's father at his workplace and expressed fear that she could be harmed
by the procedure. As he had done with Mrs. Fonseca, Appellant admitted their
relationship and told Mr. Fonseca that Elaine was having an abortion. Though
angry in hearing of her pregnancy, Mr. Fonseca replied that there was nothing
he could do and that Appellant had disrespected his family and home .
Elaine confided that she was ending her relationship with Appellant and had
refused to answer his phone calls.
After the abortion, Batista took Elaine back to her apartment, where
Elaine's mother picked her up and took her home.2 Appellant later called,
asking Mr. Fonseca whether his daughter had arrived home from the clinic .
Mr. Fonseca told Appellant that Elaine had not yet gotten home. The next
morning, December 12, Mr. Fonseca left for work at 6 :00 a.m., clocking in at
6 :17 a.m . Mrs. Fonseca left for work around 6 :20 a.m. According to Appellant,
Elaine called him at 6 :30 a. m. Aware that he had been at the clinic, Elaine told
Appellant that she did not want him to be upset, explaining that she had no
choice in the matter. She thanked him for coming to the clinic, told him to give
her some time, and reassured him that things would work out and her parents
would eventually understand .
At 6:39 a.m., 911 dispatch received a phone call from the Fonseca
residence from a Spanish-speaking woman, indicating that someone was
breaking into her house . Upon arrival, the police found a window pane broken
in the front door, blood spots on the front steps leading up to the house and on
the floor inside the door. Inside, they discovered Elaine on the living room
floor, lying in a pool of blood. She was transported to the hospital and
pronounced dead at 8:29 a.m. The cause of death was multiple blunt force
injuries to the head including two injuries from a weapon with a circular
surface .
2 Once there, Elaine began packing for a scheduled trip to Puerto Rico to visit family
and friends .
The police went to the Jefferson' County Board of Education, Appellant's
employer, and spoke with his supervisor . There, they learned Appellant's
address and that he drove a bus for the school system. They also learned that
Appellant ordinarily reported to work at 5 :45 a.m. and left to drive his route at
6 :00 a.m. That day, however, Appellant had not come to work. His supervisor
was concerned because it was unusual for Appellant to miss work, especially
since he did not call to report his absence. She called Appellant's house and
cell phone, leaving messages for him to return her calls . Leaving Appellant's
workplace, the police then went to his apartment. After obtaining a search
warrant, the police searched the apartment and found Appellant's passport,
birth certificate, cell phone, and a picture of Elaine with Spanish writing on the
back . The police contacted Appellant's friends and family, including Sonia
Ramos, to ascertain Appellant's whereabouts, with no success .
On December 14, Sonia Ramos received a phone call from Appellant.
She immediately asked whether he had any proof of his innocence, but
Appellant claimed to be unaware of Elaine's death or any related investigation .
Sonia proceeded to tell Appellant that the police were looking for him in
connection with Elaine's death . He quickly ended the call without revealing his
whereabouts.
At some point thereafter, Appellant fled to Texas, where he resided with
Sonia's son, Luis. He called Sonia many times and, in late February of 2003,
she called police to inform them of their conversations.3 Appellant eventually
left Luis' home and traveled to Florida so that he might stay with his former
brother-in-law, Angel Serrano-Garcia, and his family. Similar to his stay in
Texas, Appellant talked to Sonia almost every day by phone. In March of 2003,
Det. Virola, of the Louisville Metro Police Department, learned that Appellant
was possibly staying with relatives in Florida and contacted Lt. Rafael Garcia
with the City of Hialeah Police Department with information concerning
Appellant's possible location. That same morning, officers arrived at the
Serrano-Garcia residence where they arrested Appellant without incident.
After his arrest, Appellant told police that he knew he was wanted, but
denied killing Elaine . Appellant claimed that he had not turned himself in
because his truck had broken down and he did not have the money for its
repair. The police then interrogated Appellant and he agreed to give a taped
statement, in which he generally told police about how he and Elaine met and
how their relationship had developed - adding that he did not approve of her
abortion. Appellant went on to explain that Elaine called him on December 12
at 6 :30 a.m . and talked about the abortion, about Appellant going to the clinic,
and about Appellant calling the previous night. After this conversation,
Appellant stated that he went to a laundromat just around the corner from
Elaine's house and, upon seeing police and fire trucks at the house, thought
3 Sonia said that Appellant was afraid to turn himself in because the jails did not
have enough beds and he would have to sleep on the floor.
Mr. Fonseca had possibly harmed his wife, Mrs. Fonseca. 4 He then returned to
his apartment, choosing not to not wash any of his clothes at the laundromat .
Appellant allegedly had a doctor's appointment that same day at 1 :00 p .m ., but
chose not to enter the office for fear of the apparent police investigation. Two
days later, he fled the state. At this point in the interview, police played a tape
of Elaine's 911 call, but Appellant had no visible reaction while listening.
On December 19, 2003, a Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted
Appellant for the murder of Elaine Fonseca and burglary. At the conclusion of
trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges . Appellant
was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for the burglary conviction and
life without parole for the murder conviction, to be served concurrently. On
appeal, Appellant raises five principal allegations of error: 1) that the trial
court erroneously admitted the recording of the 911 call and the accompanying
Commonwealth's transcript of the recording; 2) that the trial court erroneously
admitted a photograph found in his apartment; 3) that the trial court permitted
his burglary conviction upon insufficient evidence ; 4) that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress his Florida statements; and, 5) that the trial
court erroneously allowed the Commonwealth to define reasonable doubt
during its voir dire . For the reasons that follow, we reverse Appellant's
convictions .
4 Appellant believed that Elaine's father had something to do with Elaine's murder.
He said that Mr. Fonseca knew a hit-man named "Rafael" from Cuba.
II . Analysis
A. 911 Call and Transcripts
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
exclude the audiotape recording of Elaine's 911 call and the Commonwealth's
transcript thereof. Though we find that admission of the audiotape was proper,
we must agree that it was reversible error for the trial court to admit the
Commonwealth's unsubstantiated transcript of the recording and, accordingly,
we address that issue in greater detail .
1 . Tape of the 911 Call
Admission of a tape recording rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. See Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S .W .2d 534, 540 (Ky. 1988)
(citing United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983)) . Even if a
portion of a recording is difficult to understand, the recording is nonetheless
admissible unless the inaudible portions render the entire recording "wholly
inaudible [or] unintelligible ." Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S .W.2d 632, 636
(Ky. App. 1994) . In other words, a recording may be admitted unless "the
inaudible portions are . . . so substantial as to render the recording
untrustworthy as a whole ." Id.
Having reviewed the recording, it cannot be said that the entire recording
was "wholly inaudible [or] unintelligible ." Id . Rather, we conclude that it was
sufficiently comprehensible for admission, as it "offered competent, reliable
evidence to assist the finder of fact in the deliberation of this matter." Id.
Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the recording into
evidence . Appellant's contentions otherwise are without merit.
2 . Commonwealth's Transcript of the Call
Similarly, it has been held that the trial court's admission of recording
transcripts is a decision reviewed for an abuse of discretion . See id. at 637.
This standard asks whether a trial court's ruling was "arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English,
993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . For reasons hereinafter set out, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to use the
Commonwealth's full transcript and that such error, here, cannot be deemed
harmless .
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the 911 tape recording during the
testimony of the dispatcher who received the call and requested the trial court
to permit the jury to use a transcript of the call that it had prepared . Appellant
objected, citing the Commonwealth's proposed interpretation of certain
inaudible portions of the recording. The trial court overruled Appellant's
objections and ruled, pursuant to Norton, 890 S .W.2d at 637, that the
Commonwealth could properly submit its transcript of the recording along with
Appellant's version of the transcript for the jury's use while listening to the
tapes Neither transcript was admitted as an exhibit, nor were they available
during deliberations .
5 For guidance, we note the trial court made no findings that the disputed parts of
the recording were audible and identifiable .
The initial transcript was prepared by a police department transcriber
and read, in relevant part:
(Person speaking in Spanish) . . .
(Inaudible) . . .
Please, someone want to come to my house in the force.
Let me connect you to Louisville Police
91 f. . ., f. . .
(Dial tone) . . .
(Phone dialing, rings 4 times)
Based upon this initial police transcription, Appellant prepared his own
transcript for the jury and it read, in relevant part:
(Person speaking in Spanish)
(Inaudible)
CALLER:
Please, someone wants to come to my
house in the force.
911 Operator:
CALLER :
Let me connect you to Louisville
Police.
Please 915 . . .
(Dial tone)
(Phone dialing, rings 4 times) . . .
The transcript that the Commonwealth sought to introduce and the trial court
admitted for the jury's use read:
Elaine:
Vidal . . . Please no Rafa . . . [911 operator
is speaking simultaneously, but his words
are unclear] Please 911 to come to my
house in the fourth(?) Please 91 . . . fa . .
Ah . . . [phone disconnects]
Police :
Louisville Police, Cam Kuhn(?)
(Emphasis added) .
We have confronted similar situations in the past. In Sanborn , this
Court found reversible error where a trial court admitted into evidence the
Commonwealth's disputed version of a transcript of the defendant's tape
recorded statement to a police officer where the defendant was not allowed an
opportunity to challenge its accuracy . 6 754 S .W.2d at 540. On appeal, such
use of the Commonwealth's transcript was held to warrant reversal as it
"certainly would sway [the jurors] as to the proper interpretation of the tape ."
Id. Sanborn concluded that it was not "within the discretion of the court to
provide the jury with the prosecutor's version of the inaudible or indistinct
portions." Id .
In Robinson , the issue concerned when and how the jury may use
competing transcripts - indeed, a different and more complex situation than
that presented in Sanborn . Robinson first noted that the preferred practice
was not to submit transcripts to the jury at all unless both parties stipulate to
their accuracy . 707 F .2d at 876. Without such stipulation and where a
dispute still exists as to the recording's proper interpretation, "the trial court
[should] make a pretrial determination of accuracy by reading the transcript[s]
against the tapes" before allowing the jury to use the transcripts . Id. (quoting
6 The jury was also allowed to view the transcript while listening to the recording at
trial, as was the case here.
10
United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 302 (D.C . Cir. 1980)) . Robinson
explained that "[t]he third and least preferred method is to present two
transcripts to the jury, one of which contains the government's version and the
other the defense's version," this method being the least preferred because "the
jury becomes the final arbiter of which version is most accurate ." Id . Indeed, if
the recording is significantly inaudible, any jury determination as to which
version is correct is purely speculative : "where . . . the tapes are partially
inaudible, the juror is precluded from making an intelligent comparison" and
"the likely result is that the transcript becomes the evidence." Id. at 878.
Robinson concluded that such "[s]hepherding [of] hearsay to the jury via the
transcripts, without employing traditional safeguards, can be considered
nothing less than prejudicial ." Id.
We believe that such a speculative determination is an unacceptable
result, as the purpose of all of the enumerated procedures is to establish "basic
safeguards to ensure reliability." Id. at 877. We, therefore, adopt the Robinson
"preference for using a transcript when the parties stipulate to its accuracy ."
Id. at 878. Where the parties, however, have not stipulated to the accuracy of
the transcript's accuracy, "the transcriber should verify that he or she has
listened to the tape and [has] accurately transcribed its content." Id . at 87879 . In addition to this measure, the "court should also make an independent
determination of accuracy by reading the transcript against the tape." Id. at
879 . However, where "there are inaudible portions of the tape, the court
should direct the deletion of the unreliable portion of the transcript," which
"assumes that the court has predetermined that unintelligible portions of the
tape do not render the whole recording untrustworthy." Id. For these reasons,
the trial court's "submission of two versions of the transcript [is] prejudicial
when the tape is significantly inaudible," as "[s]uch a practice would
undoubtedly inspire wholesale speculation by the parties and engender jury
confusion ." Id .
Turning back to the case at bar, we hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the Commonwealth's transcript to be used by the jury in
listening to the 911 recording because the transcript contained an
unsubstantiated interpretation of Appellant's last name - Vidal.7
Though the recordings (due to the denoising and slowed replay speed)
arguably reveal the term "Rafa" - a common nickname for "Raphael" - in none
of the modified and enhanced recordings can it be said that the name "Vidal"
was discernable . As a result, the trial court submitted to the jury an
interpretation that amounted to sheer speculation. See Sanborn, 754 S.W .2d
at 540 ("It is not . . . within the discretion of the court to provide the jury with
the prosecutor's version of the inaudible or indistinct portions ."). Absent
defense counsel's stipulation, the trial court should have rejected the
unfounded and baseless "Vidal" interpretation asserted by the Commonwealth .
7 In so concluding, this Court is fully aware that Sanborn involved a case where the
contested transcripts were admitted into evidence and thus available during jury
deliberations . Yet, the Court in Sanborn did not indicate that this additional fact was
necessary to find error, only that it "compounded the error even further." See 754
S .W.3d at 540 ; see also Robinson, 707 F.2d at 878 ("The government urges this Court
to give deference to the fact that the transcripts are mere aids which were not
introduced into evidence . . . . However, the distinction becomes nebulous where, as
here, the evidence is unintelligible .) .
12
See Robinson , 707 F.2d at 878 ("Where, as here, there are inaudible portions of
the tape, the court should direct the deletion of the unreliable portion of the
transcript.") .8
In the context of Appellant's case, we do not believe that this error was
harmless . Of any word added to this transcript, few could be more purely
incriminating than the defendant's last name - especially when directly tied to
a common nickname for Raphael, "Rafa." Moreover, in this setting, we think it
important to recognize that a suggestion - indeed, any suggestion - may make
all the difference in the world when charged with deciphering an otherwise
inaudible and unintelligible statement . See id . ("The practical effect of using
an aid to comprehend unintelligible matter is that the aid becomes the
evidence.") . Given that the Commonwealth's addition to the transcript of
Appellant's last name represented the only direct evidence against him in a
circumstantial case, we are bound to conclude that it "substantially swayed"
Appellant's conviction, thus warranting reversal. Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S . 750, 765 (1946) ; see also Winstead v. Commonwealth , 283 S .W.3d
678, 689 (Ky. 2009) ("The inquiry is . . . `whether the error itself had
substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction
cannot stand .') (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U .S . at 765) ; RCr 9 .24 .
8 None of this is to say, however, that the trial court must be absolutely positive of
the accuracy of the proposed interpretation in order to admit it as a part of the party's
transcript . What is required is that the trial court, in listening to the recordings, find
a reasonable basis for the proposed interpretation from the recording - i.e., the
interpretation must at least be arguably correct.
13
Having found cause for reversal, we will consider such other issues as
may call for dismissal, or are capable of repetition .
B . Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to direct a
verdict on the charge of first-degree burglary. Specifically, Appellant now
argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Elaine did not give
Appellant permission to enter the Fonsecas' home . This argument, however, is
one raised for the first time on appeal and, as such, is not preserved for our
review .
At trial, Appellant made a general motion for a directed verdict at the
close of Commonwealth's case-in-chief, which was renewed at the close of all
evidence. Although Appellant claims his motion for directed verdict adequately
preserved the insufficiency of the evidence claim in relation to the first-degree
burglary charge, we note that neither motion addressed this more specific
contention .9
By failing to raise this argument below, Appellant effectively denied the
trial court "the opportunity to pass on the issue in light of all the evidence."
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W .3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003) (quoting
Baker v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Ky. 1998)) . For this reason, we
have held that "[a] new theory of error cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal." Sprinizer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999) (citing
9 Indeed, Appellant's actual argument to the trial court centered on whether the
Commonwealth failed to prove the identity of the perpetrator as Appellant.
14
RCr 9 .22; Ruppee v . Commonwealth , 821 S.W .2d 484, 486 (Ky . 1991)); Tucker
v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. 1996) ("It must appear that the
question was fairly brought to the attention of the trial court.") (overruled on
other grounds bY Lanham v. Commonwealth , 1.71 S .W.3d 14 (Ky. 2005)) . This
rule applies "both as to the matter objected to and as to the grounds of the
objection ." Id. Therefore, we do not address the merits of Appellant's
argument any further.
C . Admission of Photograph
Appellant next claims that the trial court erred by admitting a
photograph of Elaine that was recovered from Appellant's apartment. In
particular, Appellant takes issue with the introduction of certain handwriting
located on the back of the photograph, which, in Spanish, read: "Rafi, in what
way will I tell you, I love you, I adore you, I need you. Tell me one thing. . ., do
you believe me. . .?"
Appellant objected to the handwriting because the photograph did not
reveal its author. Appellant, therefore, argued that the Commonwealth did not
properly authenticate the photograph and, also, that the writing represented
inadmissible hearsay. The Commonwealth countered that it was not arguing
that any particular person wrote the note, but rather that it was merely
introducing the photograph of the victim, found in Appellant's apartment,
dated within the time frame of their relationship . The trial court admitted the
photograph and allowed the court interpreter to interpret the writing for the
jury.
15
Beginning with Appellant's authentication argument, we note that,
pursuant to KRE 901(a), "the requirement of authentication or identification as
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
We have held that the burden of authentication is slight, requiring "only a
prima facie showing of authenticity." Johnson v. Commonwealth , 134 S.W.3d
563, 566 (Ky. 2004) (citing United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3rd Cir.
1994)) . The trial court's determination in this respect is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, see id. , a standard asking whether its decision was "arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles." Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co . v. Thompson , 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)) .
Here, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion .
Appellant's argument is similar to one rejected by the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Hyles , 479 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2007) . There, the prosecutor introduced
three photographs with writing on the back showing the appellant and a codefendant standing in front of a vehicle. The appellant in that case objected to
their admission, arguing "that there was no foundation for the admission of the
writings because the government did not offer evidence as to . . . who wrote
them." Id. at 968. There, as here, the prosecutor countered that who actually
inscribed the writing on the photograph was irrelevant ; the photograph and its
writing were introduced to prove the association between the parties depicted
in the photograph .
16
In determining that the photographs and writings had a proper
foundation and were thus sufficiently authenticated, the Eighth Circuit noted
the limited purpose for the photographs and writings was to prove the
association between the parties . The Court found that the prosecutor had met
its burden, l0 holding:
The deputy who seized the photographs from Cannon's property at
the jail testified that he saw the writing on the back when he seized
them . Other officers identified Hyles and Cannon as the people
pictured in the photographs, and the car as the same car they had
seen Cannon and Tonya driving. The government demonstrated a
rational basis for its claim that the pictures were of Cannon and
Hyles, that the car was the Pontiac Parisienne, and that the
writings shed light on the relationship between the coconspirators . The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted the pictures and writings over Hyles's objection as to
foundation .
Holes, 479 F.3d at 969 .
Similarly, here, the photograph that Appellant objected to was offered to
prove that Appellant had a photograph of Elaine in his apartment and to
establish the time frame of their relationship . The lead detective in this case,
Det. Crask, testified that he participated in the execution of the search warrant
on Appellant's apartment. Inside the apartment, he recovered the photograph
of Elaine . He further testified that the photograph had writing on the back of it
and the writing was in Spanish. The message was dated 9/11/02 and
addressed to "Rafi."
to The burden was on the prosecutor to prove the "evidence [was] sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims ." FRE 901 .
17
As we have noted, authenticating evidence need only pass a low
threshold, requiring only a prima facie showing of authenticity. Thus, given the
limited purpose of introducing the photograph, we believe that the
Commonwealth properly authenticated the photograph . The trial court,
therefore, properly exercised its discretion in admitting the photograph and the
writing on its back.
As to Appellant's argument that the writing on the back of the
photograph constituted inadmissible hearsay, we disagree. KRE 801 defines
hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted ." Though Appellant argues that the writing was offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, the Commonwealth was clearly not attempting to prove
that the unidentified author of the writing loved, adored, or needed "Rafi." The
photograph was entered for the limited purposes of showing that Appellant had
a picture of Elaine in his apartment and showing that as of September 11,
2002 their relationship was ongoing.
D. Admission of Appellant's Statement
1 . Waiver of Miranda Rights
Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress his statement to the Hialeah, Florida police because he did not
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights . Specifically, Appellant claims that he did
not fully understand the implications of his waiver, due to his Cuban heritage .
We disagree .
18
After Appellant's arrest by the Hialeah police department, he was
interrogated by two Spanish-speaking officers . In their interrogation, the police
officers established that Appellant spoke little English but understood their
Spanish. They then obtained Appellant's date of birth, address in Louisville,
and place of employment and established that he was not under the influence
of drugs, alcohol, or medication. Appellant was then advised that he had the
right to remain silent; that he had the right to consult with an attorney to get
advice prior to and during the interrogation; that an attorney would be
assigned to him before being questioned if he did not have the resources to hire
an attorney; and if he decided to answer questions immediately, without the
presence of an attorney, he had the right to stop answering until he consulted
with an attorney. When asked, Appellant clearly indicated that he understood
all of those rights .
Appellant now argues that the trial court failed to consider the
implications of his Cuban background . Specifically, he argues that under the
totality of the circumstances, he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights
because his waiver was not made with a full awareness of the nature of the
right being abandoned or the consequences of the decision to abandon it. See
Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 481-482 (Ky. 1999) .
We begin by noting that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the question of the voluntariness of a confession turns on the
presence or absence of coercive police activity . See Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S . 157, 167 (1986) . Accordingly, while an individual's cultural heritage is an
19
element to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis, it is only
relevant inasmuch as its presence causes a defendant to be acutely sensitive to
coercive police tactics.
1t is well-settled law that a statement is not compelled within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently" waives his constitutional privileges . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S .
436, 444 (1966) . Under Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court explained that a finding of coercion involves two
distinct considerations :
First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in
the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.
(internal citations omitted) . The Court concluded that "[o]nly if the `totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both [11 an uncoerced
choice and [2] the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived ." Id. (internal citation
omitted) . We also note that "the Commonwealth only needs to prove waiver of
Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence." Mills v. Commonwealth,
996 S.W .2d 473, 482 (Ky. 1999) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S . 157, 168
(1986)) .
Here, Appellant makes no argument that the Hialeah police department
engaged in intimidation, coercion, or deception. Rather, he argues that he did
not waive his rights with a full awareness of the right being abandoned or the
20
consequences of that decision due to his Cuban heritage . Yet, a transcript of
the interrogation evidences no lack of understanding as to the nature of his
Miranda rights :
Lt. Garcia: Yes, ok-Umm, gentlemen, in the first place,
what we are going to do before I ask you question
about this case, I'm going to read you your rights. CUk?
Appellant : That's all right.
Lt. Garcia: If you don't understand your rights, I need
you to tell me .
Appellant:
Correct.
Lt. Garcia: At any moment did anyone speak to you
about your rights, in some cases before, is this the first
time you hear anything about this?
Appellant :
No, it's the first time .
Lt. Garcia : Have you ever been arrested?
Appellant: Never - never, you can check my criminal
record that never.
Lt. Garcia: Then I am going to tell you and let me
know of any problem. You have the right to remain
silent. Do you understand?
Appellant:
Yes.
Lt. Garcia: Anything you say can and will be used
against you in court. Do you understand?
Appellant:
Yes .
Lt. Garcia: If you do not have the resources to hire an
attorney, one will be assigned to you if you wish before
being questioned. Do you understand me?
Appellant :
Yes.
Lt. Garcia: If you decide to answer questions now
without the presence of an attorney, you still have the
right to stop answering in whatever moment or until
you consult with an attorney. Do you understand?
Appellant:
Yes.
Lt. Garcia: Ehh . I wanted to ask you ask you about
the case. Would you want to talk to me about what
happened?
Appellant:
I would like . . .
Lt. Garcia: I - I know - and, I am informing you that
everything you are telling me it is being recorded .
Appellant :
Mm-hmm .
Lt. Garcia : - and this recording will. . .
Appellant:
Yes.
Lt . Garcia: . . .will be taken up there, to the state of
Kentucky .
Appellant :
Yes, you explained it to me .
Lt. Garcia: He explained it to you, so - if you want to
tell me something now or anything or wish ahh - to tell
me everything that happened, you have the right to do
so .
From this exchange, it is clear that Appellant was advised of his rights
and understood each right, evidenced by the fact that he immediately began to
tell his version of the events in question . We held in Ragland v.
Commonwealth , 191 S.W .3d 569, 586 (Ky. 2006), that "[a] suspect may waive
his Miranda rights either expressly or implicitly ." (emphasis added) (citin North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979)) . Indeed, "[w]hen a suspect
has been advised of his rights, acknowledges an understanding of those rights,
22
and voluntarily responds to police questioning, he may be deemed to have
waived those rights." Id. (citing Gorham v. Franzen, 760 F.2d 786, 795 (7th
Cir. 1985) ; United States v. Ogden, 572 F.2d 501, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978)) .
There being no evidence that Appellant otherwise misunderstood his rights, we
hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Appellant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
2 . Invocation of Right to Counsel
Appellant also argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to
suppress his statement to the Hialeah police department for failing to honor his
request for counsel. At issue is Appellant's following statement:
I, I, I, - I am - I am here in Florida because I, I one - I one way or
another would like to confront the situation, do you understand? (cough) - but - because if I had wanted - if I - if I had wanted I - I
woul - I would be, maybe, in Ar - arriving in Argentina by now. I
am telling you because - because I looked for evidence, somehow I don't know, maybe I made mistakes, but I looked for a way to - to
- to - what is it called? To - to show - to show that I didn't - that I
didn't create the situation but, this is not a movie that one - the
hero looks for the evidence when - like, and goes out and looks for
- because if it were up to me - I would make the father talk, do you
understand? Because he would have told me something, because I
know - I know . that, if he - if he has a person; that person that he
says that - that - that kills and that defends him because - that's
why there are some things that I want to talk to an attorney about,
because he knows how to manipulate the situation and - and and - and maybe, things that I could tell you are important to him,
do you understand?
Appellant argues this statement was a request for counsel . While it is
true that "[i]f at any time during a police interrogation the suspect has `clearly
asserted' his right to counsel, [that] interrogation must cease until an attorney
is present," Ragland, 191 S .W.3d at 586 (quoting Edwards v . Arizona, 451 U .S.
23
477, 485 (1981)), where "a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of
questioning." Id . (quoting Davis v. United States , 512 U.S . 452, 459 (1994)) ;
see also Dean v. Commonwealth , 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1992) (request
must be "unambiguous and unequivocal" to be "clearly asserted") . For
example, the statement, "`Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,' was held not to have
been a clearly asserted request for counsel." Id. (quoting Davis , 512 U .S . at
544) .
Here, in light of the circumstances, we do not believe that Appellant's
statement was a clear assertion of his right to counsel: "there are some things
that I want to talk to an attorney about, because he knows how to manipulate
the situation and - and - and - and maybe, things that I could tell you are
important to him." Appellant's later statement to Det. Virola of the Louisville
Metro Police Department further demonstrated his own awareness that he did
not assert his right to counsel:
I already talked with them [the Hialeah police department] and
issued my statement. Enough that - that if - I - I didn't have to
make a statement, I could have waited for a lawyer or something but I did my - my statement and if that is - and if that statement is
not enough for the truth, then they can do what they want with
me. I am going to keep saying the same - because it was what
happened, do you understand?
The trial court, therefore, properly overruled Appellant's motion to suppress his
statement to the Hialeah police department .
24
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Appellant's convictions and
sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .
Schroder, Scott, and Venters, JJ ., concur. Noble, J., concurs in result
by separate opinion. Abramson, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by
separate opinion in which Minton, C .J ., and Cunningham, J ., join.
Cunningham, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in
which Minton, C .J ., and Abramson, J ., join.
NOBLE, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT : I concur in the result reached
by the majority, but would state that I do not think that dual transcripts
should ever be submitted to the jury. I believe the taped statements are not
the best evidence, they are the only evidence. Unless the parties stipulate to a
transcript, it amounts to nothing more than someone saying "this is what the
witness means." The jury has ears to hear, so we should let them.
ABRAMSON, J ., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. The record and our standard
of review compel the conclusion that the trial court appropriately addressed the
911 call and transcripts . Thus, the majority has needlessly ordered a retrial of
this serious case.
This is a murder case in which the victim, Elaine Fonseca, was brutally
beaten to death in her parents' home . Moments before the fatal attack, as her
attacker was breaking into the residence, Fonseca called 911 for assistance .
The call was recorded, and the recording was introduced at trial, as it originally
25
sounded but "denoised," and then in four "denoised and expanded" versions
which progressively slowed the conversation . In conjunction with the
recording, the trial court allowed the parties to provide the jury with transcripts
of the call, and it is this provision of transcripts that the majority maintains
necessitates a retrial. Respectfully, I disagree .
A transcript, of course, repeats in written form a recorded conversation .
Although not evidence itself, the written version often significantly expedites
the introduction of the recorded evidence by helping the jurors follow the
conversation when the recording is difficult to hear or when it contains the
voices of several people speaking over each other, speaking in rapid succession,
or speaking in heavily accented English. Transcripts can thus be valuable trial
aids, but their use entails a certain risk. The risk is that "the jurors may
substitute the contents of the more accessible, printed dialogue for the sounds
they cannot readily hear or distinguish on the tape and in so doing transform
the transcript into independent evidence of the recorded statements ." United
States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1997) .
To guard against this risk, appellate courts have insisted that certain
precautions be taken to ensure that transcripts have at least "a semblance of
accuracy," United States v. Jacob, 377 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2004), and that the
juries using them know that they are interpretations of, but not substitutes for,
the actual recordings . United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1983) .
With respect to accuracy, as the majority notes, the preference is for the parties
to stipulate that the proffered transcript is accurate . When the parties
26
disagree, however, as they often will, the trial court is to make a pretrial
determination of accuracy by comparing the proffering side's proposed
transcript with the recording. The court need not find that the proposed
transcript is perfectly accurate before authorizing its use . United States v.
Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1993) . The transcript must, however, be a
reasonable interpretation of the recording, and where portions of the recording
are so unclear as to render any interpretation merely speculative, the
transcript should indicate that those portions are unintelligible and should not
purport to interpret them. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S .W.2d 534 (Ky.
1988) (citing United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1983)) . If the
court finds that the proffered transcript is sufficiently accurate and reasonable
to be an aid to the jury and if the opposing side does not offer an alternative
transcript, the court may allow use of the transcript, but it should inform the
jury that the transcript is only one party's version.
An opposing party's remedy for an allegedly inaccurate transcript is to
propose an alternative transcript of its own. United States v. Holton, supra;
United States v. Hogan, supra ; United States v. West, 948 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293 (D .C . Cir. 1980)) . The court
should ensure that the alternative transcript, too, "has the semblance of
accuracy" and is not unreasonable .
No matter which procedure is used-a transcript stipulated to by the
parties, a single transcript which the opposing party will not stipulate to but
which the court deems accurate enough to be an aid to the jury, or dual
27
transcripts both of which provide reasonable, n.on-speculative interpretations
of the recording-the jury should be instructed that the recording is actual
evidence of the recorded conversation and that the transcript is merely an
interpretation of the recording. They should further be instructed to disregard
anything in the transcript that they do not hear on the recording itself.
Whether any particular portion of the recording is clear enough to permit
interpretation, and hence transcription, or is so unclear as to render any
interpretation speculative and thus not to permit transcription is a matter left
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, supra. A
trial judge's decision either to allow or to disallow a given transcript is not to be
overturned unless "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles ." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) .
In this case, the parties disputed whether the recording of Elaine
Fonseca's 911 call was clear enough to be interpreted, but after listening to an
enhanced version of the recording, one from which noise had been removed
and which was slowed to about half its original speed, the trial judge
determined that the brief call permitted interpretation and that the
Commonwealth's interpretation-in particular its assertion that near the
beginning of the call Fonseca says, "Vidal, please no Rafa . . ."-was sufficiently
accurate and reasonable to be included in its transcription of the recording.
Because Appellant Juan Pelegrin-Vidal contested that interpretation, the trial
court, consistent with the case law discussed above, permitted him to offer a
counter-transcript .' 1 He offered a transcript a police officer had prepared early
in the investigation . That transcript characterized the initial part of Fonseca's
portion of the 911 call as "inaudible ." Both transcripts were presented to the
jury in conjunction with the enhanced recording, but they were not introduced
as evidence and were collected from the jury prior to its deliberation . During
closing argument, moreover, both parties referred to the transcripts and invited
the jury to listen carefully to the recording so as to hear the version that party
favored . Both parties emphasized, however, that the transcripts were not
evidence and that the jury was to rely ultimately and solely on what it heard on
the recording.
The majority asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
authorizing the transcription of an "inaudible" portion of the 911 recording,
The record reflects that the issue arose on July 14, 2004, when Vidal moved to
exclude the 911 tape and, if the tape was to be admitted, to exclude any transcript
of the recording. On August 27, 2004, the court held a hearing on Vidal's motion, at
which time the Commonwealth acknowledged its proposed transcript (which was in
the record as part of Vidal's motion and was read at the hearing) and submitted as
exhibits a copy of the original tape recording and a CD with the denoised and slowed
versions of it. By order entered August 30, 2004, the court noted that it had
listened to the enhanced versions of the recording and in light of that exhibit ruled
that the Commonwealth's transcript was permissible under the law. By comparing
the proposed transcript with the tape and satisfying itself, reasonably in my
judgment and certainly within its discretion, that the transcript was a reasonably
and sufficiently accurate reflection of the tape to be an aid to the jury, the trial court
properly fulfilled its role as screener of the proposed transcript . The majority's
characterization of the 911 tape as "inaudible" manufactures an abuse of
discretion where in fact there was none .
11
29
that portion just mentioned when, according to the Commonwealth, Fonseca
says, "Vidal, please no Rafa . . . ." The majority maintains that the name
"Vidal" cannot be distinguished on the recording and that by including it in its
transcript the Commonwealth introduced an interpretation of the recording
that amounted to sheer speculation. With all due respect, the majority has
apparently applied a standard of total clarity to the underlying recording and
complete accuracy to the proffered transcript. As discussed above, those are
not the proper standards . The recording need only be clear enough to make
possible a reasonable, non-speculative interpretation, and the transcript need
only have the semblance of accuracy. Under these standards, the trial court's
decision to submit the parties' alternative transcripts to the jury was not
arbitrary or unreasonable or in any other way an abuse of discretion, for, as
enhanced, the recording is not at all "inaudible," as the majority posits . It
plainly includes, if not the exact expression-"Vidal, please no Rafe . . ."-as
interpreted by the Commonwealth, something so like it that the
Commonwealth's interpretation is perfectly reasonable and anything but
merely speculative .
By labeling the disputed portion of the recording as "inaudible"-again, it
is not, it clearly contains words, not merely noise or garbled sounds, and at the
least the words are very like the Commonwealth's interpretation-the majority
has found an abuse of discretion where none exists and has needlessly
imposed a retrial. Accordingly, I respectfully strongly dissent on this issue .
Minton, C .J. ; and Cunningham, J., join.
30
CUNNINGHAM, J ., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART : I
join the opinion of Justice Abramson and wish to add to it.
It seems to me, that with our decision here today, we move further down
the road in complicating what should be a fairly simple issue. Furthermore, by
continuing to be guided by the 1983 Robinson case, we are falling more and
more into the minority of states as to how transcripts should be handled .
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S .W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988), cited by the
majority, deals more with the unfairness of the method used than the
admissibility of transcripts . In that case, the prosecutor's transcript was the
only one offered into evidence, even though there were twenty-five incidents
where the defense disagreed with the Commonwealth's transcript . It appears
that the defendant there was not given an opportunity to offer his own
transcript of the tape. Significantly, the Commonwealth's transcript was not
used for the demonstrative purpose only, but was introduced into evidence for
the jury to take into the jury room.
Transcripts are merely interpretations of original tape recordings. The
source itself - the tape - may range from being totally inaudible to totally
audible, but in most instances is somewhere in between. Someone has to
interpret what is being said, and the fact that a tape is partially inaudible does
not preclude it from being admissible. Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S .W.3d
345, 352 (Ky. 2005) (citing Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S .W .2d 632, 636
(Ky.App . 1994)) .
Juries are just as capable of interpreting tape recordings as are judges
and lawyers . Therefore, the critical threshold of the admissibility of this type of
evidence is the tape itself. It is longstanding law that the decision to employ
recordings and transcripts is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the
trial judge . Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 S .W .3d 39, 45 (Ky. 2002) (citing
United States v. Bryant, 480 F.2d 785, 789 (2nd Cir. 1973)) . See also
McCormick on Evidence ยง 212 (2nd Ed.) .
The Robinson case states the obvious preference for using a transcript
when the parties have stipulated to its accuracy . This suggestion offers little
help. Defense counsel will most likely be reluctant to stipulate to the accuracy
of transcripts when the tape is damning and incriminating. To require a
stipulation as to the accuracy of a transcript would place its admission solely
in the hands of the defendant.
Evidence regarding the consideration of transcripts is not the most
critical determination . The tapes themselves must be authentic, accurate, and
trustworthy. Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 362 S .W.2d 494, 497 (Ky. 1962)
(listing the 7 foundational requirements for admissibility) .
Once the authenticity and integrity of the tape recording have been
established, there must be a showing of relevance . "Relevant evidence" means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. KRE 401 . A totally inaudible tape
recording would have no relevancy because it is not "of consequence to the
32
determination of the action." This is a. low threshold, however, because small
bits and pieces of a tape recording may be of tremendous "consequence" while
the rest of it is not.
Trial courts are allowed broad discretion in admitting the tapes
themselves and, with the showing of their authenticity and relevancy, the
judgment of the court should not be reversed unless there is a showing of an
abuse of discretion. Johnson, 90 S .W.3d at 45. Once a tape has been admitted
into evidence, each side has fair access to its own interpretation . For instance,
counsel for each side may play the tape recording during closing argument and
provide his or her own oral interpretation for the jury. There is no difference in
this method of interpretation than a written interpretation through a
transcript, which the jury may read during the playing of the tape recording.
The only requirement should be that the methodology be fair . In other words,
both sides must get their shot at submitting their own transcript - or
interpretation - of what the tape relates.
That was done in this case . And the evidence in this case reveals that
the tape recording was played several times so the jury had the opportunity to
compare each of the transcripts with the actual recording. Since the Sixth
Circuit federal case of Robinson was decided, other states have dealt much
more liberally with the use of transcripts. U.S. v. Robinson, Slip Copy, 2008
WL 5381824 (S.D .Fla.) (If there is a dispute as to the transcript, each side
should produce its version and/or each side may introduce evidence
supporting the accuracy of its version or challenging the accuracy of the other
33
side's version . The jury must reconcile the accuracy.) ; U.S. v. Ervin, 300
Fed.App. 845 (11th Cir . 2008) (The proper protocol when a party disputes the
accuracy of a transcript is for each side to produce its own version of the
transcript or its own version of the disputed portions.) ; Turner v. State, 950
So .2d 243 (Miss .Ct.App . 2007) (Transcripts of audiotapes may be introduced
into evidence for the same purpose that an expert witness's testimony is
introduced - as a device to help the jurors understand other types of real
evidence - and when there is a disagreement as to the accuracy of the
transcripts, the proper procedure is for the jury to receive both sides'
versions.) ; Leal v. State, 782 S .W .2d 844 (Tex.Crim .App. 1989) (If an agreed or
stipulated transcript cannot be produced, then each side should produce its
own version of a transcript, or its own version of the disputed portions of the
transcript .) ; State v. Rogan, 640 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio Ct.App . 1994) (Defense
counsel should be allowed to produce to the jury at the time of the playing of
the tapes the defendant's version of the words being heard by the jury.) ; People
v. Haider, 829 P .2d 455 (Colo.Ct.App . 1991) (If the parties do not stipulate to
an official transcript, the judge may either make a pretrial determination of the
accuracy of the transcript by comparing it to the tapes, or may permit the jury
to examine both versions of the transcript so it can determine which is more
accurate.)
I would simplify our own rule concerning the use of transcripts of tape
recordings at trial . If the tape itself is admitted, then the interpretation should
become a jury question. The jury can be assisted by interpretations distilled by
34
the adversarial process. As long as the transcript is duly authenticated by the
person who transcribed it and each side is given an opportunity to use a
transcript for demonstrative purposes, it is a fair process . The court should
make sure that the tape is played through one time for each of the
interpretative transcripts. This procedure was essentially followed in this case.
I would affirm.
Minton, C .J. ; and Abramson, J., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender
Cicely Jaracz Lambert, Assistant Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Bryan Darwin Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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