BETTY J. SWEASY V. WAL-MART STORES, INC. #1269, ET AL.
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 29, 2009
TO BE PUBLISHED
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BETTY J . SWEASY
V
APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2008-CA-001571-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 05-65193
WAL-MART STORES, INC. #1269;
HONORABLE RICHARD M. JOINER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
The Workers' Compensation Board reversed an Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ's) decision to award permanent partial disability benefits from the
date that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), holding
that her entitlement began on the date of her injury. The Court of Appeals
reversed and reinstated the award, however, having construed KRS
.730(1)(d)
342 to mean that an award based on a disability rating of fifty percent
or less "may or may not begin" when the impairment or disability from an
injury arises . Appealing, the claimant argues that there is no justification for
the court's interpretation of KRS 342 and that her permanent
.730(1)(d)
disability arose on the date of her injury. We agree; hence, we reverse.
v.c.
KRS 342 .730(1)(b) - (d) entitle a partially disabled worker to permanent
income benefits from the date that the permanent impairment or disability that
they compensate arises. The amount of impairment remaining at MMI forms
the basis for assigning a permanent impairment rating, but the impairment
deemed to be permanent at MMI "arises" when a harmful change in the human
organism occurs . This claim must be remanded for the entry of an award that
begins on the date of the claimant's injury because the evidence compels a
finding that her permanent impairment and disability of fifty percent or less
arose on that date .
The claimant's work history included jobs as a bank teller and poster,
medical records clerk, pharmacy aide and cashier, and insurance claims
decoder. She injured her back on November 28, 2005, in the course of her
work as a Wal-Mart cashier. She received medical treatment and was taken off
work for three days, after which she returned to work processing credit card
applications and as a greeter . Both types of work complied with her light-duty
restriction. On March l, 2007, Wal-Mart refused to honor the restriction any
longer and terminated her employment .
The claimant sought benefits for permanent total disability. She testified
that she considered herself unable to perform any of the jobs that she had
performed at Wal-Mart . She also submitted medical evidence concerning the
permanent impairment rating and restrictions that the injury caused .
The ALJ awarded TTD benefits from March 1, 2007, through August 24,
2007, during which time the claimant had not reached MMl or a level of
improvement that would permit a return to employment. I Convinced that she
lacked the physical capacity to return to the type of work performed at the time
of injury but was only partially disabled, the ALJ awarded the claimant a triple
permanent income benefit. The ALJ based the benefit on an 8% permanent
impairment rating, which converted under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) to a 6.8%
disability rating, and enhanced the benefit by a factor of 0 .6 due to the
claimant's age of 64 at the time of injury. The ALJ ran the benefit period of the
award from August 25, 2007. Although the claimant's disability rating entitled
her to a 425-week award under KRS 342 the ALJ terminated benefits
.730(1)(d),
on November 28, 2007, due to her eligibility for normal old-age social security
retirement as of June 21, 2007 .2
The claimant's petition for reconsideration argued that the ALJ should
have begun her TTD award on the date of injury rather than the date that WalMart terminated her employment . She also argued that nothing entitled the
employer to credit for the wages that she received during the period before she
was terminated. After the ALJ denied the petition, she appealed.
The Board determined that the evidence did not compel a TTD award
during the period before the claimant's termination on March 1, 2007, noting
1 KRS 342 .0011(11)(a) ; Central Kentucky Steel v. Wise , 19 S .W.3d 657 (Ky. 2000).
a KRS 342 .730(4) requires all income benefits to terminate as of the date on which the
worker qualifies for normal old-age social security retirement benefits or as of two
years after the injury, whichever occurs last. Two years after November 28, 2005
occurred last.
that her customary employment included light-duty work. The Board also
determined, however, that the ALJ committed a palpable error by failing to
award permanent partial disability benefits from the date of injury through
March 1, 2007, because the claimant's permanent disability began at the time
of the injury . Although acknowledging that she appealed on a different ground,
the Board noted that it had, both the authority and the duty to determine
whether the award conformed to Chapter 342 .3 Thus, it remanded the claim
for the entry of a corrected award.
Wal-Mart appealed, questioning both the Board's authority to raise a
legal issue sua sponte and its decision concerning the date for commencing
partial disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the
first issue but reversed on the second. The sole issue raised in this appeal
concerns the date for commencing permanent partial disability benefits.
The claimant argues that the Court of Appeals misconstrued KRS
342 .730(1)(d), which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
For permanent partial disability, if an employee has a
permanent disability rating of fifty percent (50%) or
less as a result of a work-related injury, the
compensable permanent partial disability period shall
be four hundred twenty-five (425) weeks, and if the
ermanent disability rating is greater than fift
(50%), the compensable permanent partial disability
period shall be five hundred twenty (520) weeks from
the date the impairment or disability exceeding fifty
percent (50%) arises. (emphasis added) .
3
See KRS 342 .285(2)(c) . See also Whittaker v. Reeder , 30 S .W.3d 138 (Ky. 2000) .
Although KRS 342 .730(1)(d) states specifically that the compensable
period of a disability greater than 50% commences when "the impairment or
disability exceeding [50%] arises," it fails to specify when the period of a
disability less than 50% commences . Viewing the discrepancy as an
expression of legislative intent, the Court of Appeals determined that the period
for a disability less than 50% "may or may not begin on the date that the
impairment or disability due to an injury arises ." Thus, the court found no
error in the ALJ's decision to award permanent income benefits from the date
that the claimant reached MMI.
Wal-Mart raises two arguments to defend the Court of Appeals' decision .
Adopting the court's reasoning, Wal-Mart argues first that KRS 342 .730(1)(d)
evinces an explicit legislative intent to treat 520-week and 425-week awards
differently . In other words, it requires 520-week awards to begin on the date
that impairment or disability arises but permits an ALJ to choose to commence
a 425-week award at MMI . Wal-Mart bases its second argument on an
alternative construction of KRS 342 to mean that all partial disability
.730(1)(d)
awards begin on the date that the permanent impairment or disability arises.
Relying on the definition found in KRS 342.0011(11)(b), the employer argues
that permanent partial disability does not arise until an injured worker reaches
MMI and receives a permanent impairment rating. Although we agree with the
latter construction of KRS 342 .730(1)(d), we do not agree that permanent
impairment or disability arises at MMI .
The essence of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate
legislative'intent .4 A court must look to the legislative policy and purpose of a
statute rather than to focus on a single sentence or portion of a sentences The
court must also consider the' -statute's policy and purpose when determining
the meaning of the words that the legislature used . 6 With those principles in
mind, we turn to Chapter 342 and more specifically to KRS 342 .730(l) .
Chapter 342 protects the community's interest by requiring employers to
provide compensation for the effects of work-related injuries so that injured
workers and their dependents do not become a burden on the community . 7
KRS 342. 0011(1) defines an injury as being a work-related traumatic event that
is the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human organism as
evidenced by objective medical findings. Impairment is a loss, loss of use, or
derangement of a body part, organ system, or organ function; thus, impairment
shows that a harmful change in the human organism exists . 8 The post-1996
Workers' Compensation Act deems a traumatic event that causes impairment
to cause disability as well . 9
Hale v. Combs, 30 S .W.3d 146, 151 (Ky. 2000); City of Louisville v. Helmgn, 253
S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1952); AK Steel Corporation v. Commonwealth , 87 EMM 15,
17 (Ky. App. 2002) .
-5 Cabinet for Families and Children v. Cummins, 163 S .W.3d 425 (Ky. 2005); Cosby
v. Qom 147 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2004) ; Count, of HaAaan v. Appalachian Regional
.,
Healthcare, Inc ., 85 S.W .3d 607 (Ky. 2002) .
6 Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc . v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d
493 (Ky. 1998) .
7 Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872 S .W.2d 446 (Ky . 1994) .
8 See FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams , 214 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Ky. 2007) .
9 Id.
4
.730(1)(a)
KRS 342 - (d) provide income benefits based on the presence of
work-related "disability," which is a decrease in the ability to perform work .lo
Impairment and disability may or may not be permanent or rise to a level that
warrants permanent income benefits. "Permanent partial disability" refers to
"the condition of an employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability
rating but retains the ability to work."" KRS 342 bases the amount
.730(1)(b)
of a partial disability benefit on the permanent disability rating that results
from multiplying the permanent impairment rating that an injury causes by
the corresponding statutory factor . KRS 342 .730(1)(c) 1 and 3 provide benefit
multipliers based on the worker's lack of physical capacity to perform the type
of work performed at the time of the injury, age, and educational level.
Consistent with KRS 342 .710(1)'s goal of encouraging a return to work, KRS
342 .730(1)(c)2 provides a multiplier for those who return to work at the same
or a greater wage . It permits them to receive a basic benefit in addition to their
wage while working but to receive a double benefit during periods that they are
unable to sustain the employment .
This appeal concerns KRS 342 .730(1)(d), which provides compensable
periods of 425 weeks for disability ratings of 50% or less and of 520 weeks for
disability ratings that exceed 50% . KRS 342 . 730(1) (d)'s failure to specify when
the period of a 425-week award begins may be read to imply legislative intent
to permit such an award to begin on a date other than when the permanent
to See Adkins v. R & S Body Co . , 58 S.W.3d 428 (Ky. 2001) .
11 KRS 342.0011 (11) (b) .
impairment or disability of 50% or less arises. Yet, mindful of policy and
purpose for which KRS 342 .730(1)(b) - (e) were enacted, we conclude that the
legislature intended no such absurdity . 12 Neither the Court of Appeals nor the
employer points to a reasonable basis for an ALJ to commence benefits on a
date other than the date that the permanent impairment or disability arises .
Perceiving there to be no reasonable basis, we turn to the question of when
permanent impairment or disability arises for the purpose of commencing
partial disability benefits .
.
A condition "arises" when it comes into being, begins, or originates . 13
Thus, impairment arises for the purposes of Chapter 342 when work-related
trauma produces a harmful change in the human organism . That usually
occurs with the trauma but sometimes occurs after a latency period. In either
circumstance the authors of the American Medical Association's Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment consider the amount of impairment that
remains at MMI to be "permanent." The fact that they direct physicians to wait
until MMI to assign a permanent impairment rating does not alter the fact that
the permanent impairment being measured actually originated with the
harmful change . We conclude, therefore, that the compensable period for
partial disability begins on the date that impairment and disability arise,
without regard to the date of MMI, the worker's disability rating, or the
compensable period's duration.
12
13
See Bailey v. Reeves , 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1984) ; Overnite Transportation Co. v.
Gaddis , 793 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. App . 1990) .
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged 101 (2d ed. 1977) .
The evidence compelled a finding that the claimant's injury produced
permanent impairment and disability from the outset. Thus, it also compelled
a partial disability award in which the compensable period began on the date of
injury. The claim must be remanded for that purpose .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this claim is
remanded to the ALJ for the entry of a proper award.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
BETTY J. SWEASY:
Wayne C . Daub
600 West Main Street
Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
WAL-MART STORES, INC. #1269 :
William Bryan Hubbard
Ward, Hocker 8v Thornton, PLLC
333 W. Vine Street
Suite 1100
Lexington, KY 40507
James Richard Martin, II
315 Beaumont Circle
Suite 200
Lexington, KY 40513
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