WILLIAM R. BURDINE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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APPELLANT
WILLIAM R. BURDINE
V.
ON APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00141
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A circuit court jury found William Burdine guilty of one count of firstdegree sexual abuse, one count of first-degree sodomy, and one count of firstdegree rape and recommended a total sentence of forty-five years'
imprisonment . The trial court sentenced Burdine in accordance with the jury's
recommendation, after which Burdine filed this ~appeal as a matter of right. I
Burdine's appeal raises four issues, all related to the trial of his case.
Burdine argues that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the introduction of
what he characterizes as evidence of prior bad acts, (2) refusing to grant a
continuance after he allegedly suffered a sudden and unexplained loss of
Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
consciousness during trial, (3) permitting allegedly improper bolstering of L.J .'s
testimony, and (4) refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree sexual abuse.
Because we find no reversible error on any of these issues, we affirm.
I . FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
L.J., the victim, stated that she stopped at a roadside rest area in Whitley
County, Kentucky, where she fell asleep . She was awakened by a tapping on
her car window and a man exclaiming that something was leaking from her
car . When L.J . emerged from her car, the man grabbed her breast and asked
her if she wanted to make a quick fifty dollars. When L.J. declined, the man
forced her back into her car and told her he would slit her throat if she
screamed . The man entered the car with L.J. and ordered her to remove her
pants and underwear. When L.J. resisted, the man again threatened to slit her
throat if she did not cooperate. The man then began to touch L.J .'s vaginal
area with his fingers . He then drove L.J.'s car to a different location in the rest
area, parked it behind a truck, repeated his threat to cut L .J.'s throat if she did
not cooperate, and then revealed his penis and attempted to put his mouth
near L.J.'s vagina. When L.J. resisted, the man forced L.J . to perform fellatio
upon him, after which he removed L.J .'s shirt and bra. The man then mounted
L.J ., pinning her down, bit her neck, and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, the man rummaged through L.J.'s purse until he found some
lotion . He squirted lotion onto his penis, and forced L.J . to masturbate him
until he ejaculated onto her hands . The man then found a bottle of hair
conditioner in L.J.'s purse and forced her to insert the bottle into her vagina.
The man also found a disposable camera in L.J.'s purse and took photos of her
in the nude. The man also discovered L.J .'s address from her driver's license
and told her that he knew where she lived, which would enable him to find her
to kill her if she told anyone what he had done. The man then asked L.J . if he
could keep her underwear, and did so, even though L.J. refused to give her
consent. The man then took a cigarette from a pack lying in the car and
departed. According to L .J ., this ordeal lasted about an hour.
After the man left, L.J . drove herself to a gas station at the next exit
where police were called. She was taken to a hospital where physical
examination revealed bite marks on her neck and a labial abrasion . The exam
also revealed semen on L .J.'s hand and a foreign fiber on her clothing. When
investigators examined L.J.'s car, they collected a hair and fingerprints from a
cigarette pack. Testing of the hair conditioner bottle revealed the presence of
vaginal fluid .
Investigators created a composite sketch of the assailant based upon
L.J .'s description . When that sketch was disseminated throughout the state,
the authorities in Campbell County, Kentucky, notified the investigators that
they were holding an inmate who matched the assailant's description . That
inmate was Burdine, who had been arrested in an unrelated traffic accident.
L.J . identified Burdine as her rapist from a photographic lineup .
Burdine's version of events in Whitley County was different . Although
Burdine initially claimed not to have been in Whitley County at the time of
L.J .'s rape, he later changed his story when he testified at trial to relate that he
had been with L.J . in Whitley County on the day in question. Burdine claimed
that he met L.J. at a gas station, and they struck up a conversation . Burdine
claimed that L.J. accepted his invitation to accompany him to a nearby adult
book store, but that that store was closed.
Afterwards, Burdine claimed that he and L.J. smoked marijuana together
and that to impress L. J., he had fabricated a story about being a bank robber.
Burdine claims that he masturbated in L.J.'s car and that L.J. cleaned up his
semen with an unknown object. Burdine claimed that he and L.J. made plans
to meet the following weekend but that when further conversation with L.J .
revealed that her boyfriend was African-American, Burdine was so upset that
he called L.J. a racially inflammatory name, left her abruptly, and headed for
the Cincinnati area. When he later heard news reports of a rape at the rest
area in Whitley County, he regretted the harsh words he had spoken to L.J., so
he went to call her to apologize . Unfortunately, Burdine had been drinking and
smoking marijuana. En route, he ran a red light and crashed his vehicle,
injuring six others . This led to his arrest .
A search of Burdine's car produced a disposable camera, dark blue
running shorts, and a bag containing a pair of women's underpants. For the
encounter with L.J ., the Whitley County Grand Jury indicted Burdine charging
one count of first-degree sexual abuse, one count of first-degree sodomy, one
count of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment,
and one count of third-degree terroristic threatening. After several
continuances, a jury trial on these charges commenced .
At trial, L.J . identified Burdine as the man who raped her. The
Commonwealth introduced evidence that Burdine's fingerprints matched those
on the cigarette pack in L.J .'s car. And the DNA analysis of the semen found
on L.J .'s hands contained a mixture of L.J.'s and Burdine's DNA to a certainty
of one in one thousand . Also, a hair found in L.J .'s car was found to be
consistent with Burdine's mitochondrial DNA to a probability greater than
99 .9%. The disposable camera and the women's underpants found in
Burdine's car were not L.J.'s . But those items were, nevertheless, introduced
into evidence. Also, the dark blue running shorts found in Burdine's car were
introduced into evidence; and they were found to match the fiber collected from
L.J.'s clothing after the rape.
The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the
unlawful imprisonment and terroristic threatening charges. At the close of the
evidence, the jury found Burdine guilty of the sexual abuse, rape, and sodomy
charges. The jury recommended maximum sentences of five years'
imprisonment on the sexual abuse charge and twenty years' imprisonment
each on the rape and sodomy charges, all of which the jury recommended be
served consecutively. The trial court entered a judgment sentencing Burdine to
forty-five years' imprisonment in accordance with the jury's verdict, after which
Burdine filed this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting, the Underpants
and the Camera,_ But Those Errors Were Harmless .
Burdine's first argument is that the trial court committed two evidentiary
errors. First, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence
the underpants found in his car because those underpants were not L.J.'s.
Second, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting the disposable
camera found in his car because that camera was not L.J .'s . Burdine admits
that the issue regarding the admissibility of the camera is not properly
preserved for our review .2 We agree with Burdine that the trial court erred by
allowing these items to be introduced into evidence, but we conclude that those
errors were harmless .
Burdine contends that the admission of the underpants and camera
violate the prohibition in KRE 404(b) of the admission of evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts. . . . " But we do not agree that evidence of Burdine's
possession of women's underpants and an ordinary disposable camera
constitutes evidence of a crime, wrong, or bad act because there is nothing
inherently criminal about those items. And since the underpants and camera
were never linked through evidence at trial to L.J ., Burdine's possession of
2
The Commonwealth also contends that the issue regarding the underwear is not
fully preserved because Burdine only objected in the trial court on relevancy
grounds, whereas he now complains that on Kentucky Rule of Evidence
(KRE) 404(b) grounds. Although the Commonwealth's argument appears to be
correct, Robey v. Commonwealth , 943 S .W .2d 616, 618 (Ky. 1997), we need not
definitively determine whether the issue is properly preserved because, even giving
Burdine the benefit of the doubt regarding preservation, admitting the underwear
into evidence was a harmless error .
those items was not inherently criminal . So we cannot agree with Burdine's
assumption that those items should be analyzed as prior-bad-acts evidence
under the rubric of KRE 404(b), especially since Burdine was able to establish
through cross-examination at trial that neither the underpants nor the camera
could be linked to L .J. Rather, we believe that admissibility of those items
must be analyzed under KRE 401 for their relevance and under the familiar
weighing of their probative value against their prejudicial effect under
KRE 403.
KRE 401 says that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ."
And KRE 403 says that relevant evidence may be excluded if, among other
things, "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice . . . ." We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under the
abuse of discretion standard .3 Since Burdine admits that the issue involving
the camera is unpreserved, our review of that item is predicated upon the
palpable error provision of Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10 .26,
under which we must "plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine
3
See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth , 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) ("Since the trial
court's unique role as a gatekeeper of evidence requires on-the-spot rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, we may reverse a trial court's decision to admit evidence
only if that decision represents an abuse of discretion .") .
whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially
intolerable ."4
Possessing women's underpants and a disposable camera was not an
element of any of the crimes charged against Burdine . And although evidence
of Burdine's possession of those items may well have been admissible if they
had been linked in some way to L.J., the Commonwealth failed to make that
evidentiary link. We also reject the Commonwealth's argument that the
evidence in question falls under the modus operandi exception to KRE 404(b) .
First, we have already explained that we do not believe that KRE 404(b) is
implicated by this evidence . Second, even if it were linked, there was
insufficient evidence to show that the crimes against L.J . were signature
crimes. In other words, the evidence here fell short of distinctive evidence
necessary to be modus operandi evidence as we have set forth in cases such as
Clark. 5 We are left, then, with determining whether the evidence of the
underpants and camera had any probative value and, if so, whether that
probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
4
5
Martin v. Commonwealth , 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006) .
223 S .W.3d at 97 ("We have attempted to clarify and refine our analysis of the
modus operandi exception in recent reported decisions of this Court. Toward that
end, we held that it is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of
the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates a modus operandi. So, as a
prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, we now require the
proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that there is a factual commonality
between the prior bad act and the charged conduct that is simultaneously similar
and so peculiar or distinct that there is a reasonable probability that the two
crimes were committed by the same individual. Thus, [altthough it is not required
that the facts be identical in all respects, evidence of other acts of sexual
deviance . . . must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called
signature crime .") (footnotes and quotation marks omitted) .
We question whether this evidence had any probative value because
neither the camera nor the underpants bore any direct connection to L.J. At
most, the evidence had very slight probative value as a weak bolstering of L.J .'s
contention that her assailant kept her underpants and her disposable camera.
But even if we accept Burdine's argument that the underpants and camera
should not have been admitted for lack of any probative value, we must
conclude that their admission was, at most, a harmless error.
The evidence against Burdine was strong . The Commonwealth presented
not only L.J .'s damning eyewitness testimony, but also presented scientific
evidence that buttressed L.J .'s version of the events .6 Also, Burdine admitted
to having attempted to view pornography, having smoked marijuana, having
been intoxicated while driving, and having directed a racially oriented remark
at L.J . So, faced with this list of uncharged bad acts to which Burdine himself
admitted, L.J .'s strong eyewitness testimony, and the scientific evidence
supporting L.J .'s version of events, we are convinced that there is not a
reasonable possibility that the strange and erroneous admission into evidence
of unidentified women's underpants and a disposable camera did not
Although some of that scientific evidence could also support Burdine's version of
events, Burdine's story would not appear to explain things such as why L.J. had a
labial abrasion or why there was vaginal fluid on the hair conditioner bottle .
reasonably contribute to the jury's verdict.? The errors in admitting the
underpants and camera into evidence were each harmless .$
B . The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
by Refusing to Grant a Continuance.
During the second day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that
Burdine had begun to tremble and had turned pale . Shortly after that,
Burdine slumped over, and his head struck a chair. This event apparently
occurred outside the jury's presence. Two nurses, who were on the premises
as witnesses to be called at trial on behalf of the Commonwealth, and an EMT
examined Burdine. Each reported that, essentially, Burdine's condition was
not life threatening. One of the nurses told the trial court that she had
performed a couple of basic tests on Burdine and that those tests indicated
that he was having a "pseudo-seizure," not a real seizure. The other nurse said
that Burdine's pulse was normal. The EMT stated that Burdine's vital signs,
such as blood pressure and pulse rate, were fine . The EMT stated that he
roused Burdine with ammonia inhalers and that Burdine was able to speak
and was responsive to commands . The EMT stated that he found no evidence
that Burdine's condition was life threatening . The Commonwealth then told
the court that Burdine had a history of "pseudo-seizures." The jury was not
s
RCr 9 .24 ; Anderson v . Commonwealth , 231 S .W .3d 117, 122 (Ky . 2007) ("An error
is reversible if the erroneously admitted evidence has a reasonable possibility of
contributing to the conviction; it is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility
that it contributed to the conviction .") .
And the erroneous admission into evidence of the camera certainly was not so
shocking and intolerable as to rise to the level of a palpable error. Martin,
207 S .W .3d at 4.
10
present while the trial court and counsel questioned the medical personnel, but
the video record reflects that Burdine was slumped over in his chair at counsel
table next to his counsel.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial or a continuance so that Burdine
could see a doctor, but the trial court denied that request. The trial court
stated that it was unable to do anything about Burdine's apparent torpor and
that it did not know if Burdine was faking, but that he "might as wells [sic] to
shape up because we are going to finish this [the trial] . That's all I know to
do ." The jury was then allowed to return to the courtroom, and the trial
resumed.
The Commonwealth called several witnesses over the course of the next
hour or so. These witnesses included some state troopers and the artist who
drew the composite sketch of the suspect. Throughout this span of trial time,
Burdine remained slumped over in the chair at counsel table next to his
lawyer . The jury was told nothing about Burdine's condition. At one point
during the testimony of a witness who was testifying about a thread found on
L.J .'s clothing that matched the dark blue running shorts found in Burdine's
car, defense counsel interrupted the Commonwealth's direct examination to
inform the trial court that he could not take notes while holding Burdine to
prevent him from falling out of his chair. Again, the trial court responded,
"What do you want me to do?" Burdine's attorney again asked for a
continuance, which the trial court denied by saying that it was going to finish
the trial and had done everything it knew to do. At one point near the end of
the Commonwealth's case, the video record shows Burdine slumped so far
forward in his chair that his head is resting on the table .
After the Commonwealth's last witness, defense counsel renewed his
motion for a mistrial. Counsel again informed the trial court that Burdine was
non-responsive and unable to assist in his defense . The Commonwealth
repeated its assertion that Burdine was feigning illness. A discussion between
defense counsel and the trial court ensued, during which the trial court stated
that Burdine had a history of faking seizures. When defense counsel expressed
concern about Burdine being able to testify, the trial court directed counsel to
ask Burdine if he could testify. Counsel attempted to do so; but Burdine,
whose head was resting on counsel table, did not respond. Defense counsel
again requested a continuance, stating that the court could hold Burdine in
contempt if it believed Burdine were faking. The trial court again denied the
request for a continuance, stating that it resented defense counsel calling the
The trial court also stated that Burdine had been
trial court "mean ."9
examined by three "medical people" who agreed that Burdine was not having a
seizure. By the time trial resumed, approximately thirty-five minutes later,
Burdine had regained consciousness but stated in an avowal that he was dizzy
and that he could not think. After Burdine's brother testified for slightly less
than two minutes, Burdine then testified in his own behalf, although he told
the jury that he felt woozy.
As defense counsel noted, the record does not support the trial court's assertion
that defense counsel had called the trial court "mean" or any similar pejorative
term.
12
On appeal, Burdine claims that the trial court erred by not at least
granting a continuance because his condition caused him to be slumped in his
chair with his shirt soaked in perspiration during about an hour of the trial.
This episode caused him to be unable to assist his attorney while the
Commonwealth called four witnesses . Obviously, we believe that the judges
across the Commonwealth have an obligation to ensure that critical stages of
the criminal process, including trial, do not proceed in medical emergencies
that render a defendant so incapacitated as to be unable to participate
meaningfully in the defense of the case. And it may be safer practice to err on
the side of caution when facing these types of situations. But under the
particular facts of this case, we do not believe the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to grant a continuance .
As we have stated many times, a trial court has broad discretion in
determining whether to grant a continuance; and we may reverse a trial court's
decision to deny a continuance only if that decision represents an abuse of
discretion. 10 Although the decision regarding whether to grant a continuance
obviously depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, in
making the determination as to whether to grant a continuance, courts should
focus on factors such as "the length of the delay, previous continuances,
inconvenience to the parties and the court, purpose of the delay, availability of
to See, e.g., Woodall v . Commonwealth , 63 S.W.3d 104, 128 (Ky. 2001) .
13
other competent counsel, complexity of the case, and whether undue prejudice
will result if the continuance is not granted .""
In the case at hand, the length of the delay is uncertain; but it is
reasonable to assume that the delay would have been of relatively short
duration because Burdine seems to contend that he only wanted to delay the
proceedings long enough to see a doctor . Next, the record reflects that there
had been several postponements of the trial in the case . More specifically,
Burdine was granted the following continuances: a continuance in January
2005 because Burdine's attorney had not had sufficient time to prepare for
trial; another continuance in July 2005 because the results of Burdine's
mental competency evaluation had not been completed; another continuance in
May 2006 because a report had not been issued regarding Burdine's
competency; and a fourth continuance in November 2006 because Burdine had
been hospitalized . So it appears as if the trial court had already granted
numerous continuances to Burdine, although most of the continuances seem
to revolve around Burdine's mental or physical health, so that the charges
against Burdine had been pending for nearly three years by the time the trial
actually commenced .
As to prejudice, it is inarguable that any continuance will necessarily
cause the court, counsel, and the opposing party some degree of prejudice . 12
That inconvenience is heightened when the trial has already begun and the
11
12
Fredline v. Commonwealth , 241 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Ky. 2007) .
Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S .W.2d 694, 700 (Ky. 1994), overruled on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 563-64 (Ky. 2003) .
14
jury has been impaneled and witnesses brought to court. Because the
continuance sought in this case would, according to Burdine, have been
relatively brief, we cannot say that the continuance would have caused severe
or undue prejudice to the Commonwealth or the court. 13
The purported purpose of the delay was to enable Burdine to seek
medical attention from a physician. Although we recognize the
Commonwealth's assertion that Burdine was feigning illness, the record before
us is insufficient for us to conclude that Burdine was seeking a delay for an
improper purpose.
Since the. availability of other counsel is not a factor in this case, we next
turn our attention to the complexity of the case. Although Burdine contends
that the case was complex, we disagree . There was some scientific evidence
and the charges were serious, but the gist of the whole trial was a credibility
Since this case did not involve a host of
contest between Burdine and L.J . 14
witnesses or complex legal and factual concepts, we decline to find that its
complexity required a continuance .
We now turn to the heart of the continuance issue : whether Burdine
suffered any undue prejudice from the trial court's denial of his request for a
continuance. Burdine claims that he did suffer undue prejudice by virtue of
13
14
Eldred, 906 S .W.2d at 700 ("Of course, any change in trial date is going to cause
some inconvenience . Thus, in order to become a factor for consideration there
must be some significant or substantial inconvenience, which should be
demonstrated on the record.").
Burdine's own brief asserts that "[t]his case was essentially a swearing contest[L.J.] maintained she was raped and sodomized while Mr . Burdine maintained that
any sexual contact between them was consensual."
15
his having essentially missed the testimony of four witnesses for the
Commonwealth . Burdine also states that he was "forced to testify in his own
defense after possibly just having a seizure" and that he "felt dizzy and his
mind was not clear." Burdine also questions whether the two nurses who
examined him were truly free from bias because each had been called as
witnesses for the Commonwealth in his case.
The Commonwealth disputes Burdine's allegations of undue prejudice .
The Commonwealth points out that the witnesses whose testimony Burdine
allegedly missed testified very briefly and that their testimony concerned things
that had already been discussed in the trial, with the exception of a forensic
analyst who testified that a fiber collected from L.J .'s clothing matched the
dark blue running shorts found in Burdine's car. The Commonwealth
contends that Burdine's counsel was able to cross-examine the forensic
analyst. Furthermore, the Commonwealth asserts that Burdine offers sheer
speculation to insinuate that the nurses who examined him would have
abandoned their medical ethics simply because they had been called as
witnesses by the Commonwealth . And, finally, the Commonwealth points out
that the testimony of the EMT who examined Burdine, and who bore no other
relationship to the case, was consistent with that of the nurses .
A defendant has a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses called by the prosecution. 15 Regrettably, the Commonwealth does
is
See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S . 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d
297 (1973) ("The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call
witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due
16
not address Burdine's due process argument. But, our thorough review of this
record has brought us to the conclusion that Burdine did not suffer such
undue prejudice as to lead to a decision that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Burdine's request for a continuance.
Although a defendant's right to be present during the critical stages of
the proceedings against him is highly important, that right is not absolute . For
example, an unruly defendant may properly be removed from the courtroom
during a trial . 16 And recognizing that each case is factually distinguishable,
the general rule appears to be that "courts have been reluctant to grant a
continuance based on claimed ill-health or .disability where it appeared that
[the] accused was malingering or that the condition complained of had been
voluntarily incurred ."17 Although he did not make a precise finding that
Burdine was faking, a review of the record leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the trial court believed Burdine was at least feigning illness or greatly
exaggerating the severity of his condition. We cannot know for certain what, if
any, physical ailment Burdine suffered on the second day of trial; but we do
know that the trial court's implicit conclusion of malingering was supported by
16
17
process .") . See also RCr 8 .28 (concerning defendant's right to be present during
critical stages of trial) .
See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S .Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)
("we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if,
after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom.").
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Continuance of Criminal Case Because ofIllness of
Accused, 66 A .L.R.2d 232 § 10 (1959) .
17
the findings of the two nurses and the EMT. And the trial court saw the entire
situation first-hand . We must agree with the Commonwealth that we find it
uncanny that Burdine was able to regain control of himself to testify coherently
as he did just minutes after the alleged seizure .
Obviously, serious medical issues in the courtroom must be dealt with
humanely and fairly . The trial court here did not remain idle-Burdine was
examined by three different medical personnel who then reported to the court
and responded to counsel. That the two examining nurses had been witnesses
for the Commonwealth does not mean that they were unreliable to examine
and, if necessary, to recommend the need for immediate medical attention for
Burdine . Burdine would have us hold that medical personnel called as
witnesses by the Commonwealth would disregard medical ethics when called
upon to examine a criminal defendant. We refuse to engage in such
speculation.
We also refuse to declare that a trial court abused its discretion by failing
to have an apparently ill criminal defendant examined by a physician. We
refuse to find that the trial court abused its discretion in this case by utilizing
and relying upon the services and statements of three medical personnel.
Furthermore, Burdine has not shown any specific prejudice he suffered from
the lack of a continuance (i.e., he has not shown anything specific his counsel
was unable to ask of any witness presented by the Commonwealth during the
period Burdine claims he was allegedly incoherent) . So we find that Burdine
did not suffer undue prejudice stemming from the lack of a continuance .
18
Having examined all of the appropriate factors, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Burdine's request for a
continuance. 18
C . Burdine Has Not Properly Preserved the Issue
of Improper Bolstering of L.J .'s Credibili and,
Regardless, Any Improper Bolstering was, at Most,
a Harmless Error.
Burdine contends that Dr. Roberts, who examined L.J . in the emergency
room, was impermissibly permitted to bolster L.J .'s credibility. When the
Commonwealth asked Dr. Roberts if he observed anything about L.J. that
would suggest that she was not being truthful, Burdine's counsel objected
based upon speculation. When the trial court overruled that objection,
Dr. Roberts stated that there was nothing about L.J. that caused him to believe
she was lying and that L.J. "appeared to be one of the true innocent victims
that I rarely get to see ."
Burdine contends that Dr. Roberts bolstered L.J .'s credibility before it
was impeached. Of course, Burdine is correct that the character of a witness
should not be bolstered before it is impeached. 19 But the Commonwealth is
also correct that this issue likely is not properly preserved because Burdine
raised a different ground for objection in the trial court than he does on
is Likewise, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to declare a mistrial . See, e.g., Bray v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky.
2005) (holding that decision of whether to grant mistrial rests within discretion of
trial court and that appellate review of that decision is based upon abuse of
discretion standard) .
19 Fairrow v. Commonwealth, 175 S .W.3d 601, 606 (Ky. 2005) ("KRE 608(a)(2)
requires credibility to be attacked before it is supported.") .
19
appeal.20 Nevertheless, even if we assumed for argument's purposes that the
issue was preserved, Burdine's argument would fail.
When Burdine testified in his own behalf later in the trial, he directly
attacked L.J .'s credibility and truthfulness. We have previously held in these
types of situations that any error in permitting a premature bolstering of a
witnesses' credibility before it had been attacked was harmless if the witnesses'
credibility was later impeached.21 Thus, any error in Dr . Roberts's testimony in
this regard was, at most, harmless .
D . The Trial Court Did Not Err By
Refusing to Instruct the Jury on
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree .
Burdine contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the
jury on third-degree sexual abuse as a lesser-included offense of first-degree
sexual abuse . We disagree .
As it pertains to this case, KRS 510 .110(1) (a) provides that a person is
guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree if "[h]e or she subjects another person
to sexual contact by forcible compulsion . . . ."22 KRS 510.130(1)(a), by
contrast, provides that a person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree if
"[h]e subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent."
20
21
22
Robey, 943 S.W .2d at 618 ("The objection raised at trial was that the friend's
testimony would bolster the testimony of the other witnesses. However, this issue
was not preserved. Robey did not argue that the evidence was inadmissible on the
grounds that the friend calmed her down before speaking with her. This court will
not review an alleged error where the ground raised in the trial court differs from
the issue raised on appeal.") .
Fairrow, 175 S.W.3d at 606 .
The 2008 amendments to KRS 510 .110 and KRS 510.130 are not germane to this
case .
20
Burdine contends that the jury could have believed his version of the events
but somehow could have simultaneously believed that the sexual contact
occurred without L.J.'s consent.
According to Burdine's testimony, the only sexually-oriented contact he
had with L.J. was L.J . wiping up his semen after he masturbated in her car.
Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that L.J .'s wiping up Burdine's
semen constitutes sexual contact as that term is defined in KRS 510.010(7), 23
Burdine points to no specific testimony showing that L.J . did not consent to
that sexual contact. In fact, Burdine's own brief states that "Mr. Burdine
maintained that any sexual contact between them [he and L.J .] was
consensual ."
A trial court has a duty to instruct on the whole law of the case,24 but a
trial court need not instruct on a theory lacking an evidentiary foundation .25
Or, in other words, conjecture and speculation do not entitle a defendant to a
lesser-included offense jury instruction. In this case, the trial court did not err
by failing to give an instruction on third-degree sexual abuse when the
evidence did not support such an instruction .
23
24
25
KRS 510 .010(7) defines sexual contact as "any touching of the sexual or other
intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of
either party . . . ." The Commonwealth correctly contends that Burdine does not
point to any specific testimony tending to show that wiping up Burdine's semen
after he ejaculated was done to gratify either his or L.J.'s sexual desire .
Taylor v. Commonwealth , 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1995) .
Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Ky. 2001) .
21
III . CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, William Burdine's convictions and sentence
are affirmed.
All sitting. Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, and Scott, JJ .,
concur.
Noble and Venters, JJ., concur in result only but would hold that the
women's underpants and the camera were properly admitted because they
were relevant and probative of a signature crime or modus operandi; thus, a
harmless error analysis was not necessary because there was no error.
Schroder, J., concurs in result only and would hold that Dr. Roberts'
testimony that he believed L.J . and that she "appeared to be one of the true
innocent victims" improperly vouched for L.J .'s credibility, Stringer v .
Commonwealth , 956 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Ky. 1997), and is not the character
evidence permitted by KRE 608(a) . However, he believes the error was
harmless .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Renee Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Chesnut Maxson
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
uyrrmr (~Vurf of ~Rrufurhv
2007-SC-000580-MR
WILLIAM R. BURDINE
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE
NO . 04-CR-00141
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND MODIFYING OPINION
Pursuant to CR 76.32(1)(c), this Court hereby orders that its
Opinion in Burdine v. Commonwealth , 2007-SC-000580-MR, rendered
October 23, 2008 be modified by substituting pages 1 and 23 as attached
hereto, in lieu of pages 1 and 23 of the opinion as originally rendered, so
as to reflect the correct spelling of the name of the Commonwealth's
attorney in this case, James Chesnut Maxson . Said modification does
not affect the holding of the case .
All sitting . All concur .
ENTERED : April 23, 2009 .
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