BRAVO DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. SCOT SINGLETON
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
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CORRECTED : JUNE 11, 2009
RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009
BKRU ,ISH-,:
2007-SC-000769-DG
. PELLANT-
BRAVO DEVELOPMENT, INC.
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2006-CA-002163-MR
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO . 06-CI-00179
SCOT SINGLETON,
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
I . FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
Kentucky law prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to remit
any portion of the employee's tips to a pool for distribution among other
employees .' Scott Singleton claims that while working as a server at Bravo
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 337 .065 provides that:
(1) No employer shall require an employee to remit to the employer any gratuity, or
any portion thereof, except for the purpose of withholding amounts required by
federal or state law. The amount withheld from such gratuity shall not exceed
the amount required by federal or state law.
(2) As used in this section, "gratuity" means voluntary monetary contribution
received by an employee from a guest, patron, or customer for services
rendered .
(3) No employer shall require an employee to participate in a tip pool whereby the
employee is required to remit to the pool any gratuity, or any portion thereof, for
distribution among employees of the employer.
9cahr-Dc,
Development's Brio Tuscan Grille, management there violated this law by
requiring him to remit 3 percent of his sales or gratuities2 to a pool for other
restaurant employees . The prohibited practice is called "tipping out."
According to Singleton, restaurant management informed him that he was
required to tip out as a matter of corporate policy and that he could find a new
job if he did not like the policy.
Singleton filed a complaint with the Kentucky Department of Labor,
alleging that his employer's policy requiring him to tip out violated Kentucky
law. Following an investigation, the Department of Labor agreed with
Singleton. The Department of Labor then sent letters to Singleton and other
current or former Brio employees, indicating that it had completed its
investigation and that the employer was offering "the net amount specified on
the enclosed receipt for payment of back wages as full settlement of all wage
claims." Singleton determined that the amount offered to him would not fully
(4) Employees may voluntarily enter into an agreement to divide gratuities among
themselves. The employer may inform the employees of the existence of a
voluntary pool and the customary tipping arrangements of the employees at the
establishment. Upon petition by the participants in the voluntary pool, and at
his own option and expense, an employer may provide custodial services for the
safekeeping of funds placed in the pool, if the account is properly identified and
segregated from his other business records and open to examination by pool
participants .
Singleton claims he was required to remit 3 percent of his sales. Bravo states he
was required to remit 3 percent of his tips or gratuities . The parties seem to agree
that, ultimately, Singleton accepted a check from Bravo for the amount unlawfully
withheld from his wages .
The Kentucky Department of Labor was abolished as of June 2008 and is now
reorganized within the Labor Cabinet. Exec. Order No . 2008-472, cited in
Executive Order Notes to KRS 12 .020 . Since the Department of Labor was in
existence as of the time Singleton filed his complaint, we will make reference in this
opinion to the Department of Labor rather than to the Labor Cabinet.
compensate him for the amount unlawfully withheld from his wages . So after
obtaining legal representation, he then filed in the trial court a complaint on
behalf of himself and the purported class of others who had had wages
unlawfully withheld by Brio .
Shortly after Singleton filed the complaint, the Department of Labor
reopened its investigation. It sent letters to Brio employees, including
Singleton, informing them it had recently received new information affecting
"the amount of back wages owed" and was performing a new audit, after which
employees would be sent new release forms (presumably accompanying new
offers from the employer) . It later sent re-calculated offers to servers
(including Singleton) better to reflect amounts unlawfully withheld .
Singleton signed a document entitled, "Receipt for Payment of Back
Wages," which stated that he acknowledged payment of a certain sum as
"receipt of payment in full from Bravo . . . for unpaid wages due me as
indicated by the Kentucky Revised Statute(s) marked below" for the specified
time period . Among a list of Kentucky wage statutes, an X mark was placed
beside "Remittance of Gratuity (337 .065)," referring to KRS 337 .065 . The
document also recited "[y]our acceptance of these back wages as marked for
the period indicated above means you are accepting this amount as a
satisfactory settlement and are releasing this employer from any further
liability for your claim as indicated above." Singleton eventually cashed the
check tendered with this document.
Meanwhile, Bravo filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss Singleton's
complaint on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss . Singleton appealed but voluntarily
dismissed the appeal-apparently after his counsel spoke with a Department of
Labor investigator, who stated that the Brio investigation ,had been closed .
Singleton contends that the investigation was improperly closed without notice
to the affected employees or the issuance of a final report.
According to Singleton :
The completion of the Department of Labor's investigation,
without notice or a final report, perfects Singleton's claim, and
those of the class he seeks to represent, against Brio for liquidated
damages mandated by KRS 337 .385. The "offer of settlement" is a
misnomer, [sic] Bravo is legally required to disgorge and reimburse
its employees the entire amount of the unlawfully withheld wages.
The [Department of Labor] is not empowered to negotiate a
"settlement" for anything less than the entire amount of the
unlawfully withheld wages.
Singleton then filed a second complaint in the trial court, alleging that
the Department of Labor investigation was closed without notice or factual
findings and seeking to obtain liquidated damages, costs, and attorney's fees
for himself and a purported class of other Brio employees under
KRS 337 .385(1) . 4 Again, Bravo moved to dismiss the complaint for Singleton's
KRS 337 .385(1) states that:
Any employer who pays any employee less than wages and overtime compensation
to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of KRS 337 .020 to 337.285
shall be liable to such employee affected for the full amount of such wages and
overtime compensation, less any amount actually paid to such employee by the
employer, for an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and for costs and
such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court. Provided, that if,
in any action commenced to recover such unpaid wages or liquidated damages, the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the alternative, Bravo moved for
summary judgment on the basis that Singleton and "the vast majority of the
purported class members" had signed settlement agreements releasing Bravo
from any further liability on their wage claims .
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. In the trial court's view,
Singleton could either commence administrative proceedings or file an original
court action but could not do both. The trial court found that Singleton had
elected the administrative remedy, that Singleton failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Citing 803 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 1 :035(1)-(2), the
trial court reasoned that once administrative proceedings began, the
Department of Labor was required to investigate the dispute and facilitate a
remedy, if possible, and was only required to "evaluate the proof" and render
findings of fact if a settlement could not be reached . The trial court then stated
that an appeal to the circuit court from administrative proceedings was
permitted only after the executive director rendered final findings of fact in an
order under 803 KAR 1 :035 and KRS 13B .140 (providing for judicial review of
final administrative orders) . So the trial court essentially concluded that since
Singleton entered into a settlement rather than obtaining an order from the
to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing
that his act or omission was not a violation of KRS 337 .020 to 337.285, the court
may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages, or award any amount
thereof not to exceed the amount specified in this section. Any agreement between
such employee and the employer to work for less than the applicable wage rate
shall be no defense to such action. Such action may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction by any one (1) or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves .
executive director rendering findings of fact, Singleton's case was outside its
jurisdiction to hear appeals from administrative decisions. According to the
trial court, there really was no administrative decision because the parties had
entered into a voluntary agreement resolving their dispute
The trial court's dismissal order also indicated that Singleton's
settlement also released Bravo from further liability:
On July 1, 2005, Plaintiff signed a receipt acknowledging "payment
in full" and releasing Defendant from "any further liability for your
claim."
Plaintiff initiated this action for himself and the purported
class members seeking liquidated damages against the Defendant
pursuant to KRS 337.385. The facts in this matter are undisputed
and the issue before this Court is whether the Plaintiff and the
class he seeks to represent have abrogated their right to statutorily
mandated liquidated damages, costs and attorney's fees by
utilizing the administrative process to secure a settlement and
signing their individual "settlement agreements ."
Plaintiff argues that he could not have waived his right to
liquidated damages because he did not know KRS 337 .385 existed.
However, in Plaintiff's original complaint filed in May of 2005,
which was verified, he specifically sought to require the Defendant
to pay pursuant to KRS 337.385. Plaintiff signed his settlement
agreement about two (2) months after that complaint was filed.
Further, even if Plaintiff did not know about KRS 337.385, it has
been a [longstanding] rule that such alleged ignorance would not
render this settlement agreement invalid . [Barker v. Steams
Coal 8a Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184, 163 S.W.2d 466 (1942)] .
Singleton then appealed the trial court's dismissal order to the Kentucky
Court of Appeals . The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal on
two grounds . First, the Court of Appeals determined that the release Singleton
signed, "by its own terms," referred only to KRS 337.065 damages and not to
damages available under KRS 337 .385 . Second, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
election of remedies did not apply because it found Singleton could only obtain
KRS 337.385 damages through a court action and not through the
administrative process.
II . ANALYSIS .
We have reviewed the record and the applicable law, and we now reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment
dismissing the action. We reverse because we agree with the trial court that
the agreement signed by Singleton effectively released Bravo from any further
liability for unlawfully remitting his gratuities during the specified time period
in violation of KRS 337 .065 . We reverse despite the release's failure to mention
KRS 337 .385 or the availability of liquidated damages, costs, or attorney's fees
under KRS 337 .385.
Because we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be reinstated
on the basis of Singleton's having validly settled his claim, we need not address
arguments of election of remedies or exhaustion of administrative remedies . In
so doing, we recognize that questions will remain about whether original court
actions and administrative proceedings are mutually exclusive avenues of relief
and whether liquidated damages are only allowed in court . Answering these
lingering questions is not necessary to resolve this case . So we must decline to
address them. We believe such questions could be better answered by
legislative action amending and clarifying the governing statutes.
Trial Court Reached Proper Resolution Because of Release
of "Any Further Liability" for KRS 337.065 Violation.
When accepting a check for his previously unpaid wages from Bravo,
Singleton signed a completed Kentucky Department of Labor form entitled,
"Receipt for Payment of Back Wages." The document began with the statement
that Singleton acknowledged "receipt of payment in full from" Bravo (doing
business as Brio) "for unpaid wages due me as indicated by the Kentucky
Revised Statute(s) marked below" for a specified time period . Several wage
statutes were listed, an "X" was placed by "Remittance of Gratuity (337.065),"
and the amount of the payment was specified. The document then contained a
"NOTICE TO EMPLOYEE" stating that "[y]our acceptance of these back wages
as marked for the period indicated above means you are accepting this amount
as a satisfactory settlement and are releasing this employer from any further
liability for your claim as indicated above ."5 Singleton's signature then followed
directly under this notice .
Our precedent establishes that settlement agreements are construed
according to the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts:
An agreement to settle legal claims is essentially a contract subject
to the rules of contract interpretation ." Cantrell Supply, Inc. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S .W.3d 381, 384 (Ky.App. 2002) .
The primary objective is to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
Id. When no ambiguity exists in the contract, we look only as far
as the four corners of the document to determine the parties'
Emphasis added.
intentions . Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S .W .3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000) .
"The fact that one party may have intended different results,
however, is insufficient to construe a contract at variance with its
plain and unambiguous terms ." Cantrell, 94 S. W.3d at 385.
"Generally, the interpretation of a contract, including determining
whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law for the
courts and is subject to de novo review." Id.6
The document entitled, "Receipt of Back Wages," actually consists of two
parts: (1) accepting payment of previously unpaid wages for unlawful
remittance of gratuity for specified time period and (2) releasing Bravo from
"any further liability" for the claim "indicated above," with the only indication
as to the claim being that it arose under KRS 337.065 . Applying a de novo
standard of review to this legal question of contract interpretation, we conclude
that Singleton had effectively released Bravo from further liability on his wage
claim and that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the release did
not cover claims Singleton may have had under KRS 337 .385 .
The language of the release is clear: Singleton released Bravo from "any
further liability" on his "claim" 7 as indicated above-his claim relating to
violation of KRS 337 .065 during the specified time period . Without an
ambiguity, there is no need to look beyond the four corners of the document.
3D Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan
Sewer District , 174 S.W .3d 440, 448 (Ky. 2005) .
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) provides the following general definitions of
claim:
The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court <the
plaintiffs short, plain statement about the crash established the claim> . -- Also
termed claim for relief. 2. The assertion of an existing right; any right to
payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional <the
spouse's claim to half the lottery winnings> . 3. A demand for money, property,
or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp ., the part of a complaint in a
civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.
Although Singleton may now claim he intended to release Bravo from liability
only as to back wages, he explicitly released Bravo from "any further liability"
on his claim "indicated above," which clearly refers to the marked statute
(KRS 337.065, forbidding mandatory tip pools) . Use of the term "any further
liability" plainly means that Singleton reserved no causes of action or types of
remedies against Bravo. We also note that Singleton did not expressly reserve
any right to hold Bravo liable for liquidated damages or attorney's fees under
KRS 337 .385.
We are not persuaded by Singleton's argument that he was not aware of
the possible availability of liquidated damages and attorney's fees because of
the lack of mention of KRS 337.385 on the document. Longstanding precedent
in Kentucky establishes that one cannot escape legal consequences or
voluntarily assumed legal responsibilities based on ignorance of the law. 8 This
rule is perhaps even more squarely applied to those who are represented by
counsel, as Singleton was at the time he signed the release.
We further reject Singleton's argument that any settlement was void
because the Department of Labor lacked authority to settle cases but instead
was required to obtain full payment of unpaid wages as well as liquidated
damages . Technically, the Department of Labor did not enter into a settlement
in this case, although the settlement reached might be considered to be
supervised by the Department of Labor. Rather, the Department of Labor
investigated Singleton's claim and tried to help the parties resolve their dispute
Barker , 163 S .W.2d at 470.
through reaching a voluntary agreement between employee and employer-acts
that were clearly within its authority as established by regulation . 9 By the
terms of a voluntary agreement, Singleton accepted payment of "back wages"
and, in return, released Bravo from any further liability on his claim arising
from the KRS 337.065 violation . The fact that the Department of Labor
facilitated a possible settlement by providing forms and communicating Bravo's
offer to Singleton does not change the fact that the settlement or release
contract was between Bravo and Singleton and did not involve the Department
of Labor settling anyone else's rights .
In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in distinguishing KRS 337.065
damages from KRS 337 .385 damages and in determining that Singleton did not
release Bravo from liability under KRS 337.385. KRS 337 .065 does not
establish the availability of any particular type of damages. Rather, it is a
substantive wage provision that simply states that requiring employees to remit
tips is prohibited. The employer's potential liability and the employee's
803 KAR 1 :035 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The Executive Director of Workplace Standards, or his authorized agent, shall
investigate any complaint or routinely inspect records relating to an alleged
violation of KRS 337 .020 to 337.405 .
(2) Where a settlement cannot be reached between the employer and employee and
if an investigation reveals that questions of fact are in issue or the complaint or
routine inspection gives the executive director, or his authorized agent, good
cause to believe that factual issues need to be resolved, then the executive
director, or his authorized agent, shall evaluate all proof submitted and render
his tentative findings of fact. The proof to be evaluated by the executive
director, or his authorized agent, shall include, but is not limited to : the
findings of the investigator, sworn affidavits, contractual agreements, payroll
records, and other evidence relating to an alleged violation of KRS 337.020 to
337.405 .
potential remedies for violations of this substantive wage provision are set forth
in other statutes, namely KRS 337.990 and KRS 337 .385.
KRS 337 .990(5) states that: "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions
of KRS 337 .065 shall be assessed a civil penalty of not less than one hundred
dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each offense
and shall make full payment to the employee by reason of the violation."
KRS 337.385(1) provides that employers in violation of wage statutes including
KRS 337 .065 "shall be liable to such employee affected for the full amount of
such wages and overtime compensation, . . . for an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as
may be allowed by the court." But the statute also states that liquidated
damages may be reduced or eliminated by the court if the employer shows that
it acted in good faith. t o
We note that the release makes no reference to the statutes providing
remedies for violations of KRS 337.065, KRS 337 .990(5), or to KRS 337.385.
Nonetheless, Singleton explicitly released Bravo from "any further liability" for
10
In construing these two statutes together, interesting questions obviously might
arise, such as (1) if KRS 337.990 (which clearly refers to the Department of Labor's
ability to enforce statutory wage laws through civil penalties "in accordance with
KRS 336 .985") requires "full payment" to the employee of unpaid wages only or
could also encompass liquidated damages or attorney's fees under KRS 337 .385(1)
and (2) if the employer "shall be held liable" for liquidated damages, as well as back
wages, only in court actions or potentially also in cases resolved in the
administrative process. Nonetheless, because Singleton released Bravo from any
further liability for violating KRS 337.065, it simply is not necessary to the
resolution of this case that we answer such questions. Again, perhaps such
questions could best be answered by legislative action amending and clarifying
these statutes than by this Court addressing such questions in dicta. So we
decline to opine in dicta whether the Department of Labor may, or is required to,
seek or award liquidated damages or attorney's fees in these types of cases .
his claim "as indicated above" as relating to the substantive wage provision of
KRS 337.065 (prohibiting employer-mandated tip pools) . Clearly, the release
operated to release Bravo from any further liability for violating KRS 337.065
for the specified time period . Since the applicable damage provisions of
KRS 337 .385 and 337 .990 flow from, and are available only if, a violation of
KRS 337 .065 (or other substantive wage provision) has occurred, then a release
from "any further liability" under KRS 337 .065 necessarily encompasses a
release from any damages available under KRS 337.385 and KRS 337 .990. So
by releasing Bravo from "any further liability" for his KRS 337 .065 claim,
Singleton also released Bravo from any additional obligations it may have owed
to Singleton under the damages provisions of KRS 337 .385 and 337 .990.
III. CONCLUSION .
The trial court properly resolved the case in Bravo's favor' 1 because
Singleton had settled his wage payment dispute with Bravo, and the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court. Therefore, we now reverse the
We note that Bravo moved for summary judgment under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 56.03 on the settlement issue in the alternative to his motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under CR 12.02(a) . The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which we
affirm on the alternative ground of settlement and release of any further liability .
Because the facts are not in dispute, whether the trial court should have granted a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in favor of Bravo makes no
difference in terms of the ultimate resolution of this case. See CR 56 .03 (stating
summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and discovery evidence on file
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") .
opinion of the Court of Appeals; and we reinstate the trial court's order because
the trial court properly resolved the case in Bravo's favor.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Scott A. Carroll
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, LLP
221 East Fourth Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Andrew Christian Smith
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, LLP
52 East Gay Street
Columbus, Ohio 43216-1008
Philip Douglas Barr
Stoll, Keenon, Ogden, PLLC
300 West Vine Street, Suite 2 100
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Sherrill P. Hondorf
Hondorf Law
4490 Hartman Lane
Batavia, Ohio 45104
Margo L. Grubbs
Grubbs Law, PLLC
327 West Pike Street
Covington, Kentucky 41011
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
KENTUCKY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ;
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS ;
AND KENTUCKY SOCIETY FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, INC. :
Charles E. English, Jr.
Dennis Gaines Penn
English, Lucas, Priest 8, Owsley
1101 College Street
P. O . Box 770
Bowling Green, Kentucky 42102-0770
6;vUyrmtr (~Vurf of ~Rrufurhv
2007-SC-000769-DG
BRAVO DEVELOPMENT, INC .
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2006-CA-002163-MR
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO . 06-CI-00179
SCOT SINGLETON
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
The Memorandum Opinion of the Court, rendered May 21, 2009, is
CORRECTED on its face by the substitution of the attached opinion in
lieu of the original opinion . Said correction does not affect the holding.
ENTERED : June 11, 2009 .
IhF JUSTICE JOHN D . MINT
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