NOAH HICKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 29, 2009
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2007-SC-000751-MR
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ON APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-00078
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Noah Hicks, appeals his Breckenridge Circuit Court conviction
of Kidnapping, Robbery in the Second Degree and Assault in the First Degree.
The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of twenty-five
(25) years for Kidnapping, and ten (10) years each for the robbery and assault,
enhanced by Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) in the Second-Degree. The
sentences were all to run concurrently for a total sentence of twenty-five (25)
years . This appeal followed .
Facts
On June 17, 2006, at around 4 :00 p.m., Appellant picked up Carroll
Garvey in his car at Garvey's brother's house in Radcliffe, Kentucky . The two
(2) men made plans to "hang out" that night. They discussed possible plans,
including going to a friend's party and/or attending a hip-hop concert. During
the discussions, Garvey mentioned that he had $395 .00 cash in his pocket,
which he said was a gift from his mother, and agreed to buy Appellant's ticket
if they went to the concert.
Ultimately, they drove to Terrance Banks' house in Gustin, in Meade
County . As they turned onto Banks' road, they passed another car, driven by
Erroll Rogers, who had Kyron Perks with him . They met on a nearby dead-end
road and began talking. As the four (4) men were talking, Terrance Banks, who
lived nearby, pulled up on an ATV. After Banks arrived, they were all talking,
smoking marijuana,' and trying to decide what to do that night. Appellant
then suggested that they all get in his car and go to his house to hang out.
Everyone agreed, so Banks and Rogers parked their vehicles and they all piled
into Appellant's car, headed to Appellant's trailer home.
Upon arrival, they decided to hang out at Appellant's trailer for awhile as
it was raining. Appellant, Rogers, and Banks then went to a back room of the
trailer where they were "tooting" some cocaine, which Garvey declined.
A while later, Rogers suddenly tackled Garvey. Banks also jumped on
top of Garvey. Appellant and Rogers then "hog-tied" Garvey, tying his wrists
and ankles together.
After tying him up, they took his cell phone, identification cards, and his
$395.00, which he had not mentioned to anyone except Appellant. Appellant
Garvey testified that he did not smoke marijuana with the others because he
recently applied for a job, had an interview in a few days, and did not want
marijuana to show up in a urine test. He admitted, however, that he intended to
drink alcohol that evening
then retrieved some sheets, taped a sheet over Garvey's head and another
around the rest of Garvey's body so that Garvey could not move and could not
see. He was then carried outside and placed in the trunk of the car.
Garvey began pleading with Rogers for his life. As he pleaded, he heard
laughing and joking up front, until eventually the music on the radio was
turned up to drown out his pleas . Scared, Garvey struggled against his
restraints and eventually they loosened and he was able to untie himself.
Although still trapped in the trunk, he was then able to see out of a little hole
in the trunk.
The car eventually stopped and Garvey heard a door open and close. At
trial, Perks testified that, at this stop, Appellant got out of the car, went into a
house and got a pistol.
They then left and they eventually turned onto a hilly and winding
country road deep in the woods. After a while, they stopped and got out of the
car . Through the hole in the trunk, Garvey saw Appellant walk by the trunk
wearing a black glove and carrying a handgun .
Appellant opened up the trunk, said something about Garvey being
untied, and ordered Garvey to get out . As he got out, Garvey noticed they were
in a wooded area, Appellant and Rogers were standing directly in front of him,
and Appellant was holding the handgun and pointing it at Garvey's feet.
Rogers then told Garvey to pull his shirt over his face so he would not
have to watch them shoot him. Garvey pretended he was going to pull his shirt
over his head, but then took off running towards the woods. He heard three (3)
gunshots in short order and heard bullets go whizzing by his head. Garvey
took quick, zig-zagging steps to avoid being hit by the bullets . Garvey later
testified that he took about five (S) quick steps before he heard the shots .2 One
bullet struck Garvey in the back of his right arm, exiting through the front of
his shoulder.3
The bullet knocked Garvey down but he immediately got back up and
continued running. At the time, he heard someone yell "he's alive!!!," as in
disbelief. As Garvey ran, his shoe flew off and, as he made it to the tree line,
the others got back into Appellant's car and drove off.
Unbeknownst to Garvey, he was shot on Edgar Basham Road, a rural
country road in Breckinridge County, near Mystics, Kentucky . After the car
left, Garvey took off his shirt and used it as a tourniquet for his shoulder . He
began walking beside the road toward a building he had seen earlier through
the hole in the trunk.
Along the way, he passed out several times from blood loss. When he
regained consciousness, he continued walking, eventually arriving at Albert
and Jennifer Heckman's home, located about two hundred (200) yards off of
Edgar Basham Road . Mr. Heckman noticed the bloody shirt wrapped around
2 At trial, Appellant's trial attorney asked Garvey to run six (6) steps for the jury, and
about one (1) second elapsed.
3 The bullet that struck Garvey was a hollow point bullet which shattered the bone in
his arm. Doctors at the University of Louisville Hospital were required to place a
metal rod and plates in his arm and shoulder to replace the lost bone . At trial,
Garvey showed the jury sizeable and permanent scars on his arm and shoulder
resulting from the bullet.
Garvey's shoulder and helped Garvey to a chair and tightened the tourniquet at
Garvey's request . Mr. Heckman then went inside to get help from his wife, who
works in a doctor's office .
Mrs. Heckman was- troubled by Garvey's pale, grey skin color when she
first saw him. She then examined the wound, saw the bullet hole, and called
911 . Due to the remoteness of the location, it took more than an hour before
the ambulance arrived. Garvey was ultimately flown by helicopter to the
University of Louisville hospital, where he remained for over a week.
Before going to the hospital, Garvey provided the police with the names
of his attackers, and specifically named Rogers and Appellant as responsible
for his injuries. The police then executed a search warrant at Appellant's home
and, although they did not find anything, Appellant confirmed that the gun
was at Rogers' house . The police executed a search warrant at Rogers' home,
and found the gun, a loaded 9 mm Glock 17 handgun and an extra clip, hidden
in Rogers' bathroom under some laundry. They also located the crime scene on
Edgar Basham Road and recovered two (2) 9 mm shell casings on the side of
the road as well as Garvey's lost tennis shoe.
Later, the Breckinridge Co. Sheriff interviewed Appellant, at which time
Appellant signed a written waiver of rights. During the interrogation, Appellant
admitted he picked up Garvey4 and took him to Appellant's home . He admitted
Garvey was jumped and tied up at his house. He admitted that he grabbed a
Appellant did not call Garvey by his name, he instead referred to him as the "Asian
kid" or "Asian boy." Banks also referred to Garvey in the same terms.
belt and extension cord to tie up Garvey. He admitted that he helped put
Garvey in the trunk of his car and they drove around for one and one-half to
two (1 1/2 to 2) hours . He also admitted that he had the gun in his hand when
Garvey got out of the trunk, as well as firing the gun when Garvey started
running away. Appellant said that he was at the rear of the vehicle when he
fired the gun and that Garvey was running last time he saw him.
Appellant, Banks, and Rogers were tried jointly. Appellant was found
guilty of 1) Kidnapping (with serious physical injury) ; 2) Second-Degree
Robbery; and 3) First-Degree Assault, enhanced by a finding of Second-Degree
Persistent Felony Offender ("PFO") . The trial court accepted the jury's
recommendation and sentenced Appellant to twenty-five (25) years
imprisonment for the Kidnapping conviction, ten (10) years for the PFOenhanced Second-Degree Robbery conviction, and twenty-five (25) years for the
PFO-enhanced First-Degree Assault conviction, all to be served concurrently for
a total term of twenty-five (25) years .
This appeal followed with Appellant alleging error in: 1) the trial court
denying him the right to confront a witness against him, 2) denying him an
instruction on Second-Degree Assault, and 3) ordering his witness to show a
tattoo to the jury during his testimony.
For reasons set out below, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
1 * The Rift to Confront a Witness
Appellant first argues the trial court improperly limited his crossexamination of the victim, Garvey, by not permitting Appellant to question
Garvey about his misdemeanor probationary status that prevented him from
using illegal drugs . However, a review of the trial record reveals that the
request to pursue such cross-examination was made by Banks' attorney,
Steven Reed, rather than by Appellant.
According to the record, during Garvey's cross-examination, Appellant
began inquiring as to why Garvey had $395 .00 on his person . After a few
inferential questions, the trial court excused the jury and requested a private
meeting with counsel in chambers .
During this meeting, the trial court said he was unsure of where
Appellant was going with those questions and was starting to get
uncomfortable, as six (6) months prior to trial the trial court had advised the
defendants that he would not permit evidence and testimony to the effect that
"Garvey was a drug dealer who needed to be shot." The court said it was
proper to ask Garvey about whether he had $395.00, but it was impermissible
for Appellant to ask Garvey if he had the money to buy drugs . Appellant
acknowledged that that was indeed his next line of questioning but acquiesced
in the court's ruling.
The meeting was about to conclude and Appellant's trial counsel was
headed out the door when Banks' attorney argued that the aforementioned line
of questioning should be permitted because Garvey was on probation for a
misdemeanor . Banks' attorney argued that since Garvey's probation could be
revoked for using illegal drugs, he had a motive to lie about using illegal drugs
with the other defendants.
After this objection, a lengthy discussion followed but the record does not
reflect that Appellant also objected to the trial court's ruling prohibiting crossexamination about Garvey's misdemeanor probationary status. This absence is
critical because "[t]he objection of an attorney for one co[-]defendant will not be
deemed to be an objection for the other co[-]defendant unless counsel has
made it clear that in making the objection it is made for both defendants ."
Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S .W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. 1989) ; see also, Rice v.
Commonwealth , 199 S .W.3d 732, 738 (Ky. 2006) . Accordingly, we find this
issue is not properly preserved. Appellant, however, requests review under the
palpable error standard set forth in RCr 10 .26.
RCr 10 .26 provides that, "[a] palpable error which affects the substantial
rights of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may
be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the
error."
Thus, under RCr 10.26, an unpreserved error may be reviewed on appeal
if the error is "palpable" and "affects the substantial rights of a party." Even
then, relief is appropriate only "upon a determination that manifest injustice
has resulte d from the error." Id. "Manifest injustice" means that "a
substantial possibility exists that the result of the trial would have been
different." Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S .W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997) . An error is
"palpable," only if it is clear or plain under current law. Brewer v.
Commonwealth , 206 S.W .3d 343 (Ky. 2006) . Generally, a palpable error
"affects the substantial rights of a party" only if "it is more likely than ordinary
error to have affected the judgment ." Ernst v . Commonwealth, 160 S .W.3d
744, 762 (Ky. 2005) .
That being said, the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of Garvey's
misdemeanor probationary status was not error at all . It is well-settled that
"[t]he presentation of evidence as well as the scope and duration of crossexamination rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. This broad rule
applies to both criminal and civil cases ." Moore v. Commonwealth, 771 S .W.2d
34, 38 (Ky. 1988) . Moreover, under KRE 611, a trial court is vested with sound
judicial discretion as to the scope and duration of cross-examination and may
limit such examination when "limitations become necessary to further the
search for truth, avoid a waste of time, or protect witnesses against unfair and
unnecessary attack ." Derossett v . Commonwealth, 867 S .W.2d 195, 198 (Ky.
1993) .
Though Appellant cites the Confrontation Clause in support of his right
to cross-examine Garvey as to his misdemeanor probationary status :
it is . . . well established that the right to crossexamination is not absolute and the trial court retains
the discretion to set limitations on the scope and
subject: "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish."
Capshaw v. Commonwealth , 253 S .W.3d 557, 566-67 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing
Davenport v. Commonwealth , 177 S .W .3d 763, 768 (Ky. 2005)) .
In other words, the trial courts "retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant." Capshaw, 253 S .W.3d at 567 .
Thus, although KRE 607 permits a witness' credibility to be questioned,
the right to explore witness bias is not unlimited, even when considered in the
context of the Confrontation Clause. As Capshaw held, "[d]efendants cannot
run rough-shod, doing precisely as they please, simply because crossexamination is underway. So long as a reasonably complete picture of the
witness' veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys [the] power
and discretion to set appropriate boundaries." Id.
Here, although Banks' attorney argued Garvey's misdemeanor
probationary status was relevant as his probation could be revoked for using
illegal drugs, the trial court deemed Garvey's probationary status was
irrelevant. This was because Garvey had already admitted sufficient facts to
revoke his probation since he intended to get drunk on the day at issue, which
was prohibited by the terms of his probation . As the trial court noted, Garvey's
probation could not be revoked any more for smoking marijuana .
Moreover, when the trial court asked Appellant's trial counsel what was
the specific purpose for which he wanted to ask Garvey about his probationary
status, Appellant's trial counsel essentially argued that the evidence of
probation would prohibit Garvey from using controlled substances, and this
evidence would discredit his testimony that he did not use controlled
substances and his testimony that he possessed the $395 .00 to buy alcohol.
However, it is clear by implication that Appellant wanted the jury to believe
that Garvey was using illegal drugs, that he intended to spend the $395 .00 on
the purchase of illegal drugs, and that he must be a drug dealer to purchase
that many drugs.
Yet, the only relevance of such evidence would have been to impeach
Garvey's testimony as to why he did not smoke marijuana with the other codefendants . Therefore, evidence of Garvey's probationary status is, at best,
only marginally relevant because the issue of whether or not Garvey smoked
marijuana had nothing to do with, and provided no motivation for, Garvey to lie
about being robbed, kidnapped and shot.
Accordingly, given the trial court's power to limit the scope of crossexamination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit
Appellant to ask Garvey about whether his misdemeanor probationary status
prevented him from using illegal drugs at the time that Appellant robbed,
kidnapped, and shot him.
II. Second-Degree Assault Instruction
Appellant next argues the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury
instruction for Second-Degree Assault as- a lesser-included offense of the FirstDegree Assault charge . At issue is the magnitude of Garvey's injuries . We
must determine whether as a matter of law the Commonwealth proved that the
injury Garvey suffered as a result of being shot by Appellant constituted a
"serious physical injury," as is required to sustain a First-Degree Assault
charge, but not a "physical injury," which would require an instruction on
Second-Degree Assault.
We begin by reiterating the maxim that although a judge is required to
instruct the jury on the whole law of the case, including any lesser included
offenses, a judge does not have a duty to instruct on a theory with no
evidentiary foundation . Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S .W.3d 63, 72 (Ky. 2000)
(citin Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S .W.3d 925, 929 (Ky. 1998)).
Lesser included offense instructions should be given if the evidence
would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit
him of the greater. Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1977) .
In other words, a lesser included instruction is only appropriate if, given the
evidence, a reasonable juror could entertain a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt on the greater charge, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of the lesser charge. Thompkins v . Commonwealth ,
54 S.W.3d 147, 15 1 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Skinner v. Commonwealth , 864 S.W.2d
290, 298 (Ky. 1993)) . When the evidence does not warrant a finding of guilty
on the instruction, the trial court does not have a duty to instruct on the lesser
included offense. Churchwell v. Commonwealth, 843 S .W.2d 336, 338 (Ky.
App. 1992) . The duty to instruct on lesser included offenses does not require
the trial court to instruct on theories without evidentiary support . Thompkins ,
54 S.W.3d at 151 (citing Houston, 975 S.W .2d at 929) .
Here, Appellant concedes that sufficient evidence was presented from
which a jury could find serious physical injury, a necessary element for FirstDegree Assault. However, Appellant argues that, upon the same evidence, the
jury could determine Garvey's injuries were moderate enough to sustain a
conviction on the lesser included Second-Degree Assault charge which requires
only a "physical injury" and argues the trial court erred by not issuing a
Second-Degree Assault instruction. We disagree .
KRS 500 .080(15) defines "serious physical injury" as "physical injury
which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ[ .]" In contrast, KRS
500 .080(13) defines "physical injury" as "substantial pain or any impairment of
physical condition." Thus, at issue is the magnitude of Garvey's injury.
Garvey was shot in the back. Gunshots, by their very nature, cause
substantial, prolonged pain. Garvey had a bullet travel through and out his
shoulder and arm, causing bone fragments to explode out of the exit wound,
fragments that he will never recover. After being shot, Garvey lost so much
blood he passed out on multiple occasions before being rescued . He had to
stay in the hospital for over a week.
Garvey testified that he still felt pain during trial, sixteen (16) months
after the shooting. Even after six (6) weeks of painful rehabilitation therapy,
Garvey was still laboring under impairments to the functioning of his arm and
shoulder at trial . The missing bone fragments were replaced by hunks of
metal. He also has large scars on the back of his arm and shoulder.
In Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S .W .3d 775 (Ky. 2004), we noted :
[the victim's] injuries resulted not only in headaches
and neck pain, but also muscle spasms causing
decreased range of neck motion, and numbness of her
right arm. The numbness continued at least until her
treatment by Dr. Zhou, which did not begin until five
[(5)] months after the assault . . . . A jury could []
believe that [the victim] was still suffering from the
effects of her injuries on the day of trial, nineteen
months after the assault, and that the duration of
those effects constituted a "prolonged impairment of
health ."
Id. at 787. We further held that pain is an "impairment of health," and that
prolonged pain constitutes a "serious physical injury." Id.
In Clift v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W .3d 467, 470-472 (Ky. App . 2003), the
Court of Appeals held that a reasonable juror could find that significant
impairment of an eleven (1 l)-month-old's use of his arm for four (4) weeks due
to a broken humerus is either a "prolonged impairment of health" or a
"prolonged loss or impairment of the function of [a] bodily organ" under KRS
500 .080(15) and, therefore, constitutes a "serious physical injury."
The injuries sustained by the victims in Parson and Clift were less severe
than those suffered by Garvey. Therefore, here, the evidence introduced at trial
demonstrated Garvey suffered an injury that was either a "prolonged
impairment of health" or "a prolonged loss or impairment of the function of [a]
bodily organ." Thus, the Commonwealth proved, as a matter of law, that the
injury Garvey suffered as a result of being shot by Appellant constituted a
"serious physical injury ." In light of this evidence, a reasonable juror could not
entertain a reasonable doubt that Garvey received only a physical injury;
accordingly, no lesser instruction for Second-Degree Assault was warranted .
See, Thompkins, 54 S .W.3d at 151 ; Gabow, 34 S .W .3d at 72 ; Houston, 975
S .W.2d at 929 . Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Appellant's
request for a Second-Degree Assault instruction.
III. Requiring Witness to Show Tattoo
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by requiring
Appellant's witness, Ryan Spence, to take off his shirt and show an alleged
swastika tattoo to the jury. We agree, but conclude that the error was
harmless .
Spence was Appellant's only witness. Spence said he knew Appellant but
only as an acquaintance .5 Spence was in jail with Rogers after Rogers' arrest
5 The day before Spence was supposed to testify, Rogers' trial counsel, by private
meeting, advised the trial court that Rogers had learned of allegations that Appellant
was offering to pay two (2) other prisoners, Spence and David Welker, to testify on his
15
for his participation in Garvey's shooting. While in jail, Rogers and Spence
played basketball together and might have gone to church together .
At trial, during direct examination, Spence admitted that he was a
convicted felon and testified that, while incarcerated in the Breckinridge
Detention Center, he came to know Rogers and Appellant . Spence said that
when other prisoners asked Rogers what he had done to be in jail, he heard
Rogers say that he "shot an Asian kid and put him in the trunk."
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Spence to take off his
shirt in order to show the jury a swastika tattoo on the back of his arm.
behalf. Rogers alleged that Appellant wanted them to testify that they heard Rogers
say that he had shot the gun . Welker supposedly provided this information to Rogers
in the presence of yet another prisoner, Chris Ditto.
Learning of these allegations, the trial court requested the Sheriff to assign a
deputy to go to the Detention Center and investigate the matter. The deputy
investigated the allegations and, later that afternoon, reported his findings to the trial
court. Welker confirmed that Appellant had offered to put money "on my books" and
take care of him if he testified for Appellant. Ditto confirmed that he heard Welker tell
Rogers that Appellant had offered $1,000 to three (3) people, Welker, Spence, and an
unidentified 3rd person, if they would testify on his behalf. Spence, however, told the
deputy that he was testifying on his own free will. Upon receipt of the deputy's
findings, the trial court advised all of the defendants and attorneys in chambers, since
they potentially constituted exculpatory information to which the defendants were
entitled under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .
The next morning, during Appellant's case-in-chief, Appellant's trial counsel
requested another private meeting with the trial court . Appellant's trial counsel
advised the court that Appellant still desired Spence to testify and he wanted the
record to reflect that Appellant understood some of the problems with that decision .
However, Appellant alleged that he had a "falling out" with Welker and Welker's
allegations were not true .
The trial court explained to Appellant that if he called Spence, Spence's
testimony could be nullified by Welker's and Ditto's contrary testimony and that a jury
might also think that Appellant must be guilty if he tried to bribe witnesses.
Nonetheless, Appellant still wanted Spence to testify. Appellant's trial counsel stated
that he believed it was ethically proper for him to call Spence as a witness since he did
not actually "know" who was telling the truth and the trial court agreed.
16
Spence refused. A bench conference was held in chambers and the prosecutor
explained that the swastika tattoo was relevant as to Spence's credibility since,
in addition to the bribery allegations, his testimony might additionally be
motivated by racial bias, as Rogers was African-American and Spence and
Appellant were white. Appellant, on the other hand, contended that the tattoo
alone did not mean that Spence actually harbored racial prejudice . Over
Appellant's objections, the trial court ordered Spence to take off his shirt and
show his tattoo to the jury, 6 but cautioned that they were to view the evidence
only as it bore on Spence's credibility for "testimony that appears to be nonfavorable to an African-American. 7" Notwithstanding the admonishment,
Appellant now argues the trial court's decision to order Spence to show the jury
his tattoo amounted to reversible error.
We begin by noting that, generally, a trial judge's ruling on an
admissibility issue, if supported by substantial evidence, is dispositive of the
question. Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W .2d 802 (Ky. 1990) ; Halvorson v .
Commonwealth , 730 S .W.2d 921 (Ky. 1986) ; RCr 9 .78 . Therefore, the trial
court's decision to admit evidence of Spence's swastika tattoo is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See Partin v. Commonwealth 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996) ;
6 The argument presumes the existence of a swastika tattoo . Appellant objected at
trial, saying that the record should reflect that Spence did not have a swastika
because he did not see one. The trial court acknowledged that he did not see a
swastika either. The prosecutor argued the tattoo was a swastika, but Spence insisted
the tattoo had been modified into an iron cross.
7 The trial court admonished the jury as follows : [i]f it exists, I'm not saying whether it
does or not, you saw what you saw. If it exists, it's relevant only to the extent that it
bears on his credibility as a witness who is giving testimony which would appear to be
non-favorable to an African-American."
17
Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1998) ; Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S .W.2d 941 (Ky . 1999) . "The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles." English , 993 S .W.2d at 945 .
Here, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
Spence to display his tattoo for the jury. While, in general, it is true that
"[w]itness credibility is always at issue," King v. Commonwealth , 276 S.W .3d
270, 275 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S .W.2d 718, 721
(Ky. 1997)), it is equally true that evidence must be relevant, defined as "having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." KRE 401 . In this instance, the stated relevancy of
Spence's swastika tattoo was that its presence on his person was tantamount
to his racial bias towards African Americans. Though, by and large, that may
often be the inference, we simply cannot say that it was the appropriate
inference here because no other evidence was presented - either direct or
circumstantial in character - which tended to show what Spence's swastika
tattoo meant to him, why he chose to have it placed on his body, or whether he
had any particular feelings, negative or positive, towards African-Americans or
any ethnic group at all. In this way, the relevancy of the tattoo, defined as
evidence of Spence's racial bias, depended, at least in part, "upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact," and the independent evidence presented was
so patently lacking as to be insufficient to support that finding . 8 See KRE
104(b) .
Nevertheless, because we cannot say that "`the error itself had
substantial influence' upon Appellant's trial such that it "substantially
swayed" his conviction, we hold that the error was harmless and does not
warrant a new trial. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S .W .3d 678, 688-89 (Ky.
2009) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)) ; see also
RCr 9 .24 . In light of the fact that Welker subsequently testified that Appellant
offered to pay him and Spence, his cellmate, for favorable testimony,
independent evidence strongly suggested that Spence's credibility was suspect
for reasons other than racial bias. Moreover, the Commonwealth's evidence
overwhelmingly pointed to Appellant's guilt, which evidence included not only
Garvey's testimony and corroborating physical evidence, but also : Appellant's
admission to picking up Garvey and taking him to his home; Appellant's
admission that Garvey was attacked, bound, and placed in the truck of his car;
Appellant's admission that he held the gun and shot it at Garvey as Garvey was
fleeing into the woods; and, Perks' testimony that Appellant bound Garvey,
placed him in his trunk, and shot at him as he fled.
8 The Commonwealth contends that because this Court has acknowledged the proper
admission of similar demonstrative evidence in the past, we should likewise do so
here . See Riley v. Commonwealth , 620 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Ky. 1981) . Riley, however,
involved the use of such evidence for purposes of identifying an accused, not as
evidence of witness credibility. Id. at 318. As such, the relevance of Spence's tattoo
turns upon very different considerations - namely, the connection between the tattoo's
meaning and the witness who wears it.
19
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's convictions for
Kidnapping, Robbery in the Second Degree and Assault in the First Degree.
Minton,- C .J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Schroder, Scott, and Venters,
JJ., concur. Noble, J ., dissents in part by separate opinion.
NOBLE, J., DISSENTING IN PART: I concur with the majority except
that I do not think admission of the tattoo was harmless .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jamesa J . Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Ln Ste 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Stephen Bryant Humphress
Assistant Attoreny General
Office of the Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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