MICHAEL D. JOHNSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLI SHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2009
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2008-SC-000092-MR
MICHAEL D. JOHNSON
ON APPEAL FROM WOLFE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRANK A. FLETCHER, JUDGE
NO . 05-CR-00095
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Michael D . Johnson, was convicted by a Wolfe Circuit Court
jury of two counts of second-degree manslaughter, two counts of second-degree
assault, one count of operating a motor vehicle without a license, and one
count of leaving the scene of an accident. He was sentenced to forty years'
imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const.
ยง110(2) (b) .
Appellant asserts three arguments on appeal : (1) that certain
incriminating statements were not properly disclosed to Appellant by the
Commonwealth in discovery, and were improperly admitted as evidence ; (2)
that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a change of venue ; and (3)
that the trial court imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum .
We now reverse Appellant's conviction and sentence because the
Commonwealth's failure to disclose Appellant's incriminating statements
pursuant to RCr 7.24 undermines our confidence in the outcome of the trial .
On September 4, 2005, two people, Justin Amburgey and Jason Tolson,
were killed in a single car accident in Wolfe County. Evidence gathered after
the accident indicated that Appellant was the driver of the car and was under
the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the accident. On October 31,
2005, Appellant was indicted by a Wolfe County Grand Jury on two counts of
murder, two counts of first degree assault, one count of operating a motor
vehicle without a license, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. At
trial, Appellant testified that another man, Kevin Smith, was the driver. His
entire defense centered on proving that he was not behind the wheel of the car
at the time of the accident.
On cross-examining Appellant, the prosecutor asked if, after the accident
he told Mike Sherouse, a friend of Appellant's, "I wrecked my car," "I tore my
car all to pieces," and "I think I killed three of my friends ." Appellant testified
that he did not recall making those statements . The prosecutor then informed
the trial court that she intended to call Sherouse as a rebuttal witness.
Appellant's counsel objected to the introduction of Appellant's incriminating
statements through Sherouse's testimony, because the Commonwealth had
failed to disclose them in discovery pursuant to RCr 7 .24 . The prosecutor
responded that Sherouse was disclosed as a potential witness in voir dire and
that his testimony would be provided for impeachment purposes only. The
trial court overruled Appellant's objection .
Sherouse testified that after the accident Appellant said, "I wrecked my
car," "I tore my car all to pieces," and "I think I killed three of my friends." On
cross-examination, Sherouse testified that he previously told the police about
Appellant's incriminating statements, that he spoke with the prosecutor prior
to trial, and that he was under subpoena to appear at trial. In closing
argument, the prosecutor emphasized Sherouse's testimony.
The prosecutor's failure to disclose Appellant's incriminating statements
clearly violated RCr 7 .24(1) . Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d 288, 296
(Ky. 2008) . The Commonwealth concedes this error, but argues that it is
harmless . However, under the facts presented in this case, we find that the
error is not harmless, and that Appellant's conviction must be reversed.
"The United States Supreme Court has held that a discovery violation
serves as sufficient justification for setting aside a conviction when there is a
reasonable probability that if the evidence was disclosed the result would have
been different ." Id. at 296-297; see also Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U .S. 1, 5-6
(1995) ; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U .S . 419, 433-434 (1995) . "A reasonable
probability of a different result" is shown when the violation "undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial ." K_yles, 514 U.S. at 434 (citing United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S . 667, 678 (1985)) . "The question is not whether the
defendant .would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence ." Kyle, 514 U .S . at 434. We
include as part of our concern about the outcome of the trial, not only the
jury's verdict on guilt, but the effect that the error may have had on the
sentence it imposed.
The prosecutor's actions in this case prevent us from having confidence
in the trial's outcome . It is clear from the record that the prosecutor knew
about Appellant's incriminating statements and willfully failed to disclose them
in discovery . This is not a situation where the existence of Appellant's
incriminating statements spontaneously came out at trial for the first time.
Sherouse testified that he told the police and prosecutor well in advance of trial
about Appellant's incriminating statements. It appears as though the
prosecutor attempted to blindside Appellant with Sherouse's testimony
concealed as rebuttal. See Chestnut , 250 S.W .3d at 297 (holding that it was
reversible error for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence which was not
disclosed under RCr 7 .24 under the guise of rebuttal evidence) . "A cat and
mouse game whereby the Commonwealth is permitted to withhold important
information requested by the accused cannot be countenanced ." James v.
Commonwealth , 482 S .W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1972) .
We decline to address the venue issue because on retrial, any questions
that arise regarding a change of venue should be based upon current
conditions . Additionally, since the parties agreed that the original sentence
was inconsistent with KRS 532 .110, we presume that upon retrial, that issue
will not arise again .
We thus, must reverse Appellant's conviction and sentence, and remand
this matter to the Wolfe Circuit Court for further proceedings.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael John Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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