LARRY MCCLOUD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2008-SC-000203-MR
LARRY McCLOUD
V.
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00087
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
AFFIRMING
Larry McCloud appeals as a matter of right' from a circuit court
judgment imposing a twenty-five year sentence, raising several issues . He
argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motions to suppress both
the search of his person and the search of a Grand Prix; (2) failing to suppress
his statements regarding ownership of items found in the Grand Prix because
his constitutional rights were violated when Royse interrogated him without
first adequately informing him of his rights; (3) permitting a detective to offer
opinion testimony regarding the drug trade; (4) improperly orally instructing
the jury to find him guilty of the trafficking in a controlled substance while in
possession of a firearm charge; and (5) denying a directed verdict on the
Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
firearm enhancements to the trafficking in a controlled substance, trafficking
in marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia charges . We disagree with
all of McCloud's arguments and, thus, affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Officer Brian Royse, along with other officers, was in an unmarked van
performing undercover surveillance in a shopping center when he noticed a
white Ford Bronco pull into a parking space near them . Royse and the other
officers watched a female leave the Bronco, go to a nearby payphone and make
a call, return to the Bronco, and again go to the payphone to make a call .
Shortly after the second call, a red Pontiac Grand Prix parked in a spot
between the officers' van and the Bronco . Royse recognized the Grand Prix
from prior arrests of its owner, who was not in the vehicle on this day. The
female then went from the Bronco to the passenger seat of the Grand Prix .
When the female was in the Grand Prix, Royse saw the Grand Prix's
driver holding in his hand what appeared to be a marble-sized piece of crack
cocaine . Royse then pulled the van into a position that blocked the Grand Prix
and the Bronco. The officers approached the Grand Prix; and Royse ordered
the Grand Prix's driver, who turned out to be the Appellant, Larry McCloud, to
exit the vehicle . When McCloud exited, Royse noticed what he believed to be a
piece of crack cocaine fall from McCloud's waist area . Royse placed McCloud
in custody and administered Mirandaz warnings . Royse searched McCloud
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .
and found what appeared to be crack cocaine in McCloud's front pocket and
what Royse believed were both powder cocaine and crack cocaine in McCloud's
baseball cap .
After searching McCloud, Royse searched the Grand Prix. Under the
driver's seat of the Grand Prix, Royse found a loaded handgun . In the back
seat, Royse found scales and what he suspected to be marijuana and powder
cocaine in, ironically, a duffle bag bearing an anti-drug slogan. When Royse
asked McCloud if the duffle bag was his, McCloud answered in the affirmative .
Another digital scale was found in the car. A small personal safe containing
$6,450 was also found in the car . Royse asked McCloud if the safe was his, to
which McCloud answered affirmatively, stating that the safe contained his
personal papers.
McCloud was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance while in
possession of a firearm, trafficking in marijuana while in possession of a
firearm, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, possession of drug
paraphernalia while in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed deadly
weapon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO 1) .
McCloud's motions to suppress were denied; and the charges were submitted
to the jury (except for the felon in possession of a handgun charge, which was
severed) . McCloud was found guilty of trafficking while in possession of a
firearm offenses, possession of drug paraphernalia while in possession of a
firearm, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon . McCloud then entered into a
sentencing agreement with the Commonwealth that resulted in an aggregate,
PFO 1-enhanced twenty-five year sentence . 3
II . ANALYSIS .
A. The Motion to Suppress was Properly Denied.
McCloud makes a three-pronged suppression argument. First, he
contends the trial court erred by finding he lacked standing to contest the
search of the Grand Prix. Second, he contends the trial court should have
suppressed the search of his person because Royse lacked probable cause for
the underlying arrest. Finally, he contends the trial court should have granted
the motion to suppress due to Royse's alleged failure to inform him of his
Miranda rights. We conclude the arrest was valid because it was based upon
probable cause . And the searches of McCloud's person and the Grand Prix
were permissible searches incident to arrest. So we find it unnecessary to
resolve the so-called standing issue.4 We also reject McCloud's Mirandarelated argument .
Motions to suppress are governed by Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 9 .78, which provides that a court presented with a motion to
By agreement, the possession of a handgun by a convicted felon charge was
dismissed without prejudice.
The concept of standing is a misnomer for Fourth Amendment analysis .
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U .S. 83, 88 (1998) ("[I]n determining whether a defendant
is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment
rights, the definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.") (internal
quotation marks omitted) . More properly, a court must determine whether a
defendant, such as McCloud, "had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and
second, whether that expectation was a legitimate, objectively reasonable
expectation." United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) .
suppress "shall conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury
and at the conclusion thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the
essential issues of fact raised by the motion or objection and necessary to
support the ruling." Upon appellate review, the trial court's findings of fact are
"conclusive" if they are "supported by substantial evidence . . . ."5 "Using those
facts, the reviewing court then conducts a de novo review of the trial court's
application of the law to those facts to determine whether the decision is
correct as a matter of law."6
All warrantless searches are unreasonable unless the search falls within
an exception to the warrant requirement .? Among the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest.$ Under the search
incident to arrest exception, an officer is permitted to search the person
arrested and the area within the arrestee's immediate control.9 In the context
RCr 9 .78 .
Commonwealth v. Jones, 217 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Ky. 2006) .
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S . 347, 357 (1967) (holding that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions .") (footnote omitted) .
Rainey v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Ky. 2006) ("A search incident to an
arrest is an exception to the general rule requiring a warrant prior to searches and
seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.") .
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) ("When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape . Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in
of automobiles, it has been held that once the driver is validly arrested, the
police have the authorization to search the entire passenger compartment. 10
Although the Supreme Court recently limited the broad scope of this
authority in Arizona v. Gant, H we do not believe Gant affects the case at hand.
Under Gant, "[poolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest ." 12 Otherwise, "a search of an
arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show
that another exception to the warrant requirement applies." 13 In the case at
hand, however, it was reasonable for Royse to believe that McCloud's vehicle
contained evidence of the offense of arrest (i. e., possession or trafficking in
drugs) . 14 Therefore, if McCloud's arrest was valid, Royse's search of McCloud
and the Grand Prix were both permissible .
10
14
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like
rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area `within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.") .
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) ("Once an officer determines
that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to
ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger
compartment.") .
U.S.
, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009) .
Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723 .
Id. at 1723-24 .
Id. at 1714 ("[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile
context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.") .
A police officer in Kentucky is statutorily authorized to conduct a
warrantless arrest if the officer either observes the arrestee commit a felony or
misdemeanor in the officer's presence or when the officer has probable cause to
believe the arrestee has committed a felony. 15 "[Plrobable cause for arrest
involves reasonable grounds for the belief that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." 16
In the case at hand, Royse, who was experienced in narcotics recognition
and interdiction, observed McCloud holding what Royse believed, based upon
his experience and training, to be crack cocaine. Cocaine is a Schedule II
controlled substance. 17 Unauthorized possession of a Schedule I or Schedule II
narcotic drug is a felony offense. 18 So Royse had probable cause to believe that
McCloud had committed a felony offense in Royse's presence, meaning that he
had probable cause to arrest McCloud. McCloud's argument that the officers
lacked probable cause for an arrest because they had not witnessed an actual
drug transaction between McCloud and the female in the passenger seat is
15
16
17
18
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 431 .005 ("(1) A peace officer may make an arrest:
(a) In obedience to a warrant ; or (b) Without a warrant when a felony is committed
in his presence; or (c) Without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe
that the person being arrested has committed a felony; or (d) Without a warrant
when a misdemeanor, as defined in KRS 431 .060, has been committed in his
presence . . . .") . See also Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) ("A
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor
committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the
arrest is supported by probable cause .") .
Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S .W.3d 532, 538-39 (Ky.App . 2003) .
KRS 218A.070(1)(d) .
KRS 218A.1415 .
without merit because Royse had probable cause to arrest McCloud on a felony
offense even before any monetary transaction occurred .
Because the arrest was permissible, the later searches of McCloud's
person and the Grand Prix, which flowed naturally and permissibly from the
probable cause-supported arrest of McCloud, were likewise constitutionally
permissible . So the trial court did not err in denying McCloud's motions to
suppress either the search of his person or the search of the Grand Prix. 19
Because it is not necessary for the resolution of the case at hand, we leave for
another day the question of whether someone driving another person's vehicle
may properly contest a search of that vehicle when there is no direct evidence
that the arrestee-driver had or lacked the vehicle owner's permission to drive
the vehicle.
We also reject McCloud's Miranda-based argument regarding the
statements he made concerning his ownership of the incriminating safe and
duffle bag found in the Grand Prix. The testimony on this topic at the
suppression hearing was not extensive. In response to questioning by the
Commonwealth, Royse testified that he read McCloud the "standard Miranda
rights" from a card Royse had in his possession . Royse also responded in the
negative when asked by the Commonwealth if McCloud had asked to speak to
an attorney, indicated he did not want to speak to Royse, or had made any
19
The fact that the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress was based
upon different reasoning (i.e., its belief that McCloud lacked standing to contest the
search of the Grand Prix) does not alter our result because it is well-settled that an
appellate court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record.
See, e.g., Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gray, 814 S .W.2d 928,
930 (Ky.App. 1991) .
statements that caused Royse to believe McCloud did not want to talk.
McCloud now contends that there was an insufficient record to show that he
was informed of his full panoply of Miranda rights and had knowingly chosen
to waive them .
Of course, a defendant subjected to custodial interrogation must be
adequately advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel, before statements made by the
defendant during that custodial questioning may be used. 20 A defendant may
waive those rights, however, provided the waiver is "knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent."21 The Commonwealth bears the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant waived his Miranda-based
rights.22 Although a court "must presume that a defendant did not waive his
rights[,]" it is sometimes possible to infer a valid waiver "from the actions and
words of the person interrogated ."23
McCloud asks us to hold that he was not informed of his rights and did
not properly waive them. But Royse's testimony that he informed McCloud of
20
Cummings v. Commonwealth , 226 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky. 2007) ("In order to use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, made by a defendant subjected to
custodial interrogation, the prosecution must demonstrate that the Appellant was
advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to remain silent and the
right to an attorney.") .
21
22
23
Mills v. Commonwealth ; 996 S.W.2d 473, 482 (Ky. 1999) ("[T]he Commonwealth
only needs to prove waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence .").
See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S . 157, 168 (1986) ("Whenever the State
bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant
claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove
waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.") .
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) .
the standard Miranda rights was unrebutted . Perhaps it would have been
better practice for the Commonwealth to ask Royse the specific language he
used in informing McCloud of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless, from the
record before us, we have a police officer's sworn testimony that he informed a
suspect of the suspect's constitutional rights and that the suspect never gave
any indication that he wished to invoke those rights. No evidence to the
contrary was adduced . Therefore, we have no evidence upon which we could
base a conclusion that McCloud was not adequately informed of his rights or
that he refused to waive them. Instead, the opposite is true because the facts
and circumstances cause us to infer that McCloud was adequately informed of
his rights and chose to waive them . So the trial court did not err in refusing to
suppress McCloud's statements regarding his ownership of the materials
discovered during the search of the Grand Prix.
B . Detective Bowling's Testimony Reg-a- rding, the
Drug Trade was_Admissible .
Detective Bryant Bowling testified about the drug trade, including things
like baggies being used to package drugs, the amount of cocaine in a typical
"hit," and his opinion regarding whether the amount of drugs seized from
McCloud indicated an intent to traffic or for personal usage . McCloud argues
Bowling's testimony "included nothing that was beyond the ken of a lay
person[,]" meaning that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
the Commonwealth to present Bowling's opinion testimony."
Our precedent is directly contrary to McCloud's argument . Bowling was
unquestionably an experienced, qualified law enforcement officer . 24 We have
approved the introduction of similar testimony both before25 and after26 the
United States Supreme Court's landmark 1993 decision regarding expert
testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.27 And we have held
that the type of testimony offered by Bowling was "representative of the type of
expert opinion based on `specialized knowledge' for which a formal Daubert
24
Even McCloud states in his brief that "Detective Bowling has significant credentials
and experience in narcotics enforcement, both as a Louisville police officer and
with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency."
25
See, e.g., Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W .2d 801, 802 (Ky. 1991) ("The trial
judge did not commit error in allowing the police to testify as to their expert
opinion that the Sargents had the drugs in their possession for sale and not
personal use . The testimony of the two detectives was admissible as that of expert
witnesses. The police testimony indicates that their opinion was based on
experience derived from many drug related investigations. . . . Both detectives
testified about the marijuana trade[,] which is certainly specialized in character
and outside the scope of common knowledge and experience of most jurors. The
opinion of the police aided the jury in understanding the evidence and resolving the
issues. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he determined that both
police officers were sufficiently qualified to give expert testimony. There was no
invasion of the province of the jury as the ultimate factfinder and there was no
error .") (citations omitted) .
See, e.g., Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 337 (Ky. 2006)
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) ("Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W .2d 801 (Ky.
1991), permitted a police witness who is qualified by training and experience to
testify in such a situation . See also United States v. Bender, 265 F.3d 464
(6th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Quinn , 230 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2000) ; United
States v. Thomas , 74 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 1996) . These cases support the principle
that a police officer, by virtue of his job, training and experience, can in certain
instances assist a jury to understand aspects of the drug trade that the average lay
juror would not be able to comprehend .") ; Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S .W.3d
426, 429-31 (Ky. 2004) (finding no error in trial court's permitting detective to offer
opinion testimony regarding a piece of paper found in defendant's vehicle as being
drug-related transaction entries) .
509 U.S . 579 (1993) .
26
27
hearing on reliability may be unnecessary. . .
."28
We believe our precedent
remains a correct exposition of the law and, thus, hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it permitted Bowling to render his opinions
without first holding a formal Daubert hearing. z9
C . The Trial Court's Stray Comment While Orally Reading
the Jury Instructions to the Jury Did Not Result in
a Directed Verdict in Favor of the Commonwealth .
The trial court's written instruction to the jury on the trafficking in a
controlled substance while in possession of a firearm charge provided that "[i]f
you find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction, you will say so by your
verdict and no more." Unfortunately, however, when the trial court read this
instruction aloud to the jury it instead stated: "You will find the defendant
guilty under this instruction . You will say so by your verdict and no more ."
McCloud argues on appeal that the trial court's misstatement constituted a
de facto directed verdict in favor of the Commonwealth .
No contemporaneous objection was lodged to the trial court's
unfortunate slip-of-the-tongue . Thus, we may review only for palpable error .30
In order for an error to be palpable, the error must be so egregious as to be
28
29
30
Dixon, 149 S.W.3d at 431 .
Id. ("Based on this evidence and existing precedents, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Duvall to render his opinion
without first holding a formal Daubert hearing.") .
RCr 10 .26 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by . . . an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.")
12
"shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable . 1131 A party claiming an error is
palpable bears the heavy burden to demonstrate "the probability of a different
result or error so fundamental as to threaten [a defendant's] entitlement to due
process of law."3 2
Of course, "since the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses, it is never proper for the court to direct a verdict of guilty where
there is a plea of not guilty, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence of his
guilt may be convincing and wholly uncontradicted ." 33 But we do not regard
the trial court's verbal miscue to have been a de facto directed verdict in favor
of the Commonwealth .
Neither party has cited us to any precedent for this question. And we
believe the issue can be settled within the framework of our general precedent
regarding the precedence written orders take over verbal statements. A trial
court is obligated to prepare written instructions (which the jury may take into
their deliberations) and also to read the instructions aloud to the jury.34 Our
precedents clearly hold that written orders of a court take precedence over any
arguably contradictory oral statements.35 The written jury instructions
permitted the jury to find McCloud guilty or not guilty of all offenses . More
specifically, the written instruction regarding the trafficking in a controlled
31
32
33
34
35
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006) .
Brooks v Commonwealth , 217 S.W .3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2007) .
Bardin v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky . 651, 231 S . W. 208, 209 (1921).
See RCr 9 .54 .
See, e.g., Terry v. Commonwealth , 253 S.W.3d 466, 477 (Ky. 2007) .
13
substance while in possession of a firearm charge required the jury to find
McCloud guilty "if, and only if' the jury members "believe[d] from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt" that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient
evidence for all the elements of that offense (as detailed in that instruction) .
Additionally, the evidence against McCloud was strong . Because the written
instructions were a correct exposition of the law and adequately explained the
jury's obligation to find McCloud guilty only if the jury members believed
beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence showed him to be guilty, we
cannot conclude that the trial court's verbal slip in this case was so egregious
as to rise to the level of a palpable error. 36
D . McCloud Was Not Entitled to a Directed Verdict on the
Firearm-Enhanced Charges .
McCloud argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have
determined that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of the firearm-enhanced
charges. We disagree.
McCloud argues that there was no specific evidence showing a nexus
between the firearm found under the Grand Prix's front seat and the criminal
charges . But our precedent makes clear that constructive possession of a
firearm in close proximity to possession of illegal narcotics (i.e., the firearm is
36
People v . Rodriguez, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 244 (Ca1 .Ct .App. 2000) ("It is generally
presumed that the jury was guided by the written instructions . The written version
ofjury instructions governs any conflict with oral instructions . Consequently, as
long as the court provides accurate written instructions to the jury to use during
deliberations, no prejudicial error occurs from deviations in the oral instructions.
Here, the trial court's instructions were delivered to the jury orally and in writing.
Because the jury had access to the correct written instructions while deliberating,
any error in reading the instructions was harmless.") (citations omitted) .
14
within the immediate control of the arrestee at the time of arrest) is sufficient to
create a jury question on whether the firearm was possessed in furtherance of
drug dealing.37 It is uncontested that a loaded firearm was found under the
front seat of the Grand Prix that McCloud was driving immediately before his
arrest and that McCloud had hidden narcotics on his person and in the Grand
Prix. Thus, drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, it was not
clearly unreasonable for a jury to have found McCloud guilty of the firearmenhanced offenses .38
37
38
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 260 S .W.3d 792, 804 (Ky. 2008) ("Furthermore, the
proof was sufficient to create a jury issue as to the elements of the firearm
enhancement : possession of a firearm at the time the drug offenses were
committed and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug offenses .
Whether or not the gun was covered by bedding, it was found in Campbell's home
and, thus, in his constructive possession . Furthermore, given its proximity to the
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and methamphetamine manufacturing equipment
found, the jury could reasonably infer that it was used in furtherance of the drug
offenses . Thus, the trial court properly denied the directed verdict motion . . . .")
(footnote omitted) ; Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226, 247 (Ky. 2003),
overruled on other grounds by Matheny v. Commonwealth , 191 S.W .3d 599 (Ky.
2006) ("Thus, constructive possession of a firearm within a vehicle at the time of
arrest and the commission of the offense, as here, satisfies the `nexus' requirement
of KRS 218A.992 .").
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) ("On motion for
directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty,
a directed verdict should not be given . For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal .") .
15
III . CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Angela Marie Rea
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
James David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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