GARY W. BENTLEY V. HON. R. CLETUS MARICLE, SPECIAL JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT, AND STELLA MAE MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL. ()
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RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
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2008-SC-000347-MR
H 8s D MINING, INC . AND
RANDALL FLEMING
V.
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2008-CA-000049-OA
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 07-CI-00168
HON . R. CLETUS MARICLE, SPECIAL
JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT; AND
STELLA MAE MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY ;
STELLA MAE MORRIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF DAVID SHERMAN MORRIS, JR. ;
AND STELLA MAE MORRIS, PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF LANDEN JAYCOB MORRIS, A MINOR
APPELLEE
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
AND
2008-SC-000357-MR
GARY W. BENTLEY
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2008-CA-000048-OA
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 07-CI-00168
HON. R. CLETUS MARICLE, SPECIAL
JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT ; AND
STELLA MAE MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY ;
STELLA MAE MORRIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF DAVID SHERMAN MORRIS, JR. ;
AND STELLA MAE MORRIS, PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF LANDEN JAYCOB MORRIS, A MINOR
APPELLEE
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is before us from the denial of a petition for writ of
prohibition by the Court of Appeals. Appellants, H 8. D Mining, Inc . and
Randall Fleming, sought a writ to bar the Harlan Circuit Court from proceeding
without jurisdiction in a tort action related to a workers' compensation claim.
The circuit court did not adjudicate petitioners' motions for summary
judgment, but provided six additional months to conduct discovery. Appellant,
Gary W. Bentley, in a separate writ petition, also sought to bar the Harlan
Circuit Court from proceeding in that action . The parties filed a motion to
consolidate the petitions, which was granted by the Court of Appeals . The
Court of Appeals then denied the writ.
Background
The facts as developed thus far in this case, when matched with the
applicable statutory language, appear on the surface to raise serious questions
about the lower court's jurisdiction to litigate the claims .
David Morris, Jr. ("Bud") worked as a shuttle car operator for H 8s D
Mining, Inc . (hereinafter H 8v D) . On December 30, 2005, Bud was working on
the "Number 3" mine . As he stood by his own shuttle car, Bud was struck
from behind by a coal hauler that was overloaded with coal . The car was
driven by fellow mine worker, David Allen . The coal on Allen's car was piled so
high that he did not see Bud before impact. Allen was under the influence of
illegal drugs at the time the accident occurred . The impact from the collision
severed both of Bud's legs beneath the knees.
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Immediately after the accident, the mine owner and Mine Emergency
Technician ("MET"), Gary W. Bentley, was called to the accident scene . An
ambulance was also called. Bentley, despite being the only MET on site, did
not administer any aid to Bud . Rather, two non-trained mine workers
attempted to administer aid to Bud . They tied makeshift tourniquets on Bud's
legs in an attempt to stop the bleeding, but as they had no medical training,
Bud continued to bleed excessively. Bentley did not touch Bud or instruct the
other mine workers on how to tie the tourniquets. The mining crew put Bud in
a buggy and drove him to the mine's surface . The ambulance company was
called again . As they waited for the ambulance to arrive, it became clear that
Bud was bleeding to death.
The crew, desperate to do something, put Bud in the back of a pickup
truck and began to drive towards the hospital . Once they reached the bottom
of the hill outside the mine, they saw the ambulance . The ambulance stopped
and the crew put Bud on a stretcher and he was transported to the hospital.
Bud was pronounced dead just seventeen minutes after arriving at the
hospital . The complaint alleges that the emergency room doctor stated Bud's
life could have been saved if basic first-aid treatment had been provided to him
in a timely manner.
The decedent's family filed an action in the Harlan Circuit Court alleging
negligence on the part of H 8s D (and its officers and directors) ; negligence on
the part of Gary W. Bentley; and negligence on the part of the ambulance
company (Johnson Life Care) . The complaint also alleges wrongful death, loss
of parental consortium, and loss of consortium . The family also claims that the
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ambulance company did not treat the call as an emergency. It is alleged that
the paramedic at Johnson Life Care who took the call instructed the
ambulance crew to deliver a patient for a routine medical appointment before
driving to the mine. The complaint further states that illegal drug use occurred
regularly at the mine, and that management was aware of, and even condoned
the drug use . Apparently, drug use was so rampant at the mine that one of the
buildings at the mine was referred to as "the crack house."
The negligent acts or omissions of all the defendants were characterized
in the complaint as grossly negligent, reckless, wanton, and/or willful.
Analysis
The Appellants ask this Court to reverse the denial of the writ by the
Court of Appeals . We review the Court of Appeals' denial of the writ for abuse
of discretion, while we review the questions of law de novo. Fletcher v.
Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Ky. 2006) . Before addressing the merits, we
note that writs of prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary in nature.
Bender v. Eaton , 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky . 1961) . Our courts "have always
been cautious and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in
granting such relief." Id.
Upon review of a writ claim, we must first determine whether the writ
remedy is available . Hoskins v. Maricle , 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) . A writ of
prohibition may be granted where (1) the lower court is acting outside of its
jurisdiction and there is no remedy readily available through application to an
intermediate court; or (2) the lower court is acting erroneously, although within
its jurisdiction, and there is no remedy by appeal. Id . This second class of
4
writs requires that great injustice and irreparable injury occur if the petition is
denied. Id . The Court is not compelled to grant a writ in either circumstance.
Id . Appellants claim that this case falls under the first class of writs (lack of
jurisdiction) . They argue that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the
decedent's family's tort claims because the family is receiving workers'
compensation benefits.
Exclusive Remedy Provision
The Kentucky Workers' Compensation statute (KRS 342 .0011 et. seq.)
provides the exclusive remedy to employees injured in the workplace . KRS
342.690(1) states as follows:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the
employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents,
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages . . . .
However, an exception to the exclusive remedy provision is as follows :
[T]he exemption from liability given an employee, officer or director
or an employer or carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury
or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression of such employee, officer or director. KRS 342 .690(1)
(emphasis added) .
Thus, employers are not provided the protections of the Workers'
Compensation Act where an injury is caused by "willful and unprovoked
physical aggression ." KRS 342 .690(1) .
The trial court abstained from ruling on the summary judgment motions
until the discovery process had been completed. This writ action makes its
way to this Court under the claim that the trial court was acting outside its
jurisdiction . Appellants claim that KRS 342 .0011 strips the trial court of its
5
subject matter jurisdiction under the facts of this case. They filed summary
judgment motions arguing the trial court had no jurisdiction (subject matter) to
hear the case . The judge declined to rule on the motions until further
discovery was done. Apparently, because the complaint alleged willful or
reckless conduct (notice pleading), the judge felt that he could not decide the
jurisdiction question until some discovery was done to establish whether the
plaintiff could prove "unprovoked physical aggression ." This is proper since on
summary judgment the facts of record must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. He could have denied the motion for
summary judgment at that time . At any rate, he has jurisdiction to rule on the
jurisdiction question, and has not yet done so .
It is premature for us to address the merits of the summary judgment
motions challenging jurisdiction which are still pending in the circuit court. It
is not beyond the realm of possibilities that, through a reasonably timed
discovery process, other facts may be fleshed out which would substantially
affect the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under KRS 342 .690(1) .
Often, if not always, a determination as to whether a trial court has
subject matter jurisdiction is one of fact-finding . Such is the case here . Trial
courts must give cases an opportunity to breathe before they are declared
dead. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing some discovery prior to making its ruling on the summary judgment
motions. Lastly, we are mindful that whether to grant any writ is discretionary
under Section 110(2)(a) of the Kentucky Constitution . We essentially hold
today that granting the writ in this instance would be premature .
6
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of
the writ.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS, H
AND RANDALL FLEMING :
8s
D MINING, INC .
Gillard B . Johnson, III
Bowling 8v Johnson, PLLC
1010 Monarch Street
Suite 250
Lexington, KY 40513
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, GARY W. BENTLEY:
Gene Smallwood, Jr.
127 Main Street, Suite C
P. O . Box 786
Whitesburg, KY 41858
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
HON. R. CLETUS MARICLE:
R . Cletus Maricle
393 Circle Drive
Manchester, KY 40962
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
STELLA MAE MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID
SHERMAN MORRIS, JR. ; AND AS PARENT AND
NEXT FRIEND OF LANDEN JAYCOB MORRIS, A MINOR :
Tony Oppegard
P. 0 . Box 22446
Lexington, KY 40522
Ronald Sheffer
Phillip Lynn Monhollen
Sheffer Law Firm, PLLC
101 South Fifth Street
Suite 1600
Louisville, KY 40202
Kellie Denise Wilson-Lee
118 N. 1st Street
P. O . Box 1470
Harlan, KY 40831
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