CRAIG EDWARD BASSHAM V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 29, 2009
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CRAIG EDWARD BASSHAM
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
NOS . 05-CR-003593 8v 06-CR-002159
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On April 1, 2008, Appellant, Craig Edward Bassham, was found
guilty by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury of rape in the first degree,
terroristic threatening in the third degree, and carrying a concealed
deadly weapon . He later pled guilty to promoting contraband in the first
degree, two (2) counts of illegal possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana), possession of drugs not in original container, and being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree . For these crimes,
Appellant was sentenced to twenty-two (22) years imprisonment .
Appellant now appeals his conviction as a matter of right . Ky. Const. ยง
110(2)(b) .
I. Background
Appellant and R.S . engaged in sexual intercourse on October 18,
2005-a fact uncontested by either party. Appellant claims that he had
consensual sex with R .S ., while R.S. claims that she was raped by
Appellant. Due to their disparate claims, the facts presented at trial by
each side differed dramatically .
On October 18, 2005, R.S. lived in Regency Mobile Home Park in
Louisville . She testified that she was sitting alone in her trailer that
night waiting on her roommate, John Foote, to return home from work.
At some point between 10:00 and 11 :30 that evening, an unknown man
rushed into the trailer yelling for Leslie . I She told the man to leave and
threatened to call the police. The man took a knife from her kitchen
counter, walked up behind her, and put the knife to her throat. The
unknown assailant then threatened R.S. with the knife, threw her onto
the couch, and raped her. He threatened to kill her if she called the
police, took her cell phone, and stated that he would come back to see
whether the police had arrived. The attacker then left, taking the knife
from R.S .'s kitchen counter with him.
Foote testified that as he approached the trailer when he returned
home from work, sometime between 11 :00 p .m. and midnight, he saw
someone with dark pants and a dark, hooded shirt get on a bicycle and
leave . When he went inside, R.S. was seated in a kitchen chair, rocking
back and forth and crying. When Foote asked her what was wrong, she
recounted her version of events regarding what had taken place that
1 Leslie "Les" Bassham was R .S.'s boyfriend and Appellant's uncle .
night . Foote then convinced R .S . to call the police, though she was
reluctant at first.
Appellant's contentions regarding the night of October 18, 2005
stand in stark contrast to R.S .'s. Appellant testified- that he entered
R.S.'s trailer looking for his uncle, Leslie Bassham, with whom he
worked, and had picked up at the trailer on numerous occasions . When
R.S. told him Leslie was not there, he stated that he wanted to smoke
marijuana with Leslie . Appellant testified that R.S . indicated that she
would like to smoke some marijuana with him and he obliged.2
Appellant testified that as they passed the marijuana joint, R.S .
would brush his hand and he took this as an indication that she was
"coming on to him ." Appellant stated that he tried to get away from R.S .
at some point, but that she pulled him back toward her. He stated that
he never threatened R.S. and that the two of them engaged in consensual
sexual intercourse, with R .S . stating that she hoped Leslie did not find
out. Appellant then left the trailer, passing Foote on his way out.
2 Appellant's claims that he and R.S . smoked marijuana on the night in
question were not substantiated by testimony at trial. Foote, Leslie
Bassham, and Officer Streever all testified that they were familiar with the
odor of marijuana smoke, but did not detect it in the trailer on the night of
October 18, 2005. Officer Cambron also testified that he was familiar with
the odor of marijuana smoke, but did not detect it on Appellant when he
stopped him and that Appellant, while possessing individual baggies of
marijuana, did not have rolling papers on his person . Additionally, Dr. Price
and Riddick (an EMT who responded to the scene), both of whom examined
R. S . that night, stated that she did not seem to be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol . Finally, when the trial court allowed a juror to ask
Detective Cohen whether there had been any physical evidence of marijuana
being smoked at R. S .'s trailer, she responded that she was not aware of any
such evidence.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant not guilty of
burglary in first degree, but did find him guilty of: rape in the first
degree, terroristic threatening in the third degree, and carrying a
concealed deadly weapon . The following day, Appellant entered into a
plea agreement as to the penalty to be imposed for the jury's findings of
guilt and also pled guilty to the following offenses which had been
severed for trial: promoting contraband in the first degree, two counts of
illegal possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), possession of
drugs not in the original container, and to being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree. For these crimes, the trial court imposed
a total sentence of twenty-two (22) years .
On appeal, Appellant raises five principal allegations of error: (1)
that the trial court failed to suppress certain statements that were the
product of custodial interrogation; (2) that inadmissible hearsay
statements were introduced that had not been made for the purpose of
medical treatment or diagnosis; (3) that prior consistent statements were
improperly introduced, which only served to bolster R.S .'s testimony; (4)
that he was denied his right to effective cross-examination and
confrontation when the trial court limited his ability to ask questions
regarding R. S .'s mental health ; and (5) that the evidence was insufficient
for the jury to find him guilty of carrying a concealed deadly weapon .
Finding no cause for reversal, we affirm Appellant's convictions.
II. Analysis
A. Though The Trial Court Erred In Admitting Appellant's
Statement Made During Custodial Interrogation, Such Error Was
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.
Appellant claims that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to suppress statements he made to Officer Cambron prior to his
arrest, arguing that they were the product of custodial interrogation in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S . 436 (1966) . While we agree
with Appellant that the trial court erred in denying his suppression
motion, we decline to reverse on these grounds because we conclude that
the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tanya Owens was R.S .'s neighbor in October 2005. Owens
testified that she knew Appellant, and had seen him at R .S .'s trailer twice
that night. The first time Appellant approached the trailer, Owens stated
that he knocked on the door and asked for "Les." The second time
Appellant went to R. S.'s trailer, she heard Appellant knock and then saw
him walk through the open door. After getting Appellant's name and
physical description from Owens, Officer Streevers (who had responded
to the scene on the night of October 18, 2005) relayed it over his police
radio . Officers Cambron and Brown responded when the information
about the rape suspect came out over their radios.
Prior to trial, Appellant made a motion to suppress certain
statements he made to Officer Cambron before being advised of his
Miranda rights concerning whether he had been at the Regency Trailer
Park on the night of the crime . The day before trial, the court held a
5
suppression hearing at which Cambron testified that he saw Appellant
riding on his bike by the road and noticed that he matched the
description of the suspect. At this point, Cambron stated that he flashed
his lights and tapped his siren, causing Appellant to pull over beside 'the
road . Officer Matt Brown was following Cambron in his police cruiser
and radioed Cambron as he approached Appellant, advising him that
Appellant was carrying a knife in his back pocket. Cambron stated that
he removed the partially concealed knife from Appellant's pocket and
asked him why he was carrying it. According to Cambron, Appellant
responded that he had the knife for personal protection .
After removing the knife, Cambron asked Appellant for his name,
which Appellant truthfully provided . Cambron testified that the name
provided by Appellant matched that of the suspect wanted for
questioning in the rape investigation . Cambron then asked Appellant if
he had any other weapons or drugs on him and Appellant admitted to
possessing the latter, including bags of marijuana and Xanax pills.
Cambron then proceeded to pat him down and confiscate the drugs from
his person. Cambron stated that when he questioned Appellant as to
why he was carrying bags of marijuana, Appellant indicated that he had
to feed his kids .
Cambron next asked Appellant if he had been in Regency Trailer
Park that night and Appellant responded, "No, where is that?" It is this
statement Appellant sought to suppress at trial . Cambron then arrested
Appellant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of his police
6
cruiser. It was not until he was later placed in a holding cell that
Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights by Detective Sherrard .
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth
argued that it was permissible for the police to determine whether
Appellant was indeed the suspect wanted for questioning before advising
him of his Miranda rights, that Appellant was not in custody until he was
placed under arrest, and that there was no evidence that Appellant
believed he was in custody until that time. Appellant countered, arguing
that a person in his position would not have believed that he or she was
free to leave after officers had confiscated drugs from his person, and
that he was not, in fact, free to leave.
The trial court issued an oral ruling denying Appellant's motion to
suppress, determined that Appellant was not in custody until he was
placed under arrest, and held that the officers were under no duty to
advise Appellant of his Miranda warnings until they arrested him. For
these reasons, the trial court concluded that Appellant's statements
regarding Regency Trailer Park were not obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation and, therefore, were not subject to suppression .
Our review of the trial court's ruling denying Appellant's
suppression motion is two-pronged . Under the first prong, we must
determine whether the factual findings of the trial court were supported
by substantial evidence on the issue of whether Appellant was in custody
when Officer Cambron asked him if he had been at Regency Trailer Park.
Beckham v. Commonwealth, 248 S .W .3d 547, 551 (Ky.2008) (citing
7
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W .3d. 403, 405 (Ky. 2006)) ; see RCr 9 .78
("If supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial
court shall be conclusive .") . Under the second prong, we conduct a de
novo review to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct as
a matter of law. Olden v . Commonwealth, 203 S .W.3d 672, 676 (Ky.
2006) (citing Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S .W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. App.
2000)) ; see Adcock v. Commonwealth , 967 S.W .2d 6, 8 (Ky .1998) . We
examine each in turn .
As to the first issue, we conclude that the trial court's factual
findings were not supported by substantial evidence and thus were not
conclusive . The trial court found that the order of events surrounding
Appellant's statement was as follows: Cambron approached Appellant on
foot, removed a knife from his back pocket, asked him if he had been at
Regency Trailer Park that night, and, lastly, removed drugs from him.
However, the record indicates that Cambron in fact confiscated the drugs
from Appellant before asking him if he had been at Regency Trailer Park.
In conducting the second prong of our analysis, we examine the
trial court's decision at the suppression hearing de novo to determine
whether it was correct as a matter of law. Olden, 203 S.W .3d at 676.
Under Miranda, statements given in response to custodial interrogation
are only admissible if a Miranda warning was given beforehand . 384
U .S . at 478-479 . In order for statements elicited during custodial
interrogation to be admissible, the now well-recognized Miranda
warnings required the officers to inform Appellant that:
8
he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires .
Id . at 479 . Here, the Commonwealth concedes that a Miranda warning
was not given before Appellant made the statements that he contends
were inadmissible . Thus, if Appellant's statements were a product of
custodial interrogation, they should have been suppressed prior to trial.
Id.
Miranda defines custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id at
444 . The United States Supreme Court has explained that a formal
arrest is not required for custodial interrogation : "the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest ." California v .
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) . While the specific circumstances
of each situation often determine whether an individual is in custody for
purposes of Miranda , the standard is objective : "the only relevant
inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S . 420, 442
(1984) .
In order to determine whether a particular set of circumstances
constitutes custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, a reviewing
Court must conduct a two-part inquiry: "[ f rrst, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation ; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave ." Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S . 99, 112 (1995) .
We must first examine the totality of events before, during, and
after the interrogation. Id . The record shows that, upon seeing
Appellant, who matched the suspect's description, Cambron turned on
his blue lights and tapped the siren and Appellant pulled over on the
bicycle he was riding. Cambron then walked up to Appellant, removed a
partially-concealed knife from Appellant's back pocket, and asked for his
name. Next, Cambron placed Appellant in front of the police car while he
and Officer Brown stood next to him . Cambron asked Appellant if he
had any drugs or other weapons on him and Appellant told him that he
had marijuana in his pockets and Xanax pills in his cigarette box.
Cambron then confiscated the drugs from Appellant's person . After
doing so, Cambron asked Appellant if he had been to the Regency Trailer
Park that night .
We must determine how a reasonable person placed in Appellant's
position would have perceived the situation. Id . In Lucas, we explained
that: "[c]ustody does not occur until police, by some form of physical
force or show of authority, have restrained the liberty of an individual .
The test is whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave." 195
10
S.W.3d at 405 . We went on to articulate several factors that may help
determine whether an, individual had been taken into custody, such as :
"the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the
person, or use of a tone ur language that might compel compliance with
the request of the police." Id.
Here, the circumstances indicate that Appellant was in custody at
the time Cambron asked him if he had been to the trailer park and that
Appellant's answer to this question should have been suppressed by the
trial court. At the time of the questioning, Appellant was standing
between two officers in front of a police car. Cambron had just removed
marijuana and Xanax pills from Appellant's pocket. 3 Thus, at least two
of the Lucas factors seem to be present here : Appellant was surrounded
by two police officers at the scene and Cambron had previously touched
Appellant on at least two occasions-once to remove the knife and
another in order to confiscate the drugs. We must conclude that a
reasonable person in Appellant's situation would not have believed that
he or she was free to terminate the interrogation and leave .
The Commonwealth contends that even if Appellant was in
custody, Cambron's question was not interrogative in nature, but rather
represented an attempt to identify Appellant. This Court, indeed, has
3 At the suppression hearing, Cambron acknowledged that once he
confiscated the drugs, it was his intention to arrest Appellant and would not
have allowed him to leave the scene . However, the inquiry we must make is
not whether Appellant was, in fact, free to leave the scene, but rather how a
reasonable person in Appellant's position would have interpreted the
situation .
held that merely asking an individual for identification does not amount
to custodial interrogation . Port v . Commonwealth, 906 S .W.2d 327, 331
(Ky. 1995) . However, the actions taken by Officer Cambron exceeded
merely asking Appellant for identification and fell within the bounds of
interrogation :
[i]nterrogation has been defined to include "any
words or actions on the part of police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect . . . focus[ing] primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police .
Wells v. Commonwealth , 892 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1995) (quoting Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U .S . 291, 301 (1980)) .
Here, Cambron had already identified Appellant when he asked
whether he had been to Regency Trailer Park that night: Cambron had
observed Appellant riding his bike and noticed that he matched the
physical description of the suspect and, additionally, the first question
Cambron asked Appellant was his name, which matched that of the
suspect. Therefore, Cambron knew Appellant's identity when he asked if
Appellant had been to the trailer park . This question was surely meant
to elicit an incriminating response, as an affirmative answer would put
Appellant at the scene of the crime . Accordingly, the Commonwealth's
argument that Cambron's question was not tantamount to interrogation
(but merely an effort to identify the suspect) is simply not convincing.
Having concluded that the trial court's failure to suppress
Cambron's testimony ran afoul of the dictates of Miranda, we must now
consider whether this error is substantial enough to warrant reversal .
The Commonwealth contends that even if Appellant's statement was the
product of custodial interrogation, the trial court's error was harmless .
This Court has stated that, "[a]n error is harmless where, considering the
entire case, the substantial rights of the defendant are not affected or
there appears to be no likely possibility that the result would have been
different had the error not occurred ." Greene v. Commonwealth, 1.97
S .W.3d 76, 84 (Ky . 2006) (citations omitted) .
Here, however, because
the trial court's error infringed upon a constitutional right, the standard
is heightened and the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" to avoid reversal. Chapman v. California , 386 U.S . 18, 24 (1967) ;
see Talbott v . Commonwealth , 968 S .W.2d 76 (Ky. 1998) .
Appellant argues that the admission of his statement made to
Cambron, in which he denied having been to Regency Trailer Park that
night, was highly prejudicial to him. The record shows that Appellant
was read his Miranda warnings only after he was arrested, driven to the
police station, and placed in a holding cell-after he had already made
his first denial of being at the Regency Trailer Park that night. However,
after he was Mirandized, he again denied having been at Regency Trailer
Park that evening: stating that he only rode by the trailer park on his
bicycle. Appellant's previous denial, therefore, appears to be nothing
13
more than cumulative evidence, and the error in failing to suppress it
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, Appellant contends that after being Mirandized, he
contradicted part of his previous statement. He argues that since he did
not deny knowing the location of the trailer park after receiving his
Miranda warnings, but rather, just denied having been in the trailer park
that night, this was not cumulative evidence. In particular, Appellant
makes the strained argument that because he later admitted to riding by
the trailer park, he thus knew its location, contradicting his previous
statement that he did not know the location of Regency Trailer Park.
Appellant's contention is without merit. Cambron did not ask him
if he knew the location of the trailer park, but rather if he had been
there. Appellant's answer to this question did not change after he was
given his Miranda warnings . Appellant still denied having been to the
trailer park, though he did admit to riding by it. Even if these
statements were marginally inconsistent with one another, any
discrepancy was not significant.4 Accordingly, though the trial court
erred in admitting Cambron's statement at trial, we conclude that the
effect of the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
4 Appellant's alleged denial of knowing the location of the trailer park was
negligible when compared to the other evidence presented against him. The
record demonstrates that there was substantial evidence against Appellant,
including DNA and medical evidence. Appellant's DNA matched the semen
found in R. S .'s vaginal swab. The doctor that examined R. S . at the hospital
noted diffuse bruising on R.S.'s chest, scratches and bruising on R.S.'s upper
chest and arms, and swelling and bruising on her lower back.
14
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Admitting Medical Records And
Statements Made For the Purpose Of Medical Diagnosis And
Treatment.
Appellant next argues that it was reversible error for the trial court
to permit Dr. Sarah Price to testify as to statements made by R. S. and to
allow the introduction of R . S .'s medical records because they were
inadmissible hearsay.-'3 We disagree and hold that the trial court did not
err in admitting this evidence, as it was admissible pursuant to KRE
803(4) .
Appellant challenges two items of evidence introduced at trial .
Appellant first contends that the medical history R.S. gave to a nurse in
the emergency room should not have been admitted as evidence .
Second, he contests the admission of certain statements that R.S . made
to Dr. Price in the emergency room . In particular, R.S . told Dr. Price that
she had been sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant and that the
perpetrator had held her at knifepoint, thrown her to the ground,
vaginally penetrated her, and hit her in the face and chest. The parties
concede that both R.S .'s medical history and her statements to Dr. Price
were hearsay.
In Kentucky, even if the declarant is available as a witness, KRE
803(4) permits the admission of certain statements that would normally
5 The Commonwealth's contention that Appellant failed to preserve this issue
for our review is without merit. Appellant objected at trial on the basis that
the statements were inadmissible hearsay. The Commonwealth contends
that this objection was insufficient because Appellant was additionally
required to object to the relevancy of the statements in order to properly
preserve this issue. Appellant's hearsay objection at trial adequately
preserved this issue for our review.
15
constitute inadmissible hearsay: "[s]aatements made for purposes of
medical treatment or diagnosis and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to treatment or diagnosis . "6 Additionally, any statement that
qualifies under this exception must also be subjected to KRE 403's
balancing test, which seeks to determine whether its "probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice ." Garrett 48
S .W .3d at 14 .
Here, Appellant primarily takes issue with the portions of R.S .'s
medical history and Dr. Price's testimony which indicated that the
assailant held R.S . at knifepoint, threw her to the ground, and hit her in
the face and chest . Appellant claims that these statements failed to aid
in R. S .'s medical treatment and diagnosis and that the evidence was
unduly prejudicial because it was used to improperly bolster R . S.'s
credibility . Appellant argues that R.S .'s claim that she was held at
knifepoint does not fit under this exception because she was not treated
for any knife-related physical injuries . We conclude that Dr. Price's
knowledge that R. S. was held at knifepoint may have been beneficial to
her diagnosis or treatment. It might have indicated that R.S . was
6 In Garrett v. Commonwealth , 48 S.W.3d 6, 14 (Ky. 2001), we held that
there is no distinction between treating and nontreating physicians in
applying the KRE 803(4) exception. Therefore, both the medical history R.S .
gave in the emergency room and the statements she made to Dr. Price fit
under the exception so long as they were made for the purposes of her
treatment or diagnosis.
16
suffering from shock, or the general severity of the physical and
emotional trauma she endured during the rape . Moreover, the probative
value of these statements outweighs any danger of prejudicing Appellant.
The record shows that R. S. stated the facts surrounding her attack but
did not place blame on any identifiable individual . In addition, in order
for R.S . to receive proper treatment for and diagnosis of her injuries,
medical personnel needed to know she had been thrown to the ground
and hit in the face and chest during the attack . These facts describing
the "inception or general character of the cause or external source" of her
injuries were clearly "reasonably pertinent to [her] treatment or
diagnosis ." KRE 803(4) .
R.S .'s medical history fits within the KRE 803(4) exception and is
relevant. Dr. Price testified that, in order to know which tests to perform
for the rape kit, she needed to know as much as she could about R.S .'s
past . The probative value of R . S.'s medical history and statements to Dr.
Price was substantial and there was no indication that Appellant was
unduly prejudiced by the admission of this evidence. As above, neither
the medical history nor the statements identified Appellant or provided
any extraneous details . If the statements did enhance R.S.'s credibility,
it was not so prejudicial as to overcome the heightened standard
announced in Garrett: "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of undue prejudice ." Garrett, 783 S .W.3d at 14.
C. The Trial Court Erred By Allowing The Introduction Of Certain
Prior Consistent Statements, But The Error Was Harmless.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce prior consistent statements made by R.S . in
police interviews . Both parties agree that prior to the introduction of
R.S .'s statements, Appellant attempted to impeach her credibility by
questioning her about discrepancies between statements she made in the
police interviews and her subsequent testimony at trial. However,
"[m]erely challenging the truthfulness of a witness's testimony does not
open the door to a parade of witnesses who repeat the witness's story as
told to them." Bussey v. Commonwealth , 797 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Ky.
1990) .
The Commonwealth argues these prior consistent statements were
used to rebut Appellant's express or implied charges of recent fabrication
and improper motive pursuant to KRE 801A(a)(2) .7 Appellant counters
that he made no such charges regarding a recent fabrication or improper
motive and that even if he had, the statements were inadmissible
7 KRE 801A(a)(2) reads:
Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined
concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as
required by KRE 613, and the statement is: . . .
Consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive[ .]
because R . S.'s motive existed before she made the prior consistent
statements . We agree with Appellant and conclude that the trial court
erred by admitting the statements, but decline to reverse on this basis,
as the error was harmless .
In order for prior consistent statements to be properly admitted,
there must first be an express or implied allegation of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive . KRE 801 (A) (a) (2) . Secondly, if such
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive is alleged, the prior
consistent statement must have been made before the alleged fabrication
or improper influence or motive arose . Tome v . United States, 513 U .S .
150 (1995) ; Slaven v . Commonwealth , 962 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1997) ; see
also Noel v. Commonwealth , 76 S .W.3d 923 (Ky. 2002) .
In the case at bar, the Commonwealth argued that the prior
consistent statements were admissible to rebut Appellant's allegation of
recent fabrication or improper motive . However, Appellant denied
making any such allegation and argued that the Commonwealth could
not introduce R .S .'s prior consistent statements based solely on the fact
that Appellant impeached her. The trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce statements made by R.S . during interviews
with Detective Cohen which were consistent with her testimony at trial.
The Commonwealth questioned both R.S . and Detective Cohen regarding
the prior consistent statements contained in these interviews .
The Commonwealth asserts that Appellant implied that R.S .'s
motive to lie was that she wanted sympathy from others and that she did
19
not want her boyfriend to know she had engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse with his nephew. Even if Appellant did imply that these were
R.S .'s motives to fabricate, they existed from the time R.S . made her first
statement. The prior consistent statements introduced at trial were not
made at a time before these motives came into existence pursuant to
Tome.
As the prior consistent statements did not fall into any exception to
the general prohibition against hearsay, the trial court erred by admitting
them . However, such error was harmless . "A non-constitutional
evidentiary error may be deemed harmless, the United States Supreme
Court has explained, if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error ." Winstead
v. Commonwealth , 283 S.W .3d 678, 688-689 (Ky. 2009) (citin Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U .S. 750 (1946)) . In Winstead , we provided a
further clarification of the standard to be used : "[t]he inquiry is not
simply 'whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart
from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the
error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand ."' 283 S.W .3d at 689 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U .S . at 765) .
There is no substantial possibility that the verdict in the case at
bar was swayed by the improper admission of R.S .'s prior consistent
statements ; therefore, the error was harmless . Appellant claims that he
and R .S . engaged in consensual sexual intercourse after smoking
20
marijuana together. However, none of the many individuals who were
present in R.S.'s trailer that night, all of whom were familiar with the
odor of marijuana, detected any evidence of such . Appellant also claims
that he never held a knife to R.S .'s throat and the knife police found on
his person when they apprehended him was alternatively either for
personal protection or for use in his job as a painter. The knife carried
by Appellant was not a knife one would associate with either personal
protection or painting-but rather, it was a kitchen knife, such as the
one R .S . claimed Appellant removed from her kitchen and used to
threaten her while he raped her. The bruises on R.S .'s body were
consistent with the series of events she described to both police and
medical professionals: that she had been pushed down and physically
restrained by Appellant during the course of the sexual assault.8 In
short, there is no substantial possibility, given all the other evidence in
the case at bar, that the verdict was swayed due to the improper
admission of a limited number of R.S .'s prior consistent statements.
Winstead , 283 S .W .3d at 689 .
8 R.S. was transported to the University of Louisville Hospital where she was
examined by Dr. Price. Price testified that R .S. had diffuse bruising on her
chest, scratches and bruising on her upper chest and arms and swelling and
bruising on her lower back. Price observed no bruising or bleeding during
R.S.'s pelvic exam, but testified at trial that in her experiences with sexual
assaults of middle-aged women who had five children, such as R.S., she
would not expect to see trauma unless the assault had been especially
brutal. Dr. Price also testified as to the medications R.S. was taking and
noted that she was alert and responsive to questions and did not appear to
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
21
D. Appellant Was Not Denied His Right Of Confrontation.
Appellant contends that his right of confrontation was violated
when the trial court refused to allow him to ask Dr. Price about the uses
for one of the drugs R .S . was prescribed-which included schizophrenia
and bi-polar disorder. The trial court conducted an in camera review of
R.S .'s mental health records to determine whether they contained
exculpatory evidence . The court issued a written order with the names
and dosages of the drugs prescribed to R.S . on the night of the rape and
stated Appellant would be allowed to ask R.S . "if she was taking these
medications on October 18, 2005 and whether her sense of perception
was affected."
Appellant, as a criminal defendant, had a right under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to cross-examine adverse witnesses. This right, however, is
not without bounds . Holt v. Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d 647, 653 (Ky.
2008) (The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee that the defense be
able to conduct cross examination in whatever manner and extent they
desire .) . Rather, "the trial court retains the discretion to set limitations
on the scope and subject" of cross-examination . Davenport v.
Commonwealth, 177 S .W.3d 763, 767-68 (Ky . 2005) . Reasonable limits
may be imposed by the trial court "based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U .S. 673, 679 (1986) .
22
At trial, Appellant questioned Dr. Price regarding the uses for
Seroquel, one of the medications R.S. took for depression and anxiety.
Dr. Price testified that she was familiar with the Phvsician's Desk
Reference (which the trial court determined to fall under the learned
treatises exception to the hearsay rule found in KRE 803(18)) and,
agreeing with the text, testified that Seroquel was used to treat
schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder. Because the trial court found no
evidence that R. S . suffered from either of these conditions in its in
camera review of her mental health records, it admonished the jury to
disregard these statements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in disallowing this testimony, as the jury could have easily been misled
by testimony regarding schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder when R.S.
had been diagnosed with neither .
Appellant also contends that the trial court violated his right of
confrontation when it refused to let him refer to R.S .'s depression and
anxiety as mental illnesses or to allow him to question R.S. and Dr. Price
about the symptoms and effects of these conditions on R.S .'s ability to
observe, recollect, and narrate . While "[i]nformation regarding the
credibility of a prosecution witness has been recognized as . .
exculpatory evidence which is subject to disclosure[,]" the reasonable
limitations on cross-examination put in place by the trial court did not
prevent such disclosure. Eldred v. Commonwealth , 906 S .W.2d 694,
701-702 (Ky. 1995) (abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v .
Barroso, 122 S .W .3d 554 (Ky. 2003)) .
23
Further information from R.S.'s mental health records was not
required to establish the fact that R .S . suffered from depression and
anxiety, as evidence was available from a less intrusive source-namely,
the fact that both R.S . and Dr. Price testified that R.S . had been
diagnosed with these conditions . Barroso, 122 S .W.3d at 564 . Appellant
complains that he was not allowed to explore the symptoms and effects
of these conditions . However, the fact is that he never attempted to ask
either R.S . or Dr. Price questions to that end .
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not
allowing these conditions to be referred to as "mental illnesses ." The trial
court did not disallow any testimony as to R.S.'s conditions, but rather,
insisted they be referred to as "mental health issues." This was within
the discretion of the trial court and did not deprive Appellant of effective
cross-examination .
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Failing To Grant Appellant's
Motion For A Directed Verdict Because There Was Sufficient
Evidence That Appellant's Knife Was Concealed.
Appellant's final contention is that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict, as the evidence was insufficient for the
jury to find him guilty of carrying a concealed deadly weapon. We
decline to reverse on this ground, as the trial court did not err in denying
Appellant's motion.
We restated the long-held standards under which we review a
motion for a directed verdict in Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S .W.2d
186, 187 (Ky. 1991)
24
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given . For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is
true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility
and weight to be given to such testimony.
(citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky . 1983) ; Trowel v.
Commonwealth , 550 S .W.2d 530 (Ky. 1977)) . "On appellate review, the
test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Benham , 816 S.W.2d at 187
(citing Sawhill, 660 S .W.2d 3) .
The dispositive question is whether there was any evidence
presented that the knife in Appellant's back pocket was not "open to the
ordinary observation of persons who may come in contact with the
person carrying it in the usual and ordinary associations of life ." Ave
v. Commonwealth , 223 Ky. 248, 3 S.W.2d 624, 626 (1928) . 9 We find
9 KRS 527 .020 states that "[a] person is guilty of carrying a concealed
weapon when he or she carries concealed a firearm or other deadly weapon
on or about his or her person ." However, the statute does not define the
term concealed, nor have the courts since its adoption. In Avery, a case
which defined "concealed" under a previous Kentucky statute, we held:
"Concealed" does not mean that it must be so hidden
that it can only be discovered by a person making a
special investigation to ascertain whether the person
has such a weapon. It is sufficient if it is so
concealed that it would not be observed by persons
making ordinary contact with him in associations
such as are common in the everyday walks of life.
3 S .W .2d at 626 .
25
that there was, and, therefore, the question as to whether the knife was
concealed was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Prince v.
Commonwealth , 277 S .W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. 1955) .
It is undisputed that Appellant was carrying a knife in his back
pocket. The two police officers who apprehended him testified that some
portion of the knife was visible when Appellant was leaned over and
riding his bicycle. However, evidence was also presented that Appellant
was wearing a shirt long enough to cover the knife and we believe this
sufficient for "a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the knife was concealed. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 . The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a
directed verdict.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, we hereby affirm
Appellant's conviction .
All sitting. Minton, C.J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, Scott
and Venters, JJ., concur. Noble, J ., concurs except as to footnote 4, as it
implies that harmless error can be determined based on a sufficiency of
the evidence test.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T . Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Office of the Jefferson District
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Christian Kenneth Ray Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Dr.
Frankfort, KY 40601
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