ROBERT TURNER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : AUGUST 27, 2009
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
2007-SC-000633-DG
ROBERT TURNER
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2006-CA-001185-MR
DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT NOS . 03-CR-00370
AND 03-CR-00431
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
Appellant was indicted in the Daviess Circuit Court in case number 03CR-00370 for second-degree burglary and being a persistent felony offender in
the first degree. He was separately indicted in the Daviess Circuit Court in
case number 03-CR-00431 for two counts of robbery, possession of marijuana,
and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree . He subsequently
entered into a plea agreement that disposed of both indictments and ultimately
pled guilty to two counts of robbery in the first degree, burglary in the third
degree, possession of marijuana, and being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree. He received a combined sentence of sixteen years' imprisonment .
Appellant, acting pro se, filed a motion, pursuant to RCr 11 .42, to vacate his
sentence, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
accurately inform him about parole eligibility .
On April 6, 2006, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant's
RCr 11.42 motion . On May 2, 2006, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel . The
notice of appeal identified case number 03-CR-00370, but failed to identify
case number 03-CR-00431 . The following day, the trial court denied
Appellant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. On May 18, 2006, Appellant
submitted a second motion to proceed in forma pauperis, along with a motion
to reconsider and a notice of appeal with a stamped tendered date of May 25,
2006 . The trial court granted Appellant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis
and appointed him counsel on June 5, 2006. Appellant's tendered May 25,
2006 notice of appeal was then filed on June 5, 2006.
The record indicates that Appellant's counsel and the Commonwealth
submitted their briefs to the Court of Appeals and oral arguments were
scheduled for June 19, 2007 . However, on June 5, 2007, the Court of Appeals
issued a show cause order requesting Appellant to explain why the appeal
should not be dismissed as untimely filed . Upon consideration of Appellant's
response, the Court of Appeals determined that the May 2, 2006, notice of
appeal was never actually filed by the circuit court clerk because the in forma
pauperis motion had been denied and not properly appealed . Accordingly, the
denial of the in forma pauperis motion became final ten days later, on May 13,
2006. Meanwhile, the trial court's original denial of Appellant's RCr 11 .42
motion, entered April 6, 2006, started the thirty day time limit to file'a notice of
appeal . The Court of Appeals concluded that Appellant's notice of appeal, filed
on May 25, 2006, was untimely, thereby depriving it ofjurisdiction .
Appellant thereafter petitioned this Court for discretionary review, which
was granted. The sole issue for our consideration is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal as untimely.
To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after
service of the judgment being appealed . CR 73 .02 (1) (a) . If the appellant is
indigent, he may file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with the notice of
appeal . As the RCr 11 .42 motion was denied on April 16th, Appellant was in
compliance with the procedural rules when he filed his notice of appeal and
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 2nd .
However, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied .
Accordingly, Appellant's timely notice of appeal, though tendered, was never
filed . Pursuant to CR 73 .02(1)(b),
[i]f timely tendered and accompanied by a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis . . . a notice of appeal . . .
shall be considered timely but shall not be filed until
the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted or,
if denied, the filing fee is paid. If the motion to proceed
in forma pauperis is denied, the party shall have ten
days within which to pay the filing fee or to appeal the
denial to the appropriate appellate court.
Here, Appellant did not properly appeal the denial of his in forma
pauperis motion within ten days, nor did he pay the filing fee . Rather, he
submitted a new motion to "reconsider" fifteen days later, on May 18th . That
motion was granted, and the second notice of appeal was considered filed on
May 25th . However, under a strict application of CR 73 .02(1), Appellant's
motion was untimely, as the May 25th notice of appeal was filed more than
thirty days after the April 16th denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion .
However, it is well-settled that Kentucky courts do not strictly apply
procedural rules to pro se indigent prisoners . Moore v. Commonwealth, 394
S.W .2d 931, 932-33 (Ky. 1965) . Instead, we will overlook a pro se litigant's
procedural missteps and base a determination on the merits of the
case. Moreover, in Ready v. Jamison , this Court abandoned the standard of
strict compliance with appellate procedural rules in favor of a substantial
compliance standard. 705 S .W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1985) . We explained : "With
this new policy we seek to recognize, to reconcile and to further three
significant objectives of appellate practice: achieving an orderly appellate
process, deciding cases on the merits, and seeing to it that litigants do not
needlessly suffer the loss of their constitutional right to appeal ." Id. at 482 .
We believe that Appellant substantially complied with the rules of
appellate procedure in this case. Clearly, by virtue of Appellant's motion to
reconsider the denial of his in forma pauperis motion, he sought review of that
order. The proper procedure is not to ask the circuit court to reconsider its
order, but rather to appeal the order to the Court of Appeals . See Gabbard v.
Lair, 528 S .W.2d 675, 677 (Ky. 1975) ; CR 73 .02(1)(b) . However, this defect
does not warrant automatic dismissal and Appellant's loss of his constitutional
right to an appeal of his RCr 11 .42 motion .
"While our court continues to have a compelling interest in maintaining
an orderly appellate process, the penalty for breach of a rule should have a
reasonable relationship to the harm caused ." Ready, 705 S.W.2d at 482 . Here,
Appellant's original motion to proceed in forma pauperis and notice of appeal
were timely filed . Though he should have appealed that denial to the Court of
Appeals, Appellant did not unduly delay the appellate procedure ; he moved for
reconsideration within fifteen days . Importantly, the trial court considered
Appellant's motion to reconsider on the merits and ultimately granted it. See
Singleton v. Commonwealth , 740 S.W .2d 159, 160, n.2 (Ky.App. 1986) (Even
though appeal was belatedly perfected, Court of Appeals nonetheless
considered the appeal on the merits "in view of the fact the circuit court
expressed an opinion upon the constitutional issue raised in the district
court.") . Ultimately, the May 25th notice of appeal is untimely by a mere eleven
days . In light of these circumstances, and the fact that Appellant was acting
pro se, we conclude that the procedural defects do not warrant the harsh
penalty of an automatic dismissal.
We likewise reject the Commonwealth's assertion that the Court of
Appeals is precluded from considering an appeal of case number 03-CR-00431,
as it was not identified in either notice of appeal . In Ready, this Court stated
that automatic dismissal is inappropriate "so long as the judgment appealed
from can be ascertained within reasonable certainty from a complete review of
the record on appeal and no substantial harm or prejudice has resulted to the
opponent ." 705 S .W.2d at 482 .
Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced for each indictment
simultaneously . In addition, Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion addressed the
convictions in both indictments, as does the trial court's order denying the
motion . Even the Court of Appeals noted that the parties had "ostensibly
treated this appeal as being taken from two separate circuit court actions . . . .
Appellant clearly intended to appeal both indictments to which he pled guilty.
We are reasonably certain that Appellant's appeal includes case number 03CR-00431 . Further, this Court can discern no substantial harm or prejudice
to the Commonwealth in so holding.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court of Appeals' dismissal of
Appellant's appeal is reversed . The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals
with directions to set aside the order of dismissal and to proceed with the
appeal on its merits .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Todd Dryden Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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