JERRY MCGUIRE V. COAL VENTURES HOLDING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION .
RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2009-SC-000114-WC
JERRY MCGUIRE
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2007-CA-002554-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 05-00468
COAL VENTURES HOLDING COMPANY, INC . ;
HONORABLE SHEILA C. LOWTHER,
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) dismissed the claimant's
February 8, 2007, application for pneumoconiosis benefits based on the law of
the case doctrine because the employer's liability for a coal dust exposure that
ended in 2002 was fully litigated previously . The Workers' Compensation
Board (Board) affirmed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board.
Appealing, the claimant argues that the Court of Appeals erred because his
previous claim was dismissed without prejudice .
We affirm. A 2006 decision by the Board rejected the claimant's
argument that his initial claim was dismissed without prejudice. He failed to
appeal the decision. Thus, the res judicata and law of the case doctrines
precluded both a new claim and a re-filed claim against the employer based on
the same exposure .
The claimant filed his initial application for benefits on March 25, 2005,
alleging a last exposure to coal dust on February 9, 2002. KRS 342 .316 and
KRS 342 .732 base a pneumoconiosis award on an original chest x-ray and B
reader interpretation thereof showing at least category 1 / 0 pneumoconiosis .
Although the claimant submitted a report from Dr. Baker, who classified a
September 22, 2003, x-ray as category 1/0, he failed to submit the original xray. He also submitted a March 29, 2004, x-ray and a report from Dr. Baker
that classified it as category 0/ 1 . The employer submitted a June 1, 2005, xray and Dr. Broudy's report that classified it as category 0/0.
On the CALJ's own motion, the claimant was informed that he had filed
multiple B-reader interpretations, including an interpretation of an x-ray that
was not filed. The CALJ placed the claim in abeyance and ordered him to file
the correct x-ray for the interpretation on which he intended to rely or vice
versa . For reasons unexplained, he notified the CALJ that he intended to rely
on the March 29, 2004, x-ray, which Dr. Baker classified as category 0/ 1, and
failed to submit another interpretation of the x-ray.
The CALJ removed the claim from abeyance, after which the Office of
Workers' Claims issued a notice of party consensus. As required by KRS
342 .316, the employer filed a Form 111-OD in which it denied the claim.
The matter was assigned to ALJ Smith and a benefit review conference
scheduled for January 2006.
On November 15, 2005, the claimant filed a motion to withdraw the
previously-submitted evidence and to submit in its place an October 31, 2005,
x-ray and a report by Dr. Baker that classified the x-ray as category 1/2 .
Objecting, the employer asserted that no statute or regulation permitted proof
to be substituted after the consensus process was complete and that such a
practice would obviate the purpose of the process. ALJ Smith passed the
motion to the benefit review conference, at which point the parties were
directed to brief the matter.
The employer's brief objected to the withdrawal of evidence, noting that
what the claimant sought differed fundamentally from an extension of time to
submit additional evidence. The employer argued that due process did not
require permitting him to substitute evidence after a consensus was declared
and the benefit review conference was held and that no statute or regulation
authorized it. Moreover, a substitution of evidence at that point amounted to
permitting him to re-litigate the claim.
ALJ Smith denied the motion to substitute, after which the claimant
moved to dismiss the claim without prejudice in order to file a corrected
application and support it with a qualifying x-ray and B-reader report. The
ALJ granted the motion summarily, but the employer's petition for
reconsideration pointed out that CR 41 .01 and Sublett v . Hall ' require a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice to be based on an analysis of certain
factors and requested an appropriate order. 2 Having considered the petition,
ALJ Smith entered an order on May 2, 2006, stating as follows:
[I]t appears that the defendant-employer engaged in
full litigation of the claim before the motion was filed,
[that] the Motion to dismiss was not filed until after
the Benefit Review Conference, and that the
defendant-employer may indeed suffer prejudice as the
consensus of the parties own experts in the claim are
negative which may not be the result if the claim is relitigated and subjected to a panel of B readers .
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons the Petition
for Reconsideration is SUSTAINED .
The claimant appealed . He asserted that the ALJ "erred by reversing her
earlier ruling," which had allowed him to dismiss his claim without prejudice .
He argued that the employer would suffer no prejudice because nothing would
prevent it from using its previously-obtained evidence to litigate a re-filed
claim. He also argued that fairness, equity, and the beneficent purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act supported permitting him to withdraw his previous
application and file a corrected application.
Affirming in an opinion rendered on September 15, 2006, the Board
noted that no statute or regulation prohibited a worker from supporting his
1 589 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Ky. 1979) .
2 The factors include: 1 .) the amount of preparation by the opposing party; 2.) the
amount of time between the filing of the claim and the motion to dismiss ; 3.) the
amount of prejudice the opposing party may suffer; 4.) the adjudicative effect of a
voluntary dismissal on the merits of the case ; 5 .) the need for terms and conditions
to govern the dismissal ; and 6 .) the prejudice that the moving party may suffer due
to such terms and conditions .
application with an x-ray or B-reader report that failed to prove his entitlement
to benefits. The Board determined that although nothing prevents a worker
from substituting proof or seeking a voluntary dismissal before the employer
submits proof, a failure to submit a qualifying x-ray and B-reader report before
the claim is submitted for the consensus process amounts to a substantive
failure of proof. Noting the claimant's statement to the ALJ that he did "indeed
rely" on the March 29, 2004, x-ray and corresponding B-reader report, the
Board concluded that he waived any allegation of error that might have
occurred to that point and that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by
dismissing the claim with prejudice. No appeal was taken from the decision .
The claimant filed the present pneumoconiosis claim on February 8,
2007, without having sustained any additional exposure to coal dust . After the
claim was assigned to the CALJ, the employer filed a special answer and
motion to dismiss. The employer argued that the doctrine of res judicata
barred re-litigation of the claim, which had been adjudicated previously and
dismissed with prejudice . To support the motion, the employer cited the ALJ's
order of May 2, 2006, and the Board's decision of September 15, 2006, which
interpreted the order as a decision to dismiss the claim with prejudice and
affirmed. The CALJ determined that the law of the case doctrine precluded a
re-interpretation of the May 2, 2006, order and, thus, dismissed the re-filed
claim with prejudice. The claimant appealed.
The doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case relate to the
preclusive effect of previous judicial decisions. Res judicata, a Latin term
meaning "a matter adjudged," stands for the principle that a final judgment on
the merits is conclusive of causes of action (claim preclusion) and facts or
issues (issue preclusion/ collateral estoppel) thereby litigated as to the parties
and their privies. 3 The law of the case doctrine concerns the preclusive effect of
judicial determinations in the course of a single litigation before a final
judgment . 4 As applied to workers' compensation cases, a final decision of law
by an appellate courts or the Board 6 establishes the law of the case and must
be followed in all later proceedings in the same case .
The claimant asserts that the CALJ erred because the Board
misinterpreted ALJ Smith's May 2, 2006, order as granting a dismissal with
prejudice when, in fact, it did no more than sustain the employer's petition for
reconsideration . He argues that the petition requested the previous order
dismissing without prejudice to be set aside and the matter to be reconsidered
under the proper legal standard but did not request the claim to be dismissed
with prejudice. He also argues that the Board's characterization of the order as
a dismissal with prejudice was mere dictum to which the law of the case
doctrine is inapplicable. Finally, he argues that an initial consensus
determination by the Office of Workers' Claims is not an adjudication on the
merits and should not have preclusive effect .
Yeoman v. Com ., Health Policy Board, 983 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Ky. 1998) .
4 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts ยง 130.
5 Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 451 (Ky . 2005) ; Scamahorne v.
Commonwealth , 376 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1964) .
6 Whittaker v. Mores, 52 S.W.3d 567 (Ky. 2001) ; Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co . , 969
S .W.2d 712 (Ky . 1998) .
3
The claimant's arguments in his initial appeal to the Board contradict his
present assertions . They made clear that he interpreted the May 2, 2006, order
as dismissing the claim with prejudice and that he requested it to be reversed .
The order sustained the employer's petition for reconsideration and contained
findings that the employer engaged in full litigation of the claim before the
claimant filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice ; that the claimant did not
file the motion until after the Benefit Review Conference; and that the employer
might indeed be prejudiced if the claim were re-litigated .
The Board determined in the initial appeal that no present statute or
regulation makes positive evidence of pneumoconiosis a jurisdictional
requirement? and that the claimant's failure to support his application with an
x-ray and report showing his entitlement to benefits constituted a substantive
failure of proof. Thus, although the May 2, 2006, order failed to state
specifically that the claim was dismissed with prejudice, the Board interpreted
it as doing so and affirmed .$ Having failed to appeal the Board's decision, the
claimant was bound by it in subsequent litigation under both the res judicata
and law of the case doctrines .
The claimant filed a new application for benefits in 2007 with a new xray and report thereof but named the same defendant-employer and alleged the
same date of last exposure as in the previous claim . As a consequence, the
7 See Scorpio Coal Co . v. Harmon, 864 S .W.2d 882 (Ky. 1993) (applicable statutes and
regulations prohibited a 1990 claim from being filed without specific evidence) .
8 In the present appeal the Board rejected the claimant's argument that the statement
was mere dictum.
Office of Workers' Claims gave it the same claim number as his previous
application. The CALJ did not err under the circumstances by concluding that
the claimant was bound by the Board's 2006 decision and, by dismissing the
2007 claim with prejudice .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
JERRY MCGUIRE:
Miller Kent Carter
Miller Kent Carter 8 Michael Lucas, PLLC
131 Division Street
P.O . Box 852
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
COAL VENTURES HOLDING COMPANY, INC . :
Jeffrey Dale Damron
Baird & Baird, PSC
P.O. Box 351
Pikeville, KY 41502
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