RONNIE LAMONT SEARIGHT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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ACTION.
RENDERED : APRIL 23, 2009
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2008-SC-000051-MR
RONNIE LAMONT SEARIGHT
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APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D . ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00933
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
After a jury trial, Appellant Ronnie Searight was convicted of first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, second-degree fleeing and evading, and of
being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) . He raises three claims of
error on appeal. Finding no reversible error, Appellant's conviction is affirmed.
I. Background
On May 16, 2007, Sergeant Clay Combs, an officer with the Lexington
Police Department, observed Appellant leaning into a vehicle that was stopped
in the road and blocking traffic . He testified that he saw Appellant reach into
the vehicle and draw his hand back out, holding a small object. Appellant
appeared visibly startled when he noticed the marked police vehicle . Sergeant
Combs then turned on his lights, opened his door, and called over to Appellant .
Upon hearing the officer's call, Appellant fled the scene . Sergeant Combs
pursued Appellant across two parking lots and over multiple fences but
eventually lost sight of him. Ultimately, Appellant was found hiding in a trash
can in a nearby yard, and he was then arrested and searched.
Another officer, Justin Burnette, actually performed the pat-down search
of Appellant. Pursuant to police procedures, he reached into Appellant's
pockets, the waistband of his shorts, and the waistband of his boxers. He also
felt down Appellant's legs, starting at the thigh and crotch area and going all
the way down to his shoes . Appellant was wearing baggy shorts and shoes but
no shirt at the time of his arrest. During the search, no contraband or
weapons were found on him . He was then placed in the back of Burnette's
squad car.
The car had been detailed and vacuumed earlier that day and no one else
had been in the back seat since the cleaning. While sitting in the car,
Appellant began moving around in an unusual manner, lifting himself off the
seat. The officers became suspicious and removed Appellant from the car for
another search. When he exited the vehicle, the officers noticed a bag
containing 683 milligrams of cocaine lying on the seat. Appellant immediately
denied possession of the bag. The officers did not observe any hair or residue
on the bag.
The grand jury handed down a four-count indictment against Appellant
alleging (1) first-degree possession of a controlled substance, (2) first-degree
fleeing/ evading police, (3) third-degree criminal mischief, and (4) first-degree
persistent felony offender .
A Fayette County jury found Appellant guilty of all the charges except
criminal mischief. During the penalty stage, the jury recommended five years
2
in prison on the possession conviction, which was then enhanced to 20 years
for the PFO conviction .
Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky. Const. ยง
110(2)(b) .
II. Analysis
Appellant raises three issues on appeal : (1) that he should have received
a mistrial because of Sergent Combs's testimony about the initial charges ; (2)
that the Commonwealth failed to submit sufficient proof to support a finding
that Appellant was a PFO; and (3) that there was not sufficient evidence to
prove the possession charge .
A. Sergeant Combs's Testimony
During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Sergeant Combs testified that
he charged Appellant with trafficking in crack cocaine after the arrest. The
grand jury, however, declined to indict on that charge, opting instead to return
a charge of possession . Appellant objected to the testimony and moved for a
mistrial, arguing that the jury had been tainted and that he had been harmed
irreparably by the testimony. Specifically, Appellant claimed the testimony was
irrelevant and prejudicial in the sense that it reinforced the image of him as a
drug dealer and not just a drug user.
The trial court chose not to grant a mistrial but did admonish the jury to
disregard testimony on what the charges might have been. The court
instructed the jury to consider only the charges of possession and
fleeing/ evading police.
The standard of review on appeal of a decision denying a mistrial is
abuse of discretion . See Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Ky.
2005) (citing Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S .W . 3d . 860, 863 (Ky. 2002)) . In
Martin, this Court stated that "[a] manifest necessity for a mistrial must exist
before it will be granted ." Id . at 381 . There was no such manifest necessity in
this case, especially since the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the
objectionable testimony. Where the trial court admonishes the jury in lieu of
the extreme remedy of a mistrial, "[i]t is presumed that the jury follows a trial
judge's admonition ." Id .
There are only two circumstances in which the "presumptive efficacy of
an admonition falters ." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky .
2003) . One situation is when "there is an overwhelming probability that the
jury will be unable to follow the court's admonition and there is a strong
likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating to
the defendant." Id. The other situation arises when a "question [is] asked
without a factual basis and [is] `inflammatory' or `highly prejudicial .' Id.
After reviewing the record, this Court finds no reason why the jury would
have been unable to follow the trial court's admonition . Furthermore, the
comment made by Sergeant Combs was not inflammatory or highly prejudicial.
Therefore, neither exception applies in this case and the presumption of an
effective admonition stands, curing any error created by Sergeant Combs's
testimony. See Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W .2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999).
B . Proof of the PFO Charge
Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient to prove an essential element of the PFO charge because it did not
conclusively show that he was on parole from one of the prior felony sentences
introduced by the Commonwealth at trial.
The jury was instructed on the PFO First Degree charge as follows :
You will find the Defendant guilty of being a Persistent
Felony Offender, First Degree under this Instruction if, and only if,
you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
following:
A. That prior to May 16, 2007, the Defendant had been
convicted of two or more felonies ;
B . That he was eighteen years of age or older when he
committed all of the offenses of which you believe he was so
convicted;
C. That pursuant to those convictions, he was sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of one year or more for each conviction ;
D. That he was on parole from at least one such prior
conviction at the time he committed the offense of which you have
found him guilty in this case ;
AND
E. That he is now twenty-one years of age or older.
During the penalty phase of the proceedings the Commonwealth read
into the record relevant. portions of certified documents from the Department of
Corrections concerning Appellant's imprisonment, including felony convictions
from 1993, 1994, 1996, and 2005 . For the purpose of proving that Appellant
was on parole when he was arrested on May 16, 2007, the Commonwealth
specifically stated : "Defendant again entered prison on December 5, 2005 and
was released on parole on January 17, 2007 ."
The Commonwealth reiterated this point in closing arguments, stating :
"According to the documents from the Department of Corrections the
Defendant was released on parole on January 17, 2007 . So he was on parole
when this possession of a controlled substance was committed .
At no time during the trial did Appellant claim that he was not on parole
when he was arrested . The trial record shows that after the Commonwealth
presented its evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, Appellant was
asked if there were any objections to the evidence presented . Appellant
unambiguously responded in the negative . Appellant did not move for a
directed verdict before the question of sentence was submitted to the jury .
During his closing argument, Appellant's attorney did not dispute that the PFO
elements had been proven, choosing instead to seek sympathy from the jury
and ask for the low end of the PFO penalty range. Therefore, the issue is not
properly preserved for appellate review .
However, Appellant argues that the issue must be reviewed as palpable
error pursuant to RCr 10.26. Palpable error, however, requires a showing of
"manifest injustice," which is a "probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law."
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S .W.3d 1, 3 (Ky . 2006) .
Because this case is devoid of any evidence of "manifest injustice,"
Appellant is not entitled to any relief. The records from the Department of
Corrections indicate that Appellant was convicted of a felony offense on
December 13, 2005 and sentenced to 4 years in prison . At the time he was
released on parole (January 17, 2007), Appellant had served just over a year of
6
that sentence . Appellant had not been discharged by the parole board at the
time he was arrested on May 16, 2007, nor had he been out of prison on parole
a sufficient period of time to have been eligible for discharge by maximum
expiration of his sentence under KRS 439 .354 .1 Therefore, the record indicates
Appellant was, in fact, on parole at the time he committed the felony for which
he was convicted . While this may not have been the clearest evidence upon
which to base a PFO conviction, there was no manifest injustice . Cf. Ruppee v.
Commonwealth , 821 S .W.2d 484, 487 (Ky. 1991) .
Because Appellant was on parole at the time of his arrest, all of the
elements of first-degree PFO were met. Any technical insufficiencies of the
evidence here do not constitute a manifest injustice .
C. Appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict
Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the end of the Commonwealth's
case-in-chief and again at the close of all evidence. He claimed the
Commonwealth failed to prove possession because it did not establish his
dominion and control over the baggie of cocaine. The trial court overruled both
motions.
1 KRS 439 .354 reads:
When any paroled prisoner has performed the obligations of his parole during his
period of active parole supervision the board may, at the termination of such period
to be determined by the board, issue a final discharge from parole to the prisoner .
Unless ordered earlier by the board, a final discharge shall be issued when the
prisoner has been out of prison on parole a sufficient period of time to have been
eligible for discharge from prison by maximum expiration of sentence had he not
been paroled, provided before this date he had not absconded from parole
supervision or that a warrant for parole violation had not been issued by the board.
7
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt
. . . . " Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) .
Appellant claims it is unreasonable to infer that he would discard a
baggie of cocaine in a police vehicle rather than conceal it in a less detectable
place before being arrested . He also argues it is not reasonable to infer that the
baggie was hidden on his person since he was wearing baggy shorts and
underwear at the time of the chase and it would have fallen out during such
strenuous exertion. Furthermore, he was subjected to a thorough pat-down
search prior to being placed in the police cruiser and the baggie had no residue
on it which would indicate it had been in a body cavity.
However, taking into account the testimony presented at trial and
viewing it in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this Court holds a
reasonable jury could find that the Appellant exercised dominion and control
over the cocaine in question . Therefore, the trial court's decision to overrule
Appellant's motions for a directed verdict was not in error.
III. Conclusion
The trial court's rulings denying Appellant's motions for a mistrial and a
directed verdict were not in error. Appellant's claimed PFO error was not
properly preserved in the trial court, and it was not manifest injustice so as to
warrant relief based upon palpable error. Therefore, the judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting . All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Appeals Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1109
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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