DERWIN IVAN NICKELBERRY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2007-SC-00711-MR
DERWIN IVAN NICKELBERRY
V.
ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00184-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Derwin Ivan Nickleberry, appeals to this court his
convictions of robbery in the first-degree and kidnapping, as a matter of
right, pursuant to Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . He was sentenced by a Daviess
County jury to forty (40) years imprisonment .
Appellant claims two errors arose during his trial affecting his
constitutional right to due process: first, remarks made during the
Commonwealth's closing argument amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct, denying him a fair trial; second, the trial court erroneously
refused to hold a hearing after Appellant raised concerns about his trial
counsel's performance after the close of evidence.
Finding no merit to Appellant's arguments, we affirm the ruling of
the Daviess Circuit Court and uphold Appellant's conviction .
I.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of August 15, 2003, employees working at a
Blockbuster Video store in Owensboro, Kentucky were robbed by two
African-American men at gunpoint . The two individuals left the scene
with some $4,000 in cash and a number of video games .
On the evening of September 7, 2003, employees working at a
Hollywood Video store in Owensboro were robbed at gun and knife point
by two African-American men . Again, the two individuals left the scene
with $1,500 in cash and some video games.
The victims of these two crimes had identical recollections of the
men who robbed them. However, none of them were able to give an
accurate description of their assailants . Eventually, Raymond Johnston,
an employee of the Hollywood Video store, was able to identify Appellant
from a photo lineup some months later. Johnston also identified
Appellant in open court as one of the perpetrators .
Tommy Jerome Hardin was initially the only person charged with
the crimes . Hardin eventually told authorities that Appellant was
involved in both robberies, purportedly because he wanted "everyone
responsible to own up." Hardin and Appellant had lived in the same
apartment complex in Radcliff, Kentucky for approximately six or seven
months during the period of the robberies. Hardin maintained that he
and Appellant were friends, but Appellant vehemently denied the
friendship .
At trial, Appellant's defense was one of complete denial and that
Hardin had wrongly implicated him in the robberies . Appellant testified
in his own defense . Later, Appellant's counsel called Antiwon Tillman to
testify that Appellant and Hardin were not friends. Tillman testified that
Hardin and Appellant once got into a fight because Hardin broke into
Appellant's car and stole his CD player.
Ultimately, the jury acquitted Appellant on all charges pertaining
to the Blockbuster store robbery. However, they found him guilty of
robbery in the first degree and kidnapping in connection with the
Hollywood Video store robbery. The jury recommended the maximum
sentences of twenty (20) years for each charge, to run consecutively . The
trial judge followed the jury's recommendations and on February 15,
2007, sentenced Appellant to forty (40) years imprisonment .
II.
A.
ANALYSIS
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT DURING HIS
CLOSING ARGUMENT DID NOT DENY
APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.
Appellant first argues that alleged misconduct of the prosecutor
during his closing argument deprived Appellant of his fundamental right
to a fair trial. Appellant has two specific complaints regarding the
prosecution's closing argument: (1) the prosecutor misled the jury into
believing that Appellant had confessed ; and (2) the prosecution told the
jury Appellant was incarcerated for a parole violation, when it was really
a probation violation .
"In any consideration of alleged prosecutorial misconduct . . . we
must determine whether the conduct was of such an `egregious' nature
as to deny the accused his constitutional right of due process of law."
Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W .2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1987) (quoting
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U .S . 637 (Ky. 1974)) . "We reverse for
prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument only if the misconduct is
`flagrant' or if each of the following [is] satisfied: (1) proof of defendant's
guilt is not overwhelming; (2) defense counsel objected ; and (3) the trial
court failed to cure the error with sufficient admonishment ." Barnes v.
Commonwealth , 91 S .W .3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis added) .
First, we will consider the "confession claim ." During his closing
argument, the prosecutor made the following statement:
I asked you all [in voir dire], any of you think that the
Commonwealth, for a crime to be committed, has to
provide you with a confession or an eyewitness? And
you said no, we're not going to hold the
Commonwealth to that burden . . . but in this case
ladies and gentlemen, that's exactly what we provided
to you . We provided a confession and an eyewitness . .
. we've given you a confession and an eyewitness .
Raymond Johnston is your eyewitness . All of those
other witnesses are your eyewitnesses . . . the other
witness is Mr. Hardin .
Appellant argues that the above statement misstated evidence from the
trial and prejudiced the jury against him. It is important to note that
Appellant did not object during trial, leaving this issue unpreserved for
review . Appellant has requested and we will review this argument for
palpable error under RCr 10.26.
It is true that Appellant did not confess to the crimes charged at
any point during or before the trial. However, the prosecutor was not
referring to Appellant in this argument . The Commonwealth was
referring to Mr. Hardin, who did confess to the police and implicated
Appellant. While the prosecutor's choice of words might have been less
precise than desired, we must view them in light of the standard set forth
in Slaughter; namely, was the use of the word "confession" such an
egregious abuse of the substantial latitude which prosecutors are
afforded during closing arguments as to deny Appellant a fair trial? We
believe not.
"[W]e must always consider these closing arguments `as a whole'
and keep in mind the wide latitude we allow parties during closing
arguments ." Young v. Commonwealth , 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75 (Ky. 2000)
(citing Wallen v. Commonwealth, 657 S .W.2d 232, 234 (Ky. 1983) and
Bowling v . Commonwealth , 873 S .W .2d 175, 178 (Ky. 1993)) . Here,
Appellant argues that, because the prosecution used the word
"confession" in its closing statement, the jury was led to believe that he
confessed. However, the prosecutor was not arguing a confession was
obtained from Appellant, rather from Hardin, his partner in the crimes.
The prosecutor even used the word "confession" again later in his closing
argument when referring to Mr. Hardin . Furthermore, none of the
Barnes elements are satisfied . Nor, can we say that the prosecutor's
5
actions even amount to misconduct. To find egregiousness here, we
would have to hold that the mere use of the word "confession" is
misconduct . We are indisposed to make such a ruling.
Appellant likewise argues that, he was prejudiced because the
prosecutor's closing argument referenced a prior incident as a parole
violation instead of a probation violation. We disagree .
"[I]t has long been the law in Kentucky that an admonition to the
jury . . . cures the error unless it appears the argument was so
prejudicial, under the circumstances of the case, that an admonition
could not cure it." Price v . Commonwealth, 59 S .W .3d 878, 881 (Ky.
2001) (citing Knuckles v. Commonwealth, 261 S .W.2d 667 (Ky. 1953)
and Thomas v . Commonwealth, 245 S .W . 164 (Ky. 1922)) .
At trial, during closing arguments, the Commonwealth mistakenly
argued that Appellant had testified the only time he was in Owensboro
was while he was incarcerated for a parole violation, to which Appellant
objected. Here, upon objection to the statement, the judge clarified the
misstatement and admonished the jury. In the trial judge's admonition,
he directed the jury to rely on the evidence they had heard prior, not the
prosecution's closing argument about whether Appellant violated parole
or probation, because closing arguments are not evidence . Following the
admonition, Appellant's counsel made no further objections or motions.
"We have held that failure to move for a mistrial following an objection
and an admonition from the court indicates that satisfactory relief was
granted . `It is well within the realm of valid assumption that counsel was
6
satisfied with the court's admonition to the jury ."' West v .
Commonwealth , 780 S .W .2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) (quoting Hunter v.
Commonwealth , 479 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1972)) .
Thus, upon review of the closing argument as a whole and giving
deference to the wide latitude which we afford the parties during such
arguments, the prosecution's arguments do not reach the threshold of
egregiousness. Moreover, the court's admonishment to the jury sufficed
to cure any misstated reference in regards to probation and parole .
Accordingly, any error was cured and Appellant was afforded a fair trial .
B.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT
A HEARING AFTER APPELLANT RAISED
CONCERNS ABOUT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S
PERFORMANCE DID NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF
DUE PROCESS.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a
sua sponte evidentiary hearing when, after the jury retired to deliberate,
but before the verdict was announced, Appellant voiced dissatisfaction
with the performance of his appointed counsel. We disagree .
RCr 11 .42 provides that any person convicted of a crime may move
the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence . An RCr 11 .42
action is the proper avenue for persons convicted of a crime to state all
grounds for holding the sentence invalid, which includes ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, there is no Kentucky law that requires a
trial court to hold a post-close-of-evidence, pre-conviction hearing on
ineffective assistance of counsel, or, for that matter, that requires an
appellate court to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal.
As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
will not be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court's
judgment, because there is usually no record or trial court
ruling on which such a claim can be properly considered . . .
This is not to say, however, that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is precluded from review on direct
appeal, provided there is a trial record, or an evidentiary
hearing is held on motion for a new trial, and the trial court
rules on the issue .
Humphrey v . Commonwealth, 962 S .W.2d 870, 872-873 (Ky. 1998)
(internal citations omitted) .
In the present instance we are without a trial record upon which to
review this issue; no evidentiary hearing was held and the trial court did
not rule on the issue. Nor was the court obligated to hold such a
hearing. If Appellant had moved for a new trial, then, a hearing would
have been required. However, those are not the facts of this case.
Appellant merely told the trial judge that he had some concerns about
his trial counsel's work after the jury was sent into deliberations . It
would be improper to require a court to hold an evidentiary hearing on
ineffective assistance of counsel claims at that time .
Thus, because no Kentucky law requires a sua sponte evidentiary
hearing to address post-close-of-evidence, pre-conviction complaints on
an attorney's performance, Appellant's argument is without merit. RCr
11 .42 is the proper avenue of relief for these claims .
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we hereby affirm
Appellant's convictions.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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