MICHAEL JOSEPH FLICK V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
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MICHAEL JOSEPH FLICK
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ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00898
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Michael Joseph Flick, appeals to this Court, as a matter
of right, his convictions of murder, second-degree assault under extreme
emotional disturbance (EED) and first-degree burglary, pursuant to Ky.
Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . A Fayette County Jury recommended life
imprisonment for the murder conviction, five (5) years for the assault
conviction, and ten (10) years for the burglary conviction and the trial
court sentenced Appellant accordingly.
Appellant now claims two errors arose during his trial affecting his
constitutional right to due process: first, he alleges that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress certain statements made to the
police; and second, that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for
a directed verdict on the murder charge given the subsequent
"inconsistent verdicts."
D C_ .
Finding no merit to Appellant's arguments, we affirm the judgment
of the Fayette Circuit Court and uphold Appellant's convictions.
I.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, Randall Lambirth contacted Appellant about purchasing
Appellant's optometry practice in Lexington. Appellant decided that he
would sell his practice, and the two men reached an agreement. The
arrangement contained a three (3) year employment contract for
Appellant, which, upon its end, would complete the sale . The
employment contract called for Appellant to work four (4) days a week,
Wednesday through Saturday, for Lambirth .
In early 2004, the relationship between Lambirth and Appellant
began to deteriorate. Appellant did not agree with how Lambirth was
running the practice and regularly argued with him . Christina Wittich,
Lambirth's girlfriend and Appellant's co-worker, confronted Appellant in
the parking lot one afternoon, as he tried to leave for lunch with a lobby
full of patients . By the summer of 2004, Appellant said he was "burned
out" with work.
During this time, Appellant asked Lambirth if he could have
Saturdays off because his father was ill; Lambirth acquiesced to his
request . However, shortly after letting Appellant take off Saturdays,
Lambirth discovered that Appellant was actually working at an optical
center in a local Wal-Mart on those days . Lambirth confronted Appellant
and told him he had to come back to work for him on Saturdays or he
would be fired . Appellant refused to come back. On November 17, 2004,
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Lambirth fired Appellant. By the end of March 2005, Appellant had filed
a wrongful termination and breach of contract lawsuit against Lambirth .
The two men would not see each other again until May 20, 2005 .
On May 20, 2005, Appellant drove to Lambirth's house. Before
exiting his vehicle, he grabbed a gun, which he had stolen from a friend.
Upon entering the house, Appellant shot and killed Christina Wittich .
Shortly thereafter, Lambirth returned home accompanied by his brother .
He went into the house and discovered Christina lying in a pool of blood.
At this point Appellant approached him with the gun . Lambirth tried to
get away, but Appellant shot him in the arm. A struggle ensued between
the two men, at which time Lambirth's brother, Chris, entered the house
and assisted Lambirth . The two men subdued Appellant by holding him
down and beating him. During the altercation, Lambirth was able to call
the police .
Lambirth and Christina were taken to the University of Kentucky
medical center where Christina was pronounced dead; Lambirth was
treated for his wounds. Appellant was also transported to the medical
center for treatment of his injuries, which consisted of various cuts and
bruises, one of which required stitches. Appellant's injuries, however,
were non-life threatening and he was awake and aware of what was
happening while in the emergency room . He was evaluated for his level
of consciousness and received the highest possible score. Appellant's xrays, ultrasounds, and CAT scans were all normal.
Officer Ben Shirley of the Lexington Police Department
accompanied Appellant from the crime scene to the hospital . Officer
Shirley attempted to read Appellant his Miranda warnings while en route
to the hospital but stopped because he feared that Appellant would not
hear him, or would be confused because of all of the commotion in the
ambulance. Once at the hospital, Officer Shirley read Appellant his
Miranda warnings at approximately 8 :20 p.m . Appellant was conscious
and told the officer that he understood the warnings by answering, "yes."
Following this, Officer Shirley proceeded to ask basic booking
information questions, which Appellant had no trouble answering.
Later, Detective Brotherton arrived at the hospital to question
Appellant about the events that had taken place . Brotherton did not reMirandize Appellant because Officer Shirley had already informed him of
his rights. Appellant was able to talk with Detective Brotherton for some
time and, in the process, was able to develop an elaborate kidnapping
story. Appellant told Brotherton that Lambirth and his brother
kidnapped him and had taken him to Lambirth's house that night.
However, Detective Brotherton did not believe Appellant because he
could not keep his story straight. When Detective Brotherton told
Appellant that he did not believe his story, Appellant invoked his right to
remain silent, which Brotherton honored, immediately ceasing the
interview. Later, Appellant was transferred to Fayette County Detention
Center.
The next morning, Detective Brotherton went to the detention
center to talk with Appellant. A few hours earlier, Appellant had
returned to the detention center from the hospital after experiencing a
bad reaction to medicine he was given. Detective Brotherton testified
that Appellant did not appear to be sleepy, confused, or disoriented .
Appellant told Brotherton that he did not remember him or the prior
conversation from the hospital . After a few questions, Appellant invoked
his right to counsel. Detective Brotherton acceded to his request.
Without further questioning from Brotherton, Appellant continued to
briefly speak, indicating that he did not want to say anything
incriminating. Eventually, Appellant again invoked his right to counsel
and the interview stopped.
At trial, Appellant moved to suppress all statements made to
Detective Brotherton because of alleged Miranda violations . The trial
court held a suppression hearing at which written memoranda of law
were submitted by both parties. On March 13, 2007, the trial court
denied Appellant's motion to suppress the statements. The court made
several findings of fact, to wit: 1) Officer Ben Shirley fully advised
Appellant of his Miranda warnings while at the hospital; 2) Appellant
indicated that he understood his rights by answering in the affirmative;
3) Appellant was fully coherent at the hospital; 4) Appellant was able to
provide Officer Shirley with accurate information that constituted
appropriate responses to the questions ; 5) nothing in the evidence
suggested that Appellant was incompetent due to mental illness; 6)
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fifteen (15) hours passed between the two interviews ; and 7) there was no
testimony that would have demonstrated that Appellant was incoherent
during the second interview.
At trial, Appellant based his defense upon the presence of Extreme
Emotional Disturbance (EED) . Each side presented its evidence either
for or against the existence of EED . At the conclusion of the
Commonwealth's case, Appellant made a motion for directed verdict
arguing that a reasonable jury could not find the absence of EED. The
trial court overruled the motion.
Ultimately, Appellant was convicted of murder, second-degree
assault under EED and first-degree burglary. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment for the murder conviction, five (5) years for the assault
conviction, and ten (10) years for the burglary conviction.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE BY
APPELLANT
i. STATEMENTS AT THE HOSPITAL
Appellant claims that his statements made at the hospital to
Detective Brotherton were not made voluntarily . He argues that based
on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Beecher v. Alabama,
389 U .S. 35 (1967) and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S . 385 (1978), his
statements were involuntary because he was being treated for injuries in
the hospital. We disagree .
In Beecher and Mincev, the High Court held the confessions to be
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
They reasoned that an appraisal of the circumstances in each case
compelled them to find that the Petitioners' confessions were the product
of coercion, borne out of severe pain and isolation. Appellant claims that
his case is factually comparable to Mincev and Beecher and therefore the
trial judge erred when he denied Appellant's motion to suppress the
statements . "Whether a confession was voluntarily made, and therefore,
admissible in evidence, is primarily a question for the trial judge to
decide, KRS 422 .110 . . . it will not be disturbed unless it satisfactorily
appears that the evidence supporting the decision was insufficient ."
Bauer v. Commonwealth , 364 S .W.2d 655, 656 (Ky. 1963) .
In Mincev the defendant had been shot and was in critical
condition. He was in the intensive care unit, on a respirator, and could
not speak. Mincey, 437 U.S . at 396. While being questioned, the
defendant lost consciousness throughout the questioning, whereupon
the officer would cease, only to resume the interrogation when the
defendant regained consciousness and "return[ed] relentlessly to his
task." Id. at 401 . The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he statements
at issue were thus the result of virtually continuous questioning of a
seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness." Id.
In Beecher , the defendant was shot by the police and taken to the
hospital . Within a few days the defendant's leg had become swollen and
the pain was so great that he was receiving injections of morphine .
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Beecher, 389 U.S . at 36 . Soon thereafter the defendant's leg was
amputated. Less than an hour after one of the morphine injections,
police interviewed the defendant and prepared detailed statements for
him to sign. Id. at 36-37 . The Supreme Court determined that the
defendant's confessions were the product of gross coercion, basing its
decision on the fact that the defendant was suffering severe pain from his
injuries and was under the influence of morphine when being questioned
by the officers . Beecher, 389 U.S . at 37-38.
The circumstances behind the statements in Mincev and Beecher
and the statements elicited from Appellant, here, are simply not
comparable . In those cases the defendants were seriously injured, in
extreme pain, and had substantial questions as to their mental acuity.
Their injuries were far more severe than were Appellant's . When injuries
are not severe, courts have been reluctant to find that the presence of
injury and medical treatment invalidates the voluntariness of a
statement . See Jackson v. Commonwealth , 187 S.W.3d 300 (Ky. 2006) ;
Abela v. Martin, 380 F .3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004) .
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the admission of involuntary confessions : `[if the defendant's] will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of [the] confession offends due process.' Bailed
Commonwealth , 194 S .W.3d 296, 300 (Ky. 2006); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 225-226 (1973) . The Supreme Court has
held that, "[o]nly if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
8
interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights
have been waived." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S . 412, 421 (1986) (quoting
Fare v. Michael C . , 442 U.S . 707 (1979)); see also Mills v.
Commonwealth , 996 S .W.2d 473, 481 (Ky. 1999) . A court's finding that
a statement is voluntary must not be disturbed on appeal unless this
finding is clearly erroneous. See Henson v . Commonwealth , 20 S.W .3d
466 (Ky. 1999) .
Here, we find no error by the trial judge . Officer Shirley testified
that he read Appellant his rights and that Appellant said he understood
them . Moreover, as the trial court found, Appellant is an intelligent man
and the injuries he sustained did not affect his ability to comprehend
what was going on nor render his will "overborne" such as to "critically
impair his capacity for self-determination ." U .S v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715,
724 (8th Cir . 2004) (citing Simmons v . Bowersox , 235 F.3d 1124, 1132
(8th Cir. 2001) (cert . denied, 534 U .S . 924 (2001)) . Therefore, when
looking to the totality of the circumstances, we decline to hold that
Appellant's statements were involuntary merely because he was receiving
medical treatment for non-serious, non-life threatening injuries . There
was substantial evidence presented, which would support the trial
judge's ruling that the statements at the hospital were voluntary.
ii. STATEMENTS AT THE DETENTION CENTER
Likewise, Appellant claims that the statements elicited from him at
the detention center were also involuntary and that the invocation of his
9
right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored" as required under
Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) . Appellant alleges Mosley
was not followed by the police.
The pertinent facts are as follows : (1) Appellant was taken to the
hospital; (2) he was read his Miranda rights and orally acknowledged
them ; (3) sometime during the questioning at the hospital, Appellant
invoked his right to remain silent;' (4) Detective Brotherton immediately
ceased his questioning; (5) the next morning Detective Brotherton visited
Appellant at the detention center for some follow up questioning ; (6)
Appellant was not re-Mirandized; (7) after a few questions, Appellant
invoked his right to counsel; (8) after a few non-elicited statements by
Appellant the interview stopped. Appellant now claims that the
invocation of his right to remain silent barred the police from initiating a
subsequent interrogation on the same matter at the detention center .
We disagree .
Mosley held that the admissibility of statements obtained after a
person in custody has decided to remain silent depends, under Miranda,
on whether his "right to cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored."
Mosley, 423 U.S . at 104. The Court looked to at a set of factors when it
determined that Mosley's rights were "scrupulously honored ." Those
factors included: (1) Mosley was carefully advised of his rights prior to
Appellant only invoked his right to remain silent; at no time, while at the
hospital, did he invoke his right to counsel.
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his initial interrogation, he orally acknowledge those rights, and signed a
notification-of-rights form ; (2) the detective conducting the interrogation
immediately ceased questioning Mosley after he invoked his right to
remain silent and did not resume questioning him or try to persuade him
to reconsider his decision; (3) Mosley was questioned about a different
crime more than two hours later at a different location by a different
officer; and (4) Mosley was again given Miranda warnings prior to the
second interrogation . Id . at 104-105 .
In the case at hand, we are of the opinion that Appellant's rights
were scrupulously honored . First, he was initially advised of his rights at
the hospital, and orally acknowledged those rights.2 Second, when
Appellant informed Detective Brotherton that he no longer wanted to talk
to him, Brotherton did not question Appellant further, nor did he
pressure him to change his mind.3 Third, the amount of time which
lapsed between Appellant's refusal to talk at the hospital and when he
was questioned at the detention center was far more than a short lapse
of time.4 Lastly, there is no evidence that Detective Brotherton had
coerced Appellant into talking with him at the detention center .
He did not sign a notification form, but that is not required under Miranda .
3 This is significant because the "right to cut
off questioning centers on the
defendant's ability to `control the time at which questioning occurs, the
subjects discussed, and the duration of the questioning."' Mills , 996 S.W.2d
at 483 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04 .) .
"[T)he constitutionality of a subsequent police interview depends not on its
subject matter, but rather on whether the police in conducting the interview
sought to undermine the suspect's resolve to remain silent." United States v.
Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 659 (7th Cir.1998) .
2
Furthermore, this Court has held that the factors used in the
Mosley decision are neither exclusive nor exhaustive and that we
approach the Mosley analysis on a case-by-case basis . Mills, 996 S .W.2d
at 483. Therefore, the fact that Appellant was not given his Miranda
warnings before the second interview does not amount to a deprivation of
his rights or to his waiver of those Miranda rights under all the facts of
this case .
Looking to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interview at the detention center, we hold, as the Court did in Mills and
Mosely, that the police "scrupulously honored" Appellant's right to cut off
questioning . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its
findings .
B . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
Appellant next claims that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion for a directed verdict after the close of evidence and that the jury
returned "inconsistent verdicts ." We disagree .
Appellant was convicted of the murder of Christina Wittich and
second-degree assault under EED for shooting Randall Lambirth .
Evidence was presented indicating that Appellant suffered from mental
illness and had become disturbed with his obsession over the lawsuit he
Furthermore, "[poolice may question a defendant after he has initially
asserted his right to remain silent, provided they have not attempted to talk
him out of asserting his privilege, and provided a time lapse occurs between his
initial assertion of his privilege and a subsequent questioning." Matthews v .
Commonwealth , 168 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Ky. 2005) .
12
had filed against Lambirth . However, there was also conflicting evidence
presented regarding Appellant's mental state tending to negate the
presence of EED.
This Court no longer requires that verdicts be consistent, merely
that the evidence to support such verdicts be sufficient. Commonwealth
v. Harrell, 3 S .W .3d 349 (Ky . 1999) . In Harrell we found, "[a] rigid
adherence to a prohibition against inconsistent verdicts may interfere
with the proper function of a jury . . . the better approach would be to
examine the sufficiency of the evidence to support each verdict." Id. at
351 . "The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the
record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt ." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) . "The
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original) ; see also Woodby v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U .S . 276, 282 (1966) .
Pursuant to Kentucky law, the inconsistent verdicts argument is
without merit; therefore, we review this claim under a sufficiency of the
evidence standard . Appellant argues that because the jury found him
guilty of second-degree assault under EED, they could not have found
him guilty of murder. This claim lacks factual and legal support.
13
In reviewing insufficiency claims, this Court must ask whether it
would be "clearly unreasonable" for a jury to find guilt under the
evidence presented. Commonwealth v . Shuttles, 80 S.W.3d 424, 426
(2002) . It is well-settled that the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt, even when other witnesses
testified to the contrary. Id. "[T]he court - as does a jury in an ordinary
case - ha[s] the right to believe the testimony adduced by one litigant in
preference to that furnished by his antagonist, even though a greater
number of witnesses testified in support of the rejected contention ."
King v. McMillian , 293 Ky. 399, 169 S .W.2d 10, 14 (1943) .
The issue thus becomes whether the jury could have reasonably
believed that while there was no EED when Appellant shot and killed
Wittich, that event and the ones ensuing triggered EED, which was
present when Appellant shot Lambirth . In fact, the jury was justified in
their determinations . Each side presented evidence as to the EED issue .
It was up to the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. The verdict
must be upheld unless it was clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt. Jackson, 443 U.S . at 318. To examine this, we turn to the record.
Evidence was presented by Appellant that he was extremely
disturbed about the lawsuit against Lambirth . The Commonwealth
presented evidence that, on the day of the crimes, Appellant was in a
good mood and did not seem disturbed to the people he interacted with
on that day. To find EED,
14
There must be evidence that the defendant suffered "a
temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed
as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act
uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme
emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious
purposes ." McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S .W.2d 464,
468-69 (Ky.1986) . "[T]he event which triggers the explosion
of violence on the part of the criminal defendant must be
sudden and uninterrupted . It is not a mental disease or
illness. . . . Thus, it is wholly insufficient for the accused
defendant to claim the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance based on a gradual victimization from his or her
environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering event
is sufficiently shown." Foster v. Commonwealth , 827 S.W.2d
670, 678 (Ky .1991) (citations omitted) . And the "extreme
emotional disturbance . . . [must have a] reasonable
explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be ." Spears, 30 S .W.3d at 155.
Greene v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W.3d 76, 81-82 (Ky. 2006) . "It is not
the court but a jury that must make a factual determination of . . .
extreme emotional disturbance." McClellan, 715 S .W.2d at 467. The
triggering event for EED may fester in the mind before surfacing, but
there is a question of whether there intervened between the provocation
and the crime a cooling-off period sufficient to preclude a conclusion that
the provocation was adequate . See Springer v. Commonwealth , 998
S.W.2d 439, 452 (Ky. 1999) ; Fields v. Commonwealth , 44 S .W.3d 355,
359 (Ky. 2001) .
It is undisputed that Appellant went to Lambirth's house on the
day in question and killed Christina Wittich. Appellant did not argue
that he did not do it; he merely argued that he did it under the duress of
EED . Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of
15
murder, if the jury believed that Appellant was not acting under EED at
the time of the first shooting.
In the present case, the jury was justified in coming to the
conclusions they made. Two possible theories exist that would validate
the jury's findings. First, the evidence presented swayed the jury to
believe that Appellant was acting in his right mind at the time he shot
and killed Christina Wittich, and that event caused his EED during the
second offense . Or, his EED could have only been triggered by Lambirth
because of their tumultuous past and therefore he was in his right mind
when he killed Christina and not when he eventually saw Lambirth .
Therefore, we find no reason to overturn the trial judge's ruling
denying the motion for directed verdict.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm
Appellant's convictions.
Minton, C.J. ; Cunningham, Schroder, Scott and Venters, JJ.,
concur. Abramson, J., concurs in result only. Noble, J ., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Joseph Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Ln Ste 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attoreny General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Dr.
Frankfort, KY 40601
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