JOHN WESLEY BRETT V. HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE, FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION AND MEDIA GENERAL OPERATIONS, INC. D/B/A WTVQ-TV; AND WILLIAM STANLEY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PU BLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
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RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
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2008-SC-000712-MR
JOHN WESLEY BRETT
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2008-CA-001199
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 03-CI-01785
HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE,
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION
APPELLEE
AND
MEDIA GENERAL OPERATIONS, INC.
D/B/A WTVQ-TV; AND WILLIAM STANLEY
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
John Wesley Brett appeals, as a matter of right, the decision of the Court
of Appeals which denied Brett a writ of prohibition against Judge Sheila Isaac,
of the Fayette Circuit Court. Brett was the unsuccessful party in a suit against
the real parties in interest . Shortly after final judgment was entered, he
received a bill for costs. When he objected to those costs, the trial court
entered a supplemental judgment and Brett sought a writ of prohibition with
the Court of Appeals, contending the trial court lost jurisdiction under
CR 52.02. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. I We affirm the Court: of
Appeals because the bill for costs is governed by CR 54 .04, and the trial court
had jurisdiction over costs.
As mentioned above, Brett was unsuccessful in his suit against the real
parties in interest . A final judgment was entered by the trial court on March
27, 2008. Brett filed a "Notice of Appeal" the same day. On April 9, 2008, the
real parties in interest tendered a "Bill of Costs" to Brett. Brett filed objections
thereto on April 14, 2008 . On May 19, 2008, the real parties in interest filed a
Motion To Enter Supplemental Judgment. The trial court heard and granted
the motion on June 20, 2008, and entered the order June 23, 2008. During
the June 20, 2008, hearing, the trial court also heard evidence concerning an
unpaid invoice for a deposition and the refusal to return discovery material
which was subject to prior interlocutory orders of the court. On July 14, 2008,
the trial court entered an order regarding the unpaid invoice and return of the
discovery material. In addition to two requests for emergency relief no longer
in question, Brett requested a writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals
contending the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter a supplemental judgment
for costs, or to modify the final judgment, ten days after the entry of the March
27, 2008, final judgment . The Court of Appeals denied the writ and Brett
brought the appeal to this Court as a matter of right.2
Also denied emergency relief not in question.
2 CR 76.36(7) .
1
"The writ of mandamus, like the writ of prohibition, is extraordinary in
nature. Such a writ bypasses the regular appellate process and requires
significant interference with the lower courts' administration ofjustice." Cox v.
Braden, 266 S .W .3d 792, 795 (Ky. 2008) . "[C]ourts of this Commonwealth are
- and should be - loath to grant the extraordinary writs unless absolutely
necessary." Id. That being said, this Court has recognized the need and has
spoken on when writs are applicable .
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing
that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate
court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction,
and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury
will result if the petition is not granted .
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) .
Brett contends the trial court lost jurisdiction over the entire matter ten
days after entry of the final judgment, citing CR 52 .02. CR 52.02 states:
Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the
court of its own initiative, or on the motion of a party
made not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment,
may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion
may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59.
Our finality rule deprives trial courts of jurisdiction to make new findings after
ten days. Yocum v. Oney, 532 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1975) .
We agree with Brett that the rule is clear that the trial court lost
jurisdiction to amend its final judgment ten days after the final judgment was
entered. However, CR 52 .02 is not to be read to deprive a trial court of all
jurisdiction. For instance, CR 60.01 allows courts to correct clerical mistakes
anytime. CR 60 .02 allows mistake, newly discovered evidence, etc ., to be
considered a year after final judgment, and fraud, "or any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief' can be considered within a reasonable
time.
More specifically, CR 54 .04 addresses costs . The portions of that rule
applicable to Brett's judgment are:
(1) Costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs ; . . . In the
event of a partial judgment or a judgment in which
neither party prevails entirely against the other, costs
shall be borne as directed by the trial court.
(2) A party entitled to recover costs shall prepare and
serve upon the party liable therefor a bill itemizing the
costs incurred by him in the action, including filing
fees, fees incident to service of process and
summoning of witnesses, jury fees, warning order
attorney, and guardian ad litem fees, costs of the
originals of any depositions (whether taken
stenographically or by other than stenographic
means), fees for extraordinary services ordered to be
paid by the court, and such other costs as are
ordinarily recoverable by the successful party. If within
five days after such service no exceptions to the bill
are served on the prevailing party, the clerk shall
endorse on the face of the judgment the total amount
of costs recoverable as a part of the judgment.
Exceptions shall be heard and resolved by the trial
court in the form of a supplementaliud ment.
(Emphasis added.)
Reading the rule provides the obvious - costs are assessed after
judgment . Exceptions are to be served within five days and the court is to
decide by way of a "supplemental judgment." Clearly, this retained
supplemental judgment jurisdiction has nothing to do with the lost jurisdiction
to amend or supplement the final judgment. There is no Kentucky case
directly on point, probably because the rule is self=explanatory . 3
Brett also contends the Court of Appeals ignored the trial court's order of
July 14, 2008, in its ruling. We disagree. The matters appear to deal with
costs of an expert's deposition and returning discovery materials, all subject to
prior orders and discussed at the June 20, 2008, hearing. These matters, if
not properly part of the supplemental order, can be decided in the direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals, and not in the writ case (in the event the Court of
Appeals decides the trial court had jurisdiction but was acting erroneously) .
Because the trial court was proceeding on matters within its jurisdiction,
with an adequate remedy by appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeals to
deny the petition for a writ of prohibition is affirmed.
Minton, C .J., Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, and Venters, JJ., concur.
Scott, J., dissents by separate opinion . Abramson, J., not sitting.
SCOTT, JUSTICE, DISSENTING OPINION: I must respectfully dissent
from the majority's opinion removing CR 54 .04's Bills of Costs4 from the
3 The only direction lacking in the rule is a specific time for filing said bill of costs.
Although not in issue here, the bill of costs was filed within a reasonable time .
4 CR 54.04 authorizes a prevailing party to recover costs such as "filing fees,
fees incident to service of process and summoning of witnesses, jury fees,
warning order attorney, and guardian ad litem fees, costs of the originals of any
depositions . . . fees for extraordinary services ordered to be paid by the court,
and such other costs as are ordinarily recoverable by the successful party."
Absent other express authority, attorney's fees and witness fees are not
allowable as costs . Dulworth & Burress Tobacco Warehouse Co . v. Burress,
strictures of our long-established rules of practice relating to final judgments
which, aside from CR 60.01, CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, mandate that motions
vacating, altering or amending a judgment must be filed no later then ten (10)
days after entry of the final judgment.5 CR 59.02 ; CR 59 .04; CR 59.05 .
Excepting CR 59, CR 60.05 mandates that "the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be as provided in rule 60.02 or 60.03 ." CR 60.05
(emphasis added).
Thus, the majority's opinion is now contrary to the trial practice I have
known for many years and which was served by the filing of Bills of Costs
generally post-verdict, but, in all events, no later than ten (10) days after entry
of the final judgment . When this practice is followed, everything that needs to
be done thereafter can be done. But to hold that there is no initial ten (10) day
requirement - that it only has to be filed within a "reasonable time" - departs
from a bright-line rule and leaves uncertainty and delay where none existed
before.
For example, under this new standard, a motion for costs filed in the trial
court following an appeal has been held to have been filed within a reasonable
time. Avery v. Demetropoulos, 531 N .W.2d 720, 722 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
("The appropriate standard to apply . . . is whether the motion for costs was
369 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ky. 1963) (attorney's fees); Brookshire v. Lavigne, 713
S.W.2d 481 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (witness fees) . Reviewing the trial court's order
on 07/14/08 and given that the costs awarded totaled $5,583 .30, it seems
probable that the amount in question included, at least, some witness fees .
5 The premise of the majority's opinion was that "the bill of costs was filed within a
reasonable time ." (Slip Op . at 5) .
filed within a reasonable time after the prevailing party was determined .") . In
addition, allowing a bill of costs to be presented within a "reasonable time,"
rather than within the ten (10) days within which the trial court can amend its
judgment, creates the scenario of _separate and additional appeals on disputed
items of cost. Simply put, relieving CR 54 .04 from the strictures of CR 59 .02,
CR 59.05, CR 60.01, CR 60.02, CR 60.03, and CR 60 .05 serves no practical
objective or purpose of the bar or the courts .
As a practical matter, aside from attorneys' and witness' fees (which are
not covered by CR 54 .04), most attorneys prepare their Bill of Costs between
the rendition of the verdict and the issuance of the subsequent judgment .
Thus, the amounts and awards, if significant, are reflected in the judgment, or
at least reserved, pending their resolution . See CR 54.02. In the small number
of cases where the judgment awards costs but does not incorporate the amount
awarded, appropriate bills and/or motions are filed within ten (10) days of the
rendition, reserving the courts' right to adjudicate any dispute, which is
thereafter incorporated in the award. This practice is consistent with the
holding in Kentucky Ass'n of Counties, Inc. v Boyce & Associates, Inc., 2002CA-001170-MR, 2003 WL 1949201 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003), wherein the court
noted:
The procedural facts are undisputed . Judgment was entered on
December 20, 2000; the judgment failed to reference in any
manner the issue of costs. As neither a motion to alter, amend or
vacate nor a notice of appeal was filed, the judgment became final
ten days later on December 30, 2000. CR 52 .02 . It is axiomatic
that the circuit court loses jurisdiction over a judgment upon
finality . As the circuit court was without jurisdiction to amend its
judgment after December 30, 2000, we are of the opinion that the
circuit court properly denied appellants' motion for costs .
Additionally, we observe that an award of costs is not, a separate
action which can be pursued independently of the underlying
claim. By its very nature, an award of costs is dependent upon the
success of the underlying claim and may be viewed simply as a
claim of relief. Upon the whole, we hold that the circuit court
properly denied appellants' motion for costs.
Id. at * 1 . Given that a "court loses jurisdiction once its judgment is
final," Mullins v. Hess, 131 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Ky. Ct. App . 2004), there is
simply no leeway or reason to exempt a simple bill of costs from this
limitation .
Moreover, contrary to the majority's assertion that a "[reeading [ol
the rule provides the obvious, costs are assessed after judgment ." Slip
Op. at 5, I believe that the applicability of the ten (10) day rule is
buttressed by a plain reading of CR 54.04. CR 54 .04 is contained within
Part VII of our civil rules, which deals with "Judgments and Costs." CR
54 .04(1) indicates that "[coosts shall be allowed as [a matter] of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs," indicating that
costs are a matter to be addressed by the court in the original judgment.
CR 54.04(2) directs that the "party entitled to recover costs shall prepare
and serve upon the party liable therefore a bill itemizing the costs
incurred by him in the action." It further provides that, "[i)f within five
days after such service no exceptions to the bill are served on the
prevailing party, the clerk shall endorse on theface of thejudgment the
total amount of costs recoverable as a part of thejudgment." Id.
(emphasis added). If nothing else, this clearly indicates an intent to
conclude this often perfunctory matter swiftly, leading to one appeal not two .
Only if there are exceptions to the bill of costs is the matter to be
"heard and resolved by the trial court in the form of a supplemental
judgment." Id. "Supplemental" is defined as "[t]hat which is added to a
thing to complete it." Black's Law Dictionai-y 1608 (3rd ed. 1968) . A
"supplemental act" is defined as "[tlhat which supplies a deficiency, adds
to or completes, or extends that which is already in existence without
changing or modifying the original ." Id. Thus, it merely adds the
findings and orders relating to costs .
Given that costs are to be reflected on or in the judgment and/or
supplemental judgment, the rules applying to judgments surely apply.
CR 59 .02 ; CR 59 .04 - 05; CR 60.01 - 03; CR 60.05 . It is for these
reasons that I dissent from the majority's opinion asserting that the Bill
of Costs was timely filed in this matter.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Sharon K. H. Morris
James Michael Morris
Morris and Morris, PSC
217 North Upper Street
P.O . Box 394
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Sheila R. Isaac
Judge, Fayette Circuit Court
551 Robert F. Stephens Courthouse
120 N. Limestone Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST:
Susan C. Sears
John Moose Spires
Catherine S. Wright
Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP
250 W. Main St. Ste 1400
Lexington, KY 40507
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