CALVIN D. MYERS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : OCTOBER l, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2008-SC-000548-MR
CALVIN D. MYERS
ON APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C . LOVELACE, JUDGE
NO. 07-CR-00057
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The charges against Appellant arose from an investigation conducted by
the United States Postal Service in early 2006. During this time, Appellant
lived at 608 West 5th Street in Tompkinsville, Kentucky, with his mother, Mabel
Deckard. She maintained P .O . Box 726 at the U.S . Post Office in Tompkinsville
and Appellant was given access to that post office box. In March of 2006,
Eddie Newberry, the U.S . Postmaster for Monroe County, became aware that a
large amount of mail bearing the names of other persons was being delivered to
and sent from both Appellant's home address and his mother's post office box.
According to Ronnie Stinson, the mailman who routinely delivered mail to 608
West
5th
Street and P.O. Box 726, the majority of such mail was card offers like
those found in magazines . Additionally, during this time Newberry witnessed
Appellant going through the post office's dumpster . Appellant was also seen
doing the same by Eddie Paul Murphy, a detective for the Commonwealth
Attorney's Office .
Due to, the suspicious nature of Appellant's actions, Newberry contacted
the U.S. Postmaster Inspector's Office to request assistance in conducting an
investigation . Jason Tatum, a U .S . Postal Inspector, was assigned to
investigate whether Appellant was "dumpster diving" and stealing business
mail order cards. Inspector Tatum's investigation led him to believe that
Appellant was retrieving other people's discarded mail from the dumpster or
post office lobby trash can and altering it with a different mailing address . In
other words, these offer cards were being returned to the various companies
under the correct names, but the addresses had been changed to either
Appellant's home address or his mother's post office box. 1 Inspector Tatum
then advised Postmaster Newberry to intercept and photocopy mail for the two
addresses if the mail recipient/addressee was not known to receive mail there .
All intercepted incoming mail was returned to the sender and all intercepted
outgoing mail from Appellant was not delivered.
At the conclusion of the investigation, Appellant was taken into custody
and read his Miranda rights. At first, Appellant denied all the charges .
However, after a large stack of altered cards was shown to Appellant, he
indicated that he had filled out "some of those," but not all. According to
1 The order forms and offer cards were for such items as magazines, DVDs, calendars,
and the like .
Appellant, he had trained two other individuals, James Burge and Darryl
Cross, to also alter the cards. Since neither Burge nor Cross lived at or
received mail at the above-mentioned addresses, they were not taken into
custody. Inspector Tatum then showed Appellant the altered order cards, as
well as a credit card application, for the indicted charges . After each were
shown, Appellant allegedly conceded that "yes he had" filled out or altered the
cards.
On August 22, 2007, Appellant was indicted by the Monroe County
Grand Jury and charged with eight counts of theft of identity, six counts of
second-degree forgery, one count of false statement as to identity or financial
condition, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. During the
course of the case proceedings, three counts of theft of identity, two counts of
second-degree forgery, and the second-degree persistent felony offender count
were dismissed. On January 10, 2009, Appellant was indicted for ten counts
of being a first-degree persistent felony offender.
At trial, six pieces of intercepted mail were introduced as exhibits . These
consisted primarily of altered orders and a credit card application for the
following six individuals : Sarah J. Brandon, Vickie Pruitt, Tonya Anderson,
Sheila Carter, Randy Williams, and William Edward Vibbert. Each testified
that he or she did not complete the order cards or give anyone permission to do
so. After a one-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of
five counts of theft of identity of another, three counts of second-degree forgery,
and one count of false statement as to identity or financial condition .
Additionally, the jury found Appellant guilty of being a first-degree persistent
felony offender and recommended PFO enhanced sentences of twenty years
imprisonment on each .of the nine counts, to run concurrently, for a total
period of twenty years. Appellant now appeals the final judgment entered as a
matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
Appellant raises multiple issues on appeal: (l.) the trial court erred in
failing to include jury instructions for attempt as to all counts ; (2) convictions
for both theft of identity or false statement as to identity or financial condition,
and second-degree forgery constituted double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred
in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the four counts of
second-degree forgery; and (4) Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on all
counts due to lack of sufficient evidence .
Jury in;tructions for attempt as to all counts
'Appellant argues that he was entitled to attempt instructions under KRS
506 .100(1)(b) for all charges. According to Appellant, these instructions were
necessary because the intended crimes were never completed due to the
interception of the offer cards by law enforcement. Therefore, because
Appellant received no actual pecuniary benefits, only a substantial step was
taken .
Kentucky law requires instructions "applicable to every state of case
covered by the indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by
the testimony." Commonwealth v. Collins, 821 S .W.2d 488, 491 (Ky. 1991),
(quoting Lee v. Commonwealth , 329 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1959)) . See also RCr
9 .54(l) . A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any lawful defense that he
has, including the defense that he is guilty of a lesser included offense of the
crime charged. Slaven v. Commonwealth , 962 S .W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997) . An
instruction on a lesser included offense is required "if the evidence would
permit the jury to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the primary
offense, but guilty of the lesser offense ." Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S .W.3d
534, 539 (Ky. 1999) .
The problem with Appellant's argument is that the charged offenses do
not require that their intended result be accomplished . The gist of all three
offenses is guilty intent coupled with action towards the purpose or result.
There is no language in KRS 516.030, KRS 514 .060, and KRS 434 .570, and
Appellant points to none, which requires that the individual actually receive
the goods sought. Forgery under KRS 516 .030 is committed when a person,
"with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another . . . falsely makes, completes
or alters a written instrument which is or purports to be or which is calculated
to become or to represent when completed" one of the enumerated writings
listed in the following subsections . Theft of identity under KRS 514.160 is
committed when a person "knowingly possesses or uses any current or former
identifying information of the other person . . . with the intent to represent that
he or she is the other person . . . ." Finally, a false statement as to identity or
financial condition under KRS 4.34 .570 is committed when a person "makes or
causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in writing,
knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on . . . for the purpose of
procuring the issuance of a credit or debit card . . . ." As these statutes plainly
indicate, actual pecuniary gain is not required, and Appellant was, therefore,
not entitled to attempt instructions . See Hopper v. Evans , 456 U.S. 605, 611
(1982) ("[D]ue process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be
given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction .") . There was no
error .
Double jeopardy
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
dismiss the second-degree forgery counts as being barred by double jeopardy
principles. Appellant was convicted of two separate crimes for each of four
altered order cards or applications relating to the following four individuals:
Vickie Pruitt, Tonya Anderson, Sheila Carter, and William Vibbert . Specifically,
Appellant was convicted of theft of identity and second-degree forgery for
signing and using Vickie Pruitt's name on "The Mystery Guild" enrollment
form; theft of identity and second-degree forgery for signing and using Tonya
Anderson's name on "The Good Cook" enrollment form; theft of identity and
second-degree forgery for signing and using Sheila Carter's name to a
"Kingsford Planners" order form; and false statement as to identity or financial
situation and second-degree forgery for signing and using William Vibbert's
name on a credit card application . The crux of Appellant's complaint is that
there is no "mutually exclusive fact in existence" between the forgery
convictions and the convictions for either theft of identity or false statement as
to identity or financial condition, other than saying that signing someone's
name to a document and writing their name to the same document are
different acts. See Clark v. Commonwealth , 267 S .W.3d 668, 677 (Ky . 2008)
("It is true that an overlap of proof does not, of its own accord, establish a
double jeopardy violation . However, an inability to point to the requirement of
at least one mutually exclusive fact in existence does ." (citations omitted)) .
A single act may be prosecuted and punished under different statutory
provisions if each offense requires proof of a factual element that the other does
not, even despite substantial overlap in the evidence used to prove the offenses.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ; Taylor v.
Commonwealth , 995 S .W .2d 355, 358 (Ky. 1999) . See also United States v.
Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 386 (1992) . The focus is on the proof necessary to prove
the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence
presented at trial. Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 S .W.2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) .
We do not believe that Appellant received multiple punishments for the
same offense, in violation of his double jeopardy rights. Each charged offense
required proof of an additional factual element that the others did not. KRS
516.030(1) (forgery in the second degree) required the Commonwealth to prove
that the written instrument falsely made by Appellant be one of the specifically
enumerated documents listed in subsection (a) . No such requirement exists for
either the charge of theft of identity or false statement as to identity or financial
condition . KRS 514 .160(1) (theft of identity) required the Commonwealth to
show that-Appellant knowingly possessed or used any "current or former
identifying information of the other person . . . with the intent to represent that
he or she is the other person . . ." for one of the purposes listed in the following
subsections . Again, this specific intent requirement was not necessary for
convictions under the other two charged offenses. Finally, KRS 434 .570 (false
statement as to identity or financial condition) makes explicit that the
Commonwealth must show an additional element; namely, that Appellant
made a false written statement to obtain a credit or debit card. Although the
offenses can be committed based on the same transaction or event, the
offenses have different elements and are, therefore, not the same, and
conviction of each is not barred by double jeopardy.
The Commonwealth introduced evidence to prove each offense and
sufficiently differentiated each count from the others . Moreover, the jury was
separately instructed on each charged offense and ultimately concluded that
Appellant was guilty of each. See Miller v. Commonwealth , 77 S .W.3d 566, 576
(Ky. 2002) . We agree with the Commonwealth that, under the facts of this
case, second-degree forgery, theft of identity and false statement as to identity
or financial condition are separate offenses for which Appellant may be
punished for committing . As such, we find no error.
Directed verdict on four counts of second-degree forgery
Appellant's next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the four counts of second-degree
forgery. According to Appellant, the Commonwealth failed to prove that the
offer cards and credit card applications fell within the purview of KRS 516.030.
Appellant contends that enrollment cards to "The Good Cook" and "Mystery
Guild" book clubs, an order form for "Kingsford Planners" and a credit card
application are not written instruments with legal effect .
This issue was not properly preserved for review. While Appellant's
motion for a directed verdict listed many grounds as a basis for relief, it did not
specify this particular ground . CR 50 .01 . See also Potts v . Commonwealth,
172 S .W.3d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 2005) . We, therefore, decline to address it in this
case.
Directed verdicts on all counts due to lack of evidence
Appellant lastly argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict as to all
counts due to insufficiency of evidence . On a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial judge must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth . C ommonwe alth v . Benham, 816 S W 2d 186 (Ky.
1991) . The standard for appellate review of a denial of a motion for a directed
verdict based on insufficient evidence is if, under the evidence as a whole, it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty, he is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Commonwealth v . Sawhill, 660
S .W .2d 3 (Ky. 1983) .
We disagree with Appellant. While it is true that none of the victims in
this case knew who filled out the order forms and applications in their names,
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that
Appellant did so. See Dillingham v. Commonwealth , 995 S.W .2d 377, 380 (Ky.
1999) . Each of the victims testified that he or she did not fill out the forms nor
authorize anyone else to do so . The mail in question was intercepted after
being delivered to or mailed from either 608 West 51h Street or P.O. Box 726.
The only two individuals living at the home address were Appellant and his
mother. Also, testimony was given that Appellant had access to the post office
box. In addition, Detective Murphy testified that Appellant admitted to filling
out the six specific offer cards and the credit application that were the source
of these charges. While Inspector Tatum's testimony conflicted in some
respects with that of Detective Murphy, it is ultimately for the jury to determine
the credibility of witnesses. Jones v. Commonwealth, 281 S .W.2d 920, 922
(Ky. 1955) . The jury was free to make a decision as to which witness to believe.
Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S .W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1995) .
The Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence as to all charges to
overcome Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Commonwealth v. Benham,
816 S .W .2d . at 187-88 ("[T)here must be evidence of substance, and the trial
court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the
prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence.") . The
evidence showed that Appellant completed or altered multiple offer cards, order
forms, and a credit card application using the names and identifying
information of other persons. In addition, the evidence showed that Appellant
forged signatures and provided false information with the intent and purpose to
obtain property, defraud others, or obtain a credit card. As such, the trial
court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
The judgment of the Monroe Circuit Court is hereby affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Stephen Bryant Humphress
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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