JOSEPH SIMPSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MARCH 19, 2009
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JOSEPH SIMPSON
V.
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419
APPELLAN
ON APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES C . SIMMS, JUDGE
NOS . 06-CR-00165 AND 06-CR-00261
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Joseph Simpson, entered an Alford' plea in the Nelson Circuit
Court to the charges contained against him in two separate indictments.
Consequently, no evidence was presented at trial. However, the investigative
reports have been made a part of the record and referred to in the briefs.
Because Appellant is claiming, in part, ineffective assistance of counsel, we
recount herein the results of that investigation and, presumably, what evidence
Appellant would have confronted at trial.
On or about March 12, 2005, the first victim, CH, a 13-year-old girl, and
SB, her 16-year-old friend, were invited to Simpson's house for a sleep-over
with Simpson's daughter . CH and SB were watching a movie with Simpson
and his 19-year-old cousin. Simpson served the girls alcohol and provided
them with lingerie to wear while they watched the movie . Later, Simpson and
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U .S. 25 (1970).
CH retired to Simpson's bedroom . There, Simpson pressured CH to pleasure
him with her hand and to perform oral sex. According to CH, Simpson set up a
camcorder on a tripod and videotaped her performing oral sex. Further, CH
stated Simpson inserted his fingers and a vibrator into her vagina. According
to CH, Simpson retrieved the vibrator from a night stand near the bed.
CH reported the incident to school officials when she became frightened
after seeing Simpson at her school . Police were contacted and during the
ensuing investigation, officers recovered the lingerie top Simpson had provided
to CH . According to CH, the bottoms had been soaked in blood as a result of
the attack, so she had thrown them away. A subsequent medical examination
confirmed CH's hymen had an old laceration or tear consistent with her story.
Pursuant to a warrant, officers discovered corroborating evidence during
a search of Simpson's house. Those items included a tripod (on the floor by the
bed), a camcorder (on the dresser in the bedroom), and several vibrators and
lingerie (in a bedroom dresser) . Further, officers recovered three videotapes .
While none of the videotapes contained images of CH, they did contain images
of other minors exposing their breasts and genitalia and performing sexual
acts.
While officers were conducting the search, Simpson arrived home . After
being advised of his Miranda rights, Simpson signed a waiver of rights form . In
addition to confirming CH had spent the night at his home, he admitted to
having given her lingerie . Further, Simpson confirmed that he had taken CH to
his bedroom, but denied having sex with her. Regarding the videotapes,
Simpson confirmed that he had made them, but contended that the juveniles
had asked him to make the videos .
Simpson was indicted by the Nelson County Grand Jury under
Indictment No . 06-CR-00165 for the following charges : (1) one count of use of
a minor in a sexual performance (with the minor incurring injury) ;z (2) one
count of second-degree rape;3 (3) one count of second-degree sodomy ;4 (4) one
count of second-degree sexual abuse ;5 (5) and two counts of third-degree
unlawful transaction with a minor. 6
As a result of a local newspaper reporting the indictment, a second victim
came forward . The second victim, TM, told officers that she had babysat for
Simpson in June of 1998 . She stated that once Simpson's children were in
bed, Simpson pressured her to take a bath. TM said that she locked the
bathroom door and refused to allow Simpson inside . Once she came out of the
bathroom, Simpson massaged her legs. In the guise of continuing the
massage, Simpson also rubbed TM's bottom and genitalia. As a result of this
disclosure, Simpson was indicted by the Nelson County Grand Jury under
Indictment No. 06-CR-00261 for one count of first-degree sexual abuse.?
After plea negotiations, the Commonwealth agreed to amend Count One
of Indictment No. 06-CR-00165 to reflect "no injury" to the minor, thus
reducing the charge from a Class A to a Class B felony. In addition, the
Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence of ten (10) years each on the
2 Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 531 .310 .
KRS 510 .050 .
KRS 510 .080 .
KRS 510 .120 .
KRS 530.070 .
KRS 510.110 .
counts of second-degree rape and second-degree sodomy . While these 10-year
terms were to run consecutively, the Commonwealth agreed the sentences on
the remaining counts would run concurrently, for a total of twenty (20) years.
Further, the Commonwealth agreed that the five-year sentence imposed under
the second indictment would run concurrently with the total sentence imposed
under the first indictment . Finally, the Commonwealth agreed not to seek any
further charges based on the videotapes discovered in Simpson's home .
Simpson accepted this offer on the condition that he would be allowed to
enter an Alford plea . Therefore, on March 2, 2007, Simpson appeared before
the Nelson Circuit Court to enter his guilty plea. During the Boykin plea
colloquy,$ Simpson informed the court that he had taken nitroglycerin tablets
that day because he was suffering from angina. However, Simpson assured the
court that he had taken the medication on previous occasions, that he had
taken it only as prescribed, and that his ability to think or act knowingly had
not been affected as a result of having taken the medication . Simpson then
entered his plea and sentencing was set for May 3, 2007 . Prior to sentencing,
Simpson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Following a hearing, the
court denied Simpson's motion and sentenced him to a total of twenty (20)
years in prison .
Appealing to this Court as a matter of right,9 Simpson argues the court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
because : (1) he lacked the capacity to voluntarily enter a plea due to his angina
s See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) .
Kentucky Constitution ยง110(2)(b) .
4
and the effects of the nitroglycerin; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Simpson raises the following issues for our consideration :
First, Simpson contends his plea could not have been knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made because at the time he entered his plea he
was experiencing chest pain as a result of angina, and also because he was
suffering from the effects of medication he had taken prior to entering his plea.
Simpson contends that while he was in this state, his attorney pressured him
into entering a guilty plea. Second, Simpson argues his plea was invalid
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel . And finally, Simpson
argues for the first time in his Reply Brief to this Court that if we find his plea
was made voluntarily, we must then conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his plea. In support of this
argument, Simpson purposes that this Court should adopt the American Bar
Association (ABA) standard for granting the withdrawal of a voluntary plea.
Each argument will be addressed in turn.
1. The trial court did not err in rejecting Simpson's claim that his
guilty plea was involuntary because of his angina and the
medication he had taken.
In support of his argument that his waiver of rights and subsequent
guilty plea are not binding absent proof that this decision was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, Simpson cites to the case of Bronk v.
Commonwealth, 58 S .W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001) . In making this determination,
Simpson also argues the Court must look beyond his responses to the plea
colloquy and consider the totality of the circumstances . See Kotas v.
5
Commonwealth , 565 S .W .2d 445, 447 (Ky . 1978) . Going beyond the colloquy,
Simpson argues he was experiencing chest pain as a result of his angina, and
that he had taken nitroglycerin tablets to alleviate the pain. Simpson claims
that he cannot fully recall the afternoon of March 2, 2007, and that his
attorney had to physically hold him up during the proceeding . Simpson also
states that he was taken to the hospital by ambulance immediately after
leaving the courtroom that day .
Further, Simpson argues one of the tests for determining the validity of a
plea is that it be a "voluntary or intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant." See Sparks v. Commonwealth , 721
S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986) . In this case, Simpson claims he was unclear
as to the extent of negotiations with the Commonwealth . Thus, under the
totality of the circumstances, Simpson argues his plea was not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered and, therefore, the trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his plea. See Rodriguez v. Commonwealth , 87
S.W .3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002) (If, after an evidentiary hearing the court determines
defendant's plea was not voluntary, the defendant has an absolute right to
withdraw it.) .
Simpson's arguments fail to address findings of fact made by the trial
court following the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Those
findings are based on the evidence presented by both Simpson and his
attorney, as well as a captain employed at the Nelson County Jail and the
medical records custodian for the jail. The court also relied on the video record
of Simpson's Boykin colloquy.
In rejecting Simpson's claim that he was disoriented throughout the plea
colloquy, the court noted that its own visual observation of Simpson during the
plea did not reveal any disorientation . The court also noted the video record of
the colloquy showed that Simpson accurately provided his personal
background, i.e ., date of birth, social security number, and education.
Further, the record demonstrated that during the proceeding Simpson
volunteered additional information, such as the fact that he had received
professional counseling after the death of a fellow soldier in Panama in 1989 .
Likewise, the court rejected Simpson's claim that he repeatedly asked to
go to trial, and that his attorney coerced him into entering a guilty plea.
Accepting the testimony of Simpson's attorney, the court found Simpson had
not repeatedly asked to go to trial. Further, the court accepted counsel's
testimony that Simpson had specifically requested to enter an Alford plea. In
addition to counsel's testimony, the video record showed that Simpson was
specifically asked by the court if he wished to go to trial or if he wished to waive
his rights and enter a guilty plea. The court noted that Simpson's answers
indicated his wish to enter an Alford plea.
Regarding Simpson's claim that his attorney had to physically hold him
up during the proceeding, the court found that the video record of the colloquy
refuted such a claim . The video record demonstrated that from 2 :05 p .m. until
2 :21 p .m., Simpson stood at the podium alone. From 2 :21 p.m. to 2 :23 p .m.,
the videotape shows Simpson's attorney standing by him with his arm behind
Simpson's back in a gesture appearing to provide moral support, not
assistance in standing. Based on the video record, the court found Simpson's
claim to be an exaggeration.
While acknowledging Simpson was taken to the hospital immediately
following his plea, the court found no credible evidence to suggest the plea was
not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. From the evidence
presented, the court found Simpson was returned to the jail at 4 :01 p.m . on
the same day. In releasing Simpson from the hospital, the court noted that no
additional medication had been prescribed . Further, the court noted that the
jail records reflected Simpson had been taken to the hospital on previous
occasions for symptoms of angina, and in each instance he was released after
very short periods of time and returned to the jail with no additional
medication having been prescribed . As to the effects of the nitroglycerin, the
court relied on Simpson's own assurances during the colloquy that he had
taken the medication only as prescribed, and that the medication had not
affected his judgment. Thus, the court concluded Simpson had failed to
introduce any medical evidence demonstrating that his medical condition on
the day of the colloquy had affected the voluntariness of his plea.
While Simpson argues evidence exists to support his contentions, he has
failed to demonstrate that no substantial evidence exists to support the court's
findings. Further, Simpson has failed to designate for the record the final
sentencing hearing which occurred on July 19, 2007 . Where the record is
silent, we must assume the evidence supports the trial court's findings. See
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985) .
As for resolving conflicts in evidence, the trial court is in the best position
to determine credibility and weight. See Bronk, 58 S .W.3d at 487 . Further,
the trial court is in the best position to judge any reluctance,
misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence of the defendant to enter
a guilty plea. Id . Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot find an
abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that Simpson failed to
demonstrate that his plea was involuntary because of his angina or the
nitroglycerin he took on the day he entered his plea. Nor can we find the court
abused its discretion by rejecting Simpson's claim that his attorney coerced
him into accepting the plea offer.
2 . The trial court did not err in rejecting Simpson's claim that his
Alford plea was involuntary because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
"As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be
reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court's judgment, because there is
usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can be properly
considered." Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 962 S .W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998) .
"This is not to say, however, that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
precluded from review on direct appeal, provided there is a trial record, or an
evidentiary hearing is held on motion for a new trial, and the trial court rules
on the issue." Id . at 872-73 (citations omitted) . Such is the case here .
Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), sets out a two part test
for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . This Court adopted
the two prong test in Gall v. Commonwealth , 702 S .W .2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1985) .
Under the test, as applied to guilty pleas, the claimant must show :
9
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance ; and (2)
that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the
plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial .
Bronk, 58 S.W .3d at 486-87, citm Sparks, 721 S .W.2d at 727-28; Centers v.
Commonwealth , 799 S .W .2d 51, 55 (Ky.App. 1990) . "Evaluating the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual inquiry
which requires consideration of `the accused's demeanor, background and
experience, and whether the record reveals that the plea was voluntarily
made ."' Id . at 487, citing Centers , 799 S .W.2d at 54 . The burden on the
claimant is heavy and includes overcoming "the presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the acceptable range of reasonable and effective assistance
of counsel[.]" Humphrey, 962 S .W.2d at 873 .
Simpson offers several assertions in support of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel . First, Simpson argues his attorney failed to make an
independent investigation of the facts. Instead, Simpson contends his attorney
relied solely on the summary provided by police . Second, Simpson claims his
attorney failed to fully inform him of the charges, the underlying facts, and the
defenses available to him. Finally, Simpson contends his attorney failed to
fully inform him of the consequences of the proposed plea. Given these
circumstances, Simpson claims his attorney was ineffective and, further, but
for that performance he would not have entered the plea .
In denying Simpson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court
rejected Simpson's contention that his counsel was ineffective . Specifically, the
10
court found Simpson's attorney had negotiated on Simpson's behalf. On the
first indictment, counsel obtained an offer of 20 years in lieu of a penalty range
of 20 - 50 years to life in prison . This included the amendment of the first
count from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, and the agreement that the
Commonwealth would recommend that all other penalties run concurrently .
Further, counsel obtained the recommendation that the penalty imposed under
the second indictment would run concurrently with the total sentence imposed
under the first indictment. Finally, counsel obtained the agreement that no
further charges would be brought based on the videotapes found in Simpson's
home.
While the court acknowledged Simpson's attorney had not viewed the
videotapes, it noted the attorney's testimony that Simpson did not dispute or
react negatively to the Commonwealth's claim that the videotapes were
incriminating. Although not noted by the trial court, the record also indicates
that Simpson confirmed in his statement to police that he had made the
videotapes at the request of the juveniles, and that they contained images of
juveniles exposing their breasts and genitalia and performing sexual acts .
Under these circumstances, Simpson has failed to demonstrate how the failure
of counsel to view the videotapes prejudiced his case. Nor has he pointed to
any information he provided to his attorney, separate from the videotapes,
which should have been pursued . See Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U .S . 52, 59 (1985) .
Likewise, we find no merit in Simpson's claim that he was prejudiced by
his attorney's failure to inform him of possible defenses. While Simpson relies
on this claim, he has made no showing that any possible defenses would have
11
been available to him. Without a showing of defenses that were available, the
facts supporting them, and the likelihood of their success, we find Simpson has
failed to demonstrate either prong of the Strickland inquiry . Cf. Hill, 474 U .S .
at 59 ("resolution of the `prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial") .
Finally, we note, as did the trial court, that Simpson declared in open
court that his attorney had informed him of the charges, the facts, and possible
defenses . Such declarations "carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge
v . Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) . Further, the record contains AOC Form 491,
signed by Simpson, indicating he had been "fully informed about [his] case[,]"
and that he had discussed "the charges and any possible defenses to them"
with his attorney. Finally, the court noted that in addition to the testimony of
Simpson's attorney that he had informed Simpson of the consequences of an
Alford plea, the colloquy demonstrates that the court also informed Simpson of
such consequences . Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion by finding Simpson failed to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, and that he was not fully informed of the consequences
of entering his guilty plea.
3. Simpson has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the
court's decision denying his request to withdraw a voluntary guilty
plea.
Simpson's final argument, raised in his Reply Brief to this Court, is that
the court abused its discretion by failing to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea, even if it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Simpson
supports this contention by noting that the motion was made before final
12
sentencing, was based on fair and just reasons, and would not have
substantially prejudiced the Commonwealth . Finally, Simpson proposes that
this Court should adopt ABA Standard 14-2 .1 concerning the withdrawal of
guilty pleas .
In considering this argument, we must reject Simpson's claim that his
motion is based on fair and just reasons. According to Simpson, those reasons
were : (1) involuntariness due to his medical condition and the effects of the
medication; (2) coercion by counsel to accept the offer in light of his medical
condition; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel . As we have rejected each of
these contentions, we are left with what Simpson describes as "a sudden
change of heart."
Of course, a "change of heart" has never, in and of itself, been sufficient
grounds for setting aside a guilty plea. While it is clear that Simpson had a
change of heart, we find he has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in denying his motion to withdraw a voluntary plea.
Simpson's reliance on the ABA standard is misplaced as that is not the law in
this Commonwealth. Rather, in Kentucky, the applicable criminal rule states
in part that "[alt any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of
guilty . . . to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." See Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8 .10 . This Court has held that the decision
to allow a voluntary plea to be withdrawn lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court. See Rodriguez, 87 S.W .3d at 10 . See also Elkins v.
Commonwealth, 154 S .W.3d 298, 300 (Ky.App. 2004) . Further, "[a] trial court
abuses its discretion when it renders a decision which is arbitrary,
13
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles ." Elkins , 154 S.W .3d
at 300, citing Goodyear Tire 8, Rubber Co . v. Thom
^pson , 11 S.W .3d 575, 581
(Ky. 2000) . As Simpson has failed to show that the trial court's actions were
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles, we cannot
find an abuse of discretion.
In conclusion, Simpson has failed to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting his claim that his medical condition, the medication he
took for it, or the actions of his attorney support his argument that his Alford
plea was involuntary. Nor has Simpson demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel . For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that
Simpson's plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Finally,
Simpson has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to withdraw his voluntary guilty plea. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Nelson Circuit Court is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
James K. Falk
6008 Brownsboro Park Blvd .
Suite H
Louisville, KY 40207
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Chesnut Maxson
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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