REGINALD MAURICE COLEMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : APRIL 23, 2009
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2007-SC-000834-MR
D
REGINALD MAURICE COLEMAN
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
CASE NO. 07-CR-00536
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Reginald Coleman appeals as a matter of right from a November 5, 2007
Judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of murder and of
tampering with physical evidence . Coleman was sentenced as a second-degree
persistent felony offender to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling
twenty-two years . The Commonwealth alleged, and the jury found, that on
July 20, 2006, Coleman shot and killed Theatrice Wortham on Hawkins
Avenue in downtown Lexington . On appeal, Coleman contends that the trial
court erred (1) when it refused to suppress statements Coleman made to his
arresting officers ; (2) when it refused to strike a potential juror for cause ; (3)
when it excluded evidence that the victim, Wortham, had cocaine in his system
at the time of his death ; and (4) when it instructed the jury on the theory of
intentional murder. Finding no error except the admission of Coleman's
confession, which error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
we affirm the trial court's Judgment.
RELEVANT FACTS
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that on or about July 15
or 16, 2006, Wortham had insulted and threatened Coleman's mother.
Coleman, who was protective of his mother, learned about the threat and
complained about it to his friends . A few days later, on July 20, 2007,
Coleman and one of his friends, Maurice Claybourne, were riding through
downtown Lexington in a van they had borrowed from one of Coleman's
cousins when they spotted Wortham on foot. The pair then rode to the home of
a third friend, Larry Walker, and enlisted his aid to "get" Wortham. Walker
testified that he anticipated violence, perhaps a beating of Wortham, and so
took along a shotgun for protection . A short time later, the threesome found
Wortham on Hawkins Avenue, called him over to the van, and confronted him
regarding threats to Coleman's mother. According to Walker, when Waltham
denied any knowledge of Mrs . Coleman, Coleman produced a handgun, leaned
toward Wortham, and fired a single shot into Wortham's upper torso . The
medical examiner testified that the bullet entered under Wortham's left arm
and lodged in his right chest area. A witness at the scene heard the shot and,
when the van drove away, observed Wortham slumped on the ground.
Emergency assistance was summoned, but Wortham died as a result of
internal bleeding a short time after being transported to the University of
Kentucky Medical Center .
In an attempt to cover up the crime, Coleman prevailed upon another
friend, Norman Alcorn, to dispose of the handgun. Approximately a week later,
an anonymous tip led police investigators to Coleman and Walker, but they
denied any knowledge of the shooting with the result that for a time the
investigation stalled .
In February 2007, however, investigators obtained statements from
Walker and Alcorn describing the shooting and the disposal of the gun . On the
basis of those statements a warrant was issued for Coleman's arrest.
Executing the warrant, the officers urged Coleman to confess, but when he
persisted in denying any involvement in the shooting the officers handcuffed
him and recited his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S . 436 (1966), to
silence and to an attorney . During the ride to police headquarters for booking,
Coleman indicated that he wished to consult an attorney, and the officers, in
compliance with Miranda, thereupon ceased to question him.
At headquarters, however, as the lead detective was placing Coleman in a
holding cell, he told Coleman that if he changed his mind and wanted to
discuss the crime he should knock on the cell door. According to the
detective's testimony at the suppression hearing, about fifteen minutes later he
returned to Coleman's cell to record the booking information and brought along
a photograph of Norman Alcorn, which he showed to Coleman . When Coleman
indicated that he recognized Alcorn, the detective said, "Yes, I talked to Corn . I
know what happened ; I'm not just bluffing." He then left the cell, again urging
Coleman to knock on his cell door if he wished to discuss the shooting. About
two minutes later Coleman knocked on the door, waived his Miranda rights,
and gave a statement implicating himself in the crime .
Coleman moved to suppress his statement on two grounds. He
complained first that the detective's recitation of the Miranda warnings, both at
the time of his arrest and also just prior to his statement, failed to specify that
Coleman's right to an attorney included the right to consult an attorney before
and during any questioning . He also complained that the detective's
confronting him with the Alcorn photo amounted to continued questioning in
the face of his request for counsel and thus constituted a violation of the rule,
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U .S .
477 (1981), that a detainee's request for counsel forecloses further
interrogation until counsel is provided unless the detainee himself reinitiates
the exchange . The trial court rejected both claims, which Coleman now renews
on appeal.
ANALYSIS
I . The Trial Court Erred When It Refused To Suppress Coleman's
Confession, But the Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.
As the parties correctly observe, our review of a suppression ruling
"requires a two-step determination . . . . The factual findings by the trial court
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the application of the law
to those facts is conducted under de novo review ." Cumming_s v .
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky. 2007) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth ,
149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky. 2004)) . In this case, the pertinent facts are not in
dispute, and thus our review of the trial court's application of Miranda and its
progeny is de novo.
We agree with the trial court that Coleman was adequately advised of his
Miranda rights, but we are convinced that his confession should have been
suppressed because the detective improperly reinitiated questioning after
Coleman invoked his right to consult with an attorney. The error in this case
was harmless, however, and so does not entitle Coleman to relief.
A. The Detective Adequately Advised Coleman Of His Miranda Rights.
Coleman's confession, of course, implicates his right under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution not to be compelled to
incriminate himself. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) . To
protect that right and to guard against the compulsion inherent in custodial
circumstances, the United States Supreme Court established in Miranda,
spa, the now familiar rule that a defendant's statements during custodial
interrogation will generally not be admissible at trial unless prior to the
statements the defendant was advised of Miranda's four basic warnings : (1)
that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Dickerson , supra. The
Miranda warnings were adopted to ensure that any waiver of a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right was voluntary. The Supreme Court has explained that
inquiry into the voluntariness of this waiver has two distinct dimensions :
First, the relinquishment of the right must have
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product
of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception . Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it . Only if the "totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that
the Miranda rights have been waived .
Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S . 412, 421 (1986) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) . Generally, the Miranda warnings are sufficient to inform a
person of the nature of the Fifth Amendment right and the consequences of
abandoning it. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U .S . 564 (1987) . An officer's failure to
give the Miranda warnings, however, or his giving a misleading or incomplete
version of them, renders the waiver involuntary because insufficiently knowing.
Oregon v . Elstad , 470 U .S . 298 (1985) ; California v . Prysock, 453 U .S . 355
(1981) ; Miranda, 384 U.S at 471 (the warning that the individual has the right
to consult a lawyer is "an absolute prerequisite to interrogation") .
When Coleman had been placed under arrest, the detective advised him
as follows :
You've got the right to remain silent. Anything you
say can and will be used against you in a court of
law. You've got the right to have an attorney. If .
you can't afford an attorney, one will be appointed
to you free of charge. Do you understand those
rights?
Later, at headquarters, when Coleman agreed to make a statement, the
detective repeated this formulation of Coleman's rights and added,
You can stop giving your statement at any time
and you can stop answering questions at any time;
that's completely up to you, OK? Do you
understand that?
Coleman maintains that the detective violated Miranda by interrogating him
without expressly advising that he had a right to consult a lawyer prior to and
during questioning.
As the parties note, the United States Supreme Court has not yet
addressed this issue, and the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have divided over
it . See Martin J . McMahon, "Necessity that Miranda warnings include express
reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation," 77 A. L. R. Fed .
123 (1986) . In United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996), for
example, the Fourth Circuit upheld general warnings similar to those the
detective gave to Coleman and opined that they
communicated to [the defendant] that his right to
an attorney began immediately and continued
forward in time without qualification. . . . Miranda
and its progeny simply do not require that police
officers provide highly particularized warnings .
Such a requirement would pose an onerous
burden on police officers to accurately list all
possible circumstances in which Miranda rights
might apply. Given the common sense
understanding that an unqualified statement lacks
qualifications, all that police officers need do is
convey the general rights enumerated in Miranda.
Id. at 82 .
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in United States v. Noti,731 F.2d
610, 614 (9th Cir. 1984), noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly
emphasized the critical importance of the right to know that counsel may be
present during questioning, held that "[t]he right to have counsel present
during questioning is meaningful . Advisement of this right is not left to the
option of the police; it is mandated by the Constitution ." Id. at 615 .
As the federal courts have observed, both views find support in Miranda,
itself, and in subsequent Supreme Court opinions . Discussing the right to
counsel facet of the warning, the Miranda Court concluded,
we hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be clearly informed that he has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for
protecting the privilege we delineate today. . . .
[T]his warning is an absolute prerequisite to
interrogation.
384 U.S. at 471 . In subsequent cases, too, the Court has upheld warnings
which, although deviating somewhat from Miranda's exact language,
nevertheless "told [respondent] of his right to have a lawyer present prior to
and during interrogation ."
Prysock, 453 U.S . at 361 . See also Duckworth v .
Ea an, 492 U .S . 195 (1989) and Fare v . Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 (1979) .
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it "has
never indicated that the `rigidity' of Miranda extends to the precise formulation
of the warnings given a criminal defendant." Prysock, 453 U .S . at 359 . On the
contrary,
Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic
incantation was required to satisfy its strictures.
The Court in that case stated that "[t]he warnings
required and the waiver necessary in accordance
with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully
effective equivalent, prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant ."
Id. at 359-60 (emphasis in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S . at 476) .
Accordingly, reviewing courts, "need not examine Miranda warnings as if
construing a will or defining the terms of an easement . The inquiry is simply
whether the warnings reasonably `conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required
by Miranda .'" Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U .S . at 361) .
As noted above, in Dickerson, which reaffirmed Miranda and clarified its
constitutional underpinning, the Court reiterated the required warnings as
follows :
[A] suspect "has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires."
Dickerson , 530 U .S. at 435 (quoting Miranda , 384 U .S . at 479) . We agree with
the Fourth Circuit that the warnings in this case-"You've got the right to
remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law. You've got the right to an attorney. If you can't afford an attorney one will
be appointed to you free of charge ."-reasonably conveyed these rights to
Coleman, and in particular adequately conveyed that his right to an attorney
began immediately, prior to questioning, and thus clearly implied that the right
applied during questioning as well . Accord, United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d
496 (8th Cir . 1992) ; United States v. Burns , 684 F .2d 1066 (2nd Cir. 1982);
United States v . Adams, 484 F .2d 357 (7th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Davis ,
459 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1972) . In sum, the trial court did not err by ruling that
the warnings given Coleman adequately conveyed his rights under Miranda.
B . The Detective Improperly Interrogated Coleman After He Invoked His
Right To Consult An Attorney, But The Admission Of Coleman's
Confession Was Harmless.
In Edwards , the Supreme Court held
that when an accused has invoked his right to
have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to
further police-initiated custodial interrogation even
if he has been advised of his rights. We further
hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police .
Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484-85 . The Court reiterated this latter requirement in
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U .S . 1039 (1983), where it stated that "before a
suspect in custody can be subjected to further interrogation after he requests
an attorney there must be a showing that the `suspect himself initiates
dialogue with the authorities."' Id. at 1044 (quoting from Wyrick v . Fields, 459
U.S . 42 (1982)) .
Coleman contends that the detective's confronting him with an important
witness's picture, telling him that he was "not bluffing," and urging him to
knock on his cell door if he changed his mind about wanting a lawyer, violated
the Edwards proscription against police-initiated interrogation following his
invocation of his right to consult with counsel. The trial court ruled that the
10
detective's acts did not amount to interrogation, and that Coleman initiated the
exchange which culminated in his statement . We agree with Coleman.
Interrogation for Miranda purposes is not limited to express questioning.
Rather, under Miranda, interrogation "refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U .S. 291, 301 (1980) .
Coleman alleges that the detective asked him if he recognized Norman
Alcorn's photograph, but even if the detective refrained from the express
question, his showing the photograph, stating that he had talked to Alcorn and
was not bluffing, and encouraging Coleman to revoke his request for counsel
were acts the detective knew or should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit the very response that occurred. There is no suggestion that the
detective's acts were a necessary, normal part of Coleman's arrest or custody or
were undertaken in response to Coleman's inquiries about the arrest and
custody procedures . State v. Grant, 944 A .2d 947 (Conn . 2008) (collecting
cases and discussing "conduct normally attendant to arrest and custody"
exception) . On the contrary, once Coleman had invoked his right to consult
with an attorney, confronting him with adverse investigatory facts was the
functional equivalent of asking for a response to those facts, and thus
amounted to improper questioning . We agree with Coleman, therefore, that the
detective improperly reinitiated interrogation in the face of Coleman's request
for counsel and so violated the rule laid down in Edwards . The trial court erred
by ruling otherwise, and by refusing to suppress Coleman's statement .
Determining that the trial court erred is not the end of our inquiry . As
the Commonwealth notes, we have previously held that Edwards violations are
subject to harmless error analysis. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76
(ky . 1998) . The test for federal constitutional error "is whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction, . . . or, put otherwise, whether the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 84 (citing Chapman v. California , 386 U.S .
18 (1967)) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted) . We agree
with the Commonwealth that the error here was harmless under this standard .
As noted above, in addition to Coleman's taped confession, the
Commonwealth presented testimony by Coleman's friends Maurice Claybourne
and Larry Walker, who knew of Coleman's anger toward Wortham, witnessed
the shooting and named Coleman as the perpetrator and by Norman Alcorn,
who described Coleman's asking him to dispose of the gun Coleman had used
to kill Wortham . None of this testimony was undermined on cross-examination
or by countervailing evidence . Given this undisputed evidence, there is no
doubt whatsoever, much less a reasonable doubt, that Coleman would have
been found guilty even had his confession been suppressed . Nor is there a
reasonable possibility that his confession prejudiced his sentence, which was
only two years greater than the legal minimum . Accordingly, although the trial
court erred when it refused to suppress Coleman's confession, the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and so does not entitle Coleman to relief.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Suppressed The Fact That The
Victim Had Cocaine In His Blood.
The post-mortem examination revealed that at the time of his death
Wortham had cocaine in his blood . Prior to trial, the Commonwealth
successfully moved to suppress that fact on the grounds that it was irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial . Coleman contends that he should have been permitted
to introduce the cocaine evidence through the medical examiner,
notwithstanding the examiner's inability to offer testimony concerning the
effect of cocaine, if any, on Wortham's behavior. The general rule, of course, is
that evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible as proof of character to show
action in conformity therewith, but that it may be admissible "[i)f offered for
some other purpose, such as proof of motive, . . . [or] intent." KRE 404(b)(1) .
Coleman apparently contends that the cocaine evidence was relevant to the
issue of his state of mind at the time of the killing. He argues that the
presence of cocaine in Wortham's blood permitted an inference that Wortham
behaved erratically and either said or did something that sparked the shooting.
The jury, of course, is not permitted to speculate, and the inference Coleman
urges would be speculative in the extreme . As noted, there was no proof
concerning the effects of cocaine, and neither Claybourne nor Walker offered
evidence that Wortham behaved confrontationally or in any way provoked the
attack . Indeed, both testified that until Coleman pulled his gun and shot, the
encounter with Wortham was a peaceful one. Given the complete lack of
13
evidence to support Coleman's drug-crazed-victim scenario, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by excluding the cocaine evidence, any marginal
relevance of which was clearly outweighed by its impermissible tendency
merely to paint the victim in a bad light.
III . The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Retained Juror 752 .
Coleman next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to strike for cause one of the venire members. During voir dire Juror
752 revealed that as a child she had been raped, that the mother of Wortham's
child had been her elementary school classmate, and that in 1992, about
fifteen years prior to Coleman's October 2007 trial, the father of her five young
children had been stabbed to death. Coleman argued that this juror's own
devastating experiences together with her acquaintance with Wortham's
"girlfriend" made it likely that she would subconsciously side with the victim
and with the Commonwealth in this case. Responding to individual voir dire
questions, the juror acknowledged that she had at first been taken aback when
she was assigned to a murder case, but stated that with the help of counseling
she had long since worked through her own tragedies and that upon reflection
she felt confident that she could consider the evidence fairly and impartially.
She also indicated that her contact with Wortham's "girlfriend" had ceased in
childhood and would not color her consideration of the evidence .
As the parties note, under RCr 9 .36(1) "a prospective juror should be
struck for cause if there is `reasonable ground to believe' that the prospective
juror `cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence."' Chatman v.
14
Commonwealth , 241 S .W.3d 799, 801 (Ky. 2007) (quoting the rule) .
Application of this standard is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court, the rulings of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
that discretion or other clear error. Id. We are not persuaded that the trial
court abused its discretion here.
Crime victims, even victims of crimes similar to those being tried, are not
subject to automatic exclusion from the venire, but may be retained if the court
is satisfied that the prospective juror can "objectively evaluate the evidence
relating to all counts of the indictment and render a fair verdict." Bratcher v.
Commonwealth, 151 S.W .3d 332, 346 (Ky. 2004) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) . Here, as the trial court observed, although Juror
752 had had experiences which could tend to create sympathy for the victim of
this crime, those experiences were long enough ago to render entirely credible
her confident assurances that neither her own experiences nor her childhood
acquaintance with Wortham's "girlfriend" would impair her ability to reach a
fair and impartial verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying
on those assurances and retaining Juror 752 .
IV. Coleman Was Not Denied His Right To A Unanimous Verdict.
Finally, Coleman contends that he was denied his right to a unanimous
verdict when the trial court erroneously included in the jury instructions a
murder theory-intentional murder-which the evidence did not support.
Coleman concedes that this issue was not properly preserved, but seeks review
for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26. Not only was there no palpable
error, there was no error at all.
As Coleman correctly notes, under Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution, a defendant cannot be convicted of a criminal offense except by a
unanimous verdict . Burnett v . Commonwealth, 31 S .W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000) . This
Court has explained that
a "combination" instruction permitting a conviction
of the same offense under either of two alternative
theories does not deprive a defendant of his right
to a unanimous verdict if there is evidence to
support a conviction under either theory. . . .
Otherwise, the verdict cannot be shown to be
unanimo us, and the conviction must be reversed.
Miller v . Commonwealth , 77 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Ky. 2002) (citations omitted) . In
pertinent part, Instruction No. 3 in this case authorized the jury to find
Coleman guilty of murder if it found that
1 . He caused the death of Theatrice Wortham
intentionally and not while acting under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance ;
OR
2. He was wantonly engaging in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and
thereby caused the death of Theatrice Wortham
under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life.
Coleman concedes that the evidence supported a finding of wanton murder
under Part 2 of the instruction, but contends that Part 1 of this combination
instruction violated his right to a unanimous verdict because there was no
evidence to support the theory that he intentionally killed Wortham . We
disagree .
16
As noted above, the Commonwealth's proof included evidence that
Coleman was deeply angered by Wortham's threatening and disrespectful
behavior toward Coleman's mother; that Coleman, Claybourne, and Walker
went looking for Wortham with the express intent of "getting" him; that
Coleman and Walker came armed to the encounter, and that soon after
Wortham approached their van, Coleman shot him at point blank range in the
upper torso, a vital area of the body where a gunshot wound is particularly apt
to be fatal. A rational juror could readily conclude from this evidence that
Coleman planned the shooting and intended that it result in Wortham's death.
The trial court did not err, therefore, by including in Instruction No . 3 the
intentional murder alternative, Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186
(Ky. 1991), and because both of the instruction's alternatives were supported
by the evidence, the combination instruction did not deprive Coleman of a
unanimous verdict .
CONCLUSION
In sum, the testimony of Coleman's friends overwhelmingly
established that he shot and killed Theatrice Wortham under
circumstances which permitted a finding that the killing was a murder .
So overwhelming was their testimony that the erroneous admission of
Coleman's confession, which, although preceded by adequate Miranda
warnings, should have been suppressed pursuant to Edwards , supra,
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman's conviction,
moreover, was tainted neither by the retention of Juror 752 in the venire
17
nor by the exclusion of evidence that Wortham had cocaine in his blood.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the November S, 2007Judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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