KEITH STILTZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PU BLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
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RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
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2008-SC-000259-MR
KEITH STILTZ
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APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM CUMBERLAND CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
NO. 07-CR-00107
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is an appeal from a judgment in which Appellant was convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), third-degree assault, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to: grant
him a continuance; appoint him a new attorney; and direct a verdict on the
assault and trafficking charges. We reject all three arguments and thus affirm.
On August 25, 2007, Officer Junior Smith of the City of Burkesville
Police Department stopped a GEO Tracker driven by Tina Lauderdale. Officer
Smith recognized the car as one that had recently been towed as an abandoned
vehicle and which police had been unable to determine its owner and if it was
insured. As Officer Smith approached the vehicle, Lauderdale got out and
started walking toward him. Smith told Lauderdale to return to her car and
provide her license, registration, and proof of insurance. As he got closer to the
car, Smith saw trash strewn about the vehicle, including some coffee filters and
other items Smith knew to be used to make methamphetamine. Officer Smith
then recognized Appellant, Keith Stiltz, as the passenger in the car. Smith
became concerned because Stiltz was moving around a lot in the car .
Officer Lawrence Nettles soon arrived as back-up. The officers noticed
that Stiltz was spraying air freshener in the car and was reaching under the
seat, despite the fact that Smith had told him to keep his hands in view. The
officers approached Stiltz's door and Smith asked what he was doing. Stiltz,
who was still fidgeting, pulled out a 2-liter Mountain Dew bottle . Nettles, who
was behind Smith, yelled, "that's a meth lab, get back!" The officers ordered
Stiltz to put the bottle down and step out of the car. Stiltz got out of the car
with the bottle in his hand, exclaiming, "get back, this shit will kill you!" Stiltz
then threw the bottle. Officer Nettles grabbed Smith and pulled him towards
the back of the car. When the bottle hit the ground some 3-5 feet from Smith,
some of its contents splashed up and hit Officer Smith's face and arm and
burned him. Smith was decontaminated and treated for the burns at a nearby
hospital. Lab tests on the contents of the 2-liter bottle confirmed that it
contained methamphetamine.
On September 27, 2007, Stiltz was indicted for manufacturing
methamphetamine, first-degree trafficking in methamphetamine, assault in the
third degree, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to a jury trial
held on February 7, 2008, Stiltz was found guilty of all four offenses and
sentenced to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment. This matter of right appeal
followed.
REQUEST FOR A NEW ATTORNEY AND CONTINUANCE
On the morning of trial, the parties met in chambers to address defense
counsel's motion for a continuance based on Stiltz's dissatisfaction with
defense counsel and his request to have a new attorney appointed for him.
Defense counsel informed the court that she and Stiltz had personal issues and
were not in agreement on how to try his case. Defense counsel maintained
that she had attempted to defend him to the best of her ability, but Stiltz
insisted that he knew the law better than she did and had asked her to do
things that she could not legally or ethically do .
Stiltz told the court that he did not want defense counsel to represent
him in the trial because he felt she was working more for the prosecution than
the Commonwealth was . In particular, Stiltz complained that defense counsel
had not obtained his medical records to show that he was intoxicated at the
time of the offense . Defense counsel stated that she did not recall Stiltz asking
her to obtain his medical records, but, in any event, she anticipated that
Stiltz's intoxicated state would be elicited through the testimony of various
witnesses because it was not `a disputed fact.
The trial judge explained to Stiltz that he could not fire his appointed
counsel and appoint new counsel simply because Stiltz wanted a different
attorney. The court denied Stiltzs motion to appoint a new attorney, reasoning
that Stiltz had not given the court any justifiable reason to discharge counsel.
The court went on to deny the motion for a continuance because the parties
were all aware that the case had been set for trial that day and there was no
reason the case should not go forward .
As to Stiltz's contention that he was entitled to new counsel, it has been
held that a defendant who is represented by a public defender or appointed
counsel does not have a constitutional right to be represented by any particular
attorney, and is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the
appointment of substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse
by counsel. Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Ky. 1982)
(citing Baker v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 325 (Ky.App. 1978) and Fultz v.
Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1966)) . "Adequate and sufficient cause
for removal of counsel has been variously defined by the federal courts and
includes (1) complete breakdown of communications between counsel and
defendant, (2) conflict of interest, and (3) legitimate interests of the defendant
are being prejudiced ." Baker, 574 S.W.2d at 327 . While Stiltz expressed
personal dissatisfaction with his counsel, no adequate reasons were
demonstrated warranting dismissal of counsel in this case . No conflict of
interest, abuse by counsel, or prejudice to the legitimate interests of Stiltz was
shown.
As for the denial of the motion for a continuance, it is well established
that the granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of a trial judge,
and unless from a review of the whole record it appears that the trial judge has
abused that discretion, this court will not disturb the ruling of the court .
Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky. 1982) ; RCr 9 .04.
From a review of the whole record in this case, we cannot say that. the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing Stiltz's motion for a continuance. There
was no indication that defense counsel was unprepared to try the case. She
appeared to have a full knowledge of the facts and available defenses, and
presented a legitimate and vigorous defense, given the facts of the case.
DENIAL OF DIRECTED VERDICT MOTIONS
Stiltz argues that it was error to deny him a directed verdict on the thirddegree assault and first-degree trafficking in methamphetamine charges. Our
standard of review on a motion for directed verdict is set forth in
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W. 2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. . . .
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal .
As to the trafficking charge, KRS 218A.1412 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree when he knowingly and
unlawfully traffics in: a controlled substance, that is
classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug;
a controlled substance analogue ; lysergic acid
diethylamide ; phencyclidine; a controlled substance
that contains any quantity of methamphetamine,
including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers ;
gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), including its salts,
isomers, salts of isomers, and analogues; or
flunitrazepam, including its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers .
A defendant acts "knowingly" when he "is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that the circumstance exists ." KRS 218A.015; KRS 501 .020(2) .
Stiltz contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knew the 2-liter
bottle he had contained methamphetainine .
Stiltz testified that he was a methamphetamine addict who had been
abusing methamphetamine for over 15 years. He testified that he was
transporting the bottle to his meth dealer, "Big Country," later that day in
exchange for some drugs and $200. Stiltz claimed at trial that he did not know
what was in the bottle and or even how to make methamphetamine . According
to Stiltz, he threw the bottle because the contents were burning him in the car .
Stiltz admitted saying, "get back, this shit will kill you" when he threw the
bottle.
Officer Smith testified that Stiltz told him that he knew what was in the
bottle . According to Smith, Stiltz stated that he was to put the bottle together
in Metcalfe County and then transport it to Willis Barbecue where he would
give it to someone named "Country" for $200 and drugs.
From our review of the evidence, there was more than sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable juror could believe that Stiltz knew that
methamphetamine was in the bottle. Stiltz's actions, his admitted history with
methamphetamine, and what he told Officer Smith belied his claim that he did
not know that methamphetamine was being made in the bottle. Hence, the
trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict as to the trafficking
charge .
Relative to the assault charge, KRS 508.025 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree
when the actor: (a) Recklessly, with a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument, or intentionally causes or
attempts to cause physical injury to :
1 . A state, county, city, or federal peace officer;
The court did not instruct the jury on an "intentional" theory of the case,
but only on the question of whether Stiltz acted "recklessly with a dangerous
instrument" when he threw the bottle containing the methamphetamine,
causing physical injury to Officer Smith. KRS 501 .020 defines "recklessly" as
follows :
(4) "Recklessly"--A person acts recklessly with respect
to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense when he fails to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will
occur or that the circumstance exists . The risk must
be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation .
Stiltz argues that the evidence established that he knew of the
substantial risk of the bottle of methamphetamine chemicals by his
exclamation "get back, this shit will kill you." Thus, he maintains that his
conduct was actually wanton ("aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk"), not reckless. KRS 501 .020(3) .
Officer Smith testified that Stiltz disobeyed his order to set the bottle
down and exit the vehicle. Instead, Stiltz tossed the bottle out of the car and it
landed three to five feet from the officer. Officer Smith testified that he did not
believe that Stiltz was aiming the bottle at him. Rather, it looked to Officer
Smith like Stiltz was just trying to get rid of the bottle quickly. While Stiltz
may have been aware of the volatility of the methamphetamine chemicals in
the bottle, the jury could have believed from the evidence that Stiltz
nevertheless failed to appreciate the risk of throwing the bottle out of the car
near the officers - that it would hit the ground and the contents would splash
up and injure one of the officers .
Appellant argues that his conduct was wanton (second-degree assault),
rather than reckless (third-degree assault) . Because third-degree assault is a
lesser included offense of second-degree assault and Appellant has admitted
that his conduct was wanton, he was not entitled to a directed verdict on the
third-degree assault charge. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to deny
a request for a directed verdict on third-degree assault.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Cumberland Circuit
Court is hereby affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Todd Dryden Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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