DESMOND COATES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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RENDERED : FEBURARY 19, 2009
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2007-SC-000897-MR
DESMOND COATES
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
NO . 07-CR-00013
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Desmond Coates, was convicted by a Fayette Circuit Court
jury of murder and tampering with physical evidence . For these crimes,
Appellant was sentenced to forty-two years imprisonment. Appellant now
appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky. Const. ยง 110 .
Appellant asserts three arguments on his appeal: 1) that a juror
was struck by the Commonwealth for a reason that was not race-neutral;
2) that he was forced to use a peremptory strike to remove a juror that
should have been removed for cause and conversely a juror the
Commonwealth had removed should not have been ; and 3) that
prejudicial bad acts evidence was improperly admitted . For the foregoing
reasons, we now affirm Appellant conviction and sentence .
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH'S EXERCISE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Appellant's first argument is that the Commonwealth improperly
used a peremptory strike to excuse a juror for a race-based reason.
During voir dire Juror 89, an African-American male, was questioned
about whether he was qualified to sit on the jury . The juror stated that
his nephew was previously tried for murder in Bell County, Kentucky,
but was acquitted. Despite the prosecution of his nephew, the juror
stated that he could be open-minded because he had not yet heard the
facts of this particular case. He also stated that he was a licensed
substance abuse counselor, but that he would not educate the jury
about substance abuse . Evidence in the trial would indicate that illegal
drugs were used by Appellant the night of the murder. The juror also
answered that he believed his son was a "victim" because he was stopped
and arrested by the police eight times in a month for "driving while
black." Finally, the juror stated that he was surprised that Appellant
was charged with a crime against a white victim because he assumed it
was a stereotypical black on black crime. Juror 89 affirmed that his
views and life experiences would not affect him in his deliberations.
Based on his answers, the Commonwealth challenged Juror 89 for
cause . The Commonwealth argued that contrary to what he stated,
Juror 89 would educate the jurors on substance abuse, that the
acquittal of his nephew for murder biased him, and that his feeling that
his son was arrested for "driving while black" biased him against the
police. The trial judge denied the motion since Juror 89 stated that he
could be fair in his deliberations .
The Commonwealth then struck Juror 89 with a peremptory
strike . The defense challenged the strike and requested that the
Commonwealth state the reasons for removing Juror 89 . The
Commonwealth reiterated its concern that Juror 89 would educate the
jury on substance abuse and about his feelings on the prosecution and
acquittal of his nephew. The Commonwealth then focused on Juror 89's
statements that his son was arrested for "driving while black" and that
he was surprised that Appellant was not charged with a "black on black"
crime. The Commonwealth believed that these statements indicated that
race would be an issue to Juror 89 since Appellant is an AfricanAmerican and his victim white. The Commonwealth argued that it
believed Juror 89 could not be impartial. The defense countered that in
its opinion none of the responses given by Juror 89 warranted his
removal from the jury pool and that of the three African-American jurors
in the pool only one would remain after this peremptory challenge .
The trial court overruled the defense's challenge to the peremptory
strike on Juror 89. The trial court believed that the Commonwealth
offered "sufficiently race-neutral" reasons for the strike.
Objections to the use of peremptory strikes are evaluated under
the three-step standard established in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S . 79
(1986), as articulated by this Court in, Washington v. Commonwealth, 34
S .W.3d 376, 379 (Ky. 2000) :
[first, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of
racial bias for the peremptory challenge . Second, if the
requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the
Commonwealth to articulate "clear and reasonably specific"
race-neutral reasons for its use of a peremptory challenge.
"While the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a
challenge for cause,' self-serving explanations based on
intuition or disclaimers of discriminatory motive" are
insufficient . Finally, the trial court has the duty to evaluate
the credibility of the proffered reasons and determine if the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination .
Id , at 379 (internal citations omitted) . We review the trial court's
determination regarding the Batson challenge under the clearly
erroneous standard . Hernandez v. New York, 500 U .S . 352, 364 (1991) ;
Gray v. Commonwealth , 203 S .W.3d 679, 691 (Ky. 2006) . The trial
court's ruling is entitled to great deference because it is in the best
position to judge the motives behind the exercise of the peremptory
strike . Gray, 203 S.W .3d at 691 .
In this matter, the first step of the Batson analysis is moot since
the Commonwealth offered an explanation for the peremptory strike to
the trial court. See Hernandez, 500 U .S. at 358 . We thus begin our
review at the second step to determine if the Commonwealth provided
race-neutral reasons for the exercise of the peremptory strike. On its
face, the Commonwealth did provide race-neutral reasons. The
Commonwealth was concerned that Juror 89's knowledge about
substance abuse may be transferred to the jury, that he had potentially
negative feelings toward the Commonwealth because of his nephew's
prosecution, and that he harbored potential racial biases and beliefs.
The Commonwealth may use a peremptory strike to remove a juror
because of his potential racial biases. See Fugett v . Commonwealth, 250
S .W.3d 604, 611-612 (Ky. 2008) (holding that the Commonwealth used
race-neutral reasons to remove two potential African-American jurors
from the panel when the two men's answers in voir dire were tinged with
potential racial biases) . Additionally, Appellant has provided no concrete
evidence that the Commonwealth harbored any discriminatory intent in
striking Juror 89 .
Based on the evidence before us, we cannot find that the trial
court's denial of Appellant's Batson challenge was clearly erroneous .
Thus, there is no error here.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE A JUROR FOR CAUSE OR FOR GRANTING THE
COMMONWEALTH'S MOTION TO STRIKE A JUROR FOR CAUSE
Appellant next argues that the trial court should have granted his
motion to strike Juror 141 and deny the Commonwealth's motion to
strike Juror 25. We will address both claims separately .
A. Juror 141
During voir dire Juror 141, a white male, stated that in 1998 a
man broke into his truck and that the Commonwealth had been helpful
in prosecuting the perpetrator. The perpetrator ultimately accepted a
plea agreement. The Commonwealth also helped Juror 141 by getting
assault charges filed against him by the family of the perpetrator
dropped . The Commonwealth's prosecutors called Juror 141 nightly
about the case and asked him if the perpetrator's plea agreement was
satisfactory. Juror 141 described the Commonwealth as "very helpful" in
the case and stated that he had a favorable impression of them .
However, he could not remember the names of the prosecutors who
assisted him. Despite his favorable impression, Juror 141 said that his
prior experiences would not affect his ability to be impartial in
Appellant's case.
Appellant's counsel moved that Juror 141 be struck for cause due
to his prior experience with the Commonwealth . The trial court denied
the motion. Appellant ultimately used a peremptory strike to remove
Juror 141 from the jury panel . Appellant now argues that the trial court
should have granted his motion to strike Juror 141 for cause and that he
is entitled to a new trial since he had to use a peremptory strike to
remove him. See Shane v. Commonwealth , 243 S .W .3d 336 (Ky . 2008) .
A trial court may grant a motion to strike a juror for cause "[w]hen
there is a reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence ." RCr 9 .36(1) . This
Court reviews a trial court's ruling on motions to strike for cause for
abuse of discretion . Ratliff v. Commonwealth , 194 S .W .3d 258, 265 (Ky.
2006) . A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a motion to
strike for cause if the potential juror had been represented by the
prosecution in the past and stated that he would seek their
representation in the future . See Riddle v . Commonwealth , 864 S .W.2d
308, 311 (Ky. App. 1993) . Alone an attorney-client relationship does not
automatically mean a juror should be excused for cause . Id. at 310 .
However, if the challenged juror stated that he or she would seek the
prosecutor's counsel in the future, the juror should be struck for cause.
Fugate v. Commonwealth , 993 S .W.2d 931, 938 (Ky. 1999) . Additionally,
if the challenged juror is currently involved in a case the prosecutor is
working on, it is an abuse of discretion to deny striking that juror for
cause . Id. at 939 .
In this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Appellant's motion to strike Juror 141 for cause . The
relationship between Juror 141 and the Commonwealth was different
from the attorney-client relationships described in Fugate , supra, and
Riddle , supra . In Fu ate, the prosecutor prepared a living will and
incorporation papers for a Habitat organization on behalf of the
challenged juror. Id . at 938 . In Riddle, the prosecutor served as the
personal attorney for the challenged jurors . Id . at 308 . In this case, the
prosecutors never personally represented Juror 141, but only prosecuted
a crime in which Juror 141 had been the victim . There was no indication
that Juror 141 called the prosecutors for legal advice or that they ever
served as Juror 141's personal attorneys . Most importantly, Juror 141
never stated that he would seek the prosecution's legal representation in
the future. Thus, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant's motion to strike Juror 141 for cause .
See Cochran v. Commonwealth , 114 S .W.3d 837, 839-840 (Ky. 2003)
(holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a
motion to strike a juror for cause when that juror had contact with the
Commonwealth because she was the victim of a crime) .
B . Juror 25
During voir dire Juror 25, an African-American man, stated that he
had been prosecuted for committing a felony in Fayette County ten years
earlier. He received a probated three-year sentence for his crime . His
rights subsequently were restored . Although he was prosecuted by the
Commonwealth, he said he harbored no ill will against the prosecutors or
the police and felt that he was treated fairly. Juror 25 indicated that he
could be impartial in this trial .
The Commonwealth moved to strike Juror 25 for cause believing
that he would be partial to the defense . Appellant's counsel challenged
this strike arguing that since Juror 25 was African-American, race could
be an issue in the Commonwealth's motion . The Commonwealth
responded to this allegation that it would move to strike for cause any
juror who was convicted of a felony and prosecuted by the
Commonwealth . The trial court granted the motion to strike .
Again, the trial court's ruling on the motion to strike for cause
must be reviewed for abuse of discretion . Ratliff, 194 S.W.3d at 265 . In
reviewing the evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in striking Juror 25 for cause . Based on the fact that the
Commonwealth successfully prosecuted Juror 25 for a felony, it was
reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that he would be biased against
the Commonwealth, or at least very sympathetic to Appellant.
Additionally, Appellant has tendered no evidence to indicate that the
Commonwealth moved to strike Juror 25 for race based reasons. We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion here . Thus, there is
no error.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR A MISTRIAL
Appellant's final argument is that the trial court improperly denied
his motion for a mistrial. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine
to prevent the admission of any evidence regarding Appellant's drug
trafficking from being presented to the jury . The Commonwealth agreed
to exclude that evidence .
During the trial, evidence presented indicated that Walter's
murderer had a street name of "Logic." Detective Bill Brislin of the
Lexington Police Department was asked what he did to determine the
legal name of the person known as "Logic ." He stated that he spoke with
the Narcotics Unit of the Lexington Police Department to see if they knew
anyone with that street name. Appellant immediately objected .
During the ensuing bench conference Appellant pointed out that
the Commonwealth had agreed to exclude any evidence regarding
Appellant's drug trafficking . Appellant believed that Detective Brislin's
testimony implied that Appellant was known by the Narcotics Unit
because he was a drug trafficker . The trial court denied Appellant's
request for a mistrial.
Detective Brislin was then brought to the bench, where he stated
that he learned that Appellant was known as "Logic" from two police
detectives, not from the Narcotics Unit . Detective Brislin was then
instructed to testify that the Narcotics Unit did not provide him the
identity of "Logic." He was also told to avoid any testimony regarding
drug usage or trafficking . Despite this proposed remedy, Appellant still
was concerned about any prejudice that may occur because of Detective
Brislin's answer. Appellant feared that even if Detective Brislin stated
that he learned nothing from the Narcotics Unit, the jury would still
wonder why he contacted them . Appellant again unsuccessfully moved
for a mistrial . The trial court suggested that an admonition be provided
to the jury. Appellant's counsel declined this proposal . Detective Brislin
ultimately testified that the Narcotics Unit provided him no information
on the identity of "Logic ."
Appellant now argues that the trial court should have granted a
mistrial after Detective Brislin's testimony because the mention of the
Narcotics Unit constituted prior bad acts evidence under KRE 404 . "It is
universally agreed that a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be
resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings
which will result in a manifest injustice ." Shabazz v. Commonwealth ,
153 S .W.3d 806, 811 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Gould v. Charlton Co ., Inc. , 929
S .W .2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996)) . The granting of a mistrial is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling should not be disturbed
absent a showing of abuse of discretion . Combs v. Commonwealth , 198
S .W .3d 574, 581 (Ky. 2006) .
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial .
While Detective Brislin did mention that he spoke with the Narcotics
Unit, he never stated that they provided him any information regarding
Appellant. The jury could only conclude from the information provided
that the Narcotics Unit had no information on Appellant. Thus, Detective
Brislin's testimony cannot constitute any prior bad acts evidence from
Appellant. The best remedy in this situation would have been an
admonition from the trial court for the jury to disregard Detective
Brislin's testimony . See Combs v. Commonwealth , 198 S .W.3d at 581
(holding that the jury is presumed to follow any admonishment from the
trial judge) . Appellant rejected such a remedy. There is no error here.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
Attorney for Appellant
Roy Alyette Durham II
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
Attorney for Appellee
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Jason Bradley Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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