DAVID EUGENE HOUCHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOVEMBER 25, 2009
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2008-SC-000373-MR
DAVID EUGENE HOUCHIN
ON APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00043
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On May 8, 2008, Appellant, David Eugene Houchin, was found guilty by
a Grayson Circuit Court jury and convicted of arson in the second-degree,
fraudulent insurance acts in excess of $300, wanton endangerment in the
second-degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree .
For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment .
Appellant now appeals his conviction as a matter of right. Ky. Const. §
110(2)(b) .
Appellant's wife and co-defendant, Angela Houchin, was convicted of arson in the
second-degree, fraudulent insurance acts in excess of $300, and wanton
endangerment in the second-degree . The jury fixed her sentence at ten years'
imprisonment.
I. Background
On the morning of July 25, 2006, members of the Anetta Volunteer Fire
Department responded to a call that Appellant's home was on fire. When they
arrived, the firefighters could not gauge how long the fire had been burning .
Upon extinguishing the fire and examining the remains of Appellant's house,
they found a two to three foot wide hole in the kitchen floor that had completely
burned through . The firefighters thought this odd since they were taught that
this formation occurs only when a fire begins at the floor. Though the Deputy
State Fire Marshall concluded that the hole in the kitchen floor was caused by
the direct and intentional use of a flammable agent, the Kentucky State Police
later tested the surrounding wood and found no presence of accelerants.
Appellant and his wife were subsequently indicted for arson along with
other related charges stemming from the fire . At their joint trial, both the
Commonwealth's and Appellant's cases rested largely upon expert investigation
and opinion because there were no known witnesses. Throughout the trial, the
Commonwealth contended that the fire was caused intentionally while
Appellant defended that the fire was purely accidental .
Robert Smith was one of two arson experts for the Commonwealth .
Smith examined Appellant's home three days after the fire, in conjunction with
an investigation by Allstate Insurance . Smith told the jury that in his opinion
the fire started at the hole found in the middle of the house and, though he
found no trace of accelerants, that it was incendiary in nature . While Smith
acknowledged that he found wiring in the house exhibiting severe fire damage,
Smith concluded that this was secondary fire damage and not the source of the
fire .2
Victor Tharp was the only defense expert. Though he did not inspect the
actual fire scene, Tharp based his opinions upon the Commonwealth's
photographs of the scene and Smith's report. Tharp told the jury that in his
opinion the fire was not incendiary, but rather was the result of improper
wiring methods in Appellant's home. In one of the photos, Tharp identified a
junction box lacking the mechanical pieces necessary for the protection of its
internal wiring, representing a violation of the National Electric Code.
According to Tharp, this wiring method can lead to the fraying of internal
wiring which, in turn, causes the wires to create a current path and overheat.
Tharp concluded that the fire began near the center of the kitchen, that it
would be impossible for a person to cause it, and that the fire possibly removed
traces of pre-existing damage to the wiring.
Dr. Thomas Eaton was the Commonwealth's final arson expert, although
he only testified during rebuttal. Dr. Eaton inspected the fire scene
approximately three weeks after the fire occurred in conjunction with Allstate
Insurance's investigation of Appellant's home . Dr. Eaton told the jury that in
his opinion the fire started at the hole that had burned through the floor.
Although Dr. Eaton acknowledged that Tharp's theory represented the probable
cause of most fires and that the wiring in Appellant's home was an electrical
code violation, Dr. Eaton inspected the junction box to which Tharp referred
2 The wiring passed through the floor from under the house and was attached to an
active outlet and junction box.
and found no evidence of melted metals or loose connections in the wires . Yet,
Dr. Eaton did find melted copper wiring near the fire's theorized origin,
indicating higher than average temperatures at that location in the houSe. 3 In
turn, he opined that some artificial accelerant must have been used to raise the
temperature of the fire to melt the copper. Thus, his ultimate conclusion was
that the house's improper wiring was not the cause of the fire but that the fire
was set intentionally through the use of an accelerant .
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of arson in the
second-degree, fraudulent insurance acts with an aggregate value in excess of
$300, wanton endangerment in the second-degree, and of being a persistent
felony offender in the first-degree . On appeal, Appellant raises three principal
allegations of reversible error : 1) that the Commonwealth introduced
incriminating statements by a nontestifying co-defendant against him in a joint
trial; 2) that the Commonwealth presented undisclosed expert testimony in
rebuttal; and 3) that the (Commonwealth improperly commented on his
decision not to testify at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's
convictions .
IL Analysis
A. Introduction of Statements by Nontestifying Co-Defendant
Appellant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial
court erroneously deprived him of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights
3
As Dr. Eaton explained to the jury, copper wiring does not ordinarily melt under the
presence of fire unless that fire was burning hotter than normal. He testified that
most fires burn between 1500-1700 degrees Fahrenheit, whereas copper wire melts
at just less than 2000 degrees Fahrenheit.
4
pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U .S . 123 (1968), and Crawford v .
Washington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), when it allowed the statements of his
nontestifying co-defendant to be introduced against him in their joint trial. We
disagree, and conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the
statements because the statements were not of such a character as to make
them inadmissible under Bruton and Crawford .
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to consolidate the
cases against Appellant and Angela for trial . A hearing was held on the matter
and Angela, through counsel, objected to the Commonwealth's motion on
grounds that a joint trial would lead to inevitable Bruton violations. Appellant
joined in Angela's objection and also argued that a joint trial would be to his
prejudice because Angela had made certain prior incriminating statements that
could also serve to inculpate him of the crimes . The trial court, however,
granted the Commonwealth's motion, reasoning that any incriminating
statements could be redacted at trial so as to not offend the defendants'
confrontation rights under Bruton .
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of four of Angela's
co-workers who had spoken with her both prior to and after the fire. When
each of the co-workers was called to testify, Appellant renewed his wholesale
objection to a joint trial and continued to assert that their testimony violated
his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation . The trial court overruled all of
Appellant's objections and the testimony proceeded .
Prior to the fire, several of the witnesses testified to hearing Angela state
that her home was in a faulty condition and that she was facing financial
5
difficulties .4 In particular, the co-workers testified to having heard Angela say
that her house could be foreclosed upon and that she was short of money at
the time . In addition, Angela allegedly told several co-workers that she thought
her house contained faulty wiring such that it would not surprise her if it
accidentally caught fire. After the fire occurred, Angela explained to two coworkers that the likely cause was an electrical defect in her home, noting the
presence of "hot spots" in her kitchen .
1 . Bruton Violation
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee a defendant the right of confrontation ."
Murphy v. Commonwealth , 50 S .W . 3d 173, 183 (Ky. 2001) . "The right of
confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses ." Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) . For this reason, "where two defendants are
tried jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other
unless the confessing defendant takes the stand." Id.
In particular, under Bruton , the Confrontation Clause forbids "the use of
a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that `expressly implicate [s]' the other
defendant," Shepherd v . Commonwealth, 251 S .W.3d 309, 314 (Ky. 2008)
(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126), "even if the jury is instructed to consider the
confession only against the codefendant," Richardson , 481 U .S . at 207 .
However, when a co-defendant's confession does not expressly implicate the
other defendant, but rather inferentially "links" him to the crime, the
4 We reject Appellant's contention that Angela's statements were inadmissible hearsay.
They were clearly admissible as party admissions, KRE 801A(b) (1) because Angela
was also a defendant in this case .
Confrontation Clause is not offended so long as the evidence itself is "properly
admitted" and "the confession is redacted to eliminate all references to the
defendant's existence." Shepherd , 251 S .W.3d at 314-15 (citing Richardson ,
481 U .S . at 202) ; accord Gabow v. Commonwealth , 34 S.W.3d 63, 71 (Ky .
2000) .
Turning to Appellant's arguments here, he contends that the statements
Angela made to her co-workers were tantamount to confessions that she and
her husband, acting together, intentionally burned their house . This assertion,
however, is inapt as Angela's statements cannot be construed as incriminating
confessions and, thus, the type of statements to which the dictates of Bruton
apply .
While Angela's statements may have suggested a faint motive for the
crimes, they did not represent a "confession." Bruton issues arise in the
context of confessions. See , e .g. , Bruton , 391 U .S. at 124 ; see also, g .g_,
Richardson , 481 U.S . at 203 ; Shepherd , 251 S.W .3d at 313; Barth v .
Commonwealth , 80 S.W .3d 390, 392 (Ky. 2001) . All of the statements that
Angela made that Appellant now disputes were made to her co-workers and did
not occur during a "post-arrest investigation ." Indeed, the statements she
made prior to the fire cannot be a confession as the crime had yet to be
committed . And none of Angela's statements after the fire were admissions of
guilt, nor were they accusatory "statements made to officials in hope of
advancing [her] own cause, potentially at the expense of [Appellant], as is
intuitively true in the event of a confession ." Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F .2d 426,
442 (6th Cir . 1983); see also Vincent v . Parke, 942 F.2d 989, 991 (6th Cir.
7
1991) . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's
objections.
2. Crawford Violation
We now address Appellant's related argument that Angela's statements,
even if not the type to which Bruton applies, constitute testimonial hearsay
running afoul of Crawford . We reject Appellant's contentions here for similar
reasons and conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the
statements.
Under Crawford , "the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
forbids admission of all testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant at
a criminal trial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination ." Bray v. Commonwealth , 177 S .W .3d
741, 743 (Ky. 2005) (citing Crawford , 541 U.S . at 68) . Invariably, the issue
that most often arises when confronted with a potential Crawford violation is
determining what constitutes "testimonial" hearsay. At a minimum, the term
encompasses "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or
at a former trial," as well as statements made during "police interrogations."
Crawford , 541 U.S . at 68 . In general, statements "are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution ." Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) .
Angela's hearsay statements were simply not testimonial in nature . As to
the many statements she made prior to the fire occurring, "a statement . .
8
made before the crime is committed . . . almost certainly is not testimonial ."
Bray, 177 S .W.3d at 746 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F .3d 662, 673
(6th Cir. 2004)) . This is usually because nothing has yet occurred "to establish
or prove ." Davis, 547 U .S. at 822 . As to the statements Angela made after her
home had burned, they were all exculpatory in nature and did not in any way
inculpate Appellant such that she could be considered a witness against him .
Cf. Rankins v. Commonwealth, 237 S .W.3d 128, 130 (Ky. 2007) (citing Davis,
547 U.S. at 821-22) .
B. Improper Expert Testimony
Appellant makes three related arguments that the trial court committed
reversible error in allowing Dr. Thomas Eaton to testify . First, Appellant
argues that the failure of the Commonwealth to provide a copy of Dr. Eaton's
report violated both Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the trial
court's discovery order. Second, Appellant argues that the testimony was
based on an undisclosed factual premise, which undermined his ability to
present an effective defense . And last, Appellant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony in rebuttal rather than in the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief. We reject Appellant's arguments here.
The record shows that, on the morning of the first day of trial, the
Commonwealth mentioned the name of Dr. Thomas Eaton as a possible expert
witness against Appellant. Through counsel, Appellant noted that though Dr.
Eaton's name had been disclosed in related civil litigation, he did not believe
that he had prepared a report of his findings .
This matter was not addressed again until the end of the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief when the Commonwealth attempted to call Dr.
Eaton as a witness . Through counsel, Angela immediately made a lengthy
objection based on her inability to cross-examine an expert witness without
adequate disclosure and notice . In particular, Angela complained that the
Commonwealth had not furnished a copy of Dr. Eaton's report, effectively
prohibiting discovery of his findings and possible opinions . Angela also
contended that Dr. Eaton's testimony would prove cumulative because he
would likely testify that there simply were no electrical problems in Appellant's
home. Appellant adopted and joined the objection .
In response, the Commonwealth agreed with Angela's assessment that
Dr. Eaton would testify as to the lack of any significant electrical problems in
Appellant's home, but countered that the testimony should be admitted
because the Commonwealth had received only recent notice of defense expert
Victor Tharp's proposed testimony that the fire was due to an accidental and
electrical cause. The Commonwealth, however, acknowledged that Appellant's
notice was timely and complied with the trial court's discovery order. The
Commonwealth went on to explain that it was not until after it had received
notice of Tharp's deposition to this effect that it discovered Dr. Eaton as an
additional expert witness . The Commonwealth, however, stated that no report
had been prepared by Dr. Eaton. Concluding the conference, Angela replied
that if the trial court chose to admit Dr. Eaton's testimony, it should be done
only in rebuttal .
After hearing the arguments, the trial court denied the Commonwealth's
attempt to present Dr . Eaton in its case-in-chief. The trial court, however,
ruled that there was still a question as to whether Tharp would testify and that
if he did, Dr. Eaton could testify in rebuttal . Before moving on, the trial court
ordered Dr. Eaton to enter the courtroom and give the bases of his opinions .
At Appellant's request, the trial court then allowed the defendants to interview
Dr. Eaton off the record .
The following morning, Tharp testified on behalf of Appellant and
explained that the cause of the fire was accidental and caused by faulty wiring.
The next morning, in accordance with its prior ruling, the trial court allowed
Dr . Eaton to testify in rebuttal. Appellant immediately objected and argued
that it was reversible error for an expert to testify to an opinion based upon a
premise not disclosed to the defendant . The trial court overruled Appellant's
objections and Dr . Eaton testified that the fire was, in all likelihood,
intentionally caused through the use of an accelerant.
1 . Brady and Discovery Order Violations
Appellant's primary argument here is that reversal is required because
the trial court allowed the Commonwealth's expert to testify without providing
Appellant a copy of his report. This, Appellant contends, represents the kind of
reversible error contemplated by Brady. He also contends that this violated the
trial court's discovery order. Having reviewed the record, we disagree and
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's
objections because Dr. Eaton's testimony was not of the type to which Brady
applies. In addition, we conclude that because the Commonwealth did not
11
have a report in its possession, custody or control, the trial court's discovery
order was not violated .
Under Brady, the Commonwealth must disclose exculpatory or
impeaching information that is material to the guilt or innocence of a
defendant. Brady, 373 U .S. at 86-88 . Its failure to do so constitutes reversible
error if it gave the Commonwealth "a more favorable opportunity to convict,"
Epperson v . Commonwealth, 809 S .W.2d 835, 840 (Ky. 1990), which renders
the verdict unworthy of confidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U .S . 667, 668
(1985) . However, where the undisclosed information is merely incriminating
and unfavorable rather than exculpatory or impeaching, Brady is inapplicable.
As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Dr. Eaton's testimony was,
quite clearly, not exculpatory or impeaching, and thus not the type to which
Brad applies . Dr. Eaton testified that he found melted copper at the scene of
the fire in Appellant's home, suggesting that the fire's temperature must have
been raised through the intentional use of an accelerant. Given that
Appellant's primary defense to the charge of arson was that the fire was
accidental, Dr. Eaton's testimony was, therefore, incriminating, not
exculpatory . Appellant's reliance upon Brady here is thus inapt.
In addition, Appellant's contention that the trial court condoned a
violation of its discovery order is without merit. Our discovery rules plainly
require discoverable reports to be in a party's "possession, custody or control."
RCr 7 .24(l) . Here, the record shows that Dr. Eaton did not generate a report
for the Commonwealth and thus there could be nothing discoverable in its
possession, custody or control . Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling Appellant's objections to that effect.
2. New, Undisclosed Factual Premise
Appellant also argues that Dr. Eaton's rebuttal testimony contained a
new, undisclosed factual premise, which undermined his ability to effectively
defend himself. In particular, Appellant argues that Dr. Eaton's opinion was
based on the presence of melted copper in Appellant's home, which was both
incriminating and previously undisclosed . To support this argument,
Appellant cites Barnett v. Commonwealth, 763 S .W .2d 119, 123 (Ky. 1988), for
the proposition that an expert cannot testify in rebuttal to a new, undisclosed
factual premise . We believe that there was no error in this regard . And
regardless, we believe that the trial court's relief from Dr. Eaton's testimony
allowed Appellant to effectively defend himself against the premise.
While Dr. Eaton's testimony was incriminating and surprising insomuch
as it revealed a previously undisclosed premise-the presence of melted
copper-Appellant cannot complain that this additional premise was so
surprising or inherently complex as to prevent his effective defense against it,
as in Barnett . Appellant concedes that he received from the Commonwealth a
report prepared by Robert Smith, which noted that, in at least two places in the
home, melted wiring was found, indicating a higher than expected localized
temperature. In fact, Appellant admits to have developed much of his defense
upon Smith's report. The general finding, therefore, was disclosed : that the
physical evidence indicated higher than expected temperatures, which, in turn,
indicated the temperatures were raised by the intentional use of an accelerant .
13
Moreover, prior to Dr. Eaton's testimony, the court, upon Appellant's
objections, ordered Dr. Eaton to disclose the bases of his opinions and allowed
Appellant to interview him on these grounds, off the record. While we are
certainly not prepared to say that such relief is always adequate, Appellant's
counsel obviously knew enough from his interview with Dr . Eaton to then
object to his testimony as containing the previously undisclosed premise and
to, as Appellant concedes, alert him to additional potential causes for increased
localized temperatures during cross-examination (namely, increased
ventilation) . We also note that nothing in the record demonstrates that the
Commonwealth had spoken with Dr. Eaton prior to trial or knew the substance
of his proposed rebuttal testimony, which may have warranted greater relief.
3 . Improper Rebuttal Testimony
Last, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the testimony of Dr . Eaton in rebuttal rather than in the
Commonwealth's case-in-chief. We disagree and conclude that admission of
Dr. Eaton's testimony in rebuttal did not amount to palpable error.5
The trial court has "broad discretion in its determination of admissibility
of evidence in rebuttal under RCr 9 .42 ." Chestnut v. Commonwealth , 250
S .W .3d 288, 297 (Ky. 2008) (citing Pilon v. Commonwealth, 544 S .W .2d 228,
231 (Ky. 1976)) . Accordingly, the trial court's decision to admit evidence in
rebuttal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Commonwealth v. Kind, 950
5 We review this alleged error only for palpable error because Appellant's claim is
unpreserved . RCr 10 .26 (allowing relief "upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error") . Appellant did not object to the testimony as
improper rebuttal evidence and concedes as much.
14
S .W.2d 807, 809 (Ky. 1997), and will generally not be disturbed absent a "clear
showing of arbitrariness ." Pilon , 544 S.W.2d at 231 ; accord 23A C .J .S .
Criminal Law § 1663 (2009) .
Although rebuttal evidence is most usual and proper where "it tends to
counteract or overcome the legal effect of the evidence for the other side,"
Houser v. Coursev, 310 Ky. 625, 221 S .W.2d 432, 434 (1949) (quoting Reserve
Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Boreing, 157 Ky. 730, 163 S .W. 1085, 1087 (1914)), a trial
court has control over the use of such evidence as a part of its power to control
the order of the proceedings . See RCr 9 .42(e) ; see also Leslie W. Abramson, 9
Kentucky Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 26:37 (4th ed . 2003) .
Indeed, for this reason, we remarked long ago that "such discretionary
variations should be liberally dealt with" on review . Bennett v. Commonwealth,
150 Ky. 604, 150 S.W. 806, 808 (1912) (quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 1873) .
Turning to Appellant's arguments here, we hold that the trial court's
admission of Dr . Eaton's testimony in rebuttal did not rise to "manifest
injustice," RCr 10.26, because the testimony was withheld until rebuttal for a
"good reason," towards "the furtherance of justice ." RCr 9 .42(e) . Here, the trial
court ordered that the testimony be withheld until rebuttal so as to relieve
Angela's and Appellant's objections that the substance of the testimony was
undisclosed and thus prejudicial to their defense. Indeed, counsel for Angela
asked the trial court to limit the testimony to rebuttal, if at all.
Consequently, the trial court prohibited the Commonwealth from
presenting the evidence during its case-in-chief to give the co-defendants' an
opportunity to discover the substance of Dr. Eaton's testimony. The trial court
15
then gave them such an opportunity, allowing them to interview Dr. Eaton
before he testified . This was certainly motivated by a good reason towards the
furtherance of justice . The record does not establish that the Commonwealth
intentionally withheld Dr . Eaton's testimony in order to gain an undue
advantage over Appellant or that it did so in bad faith, which would compel a
different conclusion . See Davis v. Commonwealth , 795 S .W .2d 942, 947 (Ky .
1990) ; See v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W .2d 401, 403 (Ky. 1988) . Therefore, we
find no palpable error in this regard .
C. Prosecutorial Comments on Right to Remain Silent
Appellant's final argument is that his convictions must be reversed
because the Commonwealth improperly commented upon his failure to testify
at trial, thus violating his Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination . We, however, disagree and conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion for a mistrial .
The comments that Appellant now challenges were made during the
Commonwealth's closing argument . There, the prosecutor assailed an
argument previously asserted by Angela's counsel, namely, that the
Commonwealth had not examined every potential reason why the arson might
have occurred and that the Commonwealth should have considered that a
third party seeking revenge could have been the actual perpetrator. The
Commonwealth countered that this was mere speculation because the only
motive evidence presented to the jury went to that of the co-defendants and the
potential for significant insurance proceeds. The Commonwealth then
continued, stating:
16
Your instructions tell. you that these defendants have the right to
remain silent . They do . But [co-defendant's counsel] suggests to
you that the Commonwealth, the detective, the investigating
officers should have assumed a revenge motive in the absence of
any information from anyone.
To this comment, Angela immediately objected and moved for a mistrial,
arguing that it was an improper attempt to draw attention to the co-defendants'
right to remain silent . Appellant joined the motion . In reply, the
Commonwealth contended that it was merely responding to the defense's
closing argument and agreed that it could not comment on the co-defendants'
decision not to testify. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the
motion .
The Fifth Amendment of the U .S . Constitution provides that "no
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S . Const. amend . V. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
the U.S . Supreme Court held that "the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt." Id. at 614; see also Spalla v . Foltz,
788 F.2d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Griffin) ; KRE 511(a) . If a reviewing
court determines that a comment did improperly touch upon the defendant's
decision to remain silent, its effect, being constitutional error, must be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid reversal. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) .
"[T]he rule set forth in Griffin applies to indirect as well as direct
comments on the failure to testify." Spalla, 788 F.2d at 403 . The test for
whether such a comment was improper is "[w]hether the language used was
17
manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused
to testify." Butler v. Rose , 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 (6th Cir. 1982) .
Here, we find it difficult to construe the prosecutor's remarks as in any
way improper because they expressly (and correctly) referenced and reiterated
the trial court's previous instruction . That instruction stated :
A Defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that the
Defendant did not testify in this case cannot be used as an
inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way.
Appellant does not contest the clear constitutionality of such an instruction,
one properly mirroring RCr 9 .54(3) . See generally Lakeside v. Oregon , 435 U.S .
333 (1978) . For this reason, we fail to see what the prosecutor's subsequent
comments added to what the jury already knew: that Appellant had a right to
refuse to testify, that he exercised that right, and that such a choice could not
be used as evidence of his guilt .
Yet, even if we assume that the prosecutor's comments carried an
impermissible inference beyond the instructions; we believe that the
statements, in context, were not manifestly intended to be, or were of such a
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take them to be, a
comment upon Appellant's failure to testify. This is because "the prosecutor's
reference . . . [was] a fair response to a claim made by the defendant," United
States v . Robinson, 485 U.S . 25, 32, representing an "equally plausible"
explanation for the statement, Lent v . Wells , 861 F .2d 972, 975 (6th Cir.
1988) . See also United States v . Norwood, 555 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir .
2009) ; United States v . Smith , 41 F.3d 1565, 1569 (D .C . Cir. 1994) .
18
Just prior to the Commonwealth's closing argument, counsel for
Appellant's co-defendant asserted that the Commonwealth's case was deficient
because it had failed to investigate the possibility of a third-party revenge
motive, which, if done, may have exonerated the co-defendants . Thereafter, the
Commonwealth explicitly prefaced its response to the argument as such ("But
[co-defendant's counsel] suggests to you that . . ."), signaling to the jury that
the comments were not "on [the prosecutor's] own initiative ." Robinson , 485
U .S . at 32 .
In addition, it is worth noting that the prosecutor was truthful in
explaining that there was, in fact, no information supporting defense counsel's
claims . The record shows that Detective Terry Scott testified at trial that, when
asked, both Appellant and Angela stated that they had no enemies or ongoing
grudges so as to suggest that another was responsible for the arson .
That the prosecutor phrased his isolated comment collectively-"without
any information from anyone"-strengthens our conclusion that the prosecutor
did not plainly intend the comment to motivate the jury to infer that
Appellant's failure to testify was evidence of his guilt. We also think it
significant that the prosecutor's past-tense phrasing highlighted the lack of
revenge motive evidence not just at trial, but also at any point in the case prior
to trial, which explained why the Commonwealth did not pursue an
investigation in this regard . CL . Robinson, 380 U.S . at 30-31 . To this end, we
believe that the prosecutor's comments were intended to be a legitimate
rebuttal to arguments just advanced by defense counsel in closing that, in fact,
ran contrary to the evidence presented. The trial court, therefore, did not err in
19
denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial . Cf. Hall v. Vasbinder, 563 F .3d 222,
233 (6th Cir. 2009) .
III . Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's convictions .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Todd Dryden Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capitol Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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