PEDRO HIGAREDA V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
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APPELLANT
PEDRO HIGAREDA
ON APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN M. HORNE, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00591
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On the morning of July 28, 2007, Pedro Higareda ("Appellant") entered
the mobile home of Sergio Pedraza, awakened him, and held a gun to his neck
in an effort to collect money for marijuana which Sergio had agreed to sell. For
that offense, Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary and of being a
second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant received a ten-year
sentence for the burglary conviction which was enhanced to twenty years by
the PFO charge . He appeals to this court as a matter of right. Ky. Const . ยง
110(2) (b) . Appellant asserts two arguments on appeal . First, Appellant argues
that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Second,
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's failure to amend his indictment
from complicity to commit burglary to burglary in the first degree should have
resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal. For the reasons set forth herein, we
affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence.
Sergio Pedraza was fifteen years-old when he first met Appellant . Shortly
thereafter, Appellant recruited Sergio to sell marijuana . The police caught
Sergio while in possession of the marijuana and confiscated both the
marijuana and his money. When Appellant came to Sergio looking for the
money from the drug sales, Sergio could not pay him . Over time Appellant's
demands for the money became more frequent and more threatening,
culminating with Appellant's burglary . Further facts will be developed below as
necessary.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree burglary charge .
On a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth .
Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S .W.3d 491, 493 (Ky. 2005) ; Bra rev.
Commonwealth , 177 S .W .3d 741, 746 (Ky. 2005) . If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . Commonwealth v .
Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky .1991) . On appeal we review the trial court's
ruling on a directed verdict to see if a reasonable juror could find Appellant
guilty in light of the evidence as a whole . Id. If a reasonable juror can find
Appellant guilty, the denial of the directed verdict was proper. A person is
guilty of first-degree burglary when:
With the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a building, and when in effectuating entry or while in
the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another
participant in the crime :
a)
Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon ; or
b)
Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime ; or
c)
Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against
any person who is not a participant in the crime
KRS 511 .020
Upon review of the evidence presented, the trial court correctly denied
Appellant's directed verdict motion . Pablo, the victim's nine year-old brother,
testified that on the morning of the burglary, he, his brother, and his sister
were in the living room of their mobile home watching cartoons . Everyone else
in the home was asleep, including Sergio . Pablo testified that when Appellant
knocked on the front door, he looked out of the window to see who was there
while his brother answered the door. With the door open, Appellant asked for
Sergio and was told by the children that Sergio was asleep in his room.
Without permission from the children, Appellant entered the residence and
proceeded to Sergio's bedroom. Pablo testified that he saw a gun sticking out
of Appellant's pocket. Sergio testified that Appellant only visited the home once
before and that he was not a frequent guest .
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he entered
the home unlawfully as required for a first-degree burglary conviction .
Appellant cites Fletcher v . Commonwealth, 59 S .W.3d 920, 922 (Ky. App.
2001), for the proposition that a burglary was not committed if one enters a
home lawfully and subsequently commits a crime, even if he had the intent to
commit the crime when he entered . The Fletcher decision, however, affords
Appellant little support as it further holds:
The evidence most favorable to the Commonwealth establishes that
Fletcher knocked on the door and demanded that [the occupant]
open the door, which he did . There was no evidence that [the
occupant] made any kind of utterance, gesture, or movement that
could reasonably constitute an invitation, either explicit or implicit,
to Fletcher to enter the home . . . [I]t would be ludicrous to
conclude that the mere opening of a door by an occupant of a
private residence could be reasonably construed as an invitation to
enter the residence. Such a result would imperil the time-honored
principle that the home is a bastion of privacy and an occupant's
rights therein would be seriously jeopardized .
Since [the occupant] did not extend either an explicit or implicit
invitation to Fletcher to enter the dwelling, Fletcher's entry into the
dwelling by swinging his hand through the doorway for the
purpose of assaulting [the occupant] was unlawful . Accordingly all
the elements of burglary in the second degree were proved.
Id . at 923 .
Viewing the evidence as a whole, we find that it would not be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant committed first-degree burglary.
There was adequate evidence presented through Pablo and Sergio's testimony
for a jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant entered the
house unlawfully with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime.
KRS 511 .020 . No evidence was presented at trial that Appellant was given
implicit or explicit permission to enter Sergio's house . See Fletcher, 59 S .W.3d
at 923. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a
directed verdict.
II . FAILURE TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT
Appellant next argues that the trial court should have sustained his
motion for a directed verdict because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
was complicit in a burglary as charged in the indictment. Appellant asserts
that, since the evidence pointed to Appellant as the principal offender rather
than as an accomplice, the Commonwealth's failure to amend the indictment
was fatal to its case . However, Appellant is simply mistaken when he argues
that he was indicted for "Complicity to Commit Burglary" . Although the
Warrant of Arrest issued for Appellant on September 24, 2007, erroneously
identified the charge as Complicity to Commit Burglary, the actual indictment
filed on September 18, 2007, stated : " . . . [T]he above named defendant
committed the offense of Burglary in the First Degree . . . in that he burglarized
the residence of another while armed with a deadly weapon." Thus, Appellant
was tried on the same charge specified in the indictment and no amendment of
the indictment was necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment and sentence of
the Boone Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jon Alig
Elizabeth A. Bellamy
415 Licking Pike, First Floor
Wilder, Kentucky 41071
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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