PAUL DUNN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER l. , 2009
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2008-SC-000579-MR
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PAUL DUNN
V.
APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D . ISHMAEL, JR ., JUDGE
NO. 07-CR-00056-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In the early morning hours of November 16, 2006, after a night of heavy
drinking and some cocaine use, Appellant, Paul Dunn, along with two others,
robbed the Mad Mushroom Pizza Restaurant located at 370 South Limestone in
Lexington, Kentucky . At trial, Appellant did not contest that he was involved in
the robbery. Instead, he raised the defense of voluntary intoxication, claiming
that he was too drunk to have formulated the intent to commit the robbery,
and that he had been unwittingly manipulated by his son, Tyson . Considering
this and the issues raised on appeal, the following summary of the crime
should be sufficient.
On that evening, Appellant and his wife, Donna, had been at the home of
their daughter, Arekia. Arekia's boyfriend, Jessie Warren, and Appellant's son,
Tyson, were also there . They all drank a substantial amount of alcohol,
lea e.
including beer and wine coolers. Appellant also went out of the house on
several occasions and smoked crack cocaine. The only significant conversation
of the evening later recalled concerned money. Appellant and his wife argued
over their car payments and who was going to pay them.
The evidence reveals that sometime between 2 a.m . and 4 a.m., Appellant
asked Jessie to take him to get something to eat. Tyson joined them.
Appellant wanted pizza, so they parked at a McDonald's parking lot near the
Mad Mushroom restaurant. Several weeks before, Tyson had told his father
how he had robbed the same pizza place.
While the evidence conflicted somewhat as to what transpired at the site
of the robbery, the Commonwealth presented, and the jury apparently believed,
the following scenario .
Appellant stated that he went into the restaurant to get money. Armed
with a knife, he and Tyson entered through the back door . They each wore
dark bandanas across their faces . Inside, they encountered the night manager,
Brett Hetzell, and a pizza delivery driver, Dan Murphy. At knife point, they
stole money from the office, the cash register, and the safe. Jessie drove
Appellant and Tyson away from the scene.
Officer A.C. Alexander heard the description of the fleeing car on his
police radio and spotted it turning from Harrodsburg Road onto Mason Headley
road. Officer Alexander made a u-turn and followed the car, and shortly
afterward, activated the emergency lights on his cruiser. After seeing the police
lights, the vehicle momentarily came to a stop . Officer Alexander approached
the vehicle on its passenger side and observed Appellant open the door and run
into a brush line, fleeing towards Headley Green Golf Course and ultimately
eluding capture. Tyson Dunn was later captured hiding under a back porch,
and Jessie Warren was apprehended at his residence a few days later.
Based on this evidence, Appellant was convicted by jury trial of robbery
in the first degree, fleeing and evading police in the second degree, and of being
a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree . His 20-year sentence on
the first-degree robbery conviction was enhanced by the jury to 40 years based
on the first-degree PFO conviction, and he received 12 months on the seconddegree fleeing and evading police conviction . The trial court sentenced him
accordingly. He now appeals the final judgment entered as a matter of right,
Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
Appellant raises four issues on appeal: (1) the use of the videotaped
deposition of Officer Bobby Hall at trial; (2) the identification of Appellant's son
as the victim of a prior sexual abuse conviction during the penalty phase of the
trial; (3) evidence elicited by the Commonwealth that Appellant did not give a
statement to the police after his arrest; and (4) the trial court's failure to give a
directed verdict on the fleeing and evading police in the second degree charge.
Each shall be addressed in turn .
The use of the video deposition of Officer Bobby Hall
In its RCr 7 .10 motion, the Commonwealth stated that Officer Bobby Hall
was unavailable because: "He is in the military and has been called to serve .
He has been ordered to report to Ft. Knox, Kentucky at the end of February
where he will be deployed for one year." The Commonwealth argues that an
agreement was made to allow the videotaped deposition: testimony of Officer
Hall to be played at trial . Appellant, however, claims that no such agreement
was made and that the prosecution did not make a "good faith effort" to obtain
the presence of Officer Hall at trial . Appellant, therefore, maintains that the
introduction of the videotaped deposition violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him face to face, as well as
Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution .
The Commonwealth explicitly stated in its RCr 7.10 motion that it
"proposes to take [Officer Hall's] deposition and play his testimony to the Jury
at the trial ." According to statements made by the Commonwealth to the trial
judge, this was standard procedure for attorneys in the area. Additionally,
when this motion was tendered, Appellant levied no objections . In fact,
Appellant's first objection was not until the first day of trial when the
Commonwealth sought to introduce the deposition testimony. We considered a
similar issue in Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S .W.3d 775 (Ky. 2004) .
In Parson, the Commonwealth and defense counsel agreed to present
some of the medical testimony by videotaped deposition . When the
Commonwealth sought to introduce the videotaped deposition of Dr. Timothy
Nichol, defense counsel objected, claiming Nichol was not "unavailable" for
confrontation purposes . This Court ruled that Parson waived his constitutional
right to confrontation, and that the testimony was admissible. Id . at 785.
Specifically, this Court stated:
There is no provision in our criminal rules that would
have allowed Appellant to take a discovery deposition
of a witness for the Commonwealth. Rigsby v .
Commonwealth , 495 S .W.2d 795, 798 (Ky. 1973),
overruled on other grounds by Pendleton v .
Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky . 1985) .
Here, Appellant would accomplish what he otherwise
could not have accomplished were he permitted to
agree to a deposition, RCr 7.10(3) , then welsh on the
agreement after the deposition was concluded and
thereby obtain discovery of the nature of the witness's
testimony.
In this case, Appellant did not object to the Commonwealth's initial
request to introduce Officer Hall's videotaped testimony and play it for the jury.
It was not until the first day of trial that any objection was made, and this
point was referenced by the trial judge when allowing the testimony:
TRIAL JUDGE : But I think under the circumstances,
I'm going to allow the deposition and note [defense
counsel's] position on this, but I am going to allow the
deposition. I'm going to declare he's unavailable in the
sense---somebody on active military, they don't let
those folks in and out at, you know, on a regular
basis . So I do think he's unavailable. And, if, you
know, this had been raised before and some
opportunity had been given to cheek it out a little
further, that would be one thing, but I'm not prepared
to exclude at this time . So I'll overrule your objection
at this time. (Emphasis added) .
Here, by agreeing to the deposition, or at least by not. making a timely
objection, defense counsel acquired pretrial discovery to which he otherwise
was not entitled . Defense counsel's own statement to the trial court
emphasizes this point: "I don't: ever object to the taking of a deposition,
primarily because it's a free shot at discovery." Principles of estoppel and
fundamental fairness now preclude Appellant from claiming a denial of his
right of confrontation under these circumstances . As Appellant waived any
objection to the playing of the videotaped deposition at trial, we need not
determine whether Officer Hall was "unavailable" for confrontation purposes .
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to view
the videotaped deposition of Officer Hall .
The identification of Appellant's son as the victim of a prior sexual
abuse conviction during the penalty phase
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor introduced Fayette
Circuit Court Indictment No. 88-CR-00334, whereby Appellant had been
charged with and ultimately found guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree .
The prosecutor also informed the jury that the victim in this 20-year old case
was Appellant's son and co-defendant, Tyson. Appellant argues that while KR8
532 .055(2)(a) permits the introduction into evidence of "the nature of prior
offenses for which he was convicted," the Commonwealth went too far in this
case . According to Appellant, the statement by the prosecutor identifying the
victim by name denied him his right to a fair trial under the due process
clause . Additionally, Appellant claims that having his son identified as the
victim of the sexual abuse charge outweighed the probative value of the 20-year
old conviction. KRE 403 . Appellant concedes that this was not preserved for
review, but nevertheless requests review pursuant to RCr 10 .26 .
RCr 10 .26 provides: "A palpable error which affects the substantial rights
of a party may be considered . . . and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error." The
necessary showing is an error "so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's
entitlement to due process of law." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W .3d 1, 3
(Ky. 2006) .
"Kentucky's Truth-in-Sentencing statute is geared toward providing the
jury with information relevant to arriving at an appropriate sentence for the
particular offender." Williams v. Commonwealth, 810 S .W.2d 511, 513 (Ky .
1991) . This Court has previously held that "all that is admissible as to the
nature of a prior conviction is a general description of the crime ." Robinson v.
Commonwealth , 926 S.W .2d 853, 855 (Ky. 1996) .
In the instant case, the prosecutor read to the jury the name of the
victim, his age at the time, and the date of the offense . In fact, it appears that
the prosecutor read the indictment verbatim. No additional testimony was
given, nor were any of the more specific facts and circumstances surrounding
the offense offered to the jury. The concerns in Robinson that the jury would
hear extraneous facts about the conviction or, in essence, "retry" prior crimes,
are simply not present in this instance . Id. We do not believe the statements
by the prosecutor fundamentally threatened Appellant's entitlement to due
process of law. Martin , 207 S.W.3d at 3 .
Nor do we believe that the reading of the name from the indictment, or
the prosecutor's statements during the closing argument of the penalty phase,
were so prejudicial as to outweigh their probative value . It is well-settled that
closing arguments are not evidence in the case and prosecutors are given
considerable leeway. Stopher v. Commonwealth , 57 S.W.3d 787, 805-806 (Ky.
2001) . Moreover, this Court has stated that "a prosecutor may use his closing
argument to attempt to `persuade the jurors [that] the matter should not be
dealt with lightly."' Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006),
quoting Harness v. Commonwealth , 475 S .W.2d 485, 490 (Ky. 1971) . KRS
532 .080(3), by its terms, imposes no requirement that prior felony offenses be
committed within a certain period of time . Contrary to the assertion of
Appellant, he did not receive a 40-year sentence "because he was a bad father."
Even if the Commonwealth had not introduced the prior sexual abuse charge,
there was, as the trial court stated, "more than sufficient evidence" to find that
Appellant was a persistent felony offender in the first degree .
We find no palpable error in this instance .
Evidence elicited by the Commonwealth about Appellant's failure to give
a statement to the police following his arrest
Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth improperly elicited evidence
and made comments about the fact that he did not give the police a statement
upon arrest. Appellant concedes that this issue is unpreserved, but asks this
Court for palpable error review . RCr '10.26. Appellant asks us to reverse
because of allegedly improper statements made predominantly during the
penalty phase of his trial after the jury had already determined his guilt, and to
which he made no objection at the time .
Specifically, Appellant points to several different statements. First, in the
deposition of Officer Hall, the prosecutor asked if Appellant had made a
statement. Another was made by the prosecutor during the Commonwealth's
closing argument of the penalty phase. During her closing argument, the
prosecutor discussed how Tyson Dunn had cooperated and had immediately
given a statement to the police. Additionally, Appellant notes the
Commonwealth's cross-examination of him during the penalty phase, where
the prosecutor stated: "You did not talk to the police ."
Due process prohibits the Commonwealth from introducing evidence or
commenting in any manner on the defendant's silence once the defendant has
been informed of his rights and taken into custody. Romans v.
Commonwealth , 547 S .W .2d 128, 130 (Ky. 1977) . However, not every instance
will give rise to reversible error. Wallen v. Commonwealth, 657 S .W.2d 232,
233 (Ky. 1983) . "It is only reversible error where post-arrest silence is
deliberately used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial or
where there is a similar reason to believe the defendant has been prejudiced by
reference to the exercise of his constitutional right." Id . , citin Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U .S . 610 (1976) .
A careful review of the record indicates that no fundamental unfairness
occurred from Officer Hall's statement. The statement to which Appellant
takes issue was the following:
PROSECUTOR : Did he give you any type of statement?
OFFICER HALL: No ma'am . I wasn't present. I was
not present for his interview.
This reference to the post-arrest silence of Appellant is not reversible
error. Officer Hall's statement was a fleeting comment that could be read in a
multitude of ways. Ajury could reasonably believe that this statement meant
that Appellant did, in fact, give a statement, but that Officer Hall was simply
not present at the time it was given. It is ambiguous at best. Furthermore, no
other mention of Appellant's failure to give a statement was made by the
Commonwealth during this phase of the trial. It was Appellant who first made
reference to the fact that he gave no statement to the police. On direct
examination during the penalty phase, the following exchange took place :
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Were you ever taken down to
police headquarters and interviewed?
They never asked me
nothing. They didn't want to know the truth. They
didn't want to know. All they believed was Tyson and
Jessie. You're going to with two statements against
one . You're going to.
APPELLANT:
No, not at all .
This theme of "wanting to get the truth out" was repeated on multiple
occasions by Appellant during questioning by both his own counsel and the
Commonwealth . It was also an important cog in defense counsel's
summarization of his strategy during closing arguments of the penalty phase:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Probably the reason he [did not
take a plea deal] was that he felt like some other
people got some deals they shouldn't have got, because
they sold some stories he didn't think were true . . . .
He wanted to make sure the truth came out . . . . I
would remind you again that he produced himself at
the jail and waited for three and a half hours. He
wasn't given an opportunity to make a statement.
They didn't need one from him at that time .
As noted earlier, a criminal defendant's silence cannot be used to
impeach his testimony at trial. Romans , 547 S .W.2d at 130. However, "the
attorney's failure to object may constitute a waiver of an error having
constitutional implications . In the absence of exceptional circumstances, a
defendant is bound by the trial strategy adopted by his counsel . . . ."
Salisbua v. Commonwealth, 556 S .W.2d 922, 927 (Ky.App. 1977) . In this
case, the jury was confronted with evidence that the police had interviewed
Jessie Warren and Tyson Dunn . Both men told police that it was Appellant
who formulated the plan to rob the Mad Mushroom Pizza Restaurant . These
statements were in direct opposition to Appellant's suggestion that he was
merely a participant in a scheme concocted by Tyson Dunn. Defense counsel
sought to highlight the fact that Appellant made no statement to the police,
and that the police made no effort to obtain one. It was part of a reasonable
trial strategy to send the message to the jury that Appellant simply wanted to
get the truth out. In light of the foregoing, we see no exceptional
circumstances in this case warranting reversal . Id.
Trial court's failure to give a directed verdict on the charge offleeing
and evading in the second degree
A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict on a criminal charge if, after
all inferences being weighed in favor of the Commonwealth, and "under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt[ .]"
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W. 2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) .
KRS 520 .100 states as follows :
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the
second degree when:
(a) As a pedestrian, and with intent to elude or flee, the
person knowingly or wantonly disobeys a direction to
stop, given by a person recognized to be a peace officer
who has an articulable reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been committed by the person fleeing, and
in fleeing or eluding the person is the cause of, or
creates a substantial risk of, physical injury to any
person[.]
There is no question raised in this case that Appellant intentionally fled
from a known police officer or disobeyed a command to stop. Instead,
Appellant submits that the Commonwealth failed to prove the necessary
element that his actions created a "substantial risk of physical injury to any
person."
Appellant's argument is anchored primarily in the case of Bell v.
Commonwealth , 122 S .W.3d 490, 498 (Ky. 2003) . That case is clearly
distinguishable . Bell involved a charge of first-degree fleeing and evading,
where the danger of serious physical injury or death must be posed. There,
this Court held that the mere discarding of a loaded weapon, while in flight, did
not constitute enough of a risk to justify a first-degree fleeing or evading
conviction . Obviously, the burden of proof for a showing of second-degree
fleeing and evading is much less, as no proof of risk of serious physical injury
or death is required.
Here, as Officer Alexander explained, the flight was at night through dark
and uncertain terrain, consisting of rain-slick roads; fences, and brush line.
Furthermore, while fleeing in and of itself may not create a risk of physical
injury, it does establish a likelihood that one who flees is likely to fight or resist
upon being caught. Common sense deems it so . Some kind of physical injury
is not only probable, but likely. Thus, even though no physical injury actually
occurred as a result of Appellant's flight, a jury still could have drawn the
reasonable conclusion from the proof that, by running away from a police
officer in the dark along uncertain terrain and on rain-slick roads, Appellant
created a situation fraught with danger to both himself and to the police officer.
Considering the evidence as a whole, it was not unreasonable for a jury to find
Appellant guilty of fleeing and evading in the second degree.
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court is hereby affirmed .
`
Cunningham, Schroder, Scott and Venters, JJ ., concur . Minton, C.J .,
and Abramson and Noble, JJ ., concur in result only .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Appeals Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601-1109
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Perry Thomas Ryan
Office of Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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